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Editor's Preface 
Southern politics in the twentieth century, as during the entire course 
of southern history, was both national and regional in its purposes 
and means. But so visible were its regional manifestations during the 
first half of the century, so thoroughly were they stamped upon its 
national political presence, that V.O. Key in 1949 would accuse the 
South of employing the Democratic party as an "instrument for the 
conduct of (its] 'foreign relations' with the rest of the nation." One 
might also have said that the South used the United States Congress, 
in large part, as an assembly for accomplishing its regional diplomatic 
goals. Southern politics operated to preserve traditional southern 
prejudices and interests; its fundamental party characteristics were 
Democratic solidarity and white exclusivity. 
During the past three decades, immense changes have occurred 
in southern party politics, including the disappearance of Democratic 
solidarity and white exclusivity. The excellent study offered here by 
Dewey W. Grantham, the preeminent historian of recent southern 
politics, tells why and how these changes came about. The book's 
title comprises its theme: the life and death of the Solid South. Yet 
the author concludes that many of the Solid South's essential elements 
and much of the political culture in which it flourished are still sig-
nificant determinants of southern politics; that, ironically, these very 
elements and this very culture played an important role in the death 
as well as the life of the Solid South. 
This book is indispensable for inclusion in "New Perspectives on 
the South," a series designed to give a fresh and comprehensive view 
of the region's history. Each volume is expected to be a discrete essay 
representing both a synthesis of the best scholarship on its subject 
and an interpretive analysis drawn from the author's own research 
and reflections. Eight volumes are now in print; an additional twelve 
or more are anticipated to complete the set. 
Charles P. Roland 
To: Charles F. Delzell 
J. Leiper Freeman 
V. Jacque Voegeli 
Preface 
Southern politics, like racial segregation and one-crop agriculture, was 
one of those peculiar institutions that differentiated the South from 
other American regions. This southern system-long referred to as 
the Solid South-embodied a distinctive regional culture and was 
perpetuated through an undemocratic distribution of power and a 
structure based on disfranchisement, malapportioned legislatures, 
and one-party politics. It was the mechanism that determined who 
would govern in the states and localities, and it was the means 
through which the South's politicians defended their region's special 
interests and political autonomy in national politics. This was the 
Democratic South. In its broad outlines, the history of this remarkable 
institution can be traced in the gradual rise, long persistence, and 
ultimate decline of Democratic dominance in the land below the Po-
tomac and the Ohio. 
Interpreters have sometimes exaggerated the monolithic character 
of southern politics and its divergence from political currents in other 
parts of the country. But the South's political sectionalism was ex-
ceptional. There is nothing else quite comparable in the nation's po-
litical history. The strength and durability of the Solid South resulted 
in good part from three circumstances: the South's poverty, its de-
pressed economy, and the influence of its plantation-oriented elites; 
the federal system and the changing shape of national politics; and 
the potency of the region's political culture. The one-party system 
had, in V.O. Key's words, "an odd dual personality." In state politics 
the Democratic party was no party at all but "a multiplicity of factions 
struggling for office." In national politics, on the other hand, the party 
was the Solid South, "the instrument for the conduct of the 'foreign 
relations' of the South with the rest of the nation."1 
Three fairly distinct periods mark the evolution of the Solid South. 
The first, lasting roughly from Reconstruction to the turn of the nine-
teenth century, represented the formative stage in the development 
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of a one-party system in the southern states. The second, comprising 
the first half of the twentieth century, witnessed the operation of the 
system in the full panoply of its dominance. This was the classic era 
of the Solid South, which is defined in this study to include the eleven 
ex-Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma. The third 
period, beginning with the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, brought the 
disruption of the Solid South, the gradual decline of the one-party 
system, and the transformation of southern politics. It is now possible 
to speak with some confidence of "the two-party South. " 2 
Southern Democrats succeeded for almost three-quarters of a cen-
tury after Reconstruction in defending their peculiar sectional inter-
ests in national politics. The federal nature of political parties in the 
United States facilitated this endeavor, and the skillful use of congres-
sional power provided a means of warding off threats from the outside 
while simultaneously enlarging financial assistance from Washington. 
According to one political scientist, the South "influenced American 
politics in ways not dissimilar to the influence of Quebec in Canada 
or of Ireland in the United Kingdom in the years from 1870 to 1922. 
The massive influence of that deviant subculture upon national party 
politics and policy outputs has scarcely run its course a century after 
Appomattox."3 For all its sectional perversity, southern politics has 
been a national as well as a sectional phenomenon. Today the South's 
politics is subject to greater national influence than at any time since 
Reconstruction, and the region's political future obviously depends 
on what happens in the rest of the country as well as on such state 
and local considerations as the fortunes of the influential black-white 
Democratic coalitions. There is talk nowadays of the "Southernization 
of America" and of a new role for the South in American life-the 
"nation's second chance."4 
This volume presents a brief history of the Solid South. It might 
be thought of as a kind of "natural history" of a powerful regional 
institution, an institution that played an influential role in the con-
tinuing drama of modern American politics. The book is both a syn-
thesis of the extensive literature on politics in the recent South and 
an interpretation of the region's political history since the end of Re-
construction. I hope that the study will interest students, general 
readers, and scholars and that it will serve both as an introduction to 
and an interpretation of a fascinating subject. 
I am grateful to Charles P. Roland for inviting me to contribute 
to the New Perspectives on the South Series and for his critical and 
helpful evaluation of my manuscript. I am also indebted to two other 
friends, Numan V. Bartley and Jacque Voegeli, for taking time to read 
the manuscript and giving me the benefit of their keen understanding 
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of southern history and politics. Dean Voegeli wrote a comprehensive 
critique of the manuscript that contributed substantially to whatever 
merit the published work possesses. I have profited as well from an 
authoritative evaluation by a specialist selected by the University Press 
of Kentucky. Finally, I am in the debt of a host of scholars for analyzing 
and illuminating so many aspects of southern politics in the twentieth 
century. Having mentioned these obligations, I am constrained to add 
that I alone am responsible for whatever errors and limitations this 
book may have. 
Much of the preliminary work on this project was done at the 
National Humanities Center. I shall always treasure my stay at the 
Center, where I was a fellow during the academic year 1982-83, and 
I am indebted to its directors for financial support and for the stimu-
lating intellectual environment they provided under the tall pines and 
blue sky of the North Carolina Piedmont. I want to thank the De-
partment of History and the College of Arts and Science, Vanderbilt 
University, for enabling me to be on sabbatical leave in 1982-83 and 
1986-87, and I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to 'the 
Holland N. McTyeire professorship at Vanderbilt for essential re-
search assistance. 
This book is, in some respects, the distillation of many years of 
research and reflection on regional politics and the role of the South 
in twentieth-century America. During this period I have had the good 
fortune to work in a large number of manuscript depositories and 
other research institutions, and I am grateful to the many archivists 
and librarians who aided my research during those visits. I am es-
pecially obligated to Alan Tuttle and Rebecca Sutton of the National 
Humanities Center, to Carolyn A. Wallace and her colleagues at the 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, and to 
the staff members of the Vanderbilt University Library, the Division 
of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress, the Harvard University 
Library, the University of Virginia Library, the Clemson University 
Library, the Emory University Library, the Robert W. Woodruff Li-
brary of the Atlanta University Center, the University of Georgia 
Library, the University of Tennessee Library, the Tennessee State 
Library and Archives, the Alabama Department of Archives and His-
tory, the Louisiana State University Library, and the University of 
Texas Library. 
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the research assistance given me 
by Henry M. McKiven, Jr., and Robert Tracy McKenzie. Mr. McKenzie 
deserves credit for most of the figures and tables in this volume. My 
work has also been facilitated by the word-processing skills of Julia 
Buzzell and Mary Frances Moore, whose help I much appreciate. 
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The publication of this book gives me an opportunity to express 
my admiration and affection for Charles Delzell, Leiper Freeman, and Jacque Voegeli, three longtime friends and colleagues who have helped me in many ways and who have improved by spirits over the years. 
1 Forging the Solid South 
The political solidarity of the twentieth-century South originated in 
the great sectional conflict of the nineteenth century. In the 1850s a 
virulent southern sectionalism destroyed the existing party system 
and created a powerful compulsion toward political consensus in the 
South. The Civil War itself heightened southern self-consciousness 
and increased the social solidarity of the region's white inhabitants, 
despite the divisions and enmities it brought to the surface. "Out of 
that ordeal by fire," wrote Wilbur J. Cash, "the masses had brought, 
not only a great body of memories in common with the master class, 
but a deep affection for these captains, a profound trust in them, a 
pride which was inextricably intertwined with the commoners' pride 
in themselves."1 In the long run, the war did little to undermine the 
South's political autonomy. As the historian Roy F. Nichols once ob-
served, "Did not the South by its war experience insure what it 
sought, an autonomy within the nation and a political power which 
enables it at times, as now, for all practical purposes to control national 
legislation?"2 
As a matter of fact, southern white unity was more apparent after 
the war than it had been during that drawn-out conflict. The divisions 
over secession were a source of continuing irritation and bitterness 
among southerners, and during the war years islands of disaffection 
developed in various parts of the Confederacy. The new government 
was never able to institute effective political machinery within its 
jurisdiction. Appomattox had surrendered Robert E. Lee's armies but 
not the southern cause. As Robert Penn Warren declared long ago, 
the conflict of the 1860s "claimed the Confederate States for the Union, 
but at the same time, paradoxically, it made them more Southern." 
Or, to put the matter in political terms, "In defeat the Solid South 
was born-not only the witless automatism of fidelity to the Demo-
cratic Party but the mystique of prideful 'difference,' identity, and 
defensiveness."3 The Confederate flag and "Dixie" became strong 
unifying symbols for most white southerners. Outside the South, of 
2 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
course, the war strengthened the bonds of loyalty to the Republican 
party. Not surprisingly, the war and its turbulent aftermath infused 
the nation's politics with sectional appeals and helped perpetuate the 
sectional alignment of party politics that had developed in the 1850s. 
Reconstruction was no less important in the forging of the Solid 
South. Several developments of that era encouraged political com-
petition in the southern states, and it is conceivable that the process 
of reconstruction could have contributed to a more rational and en-
during political division among white southerners. With the collapse 
of the Confederacy, for example, many of the South's old Whigs 
assumed an important role in postwar politics. While this Whiggish 
element was usually identified with southern interests, it had little 
liking for Democrats, who had led the section into war. A much 
greater challenge to southern Democrats came with the organization 
of the Republican party throughout the South following the inau-
guration of Congressional Reconstruction in 1867. This brought the 
enfranchisement of perhaps a million freedmen, virtually all of whom 
became Republicans, and the formation of political coalitions in every 
southern state made up of blacks, "carpetbaggers," and "scalawags." 
Something like a fifth of the southern whites were included in these 
Republican coalitions. 
Most white southerners feared and resented the basic features of 
Radical Reconstruction, which they viewed as the source of harsh and 
vindictive policies, of Republican abuse and corruption, and of black 
effrontery and southern privation. Southern Democrats set about 
uniting as many whites as possible in the party of opposition. They 
made use of economic pressure and social ostracism, chicanery and 
fraud, intimidation and violence, and a shrewd campaign of racial 
propaganda, as well as more traditional political appeals. These tech-
niques soon proved effective. One reason was the continuing prestige 
of the old, experienced ruling class in the South. Another factor was 
the inability of the southern Whigs to retain their identity as a separate 
group. The Whigs differed among themselves as to policy, and their 
efforts to secure a moderate reconstruction program received curi-
ously little support from conservative Republicans in the North. Many 
of them were ultimately driven by their frustration into the arms of 
the Democrats, whose policies they had so often condemned in earlier 
years. Radical Republican policies and the blandishments of the 
Democrats (who resorted to the term conservative in some states as a 
gesture of conciliation toward the Whigs) eventually destroyed the 
Whigs as a clearly recognizable entity in southern politics, while en-
hancing the reputation of the Democrats among white southerners 
generally. The economic plight of the postwar South-its wartime 
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losses and its poverty, one-crop economy, and shortage of money-
also played into the hands of the Democrats. 
The overthrow of Radical Reconstruction governments in the ex-
Confederate states was made easier by the intense Republican conflict 
within several southern states, by the division between the northern 
and southern wings of the party, and by the inconsistent Reconstruc-
tion policies of Pres. Ulysses S. Grant. Passage by Congress of a gen-
eral amnesty act in 1872 restored the right to hold office to most former 
Confederates. The northern retreat from Radical Reconstruction was 
evident by this time, and in 1874 the Democrats won control of the 
national House of Representatives. Meanwhile, the "redemption" of 
the South from Republican control moved forward steadily. In most 
white districts, conservatives had held control of local governments 
from the outset. Tennessee and Virginia were reclaimed by the Demo-
crats as early as 1870, and by 1876 only Florida, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina remained in Republican hands. They were "redeemed" in 
1877, the last two as part of the Compromise of 1877. Southern leaders 
acquiesced in the election of the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, 
satisfied with the promise of troop removal, home rule, and federal 
money for internal improvements in the South. 
The political hegemony of the conservative Democrats who re-
deemed the South from Radical Reconstruction was formidable. Hav-
ing restored all of the ex-Confederate states to home rule, southern 
Democrats moved to liquidate their Republican opposition in the re-
gion. The party of Lincoln, Grant, and Hayes steadily lost strength 
in the South. One of the party's members, Albion W. Tourgee, re-
ported after the election of 1878 that "the Republican party of North 
Carolina is dead-dead beyond hope of resuscitation or resurrec-
tion!"4 In the presidential election two years later, the Democrats 
carried every southern state. The Solid South had emerged in its 
pristine form, although it would not become a thoroughgoing one-
party system for another two decades. 
Politics in the southern states from the end of Reconstruction to 
the early 1890s was dominated by the Redeemers. The original 
architects of the Solid South, they made an enduring contribution to 
the character of southern politics in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The system they inaugurated, while elaborated 
and perfected by later Democratic leaders, provided the fundamental 
structure of political solidarity in the region for more than three-
quarters of a century. The Redeemers (or Bourbon Democrats) re-
garded themselves as the "natural leaders" of the South. There was 
a good deal of truth in this view. The bulk of the section's traditional 
social and economic leaders, including most men of Whiggish per-
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suasion, was identified with the Democratic party by the late 1870s. 
A Republican leader in Georgia warned as early as 1868 that recent 
elections "should teach us as Republicans that it is impossible to main-
tain the party in this State, or indeed in the South, without a division 
of the white vote." The Democrats, he conceded, "possess most of 
the intelligence and wealth of the State, which will always control 
tenants and laborers."5 
One result of the Civil War, W.J. Cash suggested in 1941, was 
that "the habits of following and obedience" were more deeply en-
graved upon the common man than ever before. Cash also thought 
that the military leaders of the Confederacy were themselves pro-
foundly influenced by their wartime service. "They were more set in 
the custom of command, much more perfectly schooled in the art of 
it, knew better how to handle the commoner, to steer expertly about 
his recalcitrance, to manipulate him without ever arousing his jealous 
independence."6 These attitudes, one suspects, were reflected in 
southern politics during the Age of the Redeemers. Political candi-
dates certainly found it advantageous to have served in the Confed-
erate ranks. Indeed, Confederate veterans seem to have held a 
majority of the best offices at all levels of government during the 
period between Reconstruction and the 1890s. In Virginia, for ex-
ample, James Lawson Kemper, a Confederate hero who had been 
wounded at Gettysburg, was elected governor in 1869. He became 
the first of a line of seven Confederate "brigadiers" to serve as gov-
ernor of the Old Dominion. One study of 585 former Confederate 
leaders revealed that no fewer than 418 of them held elective or ap-
pointive offices after the war. It was, from the standpoint of the most 
prestigious political offices, the era of the Confederate brigadier. Dur-
ing the Forty-fifth Congress (1877-79), 77 of 107 members in the 
House of Representatives from the South had fought in the Confed-
erate armies. 
The Redeemers, of course, made good use of the romantic cult 
of the Lost Cause. They made the most of what David M. Potter has 
described as a "deeply felt southern nationalism" growing out of "the 
shared sacrifices, the shared efforts, and the shared defeat" of the 
war. 7 They helped establish an explicit linkage between Confederate 
images and religious values, joining with other southerners in making 
"a religion out of their history."8 The Redeemers' version of Recon-
struction provided another support for political conformity among 
white southerners. They told a grim story of human suffering and of 
the southern battle for civilization during Radical Reconstruction. 
"The slaughter and the sacrifices during our great civil war were 
terrible indeed," declared Rep. Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama in 1890, 
"but those dark days were lighted by the shining valor of the patriot 
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soldier; the storm clouds were gilded with glory." In Reconstruction, 
on the other hand, Herbert could find "nothing but wretchedness 
and humiliation, and shame, and crime begetting crime. There was 
no single redeeming feature, except the heroic determination of the 
better classes in the several states to restore good government."9 Con-
servatism, as one scholar has written of postbellum Virginia, "was 
not only a political party, it was also a social code and a state of 
mind."10 
As might have been expected, the Redeemers represented the 
South's most influential social and economic elements. The bulwark 
of their political control was the black belt that stretched across the 
lower South, and planters constituted a major factor in the politics of 
the various states in the region, though not always the dominant one. 
There were patrician leaders among the Redeemers such as Francis 
T. Nicholls of Louisiana and Wade Hampton of South Carolina, who 
appealed to the traditions of the Old South, and a large number of 
conservative Democrats retained close ties with the land and with 
agriculture. Many if not most politicians in the new era lived in small 
towns and depended upon farmer constituencies. In short, as James 
Tice Moore writes, there is much evidence to support "the concept 
of a continuing and potent agricultural influence" in the politics of 
the Redeemer period. 11 
But if the planter exerted a controlling influence in the politics of 
the post-Reconstruction South, he was forced to share political power 
with a rising group of business-oriented politicians. "In the main," 
C. Vann Woodward asserts in his familiar characterization of theRe-
deemers, "they were of middle-class, industrial, capitalistic outlook, 
with little but a nominal connection with the old planter regime."12 
Although Woodward may have exaggerated the discontinuity in the 
political leadership of the Old South and that of the New, there was 
a powerful Whig-industrial faction in every southern state after 1877, 
particularly in the upper South. Railroad and bondholding interests 
were closely identified with the Redeemer governments, and the New 
South emphasis on industrialization, economic diversification, and 
northern investments was warmly endorsed by the dominant political 
leaders in most southern states. Georgia's leading Democrats "glo-
rified the past, particularly the heroism of the Civil War; yet they 
emphasized youth, progress, and enterprise."13 The state's famous 
triumvirate of Joseph E. Brown, Alfred H. Colquitt, and John B. Gor-
don, who dominated Georgia politics in the post-Reconstruction pe-
riod, had all been prominent Confederate leaders. Yet in the new era 
they became businessmen and New South advocates. That the char-
acter of Redeemer leadership was somewhat more diverse than is 
often maintained is revealed in the Louisiana experience. In that state 
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three major political power centers emerged: the landowner class; the 
so-called Lottery-Ring combination, an alliance between the Louisiana 
State Lottery and the Democratic organization in New Orleans; and 
an avaricious clique of legislators and other officials who profited from 
such policies as the state's convict lease system. 
Having redeemed their individual states, Democratic leaders 
worked hard to maintain white unity and to perpetuate their control. 
While their tactics varied from state to state, their leadership tended 
to be oligarchical and conservative. In every southern state, a rela-
tively small number of popular leaders dominated the Democratic 
party, determined the acceptable candidates for key offices, and de-
cided upon the issues and candidates. The oligarchies moved quickly 
to secure control of the party organization in their respective states 
and to make sure that their lieutenants and friends were in charge of 
the election machinery. The concentration of authority in the hands 
of governors and legislators enabled these state leaders to appoint 
important local officials in every county. One of the steps taken by 
North Carolina Redeemers was to pass a law in 1876 designed to 
assure white Democratic supremacy throughout the state. It provided 
that the principal officers in each county would be appointed by 
justices of the peace, who were themselves to be named by the leg-
islature. Conservative control depended on the popularity of Demo-
cratic leaders with white voters, but it also rested upon working 
alliances between state and local leaders. The latter were often part 
of what some contemporaries unflatteringly called courthouse 
"cliques" or "rings." These influential local politicians looked after 
the interests of the party hierarchy in their towns and counties, par-
ticularly the operation of the election system and the selection of local 
officeholders, including members of the state legislature. 
Redeemer dominance was reinforced by an assortment of clever 
techniques and sharp practices: gerrymandering legislative districts, 
discriminatory apportionment of seats in party conventions, intricate 
registration and election laws, and use of fraud and intimidation at 
the polls. In some cases these New Departure Democrats made use 
of a kind of "captive black vote" against their opponents, even as 
they characterized themselves as defenders of white supremacy. In-
deed, their use of the race question assumed the quality of a fine art. 
As one historian says of the situation in Mississippi, conservative 
Democrats used the black man "unsparingly to crush all incipient 
revolts against their authority."14 
Lack of unity among the mass of small farmers and workers also 
aided the Redeemers. White yeomen in southern Appalachia gen-
erally supported the Republican party, as did most blacks throughout 
the South who continued to vote. The region's exploitative social 
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structure-increasing farm tenancy, the pervasive furnishing system, 
and the growth of textile mill villages and mining towns-debilitated 
the political role of more and more small farmers and laborers. Ag-
ricultural and industrial workers were the victims of a regional labor 
market that was shaped by high population growth and isolation from 
national labor norms and pressures. This condition facilitated the 
structuring of the work force along the lines desired by the planter-
merchant-industrialist interests. 
Critics referred to the Redeemers and their successors as "Bour-
bons," likening them to the reactionary European monarchs who had 
"learned nothing and forgotten nothing." The term is misleading, 
however, for the southern Bourbons were less inflexible and more 
innovative than the epithet suggests. "Generally speaking," one his-
torian concludes, "they were innovators in economic matters, mod-
erates in race policy once white supremacy was assured, extremists 
in politics when their own supremacy was threatened, and pro-
foundly conservative in most matters of social policy."15 Their control 
reflected corporate and financial interests, especially those involved 
in railroad promotion, merchandising, and banking. The state gov-
ernments under their leadership reduced taxes, starved public service 
agencies and eleemosynary institutions, and made economy in gov-
ernment a major priority. Yet many of them also advocated railroad 
subsidies and tax exemptions for new industries. 
While proclaiming themselves the guardians of fiscal integrity and 
of a political climate favorable for economic developers, the Redeem-
ers repudiated much of the Reconstruction debt in the southern states, 
took part in efforts to regulate railroads and other corporations, and 
supported appropriations for some state services, particularly to bene-
fit farmers. If the new state constitutions whose drafting and adoption 
they spearheaded emphasized retrenchment in spending and low 
ceilings on taxation, they also included restrictions on state aid to 
private enterprises. Nor were the Bourbon Democrats as honest and 
fiscally responsible as they pictured themselves. They, too, were 
guilty in many instances of governmental corruption, financial pec-
ulation, and public scandals. Nevertheless, they left a lasting imprint 
on southern politics and society. Perhaps their greatest contribution 
was their influence in the cultural sphere-in their efforts to create 
a united southern people with a distinct cultural identity. Taking 
advantage of their reputation as natural leaders, they stressed the 
organic character of white society and appealed to the spirit of "Her-
renvolk democracy" -a democratic society for whites only. They suc-
ceeded in large part because they were regarded as representing the 
"interests" of a majority of white southerners, who in the early post-
Reconstruction years held conventional views on most economic 
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questions and on the proper role of government, who considered race 
an important aspect of politics, and who were responsive to the pleas 
for southern white unity. 
Although every southern state supported the Democratic presiden-
tial ticket in 1880, Republican strength in the South did not decline drasti-
cally during the last two decades of the century. Those southerners 
who belonged to the Grand Old Party in the post-Reconstruction 
years were largely of two very different and often mutually antago-
nistic types: the freedmen, who for the most part lived in the low 
country, and the white inhabitants of the mountainous areas. This 
Republican coalition of blacks and whites was a powerful political 
force in the late nineteenth-century South, particularly in Virginia, 
North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. But the place of blacks in 
the party was a divisive issue in southern Republicanism and one 
that GOP leaders were never able to resolve satisfactorily. "TheRe-
publican strategy," one authority observes, "became one of offering 
their black following just enough to ensure their continued support 
while emphasizing issues that would attract greater numbers of white 
voters."16 
The four states of the upper South east of the Mississippi River 
remained a political battleground between the two major parties until 
the end of the century. The Republican percentage of the presidential 
vote in Virginia during the period 1876-1900 was never less than 39 
percent, and in 1884 and 1888, it was 49 percent. During the same 
years, North Carolina Republicans dropped below 46 percent only 
once-with 36 percent of the total vote in 1892 (the Populist ticket 
obtained 16 percent). In Tennessee, meanwhile, the Republicans re-
ceived at least 44 percent of the presidential votes in every election 
except those of 1876 and 1892, when their proportion of the popular 
vote dropped just below 40 percent. Kentucky Republicans were 
equally competitive, averaging well above 40 percent of the popular 
vote and carrying their state for William McKinley in 1896. Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and North Carolina elected Republican governors during 
this period, and each of the four states sent Republican congressmen 
to Washington, sometimes five or six at once. In the meantime, the 
Republican party dominated local elections in southwestern Virginia, 
western North Carolina, East Tennessee, and eastern Kentucky. 
In another group of southern states-Alabama, Arkansas, Geor-
gia, and Texas-Republican presidential strength was greater during 
the period 1876-1900 than is usually recognized, hovering around 
one-third of the total vote. As late as 1900, the Republican proportion 
of the vote was 35 percent in Alabama and Arkansas, 31 percent in 
Texas, and 28 percent in Georgia. In Florida the GOP percentage was 
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Table 1. Turnout and Proportion of Adult Males Voting for Each Party 
in the South in Presidential Elections, 1872-1908 
Election 
1872 
1876 
1880 
1884 
1888 
1892 
1896 
1900 
1904 
1908 
Democrat 
23.35 
38.73 
36.88 
37.20 
37.94 
33.87 
33.33 
26.54 
18.95 
19.44 
Republican 
26.87 
26.70 
23.76 
25.70 
23.08 
14.58 
19.83 
15.35 
8.31 
9.58 
Other 
0 
0 
2.90 
0.34 
1.47 
9.71 
3.00 
1.22 
1.35 
1.15 
Turnout 
50.24 
64.94 
63.55 
62.84 
62.49 
58.16 
56.16 
43.10 
28.62 
30.18 
souRcE: Adapted from J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern 
Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-
1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 12. 
NOTE: These statistics refer to the eleven ex-Confederate states only. 
40 or more in every election through 1888, after which it dropped to 
a steady level of about 20 percent. The decline in Louisiana began 
four years earlier, dropping from 42 percent in 1884 to 27 percent in 
1888 and gradually sinking to 20 percent in 1900. Mississippi Repub-
licanism showed the same pattern, declining from 36 percent of the 
total votes cast in 1884 to 25 percent in 1888 and reaching 10 percent 
in 1900. The South Carolina percentage declined steadily throughout 
this era, from 34 percent in 1880 to 9 percent in 1900. Thus, Repub-
licanism in national elections did not become insignificant in most 
southern states until after the 1890s. 
The persistence of southern Republicanism after 1876 can be at-
tributed in part to GOP efforts at the national level to win support in 
the region. In an age of extraordinarily close elections, Republican 
leaders, frequently of Whiggish background and usually conservative 
in their views, turned naturally enough to their counterparts in the 
South-to what one Republican politician referred to as "the same 
class of men in the South as are Republicans in the North"17 -in 
seeking to head off radical policies and maintain their control of the 
national government. Despite the return of home rule and Democratic 
control, there seemed to be some chance that interparty competition 
would continue in the South. In the presidential election of 1880, a 
majority of the black adult males in nine of the eleven ex-Confederate 
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states cast their ballots. The percentage of adult males voting in presi-
dential elections in the South between 1876 and 1896 was as high as 
65 percent and never lower than 56 percent. 
Seeing the cleavages that divided southern Democrats and rec-
ognizing the bankruptcy of their own Reconstruction policies, Re-
publican leaders approached the "southern question" in a growing 
mood of experimentation. President Hayes, dreaming of a strong Re-
publican party in the South, sought to attract southern conservatives 
with a generous patronage policy and favorable legislation. As it be-
came more evident that southerners of Whiggish ancestry were find-
ing a comfortable home in the Bourbon Democracy, James A. Garfield 
and Chester A. Arthur began to encourage independent movements 
that developed in one southern state after another. Benjamin Harrison 
attempted to use federal intervention, through the "force bill," to 
protect the voting rights of blacks and whites in the South. And in 
the agrarian upheaval of the 1890s, Republican leaders tried to work 
out successful coalitions with Populists and dissident Democrats. 
But success was limited. The most spectacular Republican efforts 
to perfect coalition politics-m Virginia in the early 1880s and in North 
Carolina in the 1890s-provoked bitter conflict and recrimination and 
in the long run diminished the party's strength in the region. Those 
episodes also revealed the immensity of the obstacles confronting the 
Republicans. Their party lacked leaders, newspapers, and money in 
the southern states, and its ranks were torn by recurrent factionalism 
involving personal rivalry and strife between "black and tan" and 
"lily-white" groups. "From nearly every Republican county conven-
tion," a Tennessee newspaper reported in 1900, "comes the same 
story: Two conventions, a split and contesting delegations to the state 
convention."18 Furthermore, southern whites found the Reconstruc-
tion image of Republicanism almost irresistible, and despite the will-
ingness of many GOP leaders to abandon their reliance upon black 
support, a great many southerners continued to associate the Re-
publican party with fears of Negro domination. Outside the moun-
tainous areas, southern whites were inclined to be contemptuous of 
Republicans. In Florida, one authority has noted, a white man who 
voted Republican was likely to be called "white trash," while a black 
man who attemped to vote Democratic was apt to have his ballot torn 
from his hand. 19 JohnS. Wise, a prominent Virginia Republican, later 
lamented that the average southerner was incapable of doing justice 
to the region's Republicans, that he imputed to every one of them 
"sordid motives or distorted political ideas," and that the most liberal 
estimate the Republican could expect in the South was that "he is a 
crank."20 
Republicans also encountered fraud and intimidation, as well as 
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discriminatory election officials and harshly punitive election laws. 
Five southern states enacted new poll tax, registration, secret ballot, 
and other restrictive voting laws between 1889 and 1893. These mea-
sures took a heavy toll of black and white voters. Under the circum-
stances, it was virtually impossible for Republicans to formulate a 
policy on the national level that would appeal to the enemies of the 
conservative Democrats in the South and at the same time satisfy 
powerful GOP interests outside the region. Thus, the overtures Presi-
dent Arthur made to southern independents of a radical stripe proved 
disquieting to orthodox Republicans. The change of sentiment in the 
North, reflecting the drift away from Reconstruction idealism as well 
as the strong influence of business elements in the Republican party, 
doomed President Harrison's attempt to secure passage of the "force 
bill." And to complicate matters still further, the very threat of such 
legislation became an effective weapon in the hands of those who 
championed white supremacy and the Solid South. 
Had the Bourbon Democrats been confronted only with the Re-
publican challenge, they might have retained a greater degree of 
equanimity. Actually, the Republican presence probably contributed 
to Democratic unity and discipline in the post-Reconstruction period. 
On the other hand, the Democratic regimes in the various southern 
states were not monolithic; Redeemer control in one state was not a 
carbon copy of that in other commonwealths. The Democrats in every 
southern state were divided by internal squabbles, geographic dif-
ferences, and factional groupings. In Tennessee, for instance, the 
Democrats were split into a Whig-industrialist wing and a state-rights-
secessionist-planter wing. Still, there was a Redeemer-Bourbon type 
that was generally dominant in the region's politics and that was 
responsible for a pervasive political orthodoxy throughout the South. 
Leaders of this stripe also constituted an oligarchy that could not 
always conceal arrogant expectations in the exercise of power, per-
sonal prerogatives, and deferential treatment. Some southerners re-
sented this state of affairs, and there was also widespread revulsion 
against the political chicanery and dictatorial methods of the en-
trenched Democrats. Here and there, moreover, aspiring politicians 
chafed at a leadership that denied many of them a larger role in 
Democratic politics. 
Bourbon leaders were faced, almost from the beginning of their 
dominance, with intraparty dissension and protest movements that 
held out the dread possibility of a merger with the Republicans and 
a transfer of political authority. One of the earliest of these indepen-
dent movements-and the most significant before the Populist up-
rising-was the Readjuster campaign in Virginia. This movement was 
organized in the late 1870s when the state's politics was reshaped on 
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the basis of a struggle between those who insisted upon funding 
Virginia's large debt and those who demanded its "readjustment." 
The times were ripe for a political upheaval. The Republican party 
had been repudiated and was badly disorganized, while the trium-
phant Redeemers were faced with the problem of guiding an unwieldy 
party and providing answers to a number of perplexing questions, 
including the handling of the state debt. Economic conditions were 
poor, people complained about inequitable taxes, and the schools 
suffered from inadequate support. Criticism of the conservative 
Democratic leadership increased, farmers began to see political im-
plications in the Granger movement, and some Virginians were at-
tracted to the inflationary schemes of the Greenbackers. A remarkable 
political messiah then appeared on the scene to lead the revolt. His 
name was William Mahone, ex-Confederate general, railroad builder, 
erstwhile conservative, and political organizer extraordinaire. 
The movement that Mahone led reflected the geographic and so-
cial composition of Virginia. Realizing the potential influence of an 
expanded electorate, Mahone appealed directly to the people. The 
general sought the support of the small white farmers and poorer 
classes, especially in the western part of the state, and he succeeded 
in combining those groups with a substantial number of blacks, most 
of whom lived in the eastern lowlands. The Readjuster leaders were, 
characteristically, middle-class men on the make who found few op-
portunities for political distinction in the conservative regime of the 
Redeemers. The Conservatives, as the Democrats were wont to call 
themselves, had about them an aura of aristocracy and the Lost Cause, 
but their fiscal orthodoxy and laissez-faire preachments brought them 
powerful allies from industrial and urban elements. 
Readjuster control lasted only a few years, but it had a pro-
nounced effect on Virginia politics. Capturing the state legislature in 
1879, the Readjusters soon dominated every branch of the Virginia 
government, and at one time they also controlled the two U.S. Senate 
seats and six seats in the national House of Representatives. They 
readjusted the state debt, revised the system of taxation, repealed the 
poll tax, abolished the whipping post, provided liberal appropriations 
for education, and enacted legislation favorable to labor. At the same 
time, Mahone created a patronage machine and attempted to combine 
with the Republicans. The Conservatives, meanwhile, took advantage 
of Readjuster mistakes and warned loudly of Republican control and 
black domination. By the mid-1880s, they had redeemed the state 
from "Mahoneism." But in the process they borrowed some demo-
cratic features from the Readjuster program and, like many southern 
Democrats in the 1890s, sought to broaden their appeal to the white 
masses. 
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Although Virginia was the only southern state in which inde-
pendents wrested control from the Redeemers in the 1880s, almost 
all of the former Confederate states experienced some degree of 
independent revolt in the decade following Reconstruction. One 
measure of this political dissidence is provided by the combined op-
position (anti-Democratic) vote in the following gubernatorial elec-
tions: North Carolina, 48.7 percent and Georgia, 35.1 percent in 1880; 
Virginia, 52.8 percent and Mississippi, 40.2 percent in 1881; Texas, 
40.5 percent, Alabama, 31.6 percent, and South Carolina, 21 percent 
in 1882; Tennessee, 48.7 percent, Florida, 46.5 percent, and Louisiana, 
32.9 percent in 1884; and Arkansas, 45.9 percent in 1888.21 Some of 
this political independence represented conflict over state debts and 
fiscal policies similar to the controversy in Virginia, although the re-
pudiation or readjustment of Reconstruction debts was generally 
popular in the South and inextricably connected with the overthrow 
of Radical rule in most southern states. Opposition to Democratic 
conservatives frequently developed over such local issues as the un-
equal division of educational funds, inequitable tax rates, high interest 
rates, fence laws, business favoritism, the operation of the convict 
lease system, and local-option elections; but there were widespread 
charges of machine politics, "ring" rule, and manipulated elections. 
Dissatisfaction also grew out of the malapportionment of state leg-
islatures and the black belts' use of Negro votes to strengthen their 
position. The convention system of making nominations and choosing 
party leaders, moreover, was often linked to the system of represen-
tation, which meant that black counties were given delegates far out 
of proportion to their voting strength. In South Carolina, to take an 
example given by C. Vann Woodward, "the upland plebeians found 
they had redeemed the state from the Carpetbaggers only to lose it 
to the lowland bosses."22 Yet, as another scholar has written of the 
situation in North Carolina, "The impulse toward democracy strug-
gled to take form and achieve self-conscious direction; the defense of 
undemocratic privilege adopted more extreme measures in the face 
of internal pressure and external shocks."23 
Independent movements were a real force in the South of the late 
1870s and early 1880s. In Georgia an independent campaign elected 
William H. Felton and Emory L. Speer to Congress but failed in an 
effort to overturn Bourbon control of the state. In 1878 William M. 
Lowe was elected to Congress as an independent from a north Ala-
bama district, and in the same year, a Greenback-Labor candidate 
won a congressional seat in Texas. The Greenbackers made a strong 
showing in gubernatorial contests in Kentucky, Alabama, and Ar-
kansas during the next two years, and in the early 1880s Democratic 
politicians reflecting the monetary proposals and economic radicalism 
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of Greenbackism challenged the conservative political control in South 
Carolina, Texas, and other states. While the Greenback movement 
failed to obtain a substantial number of votes in most southern states, 
it mirrored, as did other independent movements of the period, strong 
dissatisfaction with Redeemer authority as well as the socioeconomic 
cleavages in southern society that belied the claim of a Solid South. 
Yet by the mid-1880s the edge of political insurgency in the South 
had been blunted. All the old techniques of social and economic pres-
sure perfected in the battles against the Reconstruction Radicals had 
been employed in ruthless campaigns against party independents. 
The same methods would be applied even more savagely against 
Populists in the 1890s. At the same time, the southern economy im-
proved as farm commodity prices increased and as the nation entered 
into an era of unprecedented railroad construction and industrial ex-
pansion. There was a feeling of general satisfaction in the South, 
moreover, with Grover Cleveland's victory in 1884 and the return of 
the Democrats to national power early the next year. But the relatively 
placid years of the mid-1880s were not to last long, and the late 1880s 
and much of the 1890s witnessed growing agrarian distress, industrial 
crisis, and political conflict all over the country. 
The agrarian revolt marked a decisive stage in the evolution of 
modern southern politics. While gathering strength from the inde-
pendent movements and farmer organizations of the 1870s and 1880s, 
the revolt was fundamentally a protest and a countermovement 
against the encroachment of modern industrialism upon rural society 
and rural values. It was a social as well as a political movement. There 
was, to be sure, a solid basis for the agrarian unrest. Farmers in the 
South and West for two decades after 1870 had suffered from steadily 
declining agricultural prices, inequitable taxes, inadequate facilities 
and high interest charges, a contracting currency, a high tariff on the 
products they bought, and monopolistic power in business, whether 
exercised by the middlemen they dealt with firsthand or the railroads 
and industrial "trusts" somewhat further removed. Nor was that all. 
During those years farmers frequently experienced a social stagnation 
and loss of personal dignity and community status that produced 
widespread despair, resentment, and defiance in the agricultural re-
gions. In the South the situation facing the farmer, especially the 
millions of small operators and tenants, was even worse since it re-
flected the postwar revolution that introduced peculiar and regressive 
arrangements in labor, land tenure, and credit. 
Of the numerous agricultural organizations that sprang up in the 
1880s, the most important was the National Farmers' Alliance and 
Industrial Union. Originating in Texas, the Farmers' Alliance spread 
rapidly through the South in the late 1880s, pulling other farm groups 
Forging the Solid South 15 
and thousands of unaffiliated farmers into its ranks. By 1890 over a 
million southerners were members of the Alliance. Among these re-
cruits were farm leaders and substantial landowners as well as small 
operators. The major source of the organization's popularity was its 
promise of direct economic relief, particularly through its cooperative 
program, and the sense of community fostered by its local chapters 
and activities. It was the Southern Alliance, as it was called, that 
formulated the economic and political ideas that were soon identified 
with the People's party and populism. Prominent among these were 
reform measures looking to currency inflation, government-based 
credit, land reform, railroad and trust regulation, and democratization 
of the political process. 
In the beginning the agrarian reformers tried to capture the Demo-
cratic party in the South, and in the elections of 1890 they won victories 
for the Alliance standard in several states. They could point to suc-
cesses in more than half the legislative seats in eight states, to six 
Alliance governors, and to more than fifty congressmen bearing the 
organization's stamp of approval. The established Democratic lead-
ership, under mounting criticism in recent years, was alarmed and 
fearful. But the Southern Alliance soon discovered that it was more 
difficult to secure legislative reforms than to obtain campaign en-
dorsements from Democratic politicians. The scene changed rapidly 
in 1891, and by early 1892 the formation of the Populist party on a 
national basis had injected the "third-party" issue into southern poli-
tics. The Alliance's decision to "move into politics" in 1892 and the 
"radicalization" of its leadership reflected a major crisis in the society's 
cooperative program resulting from the pressure of falling cotton 
prices. 
The result was incomparably bitter and confusing. The intensity 
of the campaign of 1892 divided communities, churches, and even 
families. It destroyed the Farmers' Alliance as a viable institution. 
Many southern farmers took the plunge and became members of the 
new party, while others who subscribed to Populist principles tried 
to avoid the pain of breaking old party loyalties by calling themselves 
"Jeffersonian Democrats" and the like. Nevertheless, most southerners 
remained faithful to the Democratic party, responding to the cam-
paign on behalf of Grover Cleveland, as well as the wild talk about 
the "force bill" and the approval of Alliance demands by some Demo-
cratic leaders. Still, the People's party showed surprising strength in 
the South. When the Cleveland administration floundered amid the 
national currents of depression and economic uncertainty, while dem-
onstrating its conservative orthodoxy and lack of understanding of 
agrarian unrest, southern Populists looked to greater things. The elec-
tion of 1894 gave them a good deal of encouragement, for the third 
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party made gains in several southern states. It did especially well in 
North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, receiving almost 45 percent 
of the votes in the last state. In North Carolina the Democrats lost 
the general assembly to the Populists and Republicans, who then 
prepared the ground for an ill-fated fusion regime that captured con-
trol of the entire state in 1896. Meanwhile, the new party attempted 
to fuse with the Republicans on the state and local levels in a number 
of other states. North Carolina's "fusionist" legislature of 1895 enacted 
sweeping reforms, including an election law that enabled more blacks 
to register, a measure that prohibited interest rates over 6 percent, 
and the return of self-government to the counties. Following the elec-
tion of 1896, the new Republican governor, DanielL. Russell, set out 
to build an alliance of reformers from all parties. 
By 1896 southern opponents of President Cleveland's policies, 
prodded by his heavy-handed use of patronage and his adamant po-
sition on the currency question, had captured control of the Demo-
cratic party in virtually every state in the region. To the consternation 
of People's party leaders, these anti-Cleveland Democrats had taken 
over a large part of the Populist platform, including the iridescent 
free silver symbol. Southern Democrats then helped place William 
Jennings Bryan at the head of their party's national ticket. The ever-
present danger that the third party would join forces with the Re-
publicans in the South, as it did so spectacularly in North Carolina, 
gave impetus to this liberalization of the southern Democracy. It was 
also a factor in persuading some Democrats to remain within the party 
fold. The agrarian radicals represented a coalition of rural interest 
groups that were by no means monolithic in politics. As one scholar 
has pointed out, "When southern Alliancemen had to choose between 
participating in traditional friends-and-neighbors politics and sup-
porting specific, controversial proposals, the order's internal conflicts 
burst into the open."24 In addition, the strength of the agrarian move-
ment varied from one part of the South to another. The revolt in 
Tennessee, for example, was limited and halfhearted, a consequence, 
no doubt, of the state's relatively diversified and self-sufficient agri-
cultural economy, reasonably low interest rates, and large percentage 
of owner-operated farms. The Populists, especially those in the South, 
faced a cruel and baffling dilemma in 1896. There was, in fact, no 
way out for the People's party. It could not resist the pressure to 
endorse Bryan, and the fusion-and confusion-that followed the 
Nebraskan's valiant campaign soon brought an end to the third party 
everywhere. 
Southern farmers, like various other economic and social elements 
in the United States during the era, tried with some success to con-
solidate their forces to deal with powerful interests and competing 
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groups generated by the new industrialism. Their coalescence under 
the banner of the Farmers' Alliance made them a potent interest 
group, and their resort to politics challenged the established Demo-
cratic leadership in every southern state. Much of the radicalism as-
sociated with populism was indigenous to the South, and the 
movement probably had its greatest strength in that region. It is 
true that populism was freighted with a decided provincialism and 
negativism. One historian has characterized the Southern Alliance 
as "pro-agricultural, anti-urban, anti-merchant, anti-banker, anti-
foreign," while Sen. John Sharp Williams in later years described the 
basic motivation in the Populist movement as "a revolt against all 
manner of superiorities."25 Yet the Populists not only stressed the 
centrality of tangible production as a social good; they also called for 
a revival of democratic principles in politics and appealed to the ideal 
of an orderly community and a harmony of interests in society. They 
attacked the capitalist system but retained faith in the benefits of 
private property and the market economy. Their espousal of positive 
governmental action, business control, and political democracy made 
a lasting impression on southern politics, even though southern Popu-
lists suffered humiliating defeat. Their emphasis on monetary infla-
tion and credit needs, marketing reforms, minimum prices and 
acreage controls, and better farming methods was destined to have 
a great effect on twentieth-century politics and policies. 
The program of the Farmers' Alliance and the proposals of the Peo-
ple's party threatened to overturn the whole structure of Redeemer 
politics and to halt the creation of a more thoroughgoing one-party 
system. For a moment in the early 1890s, the South seemed to stand 
on the threshold of a political revolution in which a coalition of up-
country dwellers, black and white farmers, and industrial workers 
might overcome the powerful black belt planters and their business 
allies and reverse the political and economic trends of recent years. 
Suddenly, there were contests for state and local positions that had 
real meaning-with party choices and clear-cut issues. The Populists 
challenged the "New South" system frontally, challenged its con-
servative policies and political oligarchies, challenged the southern 
mythology that helped sustain it. Populism looked to a combination 
of dispossessed farmers and blacks along economic and social lines, 
and it brought into sharp relief longtime cleavages that the Redeemers 
had never been able to suppress completely. 
While populism grew out of genuine grass-roots protest, it was 
a complex movement that represented a number of different social 
elements. Numan V. Bartley suggests that in Georgia the movement 
embodied at least two separate strains of social protest: a group of 
disaffected planters led by Thomas E. Watson and centered in "the 
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worn and declining old cotton belt" and a large number of small 
farmers whose concerns were essentially local. 26 Populism's greatest 
appeal was probably to the region's small farmers. Populists in Ala-
bama, one historian has concluded, "were only tenuously connected 
to society by economic function, by personal relationships, by stable 
community membership, by political participation, or by psychologi-
cal identification with the South's distinctive myths. Recruited heavily 
from among the downwardly mobile and geographically transient, 
they were vulnerable to feelings of powerlessness. They were largely 
superfluous farmers or ineffectively organized workers who were not 
linked to influential Alabamians by kinship or close association. They 
tended to come from isolated areas, from areas experiencing extraor-
dinary influxes of population, and from areas with increasingly large 
concentrations of tenant farmers."27 For southerners such as these, 
the economic and political trends of the late nineteenth century were 
disastrous. The expansion of cotton culture outside the antebellum 
plantation areas, the long agricultural depression, and the declining 
self-sufficiency in food production led to deteriorating material con-
ditions for millions of landless blacks and white yeomen, whose eco-
nomic prospects and independence were increasingly jeopardized by 
crop liens, sharecropping, merchant monopoly, and coercive labor 
controls. 
These marginal elements in southern society made their last po-
litical stand in the agrarian upheaval of the 1890s. They were revolting 
not only against conditions that shackled them to an exploitative 
economy but also against a politics that denied them an effective voice 
in public affairs. They disliked the political domination of the black 
belts and the alliances between plantation leaders and city politicians 
that controlled state and local government. It was, as the saying went, 
a struggle of the "wool-hat boys" against the "silk-hat bosses." There 
may have been a few "silk-hatted" Populists-certainly there were 
some well-to-do farmers in the movement-and one should not make 
the mistake of interpreting populism exclusively in terms of class. 
Yet, in the South at least, social and economic divisions were clearly 
revealed during the controversies over populism, and they rested on 
far more than the demands for agricultural parity in the national 
economy. Fundamentally, it was a matter of power and privilege. 
Commenting on the situation in North Carolina, one historian has 
written that "the self-annointed 'better half,' including planters, mer-
chants, professionals, and most of the state's industrialists, remained 
satisfied with a version of the New South that enhanced their position 
while inhibiting social and economic progress for others."28 
Although the Populist assault shook the Democratic hierarchy to 
its foundations, leaving a habit of radicalism in some quarters, 29 the 
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revolt was quelled, and political solidarity was made even more com-
plete during the years that followed. Democratic leaders hurriedly 
invoked the race issue, rang the changes on the dangers of bolting 
the party, and fell back on skillful election maneuvers and fraud to 
win endangered districts. Populist candidates for state offices were 
almost certainly counted out in Alabama and Louisiana. "Any Demo-
crat might just as well go straight into the Republican party as into 
the ranks of its active ally, the People's party," warned a prominent 
Democratic newspaper in Tennessee. 30 In Texas the prospect of a 
Populist-Republican coalition in state politics threatened Democratic 
control and brought the charge of "Negro domination." Conserva-
tives never tired of pointing to the fusionist government of North 
Carolina and pleading for escape from the horrors of a second Re-
construction. Southern Populists, observes Vann Woodward, "daily 
faced the implacable dogmas of racism, white solidarity, white su-
premacy, and the bloody shirt."31 Small wonder that southern whites 
should learn, as a perceptive contemporary put it, to set men above 
principles and "good government" above freedom of thought. Some 
southerners, of course, were influenced by the constitutional and 
state-rights arguments of the conservatives; they were suspicious of 
the centralizing effect of Populist remedies or fearful of new com-
petition and injurious regulation of local business interests. 
Still other factors worked to the advantage of the Democrats in 
the crisis of the 1890s. For one thing, they retained a monopoly of 
the region's customary leadership. It was difficult for political rebels 
to unify the southern masses, given the insistent pull of party tradition 
and the barriers of race and rural-urban differences. The Populists 
had little success, except for modest achievements in Alabama and 
Texas, in uniting farmers and industrial workers. The restrictive suf-
frage laws enacted by several southern states in the late 1880s and 
early 1890s also handicapped Populists and Republicans, and the 
Democrats, as their critics charged, were not averse to the use of 
"fraud, forgery, falsehood, and fiction" in the conduct of elections. 32 
Southern Democrats, moreover, endeavored to counter the Populist 
appeal by endorsing some of the reform demands of the agrarian 
radicals. This was more than a matter of political calculation. It also 
represented the changing nature of the Democratic party in the South, 
the emergence of new leaders, and the influence of reform ideas 
among confirmed Democrats. In Texas and a few other southern 
states, politicians such as James S. Hogg eschewed third-party politics 
but waged a battle for reform within the Democratic party. They be-
came enthusiastic champions of William Jennings Bryan. Many of 
these "halfway Populists" attempted to make their party organiza-
tions more responsive to the interests of varied groups and areas. 
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Democratic leaders in the South moved quickly following the po-
litical upheaval of the 1890s to prevent a recurrence of the Populist 
revolt and to strengthen southern solidarity. They approached the 
problem on two fronts. One of these was the regional campaign to 
secure the legal disfranchisement of blacks. Democrats in several 
states had begun, even before the climactic events of the mid-1890s, 
to press for the adoption of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other voting 
requirements. This movement was accelerated during the next few 
years. Disfranchisement advocates, sensing an issue that would rally 
white southerners and, some supporters argued, even undermine 
conservative party bosses, moved energetically and with mounting 
confidence to complete the task. At the same time, the rising tide of 
Jim Crow legislation reinforced the political proscription of black 
southerners. 
A campaign to call a constitutional convention in Mississippi was 
successful in 1890, and a new document was drafted to replace the 
Radical constitution of 1868. The constitution of 1890 included several 
franchise provisions: a literacy test, cumulative poll tax, long resi-
dence requirement, registration four months before an election, and 
disqualification for a list of crimes. An alternative to the literacy re-
quirement was devised for illiterate white men-the ability to "un-
derstand" and give a "reasonable interpretation" of any section of 
the constitution. In 1895 South Carolina followed Mississippi's course 
in adopting disfranchisement features as part of its new constitution. 
Louisiana, which resorted to constitutional disfranchisement in 1898, 
invented the "grandfather clause" as a temporary alternative to its 
literacy requirement. This provision exempted from the literacy test 
those who were entitled to vote on January 1, 1867, together with 
their sons and grandsons. North Carolina, acutely conscious of the 
actions of Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana, adopted wide-
ranging disfranchisement provisions in the form of a constitutional 
amendment in 1900. Alabama took a similar step by approving a new 
constitution in 1901, and Virginia followed suit the next year. Georgia 
added a comprehensive suffrage amendment to its constitution in 
1908. Oklahoma, in 1910, was the last state to enact constitutional 
disfranchisement. 
Though the other southern states refrained from amending their 
constitutions to disfranchise black voters, all of them except Kentucky 
approved restrictive measures in one form or another. Tennessee took 
action in 1889 and 1890 by adopting a harsh registration act, a poll 
tax requirement, and a secret ballot law. By 1904 every southern state 
except Kentucky and Oklahoma had made the poll tax a prerequisite 
for voting. In some cases disingenuous registration and voting acts 
paved the way for formal constitutional disfranchisement by restrict-
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ing the electorate, particularly blacks and poor whites. The white 
primary was also an effective disfranchising weapon. In the early 
years of the twentieth century, most of the Democratic state com-
mittees or conventions introduced statewide primaries that excluded 
blacks. 
The intense struggle within the party of Redemption during the 
1890s soon weakened the position of blacks in southern politics and 
made them a natural scapegoat in the aftermath of the agrarian revolt. 
As might have been expected, the regular Democrats, particularly in 
the black belts, assumed an instrumental role in disfranchisement, 
which they saw as a means of striking at the Republican party as well 
as discouraging third-party ventures in the future. Some Democratic 
leaders may have supported suffrage restriction because it promised 
to deprive illiterate white men of the ballot and thus of any part in 
party politics. In a number of states, such as Virginia, Democratic 
opponents of entrenched party organizations apparently hoped that 
disfranchisement would undermine the power of the ruling political 
factions. Some agrarian reformers and ex-Populists such as Tom Wat-
son in Georgia became champions of Negro disfranchisement. Men 
like Watson, dispirited, often disillusioned, and sometimes embit-
tered over the failure of their Populist dreams, turned on blacks with 
a vengeance. But in general Republicans and Populists proved to be 
the most forthright supporters of universal manhood suffrage and fair 
election laws. Many poor whites, especially those in the mountain 
and hill regions, looked with suspicion on disfranchisement schemes 
that might be turned in their own direction. Some white southerners 
undoubtedly believed that removing blacks from politics would end 
the political corruption of the 1890s and enable whites to deal con-
structively with substantive issues. Indeed, contemporary white 
southerners were inclined to view the suffrage restrictions as a nec-
essary step, even a reform, but the "race question" could not be so 
easily exorcised. It continued to supply politicians with an issue that 
aroused the average white man even more powerfully than economic 
and class exhortations. 
In the end the restrictionists carried the day, though not without 
a fight. It was, in a sense, the denouement of the agrarian revolt and 
one of the last major steps in the creation of the Solid South. The 
significance of disfranchisement is suggested in J. Morgan Kousser's 
assertion that the post-Reconstruction period of transition, uncer-
tainty, and fluctuation ended "only with the restriction of the suffrage 
and the consequent stifling of anti-Democratic political parties." Kous-
ser also observes that the new political structure ensured "the absolute 
control of predominantly black counties by upper-class whites, the 
elimination in most areas of parties as a means of organized com-
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petition between politicians, and, in general, the nonrepresentation 
of lower-class interests in political decision-mak.ing."33 The new suf-
frage laws drastically reduced the size of the southern electorate, 
decimating the remaining black vote and depriving a multitude of 
lower-class whites of the ballot. With the shrunken electorate and the 
end of interparty competition came sharply falling turnouts in state 
and national elections. 
The second front on which southern Democrats acted was, para-
doxically, the movement to liberalize party rules, particularly the 
introduction of statewide primary elections and such democratic in-
novations as the direct election of U.S. senators. This movement was 
in part a legacy of populism, and it was related to the Bryanization 
of the Democratic party in the South and to the persisting demand 
in the region for social reform. While the exclusion of blacks from 
participation in southern primaries was itself a key disfranchising 
tactic, the adoption of the primary was also related to the widespread 
distrust of the old convention system and to efforts by party leaders 
to persuade white Populists and independents to join Democratic 
ranks. The primary provided a vehicle for intra party competition, and 
it helped abolish the minority party's last remaining resource, its mo-
nopoly of opposition. Public regulation of primaries, along with pro-
gressive measures such as the Australian ballot, registration laws, 
corrupt practices legislation, and nonpartisan municipal elections, 
was no doubt meant to "purify" the electorate, do away with electoral 
corruption, and limit the influence of political bosses and vested in-
terests. But the result was further to restrict the political involvement 
of the southern masses and to create a politics that was primarily 
responsive to organized groups representing businessmen, planters, 
and the growing middle and professional classes. 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the one-party system 
loomed in bold relief over the political landscape of the South. If its 
creation seemed, in some respects, to have been predetermined, the 
process that culminated in its clear-cut emergence was by no means 
smooth or free from controversy and struggle. Indeed, the period 
between Reconstruction and the end of the century was one of great 
turbulence, disagreement, and division in southern politics. It was a 
transitional period dominated by an interplay of issues that reflected 
economic, political, and racial concerns. Not until the end of the cen-
tury were the region's political leaders able to deal with questions of 
class, party, and race in a way that would minimize the divisions 
within the South and safeguard its political solidarity. 
The power and resilience of the Redeemers contributed to this 
political outcome. Enjoying the advantage of wealth, established lead-
ership, and influence, they were able to dominate the region's political 
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life for a long time, while charting a conservative course and serving 
their own class interests. When forced on the defensive by Democratic 
independents or agrarian radicals, they appealed for party regularity 
and were usually flexible enough to make judicious concessions to 
their opponents. Despite their privileged position and the recurrent 
challenge to their control, one should not exaggerate the internal 
struggle and class conflict during their regimes. The Redeemers iden-
tified themselves with the larger white community in terms of cher-
ished southern myths and cultural values, and except for times of 
acute economic distress, they were perceived as representing the "in-
terests" of most white southerners. In confronting the race question, 
they could act the role of paternalist in seeking black support and also 
resort to white-supremacy alarmism when it suited their purposes. 
Still, their political control was never secure; it was threatened by 
Republicans, Populists, and the possibility of a fusion of the two 
groups. 
Although the Republicans were a minority party in every southern 
state during the late nineteenth century, they remained active and 
constituted a powerful presence in several states. The party was sus-
tained by the continued involvement of a substantial number of black 
men and the loyalty of mountain residents in the upper South. Na-
tional GOP leaders in the 1880s kept alive their hope of strengthening 
the party's southern ranks. There was a class as well as a racial di-
mension to this Republicanism, since it depended on the black masses 
and on many disadvantaged inhabitants of the mountains. That may 
explain why southern Republicans displayed a greater willingness 
than did the Democrats to support education, to oppose the use of 
convict labor, and to seek certain kinds of government aid. They were 
also more solicitous of blacks, despite the divisions that frequently 
developed among them over candidates, patronage, and the preroga-
tives of each race. But the region's Republicans were never able to 
overcome the barriers of race and party. Republicanism, because of its 
Reconstruction connotations and its black support, was an epithet to 
many white southerners, and that provocative identity, along with 
restrictive voter legislation and the political harassment of Afro-
Americans, was a constant problem for Republicans in the southern 
states. Nevertheless, the political upheaval of the 1890s brought the 
party new opportunities in the South. It also brought the Democrats 
the most serious crisis they had confronted since Reconstruction. 
Populists, like the Republicans, soon discovered the sanctity of 
traditional party allegiance. Southern Alliance leaders first tried to 
take control of the Democratic party, but they were unable to trans-
form the party. When the more radical insurgents organized a third 
party, they were bitterly attacked for disrupting the unity of white 
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society in the South. Although the new party no doubt attracted some 
men because it gave them a chance to move up in politics, a far greater 
number of sympathetically minded Democrats could not bear the 
thought of leaving the party of southern orthodoxy. Populism re-
flected and endeavored to capitalize on class divisions in southern 
society-on the differentiation between the bourgeois world of land-
lords, merchants, and bankers and that of workers, particularly of 
tenants, sharecroppers, and small landowners. Populism did appeal 
strongly to dispossessed elements in the South, but its leaders found 
it impossible to mobilize a majority of these working-class southerners, 
many of whom were too depressed and isolated to take much part 
in politics. Economic incentives were frequently outweighed by con-
siderations of race and party. Even at the height of the dramatic strug-
gle of the 1890s, class was scarcely the most compelling issue in 
southern politics, and in the climactic campaign of 1896 the conflict 
between class and party was eased when the People's party endorsed 
the Democratic Bryan. Finally, there was the question of race. The 
Populists sought the votes of blacks and tried to promote their eco-
nomic and political advancement. Yet there were limits to the racial 
tolerance of white Populists, and their appeals for interracial coop-
eration made them vulnerable to the charge of dividing the white 
community and opening the door to "black domination" of southern 
politics. In the aftermath of the agrarian revolt, many Populists re-
signed themselves to Negro disfranchisement and even made the 
black man the scapegoat for the failure of their movement. 
Thus, the contours of the new political system in the South were 
profoundly influenced by party, race, and class. By the late 1890s, 
the Republican and People's parties were discredited. The triumph 
of the one-party system was related to the loss of economic indepen-
dence and the growing political isolation of a large number of white 
southerners, whether as landless farmers or unorganized industrial 
workers. Black southerners also slid further into the abyss, largely 
abandoned by the Republican party and the federal government and 
increasingly subjected to economic and political discrimination within 
the South. Most blacks and many whites were disfranchised. The 
power of planters and businessmen had increased. And in the future 
class and racial issues would be considered only within the confines 
of the Democratic party. 
Meanwhile, in the larger context of national parties and policies, 
the South was moving into a new position. The political upheaval of 
the 1890s, the Cleveland administration's inability to deal effectively 
with the debilitating economic crisis, and the critical presidential elec-
tion of 1896 produced a great realignment of the political system. The 
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realignment transformed the Republicans into the nation's majority 
party. It also had important repercussions in the South. It ended the 
Republican party's serious interest in the region's politics, removed 
the last institutional obstacle to the Solid South, and made the south-
ern Democrats a majority faction in a minority party. 
2 The One-Party Systetn 
With the completion of disfranchisement, the politics of the southern 
states had been restructured. The suffrage was drastically limited, the 
political influence of black belt planters and urban business and 
professional elements was enhanced, and the new system was safe-
guarded by a formidable array of registration and voting laws. Literacy 
tests, the poll tax requirement, and the administration of stringent 
registration statutes prevented millions of southerners from taking 
any part in politics. A great majority of those who could vote identified 
themselves as Democrats, and except for isolated areas, the Repub-
lican party had declined to insignificant proportions. Although Popu-
list issues and ideas still appealed to many southerners, their influence 
was largely confined to factional differences within the Democratic 
party. Indeed, government in all its aspects was dominated by a single 
party. 
One might conclude, given the place of factional groupings in 
early twentieth-century southern politics, that the South really had 
no party system. Nevertheless, each of the region's states had an 
institution called the "Democratic party," which performed important 
functions. As V.O. Key later noted, the "party" had an organization, 
it was the mechanism for making nominations, and it had a hand in 
the conduct of elections. The nature of the party organizations in the 
South varied. One or two states such as Virginia were controlled by 
tight-knit and durable factional organizations. But the Democratic or-
ganization in most southern states was amorphous and transitory, 
depending on the ascendancy of particular leaders and factions at any 
given moment. 
The supreme governing authority of the party in each state was 
the Democratic convention and the Democratic executive committee. 
The state convention, which normally met every two years, certified 
the winners of statewide primary elections, adopted a platform, se-
lected all or part of the state executive committee, and during presi-
dential years chose delegates to the party's national convention, 
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selected a slate of presidential electors, and debated resolutions on 
national issues. Party affairs between conventions were conducted by 
the Democratic state committee. There were also county and munici-
pal committees and, in most southern states, an intermediate level of 
district committees. These were primarily concerned with the ar-
rangements for and the conduct of local and congressional primaries, 
which also played a role in the election of delegates to the state con-
vention and, in some cases, members of the state executive committee. 
Ward and precinct organizations were rare, except for the Choctaw 
Club of New Orleans and a few other city "machines." The Repub-
lican party in most southern states had no such elaborate organization. 
No feature of the one-party system was more vital than the pri-
mary election, which superseded the state convention as a means of 
selecting nominees for statewide office during the early years of the 
twentieth century. Primaries were used in some localities as early as 
the 1870s, apparently as a way to secure the nomination of white 
candidates, and by the 1890s they were widely employed in nomi-
nating county officials. The political convulsion of the 1890s and the 
pressures that led to disfranchisement and the reinforcement of south-
ern one-partyism hastened their adoption and elaboration. First 
adopted on a statewide basis by South Carolina in 1896, the primary 
system spread over the region during the next decade and by the end 
of the progressive era had been extended, by party regulation or state 
law, to encompass the nomination of candidates at all levels of gov-
ernment. In Virginia, for example, the state Democratic convention 
authorized a statewide primary in 1904, and the first such election 
was held in 1905 to nominate the party's candidates for governor and 
U.S. senator. A state primary law was enacted in 1912 and amended 
in 1914. It provided for a uniform primary day-the first Tuesday in 
August in election years-throughout Virginia. Local officials rather 
than party representatives were charged with the supervision of the 
ballot boxes and the printing of the ballots. While the state assumed 
the costs of conducting statewide primaries, each candidate was as-
sessed a filing fee. The law did not provide for a run-off primary; the 
winning candidate in each contest needed only a plurality of the votes 
cast. Participation in statewide primaries was limited to persons who 
were qualified to vote in the general election. And in order to take 
part in a primary, a voter must have cast his ballot for the party's 
nominees in the last general election. 
In many respects the primary became the capstone in the southern 
structure of suffrage restriction and political solidarity. "If we can get 
an effective suffrage article in the new Constitution," wrote a Virginia 
leader in 1901, "the primaries will or can be made to be the real elec-
tions."1 Disfranchisement dealt a final blow to whatever lingering 
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hopes the Republican party had in the South, and nomination in the 
Democratic primary soon came to be the equivalent of the "real elec-
tion." Democratic leaders in some southern states established "closed 
primaries" based on certain tests of party loyalty. The closed primary 
was not designed to keep out the small number of Republicans but 
rather, in V.O. Key's words, "to assure the finality of the primary," 
that is, to keep voters loyal to the party nominees.2 In a sense, more-
over, the adoption of the direct primary was an inevitable consequence 
of the one-party system in the South since, with the dominance of a 
single party, "the logic of democracy" required a direct vote on nomi-
nees rather than selection by a convention. 3 A majority of the southern 
states soon introduced the second or "run-off" primary as a means 
of ensuring majority decisions. 
The party primary in the South was represented as a democratic 
instrumentality, a means of enhancing the ordinary white man's in-
fluence and of enabling white voters to divide on issues other than 
those of race. There was some truth in this claim. The primary facili-
tated the reabsorption of Populists and other dissidents into Demo-
cratic ranks, and it fostered and legitimized greater competition within 
the party. It also undermined older, oligarchical arrangements, and 
its adoption was a demand of Democratic reform factions in virtually 
every southern state. The primary election law of 1902 in Mississippi, 
for example, weakened the delta's control of Democratic state con-
ventions and party machinery, helped bring the "rednecks" to po-
litical power, and set the stage for an era of progressivism for white 
Mississippians. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why 
the liberal proponents of the compulsory primary assumed, in view 
of the restricted electorate, that the new system would work against 
the conservative leaders who had long controlled the party. The so-
called regular Democrats throughout the South accommodated them-
selves to the primary. At the same time, the primary system did 
encourage southern progressives and further their objectives. 
Meanwhile, party rules prevented blacks from taking part in 
Democratic primaries. These elections became white primaries. In 
South Carolina, for instance, every Negro "applying for membership 
in a Democratic club, or offering to vote in a Democratic primary 
election, must produce a written statement of ten reputable white 
men who shall swear that they know of their own knowledge that 
the applicant or voter cast his ballot for General [Wade] Hampton in 
1876 and has voted the Democratic ticket continuously ever since."4 
In Georgia the state Democratic executive committee welcomed "all 
white voters without regard to party political affiliations who desire 
to align themselves with the Democratic party and who will, if their 
right to participate in said primary be challenged, judge themselves 
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to support the nominee of the Democratic party."5 It was paradoxical 
that the white primary should serve as the ultimate disfranchising 
device in the southern states and at the same time provide a new 
avenue for demagogic appeals to racial passions, particularly in the 
deep South. This was true in part because the southern primary did 
a good deal to legitimate individual and factional competition within 
the party. In practice the primary contributed to a politics of person-
ality and rhetorical excess. It helped create a stylistic division in the 
ranks of southern politicians, a cleavage between what one historian 
has described as "respectability and audacity."6 
Primaries in the early twentieth-century South customarily at-
tracted more attention than the general elections, which were often 
uncontested, and frequently more votes were cast in the former than 
in the latter. Yet voter turnout, even among whites, dropped sharply 
after the turn of the century, and the rate of voter participation in 
most southern primaries was much below that in the general elections 
of states having more competitive parties. In Texas the vote in the 
state Democratic primary during the first two decades of the century 
ranged from a high of over 40 percent to a low of about 20 percent 
of the potential electorate. White registration in Louisiana reached 
only 53 percent in 1904 and in Mississippi only 63 percent in 1908. 
No more than 35 percent of Alabama's white men voted in that state's 
hotly contested gubernatorial primary of 1906. }. Morgan Kousser 
estimates that participation in the primary with the highest turnout 
in each of the southern states between 1902 and 1910 averaged a mere 
30 percent of the total adult population and only 48.8 percent of the 
white adults. During the years following 1920, about 30 percent of all 
southern adults generally voted for governor in Democratic primaries. 
Once elected, moreover, southern politicians could use their incum-
bency to great advantage. In studying 3,843 primary elections in the 
South during the first half of the twentieth century, the political 
scientist Cortez A.M. Ewing found that 41 percent of them were 
uncontested. "All in all," he concluded, "the data reveals that in-
cumbency is the most important factor in the nomination results of 
Southern primaries."7 Even so, the white primary was immensely 
important as a symbol-a symbol with both racial and democratic 
connotations. 
One aspect of the movement to establish a system of primaries 
in the South was the use of such contests to secure the popular election 
of U.S. senators. A favorite Populist proposal and one strongly sup-
ported by most reform Democrats, the direct election of senators was 
endorsed by many southern legislatures around the turn of the cen-
tury. Long before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 
1913, most southern states had secured the popular election of sena-
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tors through Democratic party rules that bound party members in the 
legislatures to vote for the top man in special preferential primaries. 
Proposals for the introduction of the initiative, referendum, and other 
forms of direct democracy made relatively little progress in the south-
ern states, although such innovations were popular in the Southwest, 
and Oklahoma and Arkansas adopted the initiative and referendum 
on a statewide basis. 
The broadening sweep of public regulation, gradually bringing 
party primaries within its scope, eventually came to cover almost all 
aspects of the electoral process. The southern states enacted laws 
designed to limit and publicize the campaign expenses of candidates, 
to outlaw the issuance of free passes by railroads, and to restrict 
lobbying by corporations and other vested interests. Thus, an Ala-
bama law of 1915 set limits to campaign expenditures and required 
every candidate to file an itemized statement of expenses as well as 
a list of contributors and contributions to his campaign. Another stat-
ute, also enacted in 1915 and amended in 1919, sought to prevent 
corporation involvement in Alabama elections and to regulate all 
forms of campaign advertising. Many of these laws, such as Louisi-
ana's Corrupt-Practices Act of 1912, were not well enforced, testifying 
to the influence of powerful economic interests. 
Although the one-party system soon became characteristic of 
every state in the South, the makeup of factional politics was different 
in each state, depending upon such variables as the nature of the 
economy, intrastate sectionalism, class and racial consciousness, dis-
tinctive traditions, and the extent of Republican competition. The 
quality of a state's political leadership was also important. In general, 
the early years of the twentieth century were characterized by an 
upsurge of intraparty conflict in the South, and in a rough way this 
competition reflected the historic divisions and evolving society of the 
individual states. There were, broadly speaking, three discernible 
groups of states in this period. The deep South, stretching from South 
Carolina to Mississippi, was dominated by a politics of race, disfran-
chisement, and rural poverty. The upper South, somewhat less con-
cerned with racial issues, was more diversified economically and 
politically. The Republican party retained some strength in this sub-
region. The four states west of the Mississippi River constituted a 
third subregion with fairly distinctive political attributes, including a 
pronounced strain of agrarian radicalism and more active involvement 
by farm and labor organizations in political affairs. 
The tendencies of the new age in southern politics were clearly 
revealed in Mississippi. 8 In no other state was preoccupation with the 
race question so complete, nor did any other part of the South offer 
more fertile ground for the cultivation of the mystique of the Lost 
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Cause and the myth of Reconstruction. Blacks were no longer able to 
vote, the Republican party had all but disappeared, and the domi-
nance of the one-party system could scarcely have been more abso-
lute. Yet the political divisions among white Mississippians during 
the first part of the century were sharp, and the fierce conflicts of 
those years possessed a degree of economic and social relevance. In 
fact, Mississippi experienced a political upheaval and a kind of demo-
cratic triumph during this period. 
Geographical contracts provided the foundation for a powerful 
intrastate sectionalism in Mississippi. The most favored section was 
the delta, a rich and vibrant cotton empire extending two hundred 
miles from Memphis to Vicksburg. There were also a few plantation 
counties along the eastern part of the state, but in general the land 
beyond the delta was poor. Eastward from the Yazoo River lay a series 
of bluffs, rolling tablelands, and sand-clay hills. Much of the southern 
half of the state, except for the relatively small coastal terrace, was 
covered with timber, and the piney woods of the southeast were 
rapidly being felled by the great lumber companies. Antagonism be-
tween the hills and the delta had long manifested itself in the politics 
of the Magnolia State. As a rule, the planters of the delta and black 
counties, in alliance with commercial and industrial interests, arrayed 
themselves against the small farmers of the hills and piney woods. 
A "redneck" revolt, encouraged by populism and the rise of a 
reform faction in the Democratic party, threatened to shift the locus 
of power in the state's politics at the turn of the century. One of the 
leaders in this movement was James Kimble Vardaman, the dominant 
figure in Mississippi politics during the first decade and a half of this 
century. Following the enactment of a state primary law in 1902, 
Vardaman began a long campaign that culminated in his nomination 
as the Democratic choice for governor. A magnificent actor, he pro-
jected a magnetic personality on the platform, and his swelling oratory 
lifted his audiences out of themselves. "The White Chief," as he was 
called, combined an attack on the trusts and special "interests" with 
an assault on the hapless black man. His campaigns divided white 
Mississippians into those who supported him and those who opposed 
him. Another champion of the rednecks was Theodore Gilmore Bilbo, 
who won the governorship in 1915. Bilbo, a young politician from 
the piney woods of the south, rose to prominence as an ardent Var-
daman man, first as one of his lieutenants in the state senate and 
then as lieutenant governor. A diminutive dynamo, he was a skillful 
stump speaker, a master of invective and scurrility who delighted in 
the rough-and-tumble of Mississippi politics. 
What Albert D. Kirwan described as a period of "almost incessant 
agrarian revolt" in the late nineteenth century finally engulfed the 
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state. While the conflict between the hills and the delta and between 
insurgent and regular Democrats may not have been as clear-cut as 
Kirwan thought, the primary election law of 1902 and other changes 
revolutionized political campaigning, made possible the rise of new 
leaders, and created a new and more competitive factionalism in the 
state's Democratic party. The number of white voters remained rela-
tively high, at least in primary elections, and such democratic pro-
cedures as mandatory primaries, direct election of U.S. senators, the 
initiative and referendum, and an elective judiciary were adopted by 
the state's lawmakers. These developments broke the domination of 
the black counties in statewide elections, though without greatly di-
minishing their influence in the legislature. In the altered political 
setting of the early 1900s, organized farmers, businessmen, teachers, 
and other groups brought new issues to the fore and in many 
instances obtained their objectives. A series of reform governors 
developed legislative programs and secured the enactment of note-
worthy progressive measures. They also extended and institutional-
ized, through legal and quasi-legal means, an increasingly harsh 
system of racial segregation and discrimination against blacks. Their 
factional opponents, meanwhile, managed more often than not to 
defeat progressive legislation and to weaken the implementation of 
progressive statutes. 
Alabama shared many of the economic, ethnic, and political quali-
ties of Mississippi. One of the dynamics of its politics was a hardy 
and persistent sectionalism. Spread across the south central part of 
the state were about a dozen counties known as the black belt, an 
area of rich soil and a heavy concentration of Negroes. On the south 
the black belt sloped off to the sand hills and the coastal plain, while 
on the north it was absorbed by rising foothills and, in the northeast, 
mountains. The seat of Alabama's plantation system in the antebellum 
period, the black belt continued in the twentieth century to be the 
center of the state's social and political power. In addition to their 
wealth and prestige, black belt leaders enjoyed a significant advantage 
in the disproportionate representation given their section in the leg-
islative apportionment of 1901. The piedmont and hill sections to the 
north, as well as the wiregrass country of the southeast, had long 
distrusted and opposed the black belt. Although northern Alabama 
was the fastest growing part of the state in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the black belt frequently allied itself with 
the industrialists and financiers of Birmingham-the "big mules"-
in order to control state politics. Localism-a pattern of "friends and 
neighbors" support-was also an important aspect of one-party poli-
tics in Alabama. 
Intense factionalism in the 1890s, reflecting the state's sectional 
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divisions, was carried forward in attenuated form into the twentieth 
century. One wing of the Democratic party was identified with the 
regular, conservative leaders; the other was oriented toward agrarian 
reform and such causes as free silver, primary elections, and railroad 
regulation. But this Bourbon-agrarian reform bifactionalism was soon 
modified. Unlike certain county rings or "courthouse crowds," which 
sometimes stayed in power for decades, political factions at the state 
level depended upon the success of a particular candidate. Few state 
officials remained in office very long, since most of them, including 
the governor, were constitutionally ineligible to succeed themselves. 
Other factors also affected the older bifactionalism. The economy was 
becoming more diversified, and many Alabamians, perhaps a majori-
ty of them, were committed to the New South ideas of economic 
development and thus were reluctant to endorse radical agrarian 
schemes. The development of urban and middle-class groups, mo-
tivated by entrepreneurial and professional concerns and a growing 
interest in solving social problems, injected a new element into the 
crucible of political decision making. The emergence of railroad regu-
lation as a compelling political issue and the rise of a new leader in 
connection with that issue were also important in the manifestation 
of a different factional pattern in the state's Democratic party. 
Braxton Bragg Comer, a businessman and a political newcomer, 
gradually assumed leadership of the incipient movement to secure 
more effective regulation of railroads in Alabama. In 1904 Comer was 
elected president of the state railroad commission, and two years later 
he threw himself into a heated campaign to win the governorship. 
In railroad regulation, one historian has written, the political neophyte 
had found an issue that could bring together "the interests of Black 
Belt planters, substantial farmers, town merchants, small manufac-
turers, and the professional men who identified with these groups."9 
Comer won a smashing victory in the Democratic primary; his forces 
gained control of the party machinery and committed themselves to 
a broad program of reform. As governor, he moved vigorously and 
with a good deal of success to regulate railroad rates in Alabama. But 
well before the end of his four-year term, a new issue-statewide 
prohibition-replaced railroad regulation as the center of reform con-
troversy. Comer became a champion of prohibition, and while there 
was a general correspondence between the supporters of that reform 
and those seeking stronger railroad controls, the question provoked 
great confusion and bitterness. It also brought setbacks to "Comer-
ism," in 1909 in the defeat of a constitutional amendment providing 
for prohibition, in 1910 in the defeat of the prohibition candidate for 
governor, and in 1914 when Comer himself failed in an attempt to 
win a second term as governor. Nevertheless, Comer's leadership 
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was a central issue in Alabama politics during the decade after 1904, 
and his policies were a potent factor in creating bifactional groupings 
in the state's dominant party. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Alabama politics became more open and 
more competitive after 1901, notwithstanding disfranchisement and 
the restriction of the electorate. This was true, at least, for the prop-
erty-owning, professional, and middle-class elements. Although a 
coalition of black belt and urban-industrial interests frequently exerted 
controlling influence in political affairs, the exercise of political power 
was not monolithic. The introduction of a state primary system, in-
cluding the popular election of U.S. senators, paved the way for new 
political leaders and encouraged the consideration of diverse issues 
by the white electorate. Many business and urban groups, as well as 
black belt planters and organized farmers, now found it possible to 
advance their legislative concerns and to join in the pursuit of broader 
"reforms." The cement that held these elements together in loose and 
shifting combinations was their common commitment to organiza-
tional tactics and a measure of state intervention, as well as their 
growing acceptance of the idea that social institutions needed to be 
modernized and made more efficient. Still, the pluralistic nature of 
the state's interest-group politics should not be exaggerated. The most 
influential elements in the structure of political power in Alabama 
were planters and "big mules" and their urban allies, who were usu-
ally able to limit the scope of decision making in state government 
and more often than not to control the outcome of major elections 
and policy debates. 
None of the states of the lower South displayed more vigorous 
factionalism in Democratic party politics than Georgia. The cleavage 
in the Georgia Democracy revolved around an aggressive and am-
bitious lawyer from Atlanta named Hoke Smith, who emerged as the 
leader of a popular antirailroad movement and who in 1906 was swept 
into the governorship on a reform platform that included Negro dis-
franchisement. The intense struggle that disrupted the party for a 
decade after 1905 was encouraged by the rivalry between the Atlanta 
Journal, which Smith had once owned and published, and the Atlanta 
Constitution, whose editor, Clark Howell, was a legislative leader, 
longtime member of the Democratic national committee, and guberna-
torial aspirant. Smith's determined quest for power shattered the com-
placency of the state's established hierarchy, brought a surge of 
excitement and anticipation to the electorate, and forced most Geor-
gians into two Democratic factions. Although Smith dealt Howell a 
humiliating defeat in the primary election of 1906, the anti-Smith fac-
tion won its share of victories. In fact, neither wing of the party 
seemed able to secure complete control of the state's politics. 
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One reason for this inconclusive struggle and for the blurring of 
Georgia's Democratic factionalism after 1914 was the role of Thomas 
E. Watson, the state's leading Populist in the 1890s. In 1903 Watson 
began to exert a decisive influence on the course of the state's politics, 
first by throwing his support to Hoke Smith and then by becoming 
Smith's implacable enemy. Thousands of former Populists remained 
loyal to Watson and returned with him to the Democratic party; in 
close elections like that of 1908, his voice was sometimes the deciding 
factor in the outcome. Watson and other Populists were also instru-
mental in popularizing reform issues such as railroad regulation, abo-
lition of the convict lease system, and Negro disfranchisement. By 
1912 Watson's authority in the Democratic party was so great that 
few statewide politicians dared oppose him. He made and unmade 
governors. The agrarian leader seized upon such events as the Leo 
Frank case10 to demonstrate his appeal to the Georgia masses, and 
he further confused the state's politics by lashing out at the Wilson 
administration and depicting himself as a martyr in opposing the 
national government's wartime restraints. 
There were also other ingredients in the volatile mixture of early 
twentieth-century Georgia politics. One of these was the tyranny of 
racism. Skillful use of racial issues by agitators like Tom Watson and 
Hoke Smith not only contributed to a terrible race riot in Atlanta in 
1906 and to disfranchisement but also helped produce the average 
Georgian's deep-seated and distorted complex of racial fear and hy-
persensitivity, Sectional conflict, which found expression in occa-
sional charges in the southern part of the state that the more 
industrialized and urbanized region to the north got more than its 
share of statewide offices, was not a major theme in Georgia politics. 
More important was a pronounced urban-rural conflict. Georgia's 
commercial and industrial growth after 1880 and the neglect of its 
large farm population sharpened the impact of the agrarian revolt in 
the state. But if Henry W. Grady's New South creed appeared to be 
gaining ascendancy over Tom Watson's agrarianism in later years, 
Georgia's county-unit system gave the state's many rural counties a 
disproportionate influence in primary elections. 11 When the Smith 
faction endeavored to scrap the county-unit arrangement and to re-
place it with a "direct popular vote," Watson stirred up the country 
people by predicting that Atlanta would soon dominate the state's 
political life. The issue was one that could be invoked repeatedly, 
even after the nominating scheme had been safeguarded by legislative 
act in 1917. The system itself enhanced the political power of Georgia's 
county-seat governing class, which incorporated the planters and the 
local elites in the state's hundreds of villages and small towns. 
Politics and political reform in Georgia were strongly conditioned 
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by the introduction of the primary system, the development of a fierce 
bifactionalism in the Democratic party, a substantial infusion of 
agrarian dissatisfaction, the anomalous role of Tom Watson, and the 
challenging leadership of Hoke Smith as a self-styled progressive. 
Although the power of the countryside and rural hamlet remained 
strong, urban pressures, particularly in Atlanta, and organizations 
like the Atlanta Freight Bureau were also important in state politics 
early in the new century. Indeed, the small town elite had much in 
common with the "uptown" leadership in the cities and larger towns, 
including a commitment to economic growth, social stability, and 
"modernizing" improvements. The result was a politics in which new 
issues arose and a variety of interests emerged. While party factions 
and interest groups were constantly shifting during this era, the de-
mands on state and city government steadily increased, and the pres-
sure for reform mounted. 
South Carolina politics also embodied the main characteristics of 
the deep South pattern. Underlying the clash and clamor of politics 
in the Palmetto State were sharp sectional, class, and racial differ-
ences. Sectionalism was an old phenomenon, emerging in its earliest 
form in colonial times with the demand of the back country for self-
government and equality with the dominant coastal region. In time 
a fairly clear-cut division developed between the coastal plain and the 
piedmont plateau, which stretched in a northwesterly direction from 
the fall line to the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains. This sec-
tionalism reflected but did not altogether coincide with a hardy strain 
of class antagonism. During the late nineteenth century, this antipa-
thy was perpetuated and in some respects intensified by the con-
tinuing influence of the old aristocracy, in combination with the rising 
financial and industrial interests, on the one hand, and the growing 
farm dependency and mushrooming factory working class, on the 
other. By 1900 three out of every five farmers in South Carolina were 
tenants, and by 1914 one-fourth of the state's population lived in 
textile mill villages. The political upheaval of the 1890s brought the 
rise of new and more vigorous politicians, but the agrarian revolt was 
complicated by the pervading sense of the black man's presence. 
The most significant of these leaders was the redoubtable Ben-
jamin Ryan Tillman, the principal architect of disfranchisement in 
South Carolina. A rude and one-eyed farmer from Edgefield in the 
upcountry, "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, as he was called, was a leader 
of skill, audacity, and explosive energy. He led the embattled farmers 
to victory in 1890, aroused the upcountrymen against the Charleston 
aristocracy and government by "gentlemen," and provoked the bitter 
hostility of business and professional elements. His leadership was a 
powerful force in causing South Carolina Democrats to divide into 
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two clearly defined factions. Yet "Tillmanism" offered no radical so-
lutions, avoided third-party politics, and busied itself with capturing 
control of the Democratic party. 
By 1910, when a flamboyant upcountry politician named Coleman 
Livingston Blease was elected governor, Tillman was no longer the 
predominant figure in the state's politics. Blease, a professed heir of 
"Pitchfork Ben," was extraordinarily effective in winning the loyalty 
of textile mill workers, a group Tillman had contemptuously called 
that "damned factory class." Ambitious and opportunistic, a man of 
forceful personality and a colorful oratorical style, "Cole" Blease ap-
pealed to the racial, religious, and class prejudices of the South Caro-
lina masses. It should be noted that, in contrast to the practice of other 
southern states, South Carolina did not require those who took part 
in its primaries to meet the qualifications for the general election. 
There were few obstacles to participation in the state's primary elec-
tions, and most white men voted in at least some of these contests. 
Blease, in the words of a contemporary newspaperman, "articulated 
the poor man's unexpressed emotions, ambitions and disgruntle-
ments, did it garishly, did it sentimentally, did it courageously."12 A 
recent interpreter concludes that the upcountry politician brought to 
a focus "the sharpest class confrontation between white men" ever 
to appear in South Carolina. 13 However negative his philosophy and 
program may have been, he extended the meaning of white democ-
racy and helped produce a dramatic increase in the voting partici-
pation of white South Carolinians. He was also a powerful factor in 
the creation of a new dual factionalism in the state's politics. 
Unlike several other southern states, South Carolina failed to pro-
duce a dynamic progressive governor in the first years of the twentieth 
century. Tillman remained powerful for a time, but he demonstrated 
little interest in social reform. Blease enlivened state politics and 
aroused the interest of many ordinary South Carolinians, but he was 
not an advocate of a reform program or of new public services. There 
was still no effective reform coalition in the state: political leadership 
was lacking, the rural and industrial elites were generally reactionary 
and defensive, and the middle-class and professional elements in the 
cities and towns were not yet well organized. A reform breakthrough 
finally came with Richard Irvine Manning, an anti-Blease leader who 
was elected governor in 1914. As governor, Manning became a cru-
sader against lawlessness, something of a social reformer, and un-
questionably the state's most constructive governor during the two 
decades after 1900. He succeeded in broadening support for change 
and carried through a more positive program based on expanding 
state services, greater administrative efficiency, and the moderniza-
tion of social institutions. 
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The fifth deep South state in the early 1900s was Florida. Although 
the state's population was small-only slightly more than half a mil-
lion in 1900-its geography did not facilitate speedy communication 
or easy assembly of people on a statewide basis. Innumerable lakes 
and marshes made travel difficult, and distances were very great. 
While it was only a subdued note in the clash of factional politics 
before 1920, a distinctive sectionalism was emerging in Florida. It was 
a north-south cleavage, in which the older section, bordering Georgia 
and Alabama, was opposed by the growing peninsular region. The 
newer and less developed areas to the south were more diversified 
in their economy than north Florida, less "southern" in population, 
less traditional in outlook, and more absorbed in the New South ap-
proach to development. Because of the state's obvious transportation 
needs and the spreading enthusiasm for the development of the cen-
tral and southern parts of the peninsula, legislators and administrative 
officials were reluctant to apply stringent regulations to railroads and 
other corporations. Yet a current of agrarian radicalism carried over 
from the 1890s into the new century, and an anticorporation bias 
supplied a rallying ground for political reformers. Contemporaries 
referred to the conflict between "corporation" and "anticorporation" 
Democrats. 
In the amorphous and kaleidoscopic milieu of southern politics, 
wrote V.O. Key in 1949, "only the most able-or spectacular-
personality can function effectively in the organization of a stable 
following." 14 Such a personality was Florida's Napoleon Bonaparte 
Broward, who created the most enduring faction among the state's 
Democrats in this period. He became a hero of the common man, a 
champion of the "Crackers" against the railroad interests and "land 
pirates," and a forceful leader of the anticorporation faction. Broward 
was elected governor in 1904. His administration sponsored a number 
of reforms, including an audacious scheme to drain the Everglades. 
His opponents condemned him as a demagogic radical whose inno-
vations would frighten away much-needed capital. Broward's influ-
ence continued after his death in 1910, both because of the impetus 
his leadership had given to a bifactional grouping of the voters and 
because of the way it had encouraged Florida progressivism. Park 
Trammell, one of Broward's lieutenants, was elected governor in 1912. 
But by the time Trammell left office in 1917, the Broward era was 
clearly drawing to a close, and the old factional lines were disap-
pearing. 
A new leader came to the fore about that time in the person of 
Sidney J. Catts. A Baptist minister, insurance salesman, and political 
unknown, Catts was elected governor as an independent in 1916. He 
capitalized on prohibition sentiment, fear of what he called the 
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"Catholic menace," opposition to the enforcement of the state fish 
and oyster conservation law, and the controversial Democratic pri-
mary that denied him the party nomination in 1916. The stormy Catts, 
disrespectful of the established political order and of social pretension, 
in the manner of Coleman L. Blease, plunged the state into four years 
of turmoil. Though identified with the support of penal reforms, pub-
lic health programs, educational improvement, labor unions, and 
woman suffrage, he made full use of the spoils system and fought 
many battles with the legislature and the press. Catts suffered an 
overwhelming defeat in an attempt to win a Senate seat in 1920, and 
he was unable to perpetuate his influence in Florida politics. Politics 
in the Peninsula State thereafter became calmer but also more con-
servative. 
Virginia was part of a subregion that differed markedly from the 
deep South. Except for tobacco, a major staple in the southern part 
of the state, the Old Dominion was not extensively involved in the 
South's cash crop agriculture. Tenancy was actually declining in the 
years after 1900, and such diversified activities as livestock production 
and truck farming were growing rapidly. While still largely rural, 
Virginia was undergoing notable industrial development and urban 
growth. At the same time, its characteristic social and political outlook 
was thoroughly traditional. Indeed, no other southern state was so 
dedicated to cavalier ideals-to the notions of personal honor, gen-
tility, and paternalism. To the concepts of limited government, state 
rights, and white supremacy was added a conviction that government 
was the responsibility not of ordinary men but of the best families. 
Style was important in politics, and a measure of decorum was ex-
pected. In Virginia, the home of Robert E. Lee and the Confederate 
capital, there was a special veneration for the heroes of the Lost Cause, 
and this too blended into the nostalgia for the great days of the past. 
Virginia politics incorporated a strong intrastate sectionalism. 
Moving from east to west, one encountered the familiar geographical 
divisions of the Southeast-tidewater, piedmont, and mountains. The 
plains of the Tidewater gave way, in the north, to rolling hills and, 
in the south, to the Southside, a crescent-shaped black belt whose 
base extended for a long distance along the North Carolina border. 
Farther west lay the Blue Ridge Mountains and beyond them the 
Allegheny highlands. In the southwest was a large upland area that 
reached into the very center of the Appalachians. This was Republican 
country. The minority party normally elected at least one congress-
man and polled a third or more of the votes in presidential elections. 
The Republican presence had a disciplinary effect on the state's Demo-
crats. 
The basis for a dual factionalism in the Democratic party was laid 
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in the 1890s by Thomas Staples Martin, a little-known railroad lawyer 
who was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1893. Unpretentious and dif-
fident, a conservative but above all else a political pragmatist, Martin 
was a skillful organizer and an able tactician. His leadership was 
strengthened by a cadre of shrewd and dedicated lieutenants such as 
Henry D. Flood and Claude A. Swanson. Martin's organization was 
a disciplined hierarchy whose sources of control included the legis-
lature, Democratic party machinery, and strong outposts at the city 
and county levels. The legislature was a powerful institution in Vir-
ginia, not least because it appointed the members of the state's several 
courts. The county and city court judges in tum appointed a number 
of key local officials, including the electoral boards. The Martin or-
ganization worked closely with the important elective officials of the 
various counties, who looked to the machine's control of the legis-
lature for protection against changes that might affect their authority 
or compensation, and these courthouse "cliques" were usually able 
to furnish votes to the machine. The Martin faction enjoyed great 
strength in rural areas, and with the small electorate after 1902, the 
local leaders were strategically placed to provide the margin of victory 
in most district and state elections. So small was the Virginia electorate 
that state employees and officeholders cast about one-third of the total 
vote in state elections between 1905 and 1948. 
By the tum of the century, an increasing number of "indepen-
dents" were challenging the regular Democrats led by Senator Martin. 
They demanded clean elections, a party primary system, and stricter 
regulation of railroads and industrial corporations. In 1901 an inde-
pendent named Andrew Jackson Montague won the governorship. 
His administration proved to be moderately progressive and was iden-
tified with advances in public education, the adoption of primary 
elections, and support of the good roads movement. The "indepen-
dent versus machine" struggle continued for a decade or more, but 
the regulars won almost all of the important statewide races. Despite 
the enmity between the two factions, they were not divided by sharp 
ideological differences. Furthermore, organization leaders gradually 
accepted the major reforms advocated by their opponents, and they 
were adept at neutralizing or absorbing their enemies. A bitter op-
ponent of the machine named Westmoreland Davis managed to win 
the governorship in 1917, but he was unable to build an organization 
of his own and was decisively defeated in a bid for the Senate in 1922. 
Following Martin's death in 1919, the organization seemed momen-
tarily to be adrift, but after a brief period it acquired a new pilot in 
Harry Flood Byrd. 
Another of the upper South states was North Carolina. Less in-
volved in the plantation economy than most southern states, its eco-
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nomic life was correspondingly more diversified. Although its 
inhabitants were less bound by regional traditions than Virginians or 
South Carolinians, their politics turned again and again to the explo-
sive issue of race. The black man's part in the fusion movement of 
the 1890s and the white supremacy campaign that overthrew fusion-
ism in 1898 and 1900 were too vivid in the minds of North Carolina 
Democrats to permit the abandonment of race as an issue. The uneven 
distribution of the black population was one of the aggravating factors 
in the political sectionalism of the Old North State. In antebellum 
times the plantation system was centered in the eastern section, and 
that area was far more ardent in support of secession than the western 
part of the state, where farms were small and slaves were few. Union-
ist sentiment and Republicanism became strong in the extreme west-
ern counties. The fastest growing section in the early 1900s was the 
Piedmont, which served as a transition between plains and mountains 
and, after disfranchisement, between Democrats and Republicans. 
While the Republican party no longer had any real chance of winning 
statewide elections, it usually attracted about a third of the state's 
votes and controlled local government in some of the western coun-
ties. 
An inchoate bifactionalism characterized North Carolina Demo-
crats in the 1890s, with a rough division being manifest on such issues 
as the regulation of corporations, free silver, and the leadership of 
William Jennings Bryan. Conservative Democrats were generally as-
cendant. The chairman of the Democratic state committee and the 
strategist who led the party to victory in the white supremacy cam-
paigns of 1898 and 1900 was Furnifold M. Simmons. He headed a 
group of powerful politicians who directed the party's course during 
most of the quarter-century after 1900. Another source of support for 
the regular Democrats was their close relationship with financial and 
business leaders. The Simmons faction was also identified with a 
group of able young leaders who came to public attention in the party 
battles of the late 1890s. The most important of these new men was 
Charles Brantley Aycock, a politician of great eloquence and popu-
larity who was elected governor in 1900. Aycock gained a reputation 
as North Carolina's "educational governor," and it was during his 
administration that a spirit of self-examination in public affairs began 
to bring significant changes to the state. 
After 1905 the reform movement in North Carolina quickened, 
the "machine" was subjected to mounting criticism, and an array of 
progressive legislation was enacted. In 1908 William W. Kitchin, an 
antiorganization Democrat, won the governorship. The independents 
failed, however, to build a strong organization that could overcome 
the regulars. Simmons and his allies remained in control, although 
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the familiar factionalism in the party seemed to be losing strength by 
1917. Political affairs in North Carolina during the progressive era 
bore the heavy imprint of the race issue, disfranchisement, a restricted 
electorate, and a long-established Democratic hierarchy. The contin-
ued existence of a minority party, ineffective as it was, brought a 
degree of discipline and coherence to state politics. Important also 
was the diversified nature of the economy, which fostered the emer-
gence of a variety of interest groups, including organized shippers, 
the Farmers' Union, and social welfare elements. A substantial body 
of social reforms was enacted. Ultimately, Tarheel progressivism was 
shaped by the support of shifting coalitions that changed with dif-
ferent issues and circumstances, by the rough consensus on popular 
reforms that developed among political leaders, and by the state's 
basic conservatism. 
Perhaps the most diversified southern state was Tennessee, 
whose narrow territory reached more than five hundred miles from 
the mountain town of Bristol in the extreme northeast to the delta 
city of Memphis on the Mississippi River. The state was marked off 
into three grand divisions that were set apart from each other by 
distinctive geographical, cultural, and political characteristics. East 
Tennessee, a land of mountains, plateaus, and valleys, had not been 
suitable for slavery. An area of small farms and increasing industri-
alization in the late nineteenth century, it had opposed secession, 
supported the Union, and become Republican in its politics. The west-
ern division, lying between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi, 
was the center of the state's cotton production and had the heaviest 
concentration of blacks. Although it contained the largest city in the 
state, West Tennessee was the most rural of the three divisions. It 
had been ardent in its support of secession and war and was strongly 
attached to the Democratic party. Middle Tennessee was comprised 
of the highland rim and the central basin, a region that extended from 
the Cumberland Plateau in the east to the Tennessee River in the 
west. It was dominated by Nashville and the fertile bluegrass basin 
in which the capital city was located. Middle Tennessee's economy 
was more varied than that of West Tennessee, but it had supported 
the Confederacy and was stoutly Democratic in its politics. 
The Republican party was an institution of greater consequence 
in Tennessee than in any of the other ex-Confederate states. It con-
trolled a majority of the county governments and usually won two 
congressional districts in the eastern division, as well as a few counties 
along the highland rim of West Tennessee. Nevertheless, in state 
government and statewide elections, one-partyism had become the 
rule in Tennessee. Republicans still suffered from their identification 
with Reconstruction and black participation in politics, and they were 
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sometimes weakened by vexatious internal strife. The operation of 
the poll tax, the registration laws, and the Democratically controlled 
election system also hurt the Republicans and diminished voter par-
ticipation in general. Among the state's Democrats in the late nine-
teenth century, an industrial New South element frequently clashed 
with the party's Bourbon leadership, which disdained the New South 
creed and remained loyal to a Jeffersonian philosophy and to Old 
South traditions. On the other hand, agrarian radicalism was rela-
tively weak in the Volunteer State. Nor did "liberal" and "conserva-
tive" factions of the sort that developed in Virginia and some other 
states emerge distinctly in Tennessee during the early years of the 
new century. 
This situation began to change in 1905 and 1906 with a burst of 
factional maneuvering among Democrats and hard-fought contests 
for a U.S. Senate seat and the governorship. In 1908 Gov. Malcolm 
R. Patterson and Edward Ward Carmack, a former U.S. senator, en-
gaged in a fierce struggle for the Democratic gubernatorial nomina-
tion. Carmack was defeated and a few months later was killed on the 
streets of Nashville by one of Governor Patterson's friends. Since 
Patterson and his followers controlled the governorship and the party 
machinery, many of the Carmack partisans, calling themselves in-
dependent Democrats, refused to participate in regular party affairs 
and endorsed Ben W. Hooper, the Republican candidate for governor 
in 1910. Hooper was elected and managed to win reelection two years 
later with the support of the independent Democrats. By 1914 this 
period of schism in the majority party was about over, and in that 
year a reunited and chastened Democratic party came back into con-
trol of the state government. 
Independent and regular Democrats sometimes disagreed over 
such matters as "machine rule," the need for a primary election law, 
and the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for president in 1912. But 
the most telling issue in separating independents and regulars and 
the one that served as a catalytic agent in creating the factional align-
ment for a decade after 1905 was the struggle over statewide prohi-
bition of alcoholic beverages. Although prohibition was adopted by 
the legislature in 1909, the whole problem continued to dominate 
Tennessee politics until the election of 1914. Governor Hooper, are-
former and a vigorous opponent of the "whiskey evil," led a move-
ment that possessed some of the aspects of a religious crusade. Yet 
he found it difficult to enforce the state law, particularly in the larger 
cities. The problem was further complicated by the role of Mayor 
Edward H. Crump of Memphis, whose organization made him a for-
midable protagonist in Democratic politics and state government. The 
intense controversy surrounding the prohibition issue and the dis-
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ruption of the Democratic party in Tennessee make it hard to relate 
the social reformism of this period to political and factional divisions 
in the state. There was, in fact, increasing support for "reform" from 
both parties and from various segments of the Democratic party after 
1905. While lacking a militant antirailroad campaign like that of Ala-
bama and North Carolina, Tennesseans were nonetheless quite re-
sponsive to "the rhetoric of reform." 
Kentucky, one writer has observed, "waited until the war was 
over to secede from the Union."15 There was considerable truth in 
this hyperbole. The Democrats swept the elections of 1866, and for a 
generation Kentucky was virtually a one-party state. Though more 
southern than northern, it was a border state. Its subdivisions were 
similar to those of Tennessee: the mountains in the east, the Bluegrass 
region in the middle, and the generally flat farming area of the west. 
After the Civil War, many of the former Whig slaveholders, who were 
mostly located in the Bluegrass country, moved into the Democratic 
party, where they joined with the small farmers of western Kentucky 
to give their party predominance in state politics. The conservative 
leadership of the Democratic party also reflected the political leverage 
of Kentucky's rapidly growing industrialists. 
The severity of the depression of the 1890s, the appeal of the 
nativist and anti-Catholic American Protective Association, and the 
increasing disunity within the Democratic party enabled the Repub-
licans to elect a governor in 1895 and to carry the state for William 
McKinley in 1896. Always ready to take advantage of the majority 
party's factionalism, they had become a serious competitor of the 
Democrats. Kentucky Republicanism was strongest in the east, where 
the Whig party and Unionist sympathies had centered. The state's 
blacks, who made up about 13 percent of the population in 1900, were 
also staunch Republicans, and in Kentucky they were not disfran-
chised. Although unable to gain control of the legislature, the Re-
publicans won the governorship in 1899, 1907, and 1919. There were 
usually one or two representatives and occasionally a senator from 
Kentucky in Congress during this period. 
If the regular Democrats were challenged by the Republicans in 
the 1890s, they were also opposed by a coalescing group of dissident 
Democrats. The struggle that ensued was both ideological and or-
ganizational. It was a conflict between the conservative planters of 
the Bluegrass counties and their corporate allies in the cities, on the 
one hand, and the populistic western farmers and urban workers, on 
the other. The issues involved the money question, the regulation of 
corporations, and new election laws, but the immediate stake was 
control of the party. The first phase of this internecine strife culmi-
nated in 1900 with the assassination of William Goebel, a leader of 
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the reform Democrats. In the tumultuous aftermath of that spectacular 
incident, Goebel became a martyr in the eyes of many Kentuckians, 
and a stringent law to regulate the state's railroads was quickly en-
acted. But the bifactional groupings that emerged after 1900 were less 
distinct than they were at the height of Goebel's leadership. John 
C. W. Beckham, a Democrat who served as governor for almost eight 
years, made his peace with the Bluegrass conservatives and the busi-
ness interests. 
James B. McCreary, a more reform-minded Democrat than Beck-
ham, won the governorship in 1911. He established a progressive 
record as chief executive. Yet his reforms and the anticorporation 
campaigns of agrarian leaders like Augustus 0. Stanley did not mean 
that the industrial and commercial interests were curbed in the Blue-
grass State. In general, the conservative Democrats of the middle 
section and the Republicans in the eastern part of the state dominated 
Kentucky politics after 1900, just as the Bluegrass and western regions 
had combined to control public affairs before the end of the 1890s. 
Still, there were progressive tendencies in Kentucky, particularly 
among social reform leaders and organizations, and the state legis-
lature did approve a direct primary system, greater controls over cor-
porations, modest labor and prison reforms, increased support for 
schools and highways, and a modicum of tax reform. At the same 
time, however, the diverse character of the state's economy, the great 
power exerted by railroads and other business interests, and the shift-
ing nature of Democratic factionalism seem to have limited progres-
sivism. 
The other states of the early twentieth-century South lay west of 
the Mississippi River. Arkansas was perhaps the least characteristic 
of the four-state group. At the turn of the century, it was an over-
whelmingly rural and agricultural state. Its largest city, Little Rock, 
contained only 65,000 people as late as 1920. Arkansas had already 
begun to acquire an image of poverty, of slow economic development, 
of what one of its historians later referred to as "recalcitrant back-
wardness and resistance to change."16 It was divided, geographically 
and to some extent culturally, into two major sections. A line drawn 
diagonally from the northeast to the southwest, passing through Little 
Rock in the middle of the state, would separate the northern and 
western highlands from the southern and eastern plains. One part of 
the state consisted of hills, mountains, and valleys, while the other 
was made up of delta, prairie, and flatlands. One was the habitat of 
small farmers and mountaineers, the other of cotton planters, black 
tenants, and rice growers. Despite the division between the highland-
ers and the residents of lowland areas, political sectionalism in Ar-
kansas was less pronounced than in several other southern states. 
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The principal basis for political division in early twentieth-century 
Arkansas was the cultural split between town and country. 
Arkansas politics after the Civil War mirrored the familiar se-
quence of Reconstruction, Redemption, and Redeemer control. Al-
though the Republican party was strong in several northwestern 
counties, it offered no serious challenge to the majority party in the 
post-Reconstruction period. But by the mid-1890s, the established 
Democrats were beginning to lose their hold on the state's politics. 
The opposition came largely from within their own party and was 
stimulated by the force of agrarian protest. Then, at the end of the 
century, a new and spectacular leader arose to articulate the state's 
agrarianism and to shape its politics for more than a decade. He was 
Jeff Davis, a boyish looking lawyer who was elected state attorney 
general in 1898. Davis identified himself with the growing enthusiasm 
for a system of primary elections, and he created a sensation by 
launching a host of antimonopoly suits against insurance companies 
and other corporations. His antitrust campaign catapulted him into 
the governorship in 1900; he was twice reelected and went to the U.S. 
Senate in 1907. Thoroughly at home with the white dispossessed, 
Davis was, in the words of a contemporary writer, "surcharged with 
personal magnetism. He makes the people think he is persecuted for 
their sake, and stands between them and oppression."17 No politician 
had ever aroused the Arkansas proletariat like this "Karl Marx for Hill 
Billies," for he "evoked a hierarchy of angels and demons in which 
there were no neuters."18 He set the "rednecks" of the backwoods 
against the "high-collared crowd" of the city. He was firmly rooted 
in the agrarian folk culture of the South. 
Although Jeff Davis and his friends controlled the party machin-
ery during the early years of the century, they were unable to per-
petuate their hold on state politics. The electorate tended for a time 
to divide itself into two camps on the basis of Davis's dramatic politics, 
but it soon lapsed into an amorphous and shifting factionalism with 
little coherence or continuity. Nevertheless, Davis broke the custom 
of organizing state campaigns around courthouse cliques and took 
his electioneering to the voters at the grass roots. Furthermore, as 
one scholar has argued, the Arkansas leader "pushed the ideological 
center of the [Democratic] party well to the left. And he politicized a 
generation of Arkansas farmers whose faith in political action had 
been flagging, stroking their egos and giving them a renewed sense 
of dignity and hope."19 Near the end of the progressive era, a new 
face came to the fore. It was that of Charles H. Brough, a professor 
of economics and sociology at the University of Arkansas who was 
elected governor in 1916. Brough was a reformer, and he directed a 
major fiscal reorganization and a notable extension of state activities. 
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But his leadership failed to alter the basic pattern of the state's politics. 
While there was a strain of agrarian radicalism in Arkansas politics 
in the first part of the twentieth century, it was offset by a drastically 
restricted electorate, by the entrenched position of local elites, and 
by the conservatism of executive and legislative leaders in Little Rock. 
Louisiana was another of the southwestern states. It produced 
two great cash crops, contained a large French and Catholic popu-
lation, and had a powerful urban machine. Much of the state was 
made up of river bottomlands, lakes, and swamps. Flowing south, 
the Mississippi and Red rivers eventually joined to form a Y -shaped 
drainage basin. Most of the northern part of the state, except for the 
alluvial river bottoms, was comprised of hilly lands whose inferior 
soils were cultivated by poor white farmers and tenants. North Loui-
siana was cotton country, the most productive of which was the coun-
terpart of Mississippi's delta-a land of rich soil and many blacks. 
Another staple was produced in south Louisiana, in the flood plain 
between the Red River and the Gulf; this was sugar country, the scene 
of a capitalist and large-scale planting economy. Late in the nineteenth 
century still another staple crop-rice-was successfully introduced 
to the prairies of southwestern Louisiana. Commercial lumbering was 
important in many parts of the Pelican State, and the production of 
petroleum became significant in the second decade of the new cen-
tury. 
The pattern of the state's politics revealed three geographical com-
ponents: north Louisiana, south Louisiana (more precisely the tri-
angular-shaped area from Lake Charles in the southwest to New 
Orleans in the east to Alexandria in the north), and Orleans Parish 
(with the city of New Orleans). There was a rural-urban conflict in 
Louisiana, and the rural elements, particularly in the northern section, 
feared and distrusted the economic and political power of New Or-
leans. A religious and cultural contrast-between the Creole-Catholic 
south and the Anglo-Protestant north-cut across economic and so-
cial lines. 
Although the conservative Democrats who ruled Louisiana dur-
ing the generation following Reconstruction were plagued by sharp 
factional divisions, they carried out the wishes of the planters, the 
commercial and financial interests centered in New Orleans, and the 
railroad and lumber companies. Resentment at this state of affairs 
fanned the fires of agrarian radicalism in the 1890s and helped pre-
cipitate a crisis for the established Democrats. The People's party was 
strong in the hill parishes of north Louisiana, and in the state elections 
of 1894 and 1896, it undertook a fusion campaign with the Republi-
cans, themselves a renewed threat to the majority party following a 
decade of steady decline. The regular Democrats managed to win both 
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the state and national elections in 1896, and they then moved to pre-
vent a recurrence of the Populist-Republican challenge. They accepted 
some of the reform proposals put forward by their critics and carried 
out a process of disfranchisement. The disfranchisement of blacks and 
the introduction of statewide primaries altered the relative voting 
strength of the state in favor of New Orleans and the white upland 
parishes, at the expense of the planters, who were no longer able to 
dominate party nominations. Yet, unlike its immediate neighbors to 
the north and east, Louisiana failed to produce a charismatic cham-
pion of the poor whites and rednecks in the manner of Jeff Davis and 
James K. Vardaman. 
One reason for this failure was the important role of New Orleans 
in the state's politics. The city had a population of almost 300,000 
people in 1900, and Orleans Parish normally accounted for nearly 
one-fourth· of the electorate and representation in the general assem-
bly. Politics in the Crescent City was dominated by the Choctaw Club 
or "Old Regulars," an organization led by Mayor Martin Behrman 
for almost two decades after 1904. Behrman and his assistants ran a 
disciplined machine and one that mobilized the immigrant and lower-
class voters, worked closely with financial and corporate interests, 
and assumed a "let live" attitude toward gambling, drinking, and 
prostitution. While the Choctaws became a consistent obstacle to labor 
legislation and the effective regulation of business, they were willing 
to accept some reform legislation. The New Orleans machine was 
probably the single most powerful voice in state politics, and, in com-
bination with upriver cotton planters, it exerted decisive influence in 
Louisiana politics. The Choctaws pulled Democratic factionalism in 
the direction of bifactional groupings and gave a measure of coherence 
and stability to the state's politics. 
Despite the sectional, class, and cultural divisions that set Louisi-
anans apart from each other, conservative Democrats managed to 
retain the allegiance of most voters. A flare-up of radicalism among 
some of the old Populists and lumber workers in the hill region led 
to a Socialist vote of over 5,000 in the election of 1912, but this rustic 
rebellion soon subsided. In the same year, John M. Parker, a promi-
nent planter and New Orleans cotton factor, launched a more sig-
nificant assault on the Democrats by organizing the Progressive party 
in Louisiana as a part of Theodore Roosevelt's new third party. The 
regular Democrats controlled the governorship, except for the years 
1912-16, when Luther E. Hall, an advocate of "good government," 
held the office. Parker ran for governor on the Progressive ticket in 
1916, polling 37 percent of the total vote, and in 1920 he won the 
governorship on the Democratic ticket. In earlier years Parker and 
other urban reformers had sought to bring about a civic transformation 
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in New Orleans and to defeat the Behrman machine. Their success 
was limited, but they were instrumental in securing a commission 
form of government for the city. At the state level, a surprising amount 
of progressive legislation was enacted during the first two decades of 
the century. There was an urban flavor to much of this legislation, 
deriving from the influence of New Orleans reform organizations and 
professional groups as well as the machine that controlled the city's 
politics. 
Texas had been a Confederate state, was dominated by the Demo-
cratic party, and had a substantial black population (about 20 percent 
in 1900). It was clearly a part of the South, but the Lone Star State 
was also characterized by a western outlook that set it apart from its 
neighbors to the east. Although it was still overwhelmingly agricul-
tural and cotton remained its most valuable product, Texas had a more 
diversified economy than most other southern states, and the pace 
of industrialization was noticeably quickening. The spectacular oil 
discovery at Spindletop in 1901 opened the petroleum era in the 
Southwest and broadened the base of the state's economy still further. 
Despite the considerable concentration of blacks in East Texas, the 
race question did not as a rule assume great importance in state poli-
tics. The population, moreover, was somewhat more heterogeneous 
than that of the average southern state. In ten or twelve counties 
south of Austin, nineteenth-century German immigrants gave a dis-
tinct cast to one part of Texas. Farther south, along the Rio Grande, 
a large number of Mexican-Americans provided another ethnic varia-
tion. Ethnic-religious voting blocs were formed by persons of German 
Lutheran and Catholic ancestry and of Mexican Catholic background. 
The state's remarkable growth in the late nineteenth century and its 
vision of further economic development inevitably influenced its poli-
tics. Yet visitors were struck by the force of tradition among Texans. 
From their conversation one might think that "the massacre of the 
Alamo happened last month, that the Mexican War occurred last 
week, and that the Civil War was a tragedy of yesterday."20 
Populism had a marked effect upon Texas politics. The ferment 
of the 1890s also produced James Stephen Hogg, a popular cam-
paigner with a strong anticorporation bias. Hogg, who was elected 
governor in 1890, managed to steer a middle course between the 
Populists and the regular Democrats who preceded him as party lead-
ers. A "reform Democrat," he built up a sturdy political organization 
and momentarily compelled most Texans to divide into Hogg and 
anti-Hogg factions. Conservative elements dominated the Democratic 
party as the new century began, but the legacy of James S. Hogg's 
politics was an important element in the eventual revival of political 
and social reform in Texas. A burgeoning array of interest groups 
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began to press for more vigorous governmental action in the new 
century. Among these organizations were the Farmers' Union, the 
State Federation of Labor, the Federation of Commercial Clubs, the 
Texas Federation of Women's Clubs, and the Texas Local Option As-
sociation. 
How to handle corporate wealth and how to restrain the power 
of the railroads, lumber companies, and oil corporations became the 
central public issue in Texas during the first decade of the twentieth 
century. In 1905 an impressive number of reformers appeared in the 
state legislature, and a new attorney general launched a vigorous 
antitrust attack. The following year brought the election of Thomas 
M. Campbell, who became the state's outstanding progressive gov-
ernor. What one historian has referred to as a coalition of "small 
businessmen, young professional politicians, and organized farmers" 
paved the way for Campbell's success. 21 A series of legislative reforms 
was enacted during Campbell's four years as governor. The tide of 
progressivism weakened in 1910, when Oscar B. Colquitt, a more 
conservative leader, won the governorship. Texas progressives dem-
onstrated their greatest strength in rallying to the cause of Woodrow 
Wilson in 1911 and 1912. They dominated the state convention in the 
latter year and sent a solid Wilson delegation to the Democratic na-
tional convention. During the decade after 1906, the pattern of Demo-
cratic politics in Texas revealed a distinct bifactional configuration. 
Though the division shifted from one issue to another, the "pro-
gressive" faction tended to support stricter regulation of corporations, 
to oppose Sen. Joseph W. Bailey, to champion prohibition, and to be 
identified with the presidential campaign to nominate Wilson. 
After 1911 the "liquor question" became the most divisive issue 
among Texas Democrats. The relentless controversy over prohibition 
dominated the state's politics for several years, generally aligning drys 
and progressives on the same side. Then, in the gubernatorial primary 
of 1914, a new actor appeared on the political stage. He was James 
E. Ferguson, a farmer, lawyer, and small-town banker who had never 
before run for public office. A colorful campaigner, "Farmer Jim," 
who was elected in 1914, made a strong appeal to the state's poor 
farmers. His first important legislative accomplishment was an act to 
put a ceiling on farm tenancy rentals. Ferguson was easily reelected 
in 1916. But he ran into trouble during his second term and in 1917 
was impeached and removed from office for misapplying public funds 
and interfering arbitrarily in the affairs of the state university. "Fer-
gusonism" now became an issue in itself, and Ferguson's personal 
following was destined to make him an important factor in Texas 
politics for almost two decades. Fergusonism and the events of World 
War I disrupted the pattern of the state's politics, and, as in other 
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southern states, the old dual factionalism rapidly disintegrated. Yet, 
for all of their internal conflict, the Democrats' flexible party organi-
zation, understanding of the state's varied economic and cultural in-
terests, and willingness to provide at least a measure of state and 
federal involvement helped them retain the loyalty of a majority of 
the Texas voters. 
Of the thirteen states that seem to warrant inclusion in the early 
twentieth-century South, the least "southern" was Oklahoma. The 
frontier was everywhere in evidence in this unfinished state, which 
did not enter the Union until1907, and in many ways it was as much 
western as southern in its attitudes and behavior. The white popu-
lation was diverse in origin, there was a large Indian minority, and 
blacks made up only a little over 8 percent of the inhabitants in 1910. 
Although the economy was predominantly agricultural, it was based 
in part on the growth of wheat, on mining, ranching, and lumbering, 
and on oil, of which it produced one-fourth of the national output by 
1913. Nevertheless, Oklahoma felt the pull of strong centripetal forces 
that bound it to the South. Many of its inhabitants were natives of 
other southern states, and southerners, whose influence was pro-
nounced in the eastern and southern sections, dominated the early 
years of statehood. Southern attitudes on race were much in evidence, 
and state leaders quickly devised a means of disfranchising black 
voters. Oklahoma also shared the cotton culture of the eastern South, 
and the staple spread during this period from the southeastern section 
to the central and southwestern areas. 
A latent radicalism-manifesting itself as twentieth-century 
populism-burst into bloom by the time Oklahoma became a state. 
Nowhere in the United States was agrarian protest more conspicuous. 
The Farmers' Union and organized labor exerted great influence in 
the new state's politics. William Jennings Bryan was the idol of the 
Oklahoma masses. The hazards of farming in the Sooner State, the in-
creasing percentage of farm tenancy (over half by 1920), and the role 
of large corporations in exploiting the state's resources fostered a 
populist spirit among the people. This radicalism was reflected in the 
Democratic party, but it was expressed more dramatically in the So-
cialist party of America. The Oklahoma party had more paid-up mem-
bers than any other state by 1910, and in 1914 its state ticket received 
more than 52,000 votes. Before the war decimated their members, the 
Socialists had become an alarming specter to the Democrats and tan-
gible evidence of the desperate conditions surrounding many Okla-
homans. Populism, "Bryanism," and rural socialism helped shape 
progressivism in Oklahoma, along with farm organizations, organized 
labor, and various social reform groups. The emergence of an interest-
group politics was a key factor not only in the enactment of progres-
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sive legislation but in the general conduct of political affairs in the 
state. 
Oklahoma became a strong Democratic state and a part of the 
Solid South. Democratic leaders, who were responsible for the con-
stitution of 1907, got the new government off to a good start. Taking 
advantage of the spreading enthusiasm for progressive action, the 
Democrats eagerly embraced "reform" and worked closely with a 
progressive coalition made up of the Farmers' Union, the Twin Ter-
ritorial Federation of Labor, and independent social justice advocates. 
In addition to their attack on the Republicans for opposing ratifica-
tion of the constitution, Democratic leaders derisively identified 
the opposition party with "the Carpetbagger, the Corporation, and 
the Coon." The Republicans, moreover, made the mistake of ignoring 
reform issues in favor of traditional GOP policies, and they were hurt 
by the disfranchisement of blacks in 1910. Yet the party was a sub-
stantial threat to the dominant Democrats. Strongest in the northern 
third of the state and generally in the western section, its gubernatorial 
nominees obtained over 40 percent of the votes in the elections before 
1920. Every legislature during this period contained a strong and ac-
tive Republican contingent. The GOP congressional nominees usually 
won two or three House seats and in 1910 captured a majority of 
them. 
Meanwhile, the triumphant Democrats were unable to maintain 
party harmony very long. Differences between Democrats from In-
dian Territory and Democrats from Oklahoma Territory did not com-
pletely disappear after statehood. More important was the rivalry that 
soon developed between leaders such as Charles N. Haskell, the 
state's first governor, and William "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, who served 
as president of the constitutional convention of 1906-7. For several 
years factional alignments based on the personal followings of the 
founding fathers provided the most discernible structure of the state's 
Democratic party. This factionalism soon declined, however, and an-
other organizing principle did not immediately take its place. Con-
fronted by the Socialists on the left and the Republicans on the right, 
the Democrats tended increasingly to find leaders who represented 
business and professional interests rather than the reform coalition 
of earlier years. The bitter rivalries within their party weakened the 
Democrats, as did the Socialist upsurge before the war and a vigorous 
Republican challenge during the postwar reaction against "Wilson-
ism." In 1920 Oklahoma Republicans carried the state for Warren G. 
Harding, elected their first U.S. senator, and won five of the state's 
eight congressional seats. 
The pattern of state politics in the early twentieth-century South 
had a good deal of uniformity, despite the individuality of the various 
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state designs. The Democratic party dominated every state in the 
region. Most of the southern states enacted election "reforms" around 
the turn of the century that included some form of Negro disfran-
chisement, the poll tax as a voting prerequisite, and tough election 
laws. These so-called reforms, whatever their effect in preventing 
fraud, created a new and greatly restricted electorate in most of the 
states. At the same time, the introduction of state systems of primary 
elections brought an increase in the number of political candidates 
and encouraged bifactional groupings among Democrats. Two com-
peting factions emerged in almost all of the states below the Potomac 
and the Ohio, giving an appearance of well-defined and ongoing 
political divisions analogous to a two-party system. The primaries also 
provided an arena for interest groups and reform causes. Intraparty 
competition, along with interest-group politics, contributed to the rise 
of a group of colorful and influential reform governors, the most 
successful of whom served as focal points for progressive coalitions 
and assumed a new role as legislative leaders. In the meantime, the 
legislatures were becoming more important, with the development 
of numerous progressive campaigns and the increasing demand for 
state regulation and public services. 
·on the surface the new structure of politics in the southern states 
was paradoxical. Disfranchisement and elaborate voting requirements 
denied a substantial portion of the potential electorate any part in 
politics. On the other hand, primary elections were in some respects 
more open and competitive than the old convention system, and 
they facilitated the political role of new organizations and interest 
groups. Political power was still centered in the planters and the black 
belts, in the rising industrialists, and in the county-seat governing 
class. Yet it was redistributed to some degree after the turn of the 
century. The beneficiaries of this shift in power were the emerging 
middle-class and professional elements in the growing cities and 
towns, people who filled the ranks of numerous civic, commercial, 
and professional organizations. These groups were instrumental in 
efforts to expand the functions of state and municipal governments 
and to use them for novel purposes. 
Southern politics clearly possessed a rural and provincial cast dur-
ing this period. This was evident in the controlling position of the 
local elites in hundreds of small towns and rural hamlets, whose 
power was magnified by overrepresentation in state legislatures and 
party conventions, and in the fact that a majority of the successful 
politicians and officeholders were products of the countryside and 
small towns. But even so, the political leverage of "uptown" residents 
increased as the years passed. Basically, southern politics reflected 
the realities of a system that was undemocratic, conservative, and 
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rural-oriented, and one in which enormous power was concentrated 
in the hands of established and influential groups. The system was 
not altogether closed, however, for it sometimes fostered change, 
innovation, and even "reform." An important reason for the system's 
response to the demands for "progress" was that the dominant po-
litical and social elements were themselves willing to accept and oc-
casionally to promote change for the sake of order and stability, 
efficiency, and "modernization." 
Despite the limited electorate, southern politicians were not un-
responsive to the attitudes and desires of the white masses. Given 
the prevailing assumptions about the proper role of govemmen.t, the 
strong tradition of individualism in a largely rural society, and the 
pervasive longing for economic development, political leaders were 
reasonably faithful mirrors of their white constituents. Southern poli-
tics also responded in some measure to the pressure of groups that 
were normally outside the political process-to Republicans in some 
areas, to Socialists in the Southwest, to women throughout the South, 
and to blacks, particularly in the cities. James R. Green describes "a 
new kind of class struggle in the Southwest," one that "united the 
rural producers-indebted yeomen and the landless tenants-against 
the 'parasites' in the towns and cities" but was also attached firmly 
to the "principles of Marxian socialism."22 The creative response of 
southern women to the plight of the poor and disadvantaged was 
notable in the South's uplift campaigns, and by the end of the pro-
gressive era a genuine woman suffrage movement had taken shape 
in the region. Blacks never ceased struggling to protect their interests. 
Their civic organizations, boards of trade, public welfare leagues, and 
community betterment groups labored to extract worthwhile conces-
sions in education and other public services from the white system, 
to secure more adequate correctional facilities for black juveniles, to 
improve housing and sanitation in black areas, and to promote moral 
conduct, social order, and efficiency in the Negro community. 
The ambiguities of the political system can be seen in the complex 
of reform movements that comprised southern progressivism. Anum-
ber of tendencies-quickening social change, an emergent ideology 
of southern progress, a broadening humanitarianism, and the trans-
formation of politics around the tum of the century-converged to 
provide a favorable setting for southern progressivism. Politics, of 
course, constituted an essential medium for the waging of these cam-
paigns. State and local governments were the primary agencies for 
the resolution of conflicts in the community and for the regulation of 
business practices and social behavior, as well as the source of public 
services. The South's economic growth and diversification increased 
the demands on state and local governments for franchises, services, 
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and regulations. The expanding cities and towns were confronted 
with especially troublesome problems, which often required action 
by state legislatures. With the enhanced role of government came a 
dramatic enlargement in the part played by economic and professional 
organizations in the formulation and enactment of public policy. 
Chambers of commerce, freight bureaus, farmers' organizations, labor 
unions, professional associations, and scores of other groups were 
soon participating in local and state politics throughout the region. 
Reform Democrats, influenced by populism and the leadership of 
William Jennings Bryan, were particularly responsive to the political 
demands of these groups. 
A series of progressive movements unfolded in the South as 
hundreds of politicians, newspaper editors, educators, and members 
of the professions cast themselves in the role of reformers, launching 
scores of campaigns for public education, railroad regulation, more 
efficient agricultural methods, a more adequate welfare system, and 
so on. One group of reform efforts was primarily concerned with 
governmental regulation and the imposition of social controls in trou-
blesome areas such as race relations and corporate enterprise. A sec-
ond significant category of progressive campaigns in the South was 
dominated by the theme of social justice, by efforts to outlaw child 
labor, to establish juvenile courts, and the like. Social efficiency, es-
pecially as it related to economic development, was another focus of 
the reform movements. The campaigns for efficiency in agriculture, 
municipal government, and industrial labor led to greater emphasis 
on scientific knowledge, expertise, and effective administration in the 
public arena. Similar pressures emanated from other reform cam-
paigns, such as the movements for public education, public health, 
and good roads. The incentives that underlay the reform movements 
were varied and overlapping; issues like compulsory education and 
restrictions on child labor reflected an interest in social control as well 
as humanitarian concern. Virtually all of these progressive campaigns 
had assumed a regionwide character by 1910, and they were almost 
always promoted as "southern" reforms. But for all their talk of de-
mocracy, morality, and social uplift, southern progressives were cau-
tious reformers, led by middle-class and professional men and women 
who were generally amenable both to the limits imposed by the cen-
ters of power in their states and to the restraints of regional values 
and traditions. Unlike the third-party radicals of the 1890s, the pro-
gressives contributed to the white consensus on the race question and 
did not make the mistake of bolting the Democratic party. 
By the time Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency in March 
1913, the reform movements in the South, as in other sections, were 
increasingly influenced by national organizations, standards, and so-
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lutions. This nationalization of reform was apparent in two of the 
southern progressives' most vigorous regulatory movements: the cam-
paign to control railroads and the crusade to prohibit the sale and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages. It was manifested as well in the 
reform legislation enacted by the Wilson administration. World War 
I also had a nationalizing effect on the South. It contributed to the 
region's prosperity, brought an expansion in the functions of gov-
ernment, encouraged civic cooperation, enhanced the role of volun-
tary groups, and opened new avenues of social control, efficiency, 
and social justice. 
Southern progressivism could claim some impressive achieve-
ments, notwithstanding the region's inherently undemocratic political 
system. It was a major factor in shaping the South's politics and social 
thought for the next half-century. The progressives created a synthesis 
of the antithetical approaches of the Redeemers and the Populists. 
They were to function both as agents of modernization and as guard-
ians of southern tradition. They attracted support from diverse social 
elements, including the region's civic-commercial elites and upwardly 
mobile urban groups. Progressivism also drew on the swirling protest 
of the 1890s, and agrarian radicalism influenced the politics of the 
new century, helping to account for the anticorporation sentiment, 
intraparty competition, and morality-oriented campaigns. The pro-
gressives promoted the reform of southern institutions, the devel-
opment of more efficient government, and the expansion of public 
services. They sought to integrate the South more fully into the po-
litical life of the nation and were eager for southerners to play a more 
constructive role in national affairs. 
Well before the United States entered World War I, the Solid South 
had become a southern-and an American-institution. Although 
the Republicans controlled some local areas in the upper South and 
the Socialists in Oklahoma were a threat for a few years, there was no 
serious challenge to Democratic hegemony in the region. Political com-
petition, which was often intense, was restricted to the Democratic 
primaries. While politics was of central importance to the well-being 
of most southerners, it was most responsive to the property-owning 
and professional elements. The one-party system revolved around a 
severely limited electorate, factional competition within the white pri-
mary, a pronounced rural and small-town orientation, and a process 
of decision making that was ultimately determined by a relatively few 
well-organized and powerful interests. Having become established, 
the system continued year after year, decade after decade. It became 
an accepted feature of southern life. Meanwhile, the region's role in 
national politics was also contributing to the image of the Solid South. 
In the National 
Arena 
The American political universe that took shape in the realignment 
of the 1890s reflected what one political scientist calls "the most en-
duringly sectional political alignment in American history."1 So para-
mount were the Republicans in this party system that much of the 
North and West was scarcely less subject to one-party politics than 
was the South. Except for the special case of 1912, 84.5 percent of the 
total electoral vote for Democratic presidential candidates between 
1896 and 1928 came from the southern and border states. In guber-
natorial elections between 1894 and 1931, Republicans won 83.1 per-
cent of the contests in the Northeast and 67.2 percent of those in the 
Midwest and West. On the other hand, one scholar has estimated 
that between 1876 and 1945 Democratic candidates were victorious in 
almost 95 percent of all political contests in the eleven ex-Confederate 
states. Genuine competition was limited to a relatively few states such 
as New York, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, 
and Missouri. "The Republican party's domination of national par-
tisan politics," one historian has written, "reflected the concentration 
of people and economic power in the northeastern-midwestern states, 
and it consolidated the transfer of political power to northern finan-
cial-industrial elites that had begun in the 1850s."2 
Few observers suspected at the beginning of the twentieth century 
that the South would soon play a larger role in national politics. Writ-
ing in 1910, one commentator called attention to the region's con-
tinuing obsession with the race issue, lack of free thought as compared 
with other parts of the country, and longtime political isolation within 
the nation. Save for the ill-fated Andrew Johnson, no southerner had 
occupied the White House since the Civil War, nor had any southern 
leader been nominated for president or vice-president in that period. 
The South had seldom been represented in the cabinet or on the 
Supreme Court, and relatively few from the region had served in the 
diplomatic and consular services during those years. As for Congress, 
one contemporary wrote, "If for fifty years there has been a single 
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great general law or policy initiated by Southerners or by a South-
erner, or which goes or should go by any Southerner's name, the fact 
has escaped me."3 The southern political leader, observed World's 
Work in 1902, "has a nationality inside of a nationality. He is suspi-
cious. He seems to belong to a special cult. He does not take up 
national problems as if they were his problems, but rather as if they 
were somebody else's whose work it was his duty to criticize."4 Al-
though William Jennings Bryan, the foremost Democratic leader in 
national politics between 1896 and 1912, had a large following in the 
southern states, most of the party organizations in the South were 
racked by continuing struggles between the Bryanites and more con-
servative factions. 
Nevertheless, in one respect the South's role in national politics 
after the 1890s was greater than it had been in the late nineteenth 
century. It had a strong voice in the decisions of the national Demo-
cratic party and to some extent in the policies of the national govern-
ment. This was true in part because the region normally made up the 
largest and most dependable component of the Democratic party in 
national elections. Southern Democrats usually constituted a majority 
of their party's members in Congress. The Fifty-seventh Congress 
(1901-3), for example, contained ninety-five Democratic representa-
tives and twenty-two Democratic senators from southern states, as 
against fifty-six Democratic representatives and nine Democratic sena-
tors from other regions. The average Democratic congressman from 
the South enjoyed a longer tenure than his counterpart from other 
areas. Incumbency was a decided advantage in most primary elections 
for congressional seats, while the lack of Republican opposition in 
general elections was also a significant factor in the seniority acquired 
by many southern congressmen. There was an element of deference 
in the attitude of the southern electorate toward their established 
representatives in Washington, a disposition to view them as natural 
leaders and as patriarchal statesmen. 
Their long service, seniority, and ranking positions on standing 
committees enabled southern congressmen to master the organiza-
tional and procedural structure of the U.S. Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives. They made adroit use of the committee system, usually 
dominated their party's congressional caucuses, and began to dis-
cover the possibilities of unlimited debate in the Senate. Elaborating 
these political devices, they were able to maintain a position of power 
in the national government and in principle to apply John C. Cal-
houn's concept of the concurrent majority. The constructive contri-
butions of these southern congressmen were greater than might be 
thought. They provided sturdy support for railroad regulation, tariff 
and tax revision, and a variety of agrarian reforms during the ad-
60 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
ministrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. Yet 
they struck many observers as being peculiarly undisciplined, quix-
otic, and anachronistic. 
One reason for this impression was that racial considerations 
seemed to color every political issue in the South. As one southern 
senator pointed out, in explaining the reaction of his fellow south-
erners to the presidential appointment of a black man to federal office, 
"Of course, there are some senators ... who will be more loud-
mouthed and exclamatory in opposition to the Negro's confirmation 
than anybody else but who really are at heart perhaps glad that you 
sent the name in; it gives them an opportunity to roar through the 
press and otherwise for home consumption. It is grist come to their 
mill, while for conservative men who have been and want to remain 
friends of the administration it is most embarrassing, in fact, either 
hurtful to them or suicidal to them at home, depending upon what 
course they take."5 Another factor was the vigorous factional strug-
gles that developed at the state level throughout the region and the 
rise of a new group of colorful and demagogic politicians whose per-
sonalities and rhetoric appealed strongly to the white masses and who 
were regarded with contempt in the North. Some conservatives be-
wailed the new "radicalism" of southern politics. In 1906, for instance, 
the editor of the Charleston News and Courier deplored "the political 
proletairism [sic] which has controlled the South." He expressed the 
opinion that, in time, "the conservative spirit of our people would 
undoubtedly have prevailed in the politics of the nation, but [that] in 
no other part of the country have the Socialistic tendencies of the 
times so largely affected the political activities of the people as in the 
Southern States."6 
The complex of reforms identified with William Jennings Bryan 
did introduce an issue with a certain ideological coherence into the 
factional conflicts among southern Democrats. This division was re-
flected in Bryan's presidential nomination in 1900 and 1908, as well 
as in the nomination of the conservative Alton B. Parker in 1904. 
Although Bryan was resented and opposed by numerous politicians, 
newpaper editors, and businessmen in the South, he had a telling 
effect on southern political attitudes. As a leading historian has writ-
ten, the southern states became "the most thoroughly Bryanized re-
gion in the country."7 "If we can't win with you," an Alabama 
congressman wrote Bryan early in 1908, "it seems to me that we can't 
win with anybody. We don't want another Judge Parker or anybody 
else that had a violent pain in the conscience in 1896 on account of 
free coinage .... [The money power opposes you] because it knows 
that you stand and will continue to stand for the control and regulation 
of the great corporations, including the railroads, and that you favor 
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an income tax."8 In the opinion of the Chicago Chronicle, a Republican 
newspaper, the southern Democratic leadership during this period 
was just as "wrong-headed and fanatical on economic questions and 
as strong in its socialistic tendencies as the Bryan and Hearst De-
mocracy in the northern states."9 Bryan's appeal in the South was 
related to the revival of Jeffersonian principles, especially the agrarian 
side of Jefferson, but it was centered even more solidly in the Ne-
braskan's advocacy of currency and banking reform, railroad regu-
lation, democratic innovations, and the like. 
A minor but persistent refrain in the political discourse of the 
early twentieth-century South was the call for a more independent 
and nationally oriented politics. One source of this dissatisfaction was 
the growing capitalist sentiment in the southern region, which en-
couraged a certain restlessness among businessmen and expressions 
of discontent with the Democratic party's position on such issues as 
the tariff, ship subsidies, and foreign policy. There were also com-
plaints from a group of latter-day "mugwumps," whose views were 
a manifestation of the new social criticism in the South and who in 
a broad sense were a product of the emerging professions and grow-
ing middle class in the cities. These critics contrasted the economic 
advances and bright industrial prospects of their region with its po-
litical intolerance, lack of influence in national affairs, and loss of "the 
old time southern force and character." They longed for an end to 
the Solid South, for the expulsion of its "narrow and sectional spirit," 
for greater independence of thought, and for discussion of national 
issues. The Solid South had turned out to be a misfortune, the young 
historian Ulrich B. Phillips wrote in 1904. "It has prevented her having 
due influence upon national legislation and administration, and what 
is worse it has proved perhaps a greater check to freedom of thought 
than slavery was."10 "We have been told for years," complained Wal-
ter Hines Page in 1900, "that if the negro vote were eliminated, the 
Southern white vote would be divided on National questions." Yet 
there was little indication of such political competition in the aftermath 
of disfranchisement. The trouble with southern politics, Page wrote 
a few years later, could be summed up in five words: "small men in 
public life." The region desperately needed new political leaders. This 
leadership must "leave the [Civil] war alone-and the Negro ques-
tion," must not be afraid of "Mr. Bryan, nor of the backward Southern 
press," must speak the language of Grover Cleveland, and must be 
"national" in thought. 11 
Some of the independents hoped that the South's political eman-
cipation would be accomplished through presidential leadership. 
They spoke kindly of William McKinley, were alternately encouraged 
and disappointed by Theodore Roosevelt, and for a brief time placed 
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their confidence in William Howard Taft. "Roosevelt," a North Caro-
linian predicted in October 1901, "is going to break the back bone of 
the old moss back democratic ring rule in the South, as sure as fate." 12 
Such wistful expectations were never realized, of course, and the 
twenty-sixth president's racial mishaps and controversial appoint-
ments provoked an outpouring of scorn and condemnation in the 
southern states. Still, southerners could not entirely resist the effer-
vescent Roosevelt, even though few of them were ever willing to vote 
for him. Professor Edwin Mims of Trinity College noted in 1905 that 
many southerners were drawn to Roosevelt because of his "intense 
Americanism" and "disinterested public service." Mims also thought 
that the president, who boasted that his ancestry was half southern, 
acted like a southerner in displaying "a certain quality of enthusiasm, 
demonstrativeness, and cordiality." Alexander J. McKelway, a promi-
nent child labor reformer, declared that the New Yorker's advocacy 
of progressive measures like pure food, meat inspection, and railroad 
regulation had made him many friends in the South. During the Roo-
sevelt years, McKelway remarked, southerners began for the first time 
since the Civil War to consider the federal government as possibly a 
"beneficent agency."13 On the other hand, Roosevelt failed to reform 
the Republican party in the South, despite his bold pronouncements. 
While the president relied upon the black educator Booker T. Wash-
ington as a southern adviser, he gave tacit encouragement to the 
developing lily-white movement in states like North Carolina and 
Louisiana. Republican leaders in the South continued to devote their 
energies to the politics of selecting delegates to the national conven-
tion, to federal patronage, and to the control of the party machinery 
in their respective states. 
In 1908 William Howard Taft increased the Republican percentage 
of votes in most of the southern states, and after his election he at-
tracted attention in the region with several sympathetic speeches and 
felicitous statements designed to appeal to the sensibilities of white 
southerners. Perhaps the new president could revitalize the Grand 
Old Party in the South, transform it into a respectable alternative to 
the Democratic party, and end the region's isolation in national poli-
tics. That was the wish of men like Walter Hines Page, who persuaded 
Taft to address a meeting of the North Carolina Society of New York 
in December 1908. Page described the affair as "a bugle call to all 
progressive Southerners."14 When the new president appointed the 
Tennessean Jacob McGavock Dickinson to his cabinet, many con-
servative southerners began to show greater interest in national poli-
tics. "The time has come," a small businessman in Mississippi 
asserted, "for our Southern States to take the position to which they 
are entitled. We must cut loose from 'Bryanism,' 'Vardamanism,' and 
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all other 'Isms' that have kept our country back for the past 25 or 30 
years, and look to the development and up-building of our Southern 
country."15 Whatever hopes southerners may have had for Taft's 
southern policies were soon obliterated by the disruption of the Re-
publican party and the controversy surrounding the Taft administra-
tion. But as the fortunes of the Taft presidency declined, prospects 
for the Democratic party rose. Confirmation of these possibilities first 
carne in the midterm congressional elections of 1910, when the Demo-
crats won control of the House of Representatives. Southern congres-
sional leaders began to come to the fore in 1911, most conspicuously 
in the person of Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee and majority leader in the lower house. 
This southern leadership in Washington aroused pride and antici-
pation among southerners, many of whom were showing heightened 
interest in national legislation such as tariff reduction, railroad regu-
lation, aid to agriculture, and constitutional amendments providing 
for an income tax and direct election of U.S. senators. 
Southern interest in national politics rose to new heights with the 
nomination and election of Woodrow Wilson as the nation's twenty-
eighth president. The presidential election of 1912 was the first such 
contest in almost forty years in which the South played a central part. 
Southerners were quick to claim Wilson, who had been born and 
reared in the South, as one of their own, and his spectacular rise as 
a reform governor of New Jersey was followed with keen interest by 
newspaper editors, educators, and public leaders all over the region. 
Richard Evelyn Byrd, speaker of the Virginia house of delegates, wrote 
Wilson after the latter's election as governor in 1910: "I regard you 
as the best & most available candidate for the Presidency on the demo-
cratic ticket of 1912."16 There were numerous messages of this kind, 
and Wilson's campaign of 1911 and 1912 for his party's presidential 
nomination evoked an enthusiastic response throughout the South. 
Even so, he was forced to divide the southern delegations to the 
national Democratic convention with two other popular candidates: 
Representative Underwood and Rep. Champ Clark of Missouri. Un-
derwood was a formidable contestant in the deep South, while Clark 
was very strong in Kentucky and the Southwest. Wilson won Texas 
and South Carolina, three-fourths of the North Carolina delegates, 
and a portion of those from Louisiana, Virginia, and Tennessee. 
The spirited preconvention contest for southern support in the 
Democratic convention was itself a factor in stimulating regional 
thinking about national issues. The fact that two native southerners-
Wilson and Underwood-were genuine candidates for the presiden-
tial nomination heightened southern interest. "It is good to be a 
Democrat in this year of our Lord," exclaimed the president of the 
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University of Virginia, who went on to assert: "The leaders of the 
party that bears the great name in the Federal Congress are going 
about the tasks imposed upon them by the nation with a sobriety and 
an intelligence, a self-sacrifice and a calmness, very disappointing and 
surprising to their enemies and very heartening to their friends. " 17 
Although Wilson's campaign for the nomination in the South did not 
invariably lead to a progressive-conservative cleavage, it was gener-
ally the case that his strongest support came from the so-called reform 
factions, from the old Bryan elements, from an~icorporation and an-
tiboss Democrats. He faced powerful opposition from old-style Demo-
cratic leaders, who were suspicious of him as a party outsider. Of 
course, southerners of different ideological persuasions were no 
doubt attracted to the New Jersey governor because, in Arthur S. 
Link's words, they "saw in him the South's great hope for presidential 
preferment. " 18 Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt's strenuous campaign 
as the Progressive party's nominee for president added to the excite-
ment in the South. While the split in the Republican party that led 
to Roosevelt's candidacy assured Wilson's election, southerners were 
very conscious of the fact that the Democratic nominee had received 
his strongest electoral support in the South and the border states. 
Woodrow Wilson's election to the nation's highest office seemed 
to mark the beginning of a new era in southern politics. Millions of 
southerners experienced an unaccustomed excitement-a thrill of 
pride and exhilaration-in the knowledge that one of their own had 
at last ascended to the presidency. "Long ago," a North Carolinian 
wrote, "I had despaired of ever seeing a man of Southern birth Presi-
dent." But a dramatic change had taken place. "Wilson's elevation to 
the Presidency marks an era in our national life. With it we have the 
ascendency of men of Southern birth and residence to the seats of 
power and responsibility such as has never been seen in our day. 
There is a change in personnel and policies. The world is looking on 
to witness the result. I have comforting hopes, and shall indulge them 
until driven to disappointment which I pray may not come."19 South-
ern editors and public speakers never tired of reminding their audi-
ences that Wilson was a man of southern birth, upbringing, and 
culture, a man who understood and exemplified the region's finest 
traditions. He was, his more enthusiastic supporters contended, a 
man of destiny who would end the South's long political isolation 
and respond generously to its political and economic needs. Southern 
representation in the new president's cabinet, in Congress, and in 
the Democratic party strengthened the South's expectations. Five of 
Wilson's cabinet members in 1913 had been born in the South, and 
Edward M. House, who became his chief adviser and confidant, was 
a Texan. Southerners made up half of the Democratic majority in the 
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Senate and more than two-fifths of the party's majority in the House 
of Representatives. A southern atmosphere unmistakably surrounded 
the new administration, and a number of journalists suggested that 
after a long absence the South was once again "in the saddle." The 
implication was that the southern states would now dominate the 
national government as well as the Democratic party. 
Wilson's election led many of his southern adherents to anticipate 
presidential assistance in their continuing struggles with opposing 
Democratic factions for state and local control. A Texas progressive 
warned the president-elect soon after the election, however, that "the 
Democratic Party is now in a most perilous situation. The danger lies 
largely in the Southern States and arises out of the fact that a large 
element of the Party in those states are not Democrats in reality, but 
stand-pat Republicans, sailing under the colors of Democracy, and 
others who, having no political convictions, are machine gangsters."20 
Indeed, the hopes of many reform-minded southerners were soon 
dashed by what Arthur Link describes as "the realities and necessities 
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of practical politics.'m Wilson, determined to enact his New Free-
dom agenda and to make his party a disciplined instrument for that 
purpose, was confronted with a situation in which conservative 
Democrats, particularly from the South, held powerful positions in 
Congress and were established solidly in their constituencies. The 
president soon capitulated, deferring to the recommendations of Post-
master General AlbertS. Burleson and other conservatives and per-
mitting much of the federal patronage to go to old-line Democrats in 
the South. In one southern state after another-Virginia, Kentucky, 
Alabama, and so on-the result was to disappoint and weaken the 
reform factions. 
In Virginia, Wilson's campaign was paralleled by a struggle be-
tween the dominant faction led by Sen. Thomas S. Martin and an-
tiorganization Democrats, who supported the New Jersey governor. 
Wilson's decision to work with the Martin regulars marked what one 
scholar has described as "the final demise of the anti-organization 
faction in Virginia politics."22 The independents fought on for a time. 
In 1914 they organized the Virginia Progressive League, with a re-
newed attack on the state "machine" and an effort to popularize a 
broad reform program. But the results were disappointing, and the 
factional division based on the Wilson movement of 1911-12, never 
clear-cut, became steadily less distinct in the face of the president's 
wide appeal in the state and region. Meanwhile, North Carolina pro-
gressives, inspired by Wilson's New Freedom and disheartened by 
the conservative character of the state legislature, set about the for-
mulation and adoption of an ambitious program of social reform, 
including a statewide primary, revision of the state tax system, more 
stringent regulation of business, new child labor legislation, a mini-
mum school term of six months, and a series of constitutional amend-
ments. They arranged a progressive convention in 1914 and publicized 
their demands widely through the state, only to have their proposals 
repudiated by the next state Democratic convention. Progressives in 
Virginia and North Carolina-and in other southern states-achieved 
a number of their legislative objectives over the course of the next 
few years, but these successes were not the result of presidential 
intervention in the South's factional politics. 
Southern congressmen were quite favorable in their response to 
Wilson's leadership. Few of these men had ever enjoyed the kind of 
power and patronage that came to them during the Wilson era. Their 
seniority and the Democratic majorities enabled them to dominate the 
committee structure in both houses of Congress. Twelve of the thirteen 
principal committee chairmen in the House and twelve of fourteen 
in the Senate were southerners. Most of the southern congressmen 
were in general agreement with Wilson's reform proposals in 1913 
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and 1914, and they provided strong support for the major legislative 
features of the New Freedom. Indeed, experienced southern leaders 
such as Underwood of Alabama and Furnifold M. Simmons of North 
Carolina skillfully guided the administration's tariff, banking, and 
business regulation measures through Congress. The prototypical 
southern congressman in this period was middle-aged, well educated, 
and a lawyer by training. An experienced officeholder, he had been 
born in a rural place and resided in a small southern town. A majority 
of the southern lawmakers were steeped in local politics and in the 
traditions and tactics of Congress. They were experts, moreover, in 
the substantive details of their committees. 
Despite their state-rights tradition and instinctive distrust of fed-
eral activism, southern congressmen during the Wilson period were 
forceful advocates of national assistance, especially in the field of 
agriculture. The South's support of New Freedom legislation was 
more than a matter of party loyalty and regional pride in Woodrow 
Wilson. It also resulted from the fact that a great many of the Wilson 
reforms were widely popular among southerners: tariff reform, a new 
banking and currency system, antitrust legislation, a national rural 
credit program, federal aid to agricultural and vocational education, 
government support of shipping, and federal assistance for highway 
construction. Southern senators and representatives provided large 
majorities for long-term rural credits, a federal warehouse statute, 
an agricultqral extension program, vocational education, and more 
effective regulation of commodity exchanges. The Democratic con-
gressmen, most of whom were southerners and westerners, were 
unusually cohesive in supporting these reform measures. 
Congressional Democrats from below the Potomac shared a com-
mitment to white supremacy, a proud and sensitive attachment to 
the idea of the South, and an inclination to believe that their region 
had long been exploited by powerful economic and political interests 
in the Northeast and Midwest. Yet they frequently disagreed among 
themselves. During the Wilson presidency, they seemed to be divided 
into two discernible categories. One group was an administration 
faction typified by Representative Underwood; its members were gen-
erally conservative but reliable supporters of the party and the presi-
dent. The second group included agrarian liberals like Claude Kitchin 
of North Carolina, who succeeded Underwood as majority leader in 
the House of Representatives in 1915. Other southern congressmen 
were not readily identifiable with either group. The agrarian reform-
ers, who were well represented in the House, expressed a kind of 
neopopulism and Bryanism that looked to Washington for both an-
titrust action and federal assistance to farmers and small businessmen. 
Their ranks included, in addition to Kitchin, Robert Lee Henry and 
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Rufus Hardy of Texas, Otis T. Wingo of Arkansas, and J. Willard 
Ragsdale of South Carolina. These southern agrarians helped secure 
progressive changes in the Glass Banking and Currency Bill, pushed 
for more vigorous antitrust legislation, worked for more democratic 
tax schedules in such measures as the Revenue Bill of 1916, and cham-
pioned a system of rural credits and other agricultural aid. Southern 
backers of new federal programs also contributed to the metamor-
phosis of the Wilsonian program into a series of broader and more 
vigorous federal policies in 1915 and 1916. 
Nevertheless, southern congressmen objected to several of the 
more advanced progressive proposals considered during Wilson's 
first term. They were especially apprehensive about issues that in-
volved race relations and state rights. There was marked southern 
opposition to the Alaskan Railroad Bill, the La Follette Seamen's Bill, 
workmen's compensation for federal employees, the Keating-Owen. 
Child Labor Bill, and a constitutional amendment to enfranchise 
women. Southern lawmakers were often suspicious of legislative pro-
posals with a pronounced labor or urban orientation. Southerners 
were more inclined to support certain measures of social control. They 
took the lead in the passage of a bill to restrict foreign immigration 
in 1914 and 1915 and in the successful repassage of a literacy require-
ment for immigrants early in 1917. Southern leaders were even more 
ardent in their advocacy of Negro proscription in Washington and 
the federal service. Indeed, southern pressure, in and out of Congress, 
was the most important influence in the Wilson administration's thor-
oughgoing segregation of government workers and denial of federal 
appointments to blacks, as well as the flood of Jim Crow bills intro-
duced in the Sixty-third Congress (1913-15). "Between 1913 and 
1917," one historian has concluded, "the direct impact of race con-
sciousness upon national politics stemmed largely from the reinvigo-
rated influence of southern Democrats in Washington."23 
Two of the most controversial issues of the early Wilson years 
were national prohibition and federal legislation to outlaw child labor. 
The South was divided in its reaction to federal intervention in these 
two areas. Yet the limitations of state action, in the South as else-
where, persuaded more and more southerners to join the movement 
for reform at the national level. The accelerating movement for na-
tional prohibition was accompanied by a new prohibition surge in the 
South. This antiliquor wave was first manifested in Virginia, where 
favorable action in 1914 climaxed a long and complex struggle. The 
next year brought Alabama, Arkansas, and South Carolina into the 
dry ranks. In Congress, meanwhile, the movement for national pro-
hibition steadily grew stronger. A prohibition amendment to the fed-
eral Constitution, sponsored by the American Anti-Saloon League, 
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was introduced in the House of Representatives by Richmond Pearson 
Hobson of Alabama and in the Senate by Morris Sheppard of Texas. 
When the amendment was approved by Congress in 1917, southern 
members voted overwhelmingly in its favor. 
They were much less enthusiastic about federal child labor leg-
islation. The most important measure of this kind was a bill introduced 
in 1914 by Rep. A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania and Sen. Robert 
L. Owen of Oklahoma. It provoked resolute opposition in the south-
em textile states. The bill passed the House in 1915, with most of the 
negative votes coming from six southern states, but the Senate failed 
to act on the measure. A new child labor proposal, the Keating-Owen 
Bill, was passed by both houses in 1916, however, and again the 
principal opposition came from the southern textile states. Even so, 
outside the four southern textile states, a majority of the region's 
congressmen voted for the bill. 
Although southerners found much to applaud in the New Free-
dom, there were two periods of strain and criticism in the South's 
reaction to the Wilson administration between 1913 and 1917: the crisis 
that enveloped the cotton market in the autumn of 1914 and the first 
part of 1915 and the struggle over neutrality and preparedness in 1915 
and early 1916. While the gloom in the cotton areas gradually dis-
appeared, as Allied purchases and an economic upturn at home 
caused staple prices to go up, some southern congressmen continued 
to attack the British blockade and to criticize the administration's neu-
trality policies. "The town is beginning to fill up with men of the 
restless, meddling sort," President Wilson wrote a friend in August 
1915. "Some of them are southern congressmen with wild schemes, 
preposterous and impossible schemes to valorize cotton and help the 
cotton planter out of the Reserve Banks or out of the national 
Treasury-out of anything, if only they can make themselves solid 
with their constituents and seem to be 'on the job.' " 24 Wilson's de-
cision in late 1915 to launch a preparedness program brought a good 
deal of opposition from the South, much of it reflecting Byranite sen-
timent against involvement in European wars and a latent suspicion 
of the role of corporations and cartels in the great conflagration. The 
region harbored what one authority has described as "a widely preva-
lent rural-progressive opposition to war and militarism."25 But most 
southerners were predisposed to take the side of the Allies, and their 
congressmen provided impressive support for the president's dip-
lomatic and defense policies. 
The South's involvement in national affairs was stimulated still 
further by World War I. The war spirit intensified the patriotism of 
most southerners and made them more self-conscious about their 
Americanism. The war led to an expansion of government, particu-
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larly in Washington, and fostered civic cooperation and community 
programs. There was some resistance to the draft in the Appalachian 
South and among isolated elements such as the radicalized share-
croppers of Oklahoma, and there were virulent anti-Wilson attacks 
by a few influential southern spokesmen like Thomas E. Watson and 
Coleman L. Blease. Despite some quibbling and uneasiness over fed-
eral controls and the determined opposition of a handful of southern 
congressmen such as James K. Vardaman of Mississippi and Thomas 
P. Gore of Oklahoma, most of the region's congressmen stood with 
Wilson on all of the major war measures. They did so even though 
the war legislation increased the functions and powers of the federal 
government and thus tended to undermine state-rights principles. 
Those who persisted in opposing the administration's war policies 
found themselves denounced in the southern press and confronted 
with grass-roots petitions demanding that they either work with the 
administration or resign. Several of Wilson's congressional critics 
were defeated in the Democratic primaries of 1918. On one issue, a 
constitutional amendment to enfranchise women, a majority of the 
congressmen from southern states stubbornly resisted approval, even 
when urged to do so by the president. Paradoxically, many southern 
members stood firmly on the principle of state rights when it came 
to woman suffrage but overlooked that principle in supporting na-
tional prohibition. Some of the southern lawmakers favored the Eigh-
teenth Amendment because they assumed that it would have a good 
effect on black men but opposed the Nineteenth Amendment because 
they feared that it would raise the question of black women's right 
to vote. 
In general, southern congressional leaders, entrenched in pow-
erful committee positions, gave constructive and indispensable leg-
islative assistance to the enactment of Wilson's wartime program. 
Most southern congressmen remained fervently loyal to Wilson dur-
ing the bitter controversy over the Treaty of Versailles and the League 
of Nations. Richard L. Watson concluded, in studying the wartime 
record of these Dixie congressmen, that "they had responsibilities to 
constituents, to party, and to principle, and they looked upon these 
as responsibilities, not roles to play, because in their view party loyalty 
and loyalty to constituents were in themselves principles .... each 
congressman weighed constituents, party, and principle and deter-
mined the final balance in different ways."26 
A sweeping Republican victory in the election of 1920 ended the 
Democratic interlude of national control and completed the breakup 
of the political coalition that had made Woodrow Wilson's reelection 
possible in 1916. In the 1920s the Democrats were returned to their 
familiar position as the nation's minority party. While southern au-
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thority in Washington was diminished somewhat, the region's influ-
ence in the Democratic party was, if anything, greater than ever. 
Southerners continued to dominate the Democratic party in Congress. 
They were still the mainstay of the party in national elections, al-
though as time passed their influence was increasingly resented and 
challenged by an emergent element from the Northeast. 
Republican successes in the 1920s included modest gains in the 
South itself. In the election of 1920, GOP percentages went up in 
every southern state, and the Republicans carried Tennessee and 
Oklahoma. They won ten congressional districts in those two states, 
as well as a governorship in Tennessee and a U.S. Senate seat and 
control of the state house of representatives in Oklahoma. For the 
most part, however, southerners who might have turned to theRe-
publicans in the new era were satisfied with the business-oriented 
and forward-looking governments in states like Virginia, North Caro-
lina, Tennessee, and Alabama, and with the passing of Bryan and 
Wilson they had less reason to be alarmed because of upsetting eco-
nomic policies or liberal ideas emanating from the national leaders of 
the Democratic party. There were, no doubt, many Democrats in the 
same boat with the Arkansas lawyer who wrote, soon after the elec-
tion of 1920, "I am one of the numerous Southern Democrats who 
voted for [James M.] Cox and rejoiced in the election of Harding."27 
Yet it was becoming easier to think of Republican affiliation in a region 
so strongly committed to the gospel of business expansion and eco-
nomic diversification. Republican leaders were aware of this prospect, 
and during the late 1920s there was renewed talk of a revitalized 
minority party in the South, encouraged perhaps by the threatened 
disruption of the southern Democracy. Efforts to make Republicanism 
more respectable in the southern states by transforming it into a "lily-
white" party, a movement that had been under way for a generation 
or more, received new impetus. Near the end of the decade, Herbert 
Hoover attempted "to build up a Republican party in the South such 
as would commend itself to the citizens of those states."28 
Meanwhile, the southern presence in Congress was a distinct 
reality. Southerners made up a majority of the Democratic members 
in each of the two houses, and southern senators and representatives 
held the major party posts and the ranking minority positions on most 
of the important committees. In the House of Representatives, for 
example, as the 1920s began, Finis J. Garrett of Tennessee was mi-
nority leader, John Nance Garner of Texas was the ranking member 
of the Ways and Means Committee, and William Oldfield of Arkansas 
was serving as party whip. In the upper chamber, such veteran leg-
islators as Furnifold M. Simmons, Duncan U. Fletcher, Joseph T. Rob-
inson, Carter Glass, and Oscar W. Underwood were established in 
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powerful positions. The southern senators demonstrated their nega-
tive strength in 1922, when they were primarily responsible for the 
defeat of an antilynching bill. After passing the House by a large 
margin, the measure was killed by a southern-inspired filibuster in 
the Senate. 
Southern leadership in Congress during the 1920s was generally 
cautious and conservative, especially after 1924. Congressmen from 
the South did contribute to the farm bloc that pushed through agri-
cultural credit, business regulation, and cooperative legislation early 
in the decade, and many of them supported a liberal alternative to 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon's tax-cut proposals. While 
differing over the various efforts to dispose of government facilities 
at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, on the Tennessee River, the southern 
lawmakers were enthusiastic supporters of regional development. 
This explains their backing of numerous federal aid programs in such 
areas as agriculture, highway construction, flood control, and public 
health. 
Politics in the southern states was strongly influenced by the eco-
nomic and social conditions of the 1920s. The pace of industrial and 
urban growth picked up at the same time most farmers encountered 
severe economic problems and the countryside lost population and 
vitality. Hundreds of thousands of southerners were uprooted from 
their rural and village life, moving to the cities and larger towns in 
quest of new economic and cultural opportunities. But industrial prog-
ress and urban growth led many southerners to assume that the eco-
nomic transformation of the region would steadily alleviate social 
problems. The quality of life itself changed as a result of technological 
marvels like the automobile, radio, and a host of appliances for the 
home. These developments were pleasurable and exciting as well as 
useful, but they were also threatening. "The 1920s," Numan V. Bart-
ley writes of Georgia, "brought the first serious crisis for the old order 
and intensified the defense of traditional values."29 The same was 
true of the other southern states. 
Challenges to established habits and values seemed to come both 
from within the South and from the outside. It was the outside, how-
ever, that most alarmed and frightened southern traditionalists. The 
greatest threat apparently came from the Northeast and, to a lesser 
extent, the Midwest, with their huge polyglot cities, Roman Catholic 
and Jewish religions, and foreign cultures. While much more than a 
sectional division, a conflict over cultural values raged throughout the 
1920s, pitting the urban-Catholic-immigrant North against the rural-
Protestant-Anglo-Saxon South. The Democratic party became a major 
focal point of this sectional clash, and such issues as prohibition, the 
Ku Klux Klan, and religious fundamentalism quickly emerged as divi-
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sive themes in the debate. All of these themes were closely associated 
with the South. The conflict was, in a sense, the culmination of a 
struggle between an "old" and a "new" America. 
Sectional animosity in the United States was rooted, of course, in 
the momentous political struggles of the nineteenth century. Faint 
echoes of that sectionalism could be heard in recurrent twentieth-
century episodes involving the South's treatment of blacks, and dur-
ing the Wilson years, outbursts of northern antipathy were directed 
at Claude Kitchin and other agrarian radicals in Congress. Such views 
were, to some extent, a reflection of the struggle for power in Con-
gress. Thus, Representative Kitchin wrote a southern colleague in 
November 1915, "I have had many letters from Northern Members 
saying that some complaints are made in their section that the South 
is getting all the Chairmanships, and some insisting that several of 
the vacancies should be given to Northern Democrats."30 In 1918 the 
New York World, a Democratic newspaper, predicted that there would 
never again be a Democratic Congress until "the Northern States have 
some reasonable assurance that such bodies will not be controlled by 
vengeful and parochial politicians from the South."31 
The sectional division within the Democratic party was evident 
as early as the election of 1916, when western Democrats played a 
key role in Wilson's narrow reelection. They resented the proprietary 
attitude of party leaders in the East and South toward the president, 
and many of them felt that their hard work and personal sacrifices 
during the campaign had been taken for granted. They also disliked 
the sectional pattern of the Wilson administration's patronage poli-
cies. These feelings were revived early in 1917 when Thomas S. Martin 
of Virginia was chosen over Thomas J. Walsh of Montana as the new 
Democratic majority leader in the Senate. Meanwhile, certain legis-
lative proposals tended to divide Democrats along sectional lines. 
National prohibition was an issue that came to be identified with 
southern congressmen. Opposition to woman suffrage-a somewhat 
less divisive party issue-was also associated with southern law-
makers. To northern Democrats from cities, prohibition symbolized 
the domination of the congressional hierarchy by southerners. One 
Boston Democrat was quoted as saying in 1917, "I am unalterably 
opposed to the Southern Democrats remaining in the saddle through-
out the coming Congress. " 32 Sectional ill will was a significant factor 
in the midterm elections of 1918, when many farmers in the western 
grain states deserted the Democrats. They complained about the low 
minimum wheat prices established by the government, while cotton 
prices were never regulated. 
Democratic sectionalism assumed a more ominous character in 
the 1920s. The extent of this sectional cleavage was revealed in the 
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presidential politics of 1924. A fierce struggle for the party's presi-
dential nomination developed between William Gibbs McAdoo and Al-
fred E. Smith. McAdoo, a native southerner who had recently moved 
from New York to California, had served as secretary of the treasury 
in Woodrow Wilson's cabinet and had married Wilson's daughter. A 
progressive of sorts, he was a strong prohibitionist and had the sup-
port of a large number of Ku Klux Klan members. Governor Smith 
of New York, son of Irish immigrants and a product of Tammany 
Hall, was a critic of prohibition, an opponent of the Klan, and a 
champion of the urban masses. He was also a member of the Catholic 
Church. Another candidate was Sen. Oscar W. Underwood of Ala-
bama, but he proved to be no match for McAdoo, who won a large 
majority of the southern delegates to the Democratic national con-
vention in New York. 
The convention, which lasted for seventeen days, was described 
by one newspaperman as a "snarling, cursing, tedious, tenuous, sui-
cidal, homicidal rough-house."33 A proposal to censure the Ku Klux 
Klan by name, opposed by most southern delegates, came within one 
vote of passing. The sectional division within the party was vividly 
illustrated in the lengthy balloting for a presidential nominee, in which 
McAdoo and Smith were the leading contestants. Neither could get 
the necessary two-thirds majority, however, and on the 103d ballot 
the exhausted delegates finally selected John W. Davis of West Vir-
ginia as a compromise candidate. The southerners, staunch support-
ers of McAdoo, had given Smith virtually no votes in the long balloting 
process. In the November election, all of the southern states except 
Kentucky dutifully cast their votes for the Democratic presidential 
ticket. 
Sectionalism in the Democratic party reached its apogee in the 
presidential election of 1928. William G. McAdoo withdrew in Sep-
tember 1927 as a candidate for the party nomination, leaving Alfred 
E. Smith as a strong favorite for the honor. Although there was wide-
spread opposition to Smith throughout the South, as there had been 
in 1924, he was nominated on the first ballot at the Democratic national 
convention. The New York governor remained critical of national 
prohibition, but he sought in some ways to mollify the South. The 
national convention was held in Houston, Texas, and Joseph T. Robin-
son of Arkansas, the Senate minority leader, was selected as Smith's 
running mate. Nevertheless, concerted opposition to the Democratic 
nominee developed rapidly in various parts of the region. His religion, 
while infrequently invoked directly, and his stand on prohibition 
made him vulnerable. As David Burner observes, "AI Smith's stand 
against prohibition ended an alliance between the drys and the Demo-
crats that had prevailed in the region for decades."34 Protestant lead-
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ers such as Bishop James Cannon, Jr., of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, South, organized to defeat Smith. "By rumor, speech, and 
broadside," one historian has written, "the Roman menace was 
flaunted across the South."35 While most Democratic politicians sup-
ported their party's ticket, in many cases reluctantly, a number of 
prominent party leaders refused to vote for AI Smith. Among these 
Democrats were Furnifold M. Simmons of North Carolina, J. Thomas 
Heflin of Alabama, Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, Thomas B. Love 
of Texas, and Sidney J. Catts of Florida. The Republican party cam-
paign in several southern states was merely a formality, while the 
real campaign was carried on by the so-called Hoover-Democrat or-
ganization. The result was an unaccustomed division among south-
erners in a presidential campaign. Nicholas Murray Butler, the 
president of Columbia University, remarked, "It is certainly a relief 
to find the South divided on almost everything, even if it be big-
otry."36 
The outcome of the presidential election shocked many south-
erners. Herbert Hoover, the Republican nominee, carried seven of 
the southern states, and he came close to winning Alabama. His win-
ning percentages in the South ranged from 51.8 in Texas to 63.8 in 
Oklahoma. Analyzing the election in 1949, V.O. Key demonstrated 
that the most steadfast Democrats in the South were the white resi-
dents of the black belts, while the areas that showed the greatest shift 
to the Republicans were the counties with fewest Negroes. 37 Thus, 
Democratic defections were least in Mississippi and South Carolina, 
the two states with the highest proportions of blacks. Key also iden-
tified other significant factors in the election results, including party 
loyalty, which aided the Democrats, and organization, which general-
ly worked to the advantage of the Republicans. Hoover made his best 
showing in the peripheral South, and he won such growth-minded 
cities as Dallas, Houston, Birmingham, Atlanta, and Richmond. The 
most loyal Democratic areas were characterized by a complex of fac-
tors-ruralism, cotton growing, plantation organization, intense 
Reconstruction memories-as well as racial fears and a strong Demo-
cratic tradition. Both parties tried to exploit racial fears in the South, 
but the major sources of Hoover's appeal to white southerners were 
a combination of Smith's religion, his opposition to national prohi-
bition, and his New Yorkism, which to southerners symbolized a 
disquietingly different Democratic party. 
If the election of 1928 illustrated the deep North-South cleavage 
that had developed in the Democratic party, it also provided dramatic 
evidence of a divided South. The Solid South had cracked. The dis-
senters in 1928, unlike those in the 1890s, made no attempt at third-
party politics; instead, they tried to capture control of the Democratic 
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party machinery at the state and local levels and to swing their states 
to the Republicans in the presidential contest. Thomas Watts Gregory, 
a Texan who had served in Wilson's cabinet, expressed the opinion 
of many Democratic loyalists when he asserted that "you might as 
well talk about a white negro or a green blackbird as to speak of a 
man as a 'Hoover Democrat.' " 38 Yet the differences among south-
erners were so great, at least for the moment, that such a course 
seemed to be the best alternative to party regularity. In some respects, 
the political conflict in a number of southern states had been going 
on for years. One student of Texas politics concluded that the presi-
dential campaign of 1928 in that state was "just another prohibition 
contest." He found that in almost every county there was "a return 
match staged between the old time dry and wet leaders as had been 
the case in several former prohibition elections."39 This no doubt 
oversimplifies the situation, but it appears that in several southern 
states the personalities and issues of 1928 offered an opportunity and 
a pretext for one group of politicians to challenge the control of the 
party by another. This seems to have occurred in Texas, where a group 
of young, self-styled Democrats challenged the control exercised by 
Thomas B. Love and the "old guard," who struck the insurgents as 
being fanatics in their support of prohibition. In addition, the divisive 
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campaign elicited among some journalists and in certain other quar-
ters a new brand of southern liberalism, one that was suspicious of 
sectional shibboleths, more concerned with individual liberties, and 
even willing to accept an Irish Catholic from New York as the Demo-
cratic presidential nominee. 
It remained to be seen, of course, whether the events of 1928 
would mark the end of the political era that began in the late 1890s. 
The intervening years constituted a period in which, except for the 
border states, every southern state was so wedded to the Democratic 
party that any break in its solidarity on the state and national levels 
was almost unthinkable. It was a period, moreover, in which the 
southern handling of the race question encountered little interference 
from Congress or the president, met few challenges in the federal 
courts, and received the general approbation of public opinion in the 
country at large. Even a liberal Democratic administration in Wash-
ington had served, ironically, to increase the region's attachment to 
the Democratic party. Nor was that all. The South was the bulwark 
of the Democratic party, and the powerful influence of its congres-
sional delegations safeguarded its peculiar interests and obtained their 
share of federal benefits. But in the 1920s conditions were changing, 
and a more vigorous Democratic party began to emerge in other parts 
of the country. In 1928 the South found it impossible to veto the 
nomination of a candidate it strongly opposed. At thC~t point thought-
ful southerners could see that continued Democratic growth outside 
the South would almost certainly reduce their region's influence in 
the party. 
The Classic Period 
of Southern Politics 
For three decades following World War I, the distinguishing features 
of the South's one-party politics survived with little change. The 
Democratic party remained dominant in every state in the region. 
Planters, industrialists, and other representatives of vested interests, 
along with the far-flung county-seat governing class, continued to 
exercise a controlling influence in politics even as they slowly made 
room for new business and professional groups. Poll taxes, literacy 
tests, and low voter turnouts were typical characteristics of southern 
politics at the state level. In the 1920s, after the enfranchisement of 
women, scarcely more than a fifth of adult southerners voted in either 
Democratic primaries or general elections. The only meaningful elec-
tions were the primaries, which were closed to most blacks until the 
1940s. Most political campaigns revolved around the personalities and 
qualifications of the candidates instead of more significant issues. 
Nevertheless, the region's politics did change in some respects. New 
issues and new leaders emerged, and the functions of state govern-
ment were greatly expanded in the postwar period. The configuration 
of factional politics in the various states also underwent alteration, 
gradually assuming their characteristic form in the modern era. With 
the coming of the Great Depression and the New Deal, moreover, 
the South faced new and disconcerting challenges to the autonomy 
of its established politics. 
"Any serious effort to understand Southern politics in the 1920s," 
George B. Tindall has written, "must begin with a recognition that 
the progressive urge did not disappear but was transformed through 
greater emphasis upon certain of its tendencies and the distortion of 
others."1 While the impulse for "good government" and public ser-
vices remained strong, the propensity toward reform was largely ab-
sorbed by a drive for moral righteousness and conformity, a somewhat 
muted theme in earlier progressivism. One of the strains of this re-
formism expressed itself in the zealous campaign to enforce prohi-
bition, which remained a divisive issue in state politics during the 
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1920s. Alarmed by the growing secularization of their society, south-
ern fundamentalists became more involved in the support of prohi-
bition, the antievolution movement, and the conservative Protestant 
opposition to Roman Catholicism. The conflict over Darwinian evo-
lution became a hot political question. William Jennings Bryan, now 
a resident of Florida, traveled over the South condemning the doctrine 
of evolution, while fiery evangelists like J. Frank Norris of Fort Worth, 
Texas, spoke in defense of traditional religion. By 1921 a movement 
for the passage of laws to prevent the teaching of evolution in the 
public schools was under way, and during the next few years the 
issue was considered in most of the state legislatures in the southern 
states. Tennessee and Arkansas enacted such laws, while several 
other states took administrative actions in an effort to accomplish the 
same purpose. This fundamentalist crusade contributed to the image 
of a benighted South held by many Americans in other sections-a 
South that was viewed as socially backward, intolerant, and preju-
diced. 
Another reason for such ideas was the Ku Klux Klan. Organized 
in Georgia in 1915, the secret order spread rapidly through the south-
ern states during the early 1920s. Though the Klan became a national 
phenomenon, its growth was most notable in the southern states. Its 
membership and power were especially great in Georgia, Alabama, 
Arkansas, and Texas, as well as in cities such as Atlanta, Birmingham, 
Houston, Dallas, Little Rock, and Tulsa. In the South KKK members 
seemed to be motivated by religious and ethnic prejudices but also 
by fears of social change and a desire to coerce conformity through 
morality campaigns and political action. The organization's entry into 
politics was inevitable, and it enjoyed some political successes in state 
and local campaigns. It elected or had a hand in electing several gov-
ernors and U.S. senators in Texas, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Alabama. 
The Klan declined during the late 1920s but for several years it was 
a powerful influence as well as an incendiary issue in the Democratic 
politics of the southern states. In Oklahoma it was an issue in every 
major political contest during the 1920s. 
The prohibition movement and other antivice efforts were expres-
sions of a widespread southern concern over immoral behavior, as 
well as an aspect of the reformers' commitment to the solution of 
social problems. The zeal that many southerners had earlier displayed 
for attacks on trusts and campaigns to overthrow political "machines" 
drew upon the spring of this morality. It was closely identified with 
evangelical Protestantism, with rural and small-town life, with 
agrarian reformism, and with the politics of William Jennings Bryan. 
Wartime dislocations and rapid social change in the postwar years 
heightened the social apprehensions of southern moralists and 
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strengthened their resolve to defend the traditional culture. The work 
of the Ku Klux Klan, for all its prejudice and violence, was in part an 
expression of that resolve. Community morals were an overriding 
concern of the organization's members, whose activities represented, 
among other things, a general quest for moral and social conformity. 
A similar insistence upon moral conformity was embodied in the anti-
evolution crusade and especially in the efforts of Protestant funda-
mentalists to stamp out "the specter of infidelity." The region's 
defensive temper in the 1920s was intensified by what its moral cus-
todians interpreted as challenges to southern orthodoxies. One result 
was a kind of "political fundamentalism," in which defenders of tra-
ditional morality sought to deny divisions in southern society by ap-
pealing to regional loyalties and coercing a sense of unity. This 
fundamentalism contained an element of popular democracy, since 
it reflected the belief of many southerners that their society was being 
reshaped by a diverse but powerful economic group that seemed to 
disregard long-established traditions and the idea of popular consent. 
In any case, the compulsion to preserve cultural values, a basic char-
acteristic of southern progressivism, became more defensive and 
negative in the 1920s. 
Although the postwar era changed the content and spirit of pro-
gressivism in the South, it failed to dampen the enthusiasm of south-
ern businessmen and professional people for economic development. 
Indeed, the war stimulated the region's economic expansion and 
heightened the yearnings and expectations of its inhabitants for fur-
ther "progress." The 1920s marked the triumph of the "Atlanta 
spirit," an era of commercial and industrial expansion, urban boost-
erism, and growth psychology. The good times of the new era en-
couraged this outlook, despite a series of agricultural crises and the 
straitened condition of the textile industry. The preoccupation with 
economic growth, the institutionalization of state services, and the 
achievement of administrative efficiency and professional standards, 
like the crusades for morality, represented an elaboration of older 
progressive themes. Southern progressives had always been strongly 
committed to what one scholar has called the need to "modernize the 
region through transforming its economic base."2 
"Good government" and more adequate public services, southern 
leaders increasingly assumed, were as vital to economic progress as 
natural resources, abundant labor, and resourceful entrepreneurs. 
This ingredient in prewar progressivism reached early fruition during 
the 1920s in the politics and policies of several southern states and 
municipalities. It was evident in the leadership of a number of forceful 
and effective governors such as Cameron Morrison of North Carolina, 
John M. Parker of Louisiana, Austin Peay of Tennessee, Bibb Graves 
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of Alabama, and Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia. These exemplars of 
"business progressives" stressed economy and efficiency. They re-
organized and modernized the structure of their state governments, 
devised new administrative and tax systems, and expanded state ser-
vices. 
The development of public services, a significant but somewhat 
inchoate part of earlier progressivism, was a notable feature of state 
and municipal government in the 1920s. In the South dramatic ad-
vances were made in the construction of highways, the support of 
education, the expansion of public health facilities, and the growth 
of social welfare programs. State revenue and state debt increased 
sharply. All of these functions were associated with the themes of 
economic growth, efficiency, and modernization as well as concern 
over social problems, and they elicited strong backing from busi-
nessmen, professional groups, and the urban middle class generally. 
Chambers of commerce and other business organizations were de-
voted advocates of good roads; they increasingly identified the au-
tomobile as a vehicle of commercial development and urban growth. 
Professionals such as teachers, engineers, public health doctors and 
nurses, and social workers were also champions of the expanding role 
of government in providing what they regarded as essential services. 
With the growth of these governmental functions came, slowly and 
hesitantly, a conception of greater state responsibility for social wel-
fare. 
A more radical species of reform flared up briefly in Oklahoma, 
before collapsing in disarray and futility. In the immediate postwar 
years, an agricultural depression and a determined antilabor move-
ment gave rise to the Farmer-Labor Reconstruction League of Okla-
homa, which was organized in 1921. A coalition of agricultural and 
labor groups, Socialists, and other dissident elements, the League 
sponsored a program of radical reform measures, including govern-
ment ownership of railroads and utilities, a guaranteed minimum 
price for farm commodities, and job security for workers. The new 
organization found a leader in John C. Walton, an entertaining and 
effective campaigner who was elected governor in 1922. "Our Jack" 
Walton soon plunged the state into bitter controversy; he interfered 
with the state institutions of higher education, made indiscriminate 
use of the state militia, and as a diversionary tactic launched a war 
on the Ku Klux Klan. The legislators reacted by impeaching and re-
moving him from office in the autumn of 1923. Oklahoma Democrats 
were briefly divided into adherents of the Farmer-Labor Reconstruc-
tion League and partisans of the Ku Klux Klan. The League declined 
rapidly after Walton's fall, and the Klan also lost much of its influence 
soon afterward. Meanwhile, the Republicans made gains, winning a 
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second U.S. Senate seat in 1924, carrying the state for Herbert Hoover 
in 1928, and making an impressive showing in legislative contests in 
the latter year. But the minority party was unable to take advantage 
of Democratic factionalism. In the 1920s, one student of the state's 
politics concludes, "a party of opportunism and negativism battled a 
party of factionalism and disorder."3 
Remnants of the factionalism that had typified Democratic politics 
in the prewar South were still evident in some states, but most of the 
older political groupings had disappeared by the 1920s. In Texas, for 
example, the bifactional competition that characterized early twen-
tieth-century Democratic politics was replaced by shifting political 
coalitions and a marked increase in the number of candidates in pri-
mary elections. Nevertheless, Texas politics in the 1920s continued to 
bear the imprint of earlier issues and divisions. One evidence of these 
fissures was the sharp division over prohibition; another was the 
survival from the Wilson era of the progressive-prohibition wing of 
the party. Though the faction was splintered by 1920, many of its 
adherents retained their commitment to prohibition as well as a gen-
eral orientation toward reform. The bitter conflict among Texas Demo-
crats over their party's presidential nominee in 1924 and 1928 testified 
to the continuing strength of this political element. Another carryover 
from the pre-1920 years was what Texans sometimes described as 
"Fergusonism" -the influence exerted by James E. Ferguson in state 
politics. Ferguson, a charismatic and colorful campaigner, may well 
have been the most important figure in Texas politics during the two 
decades after 1914. Either Ferguson or his wife was a candidate in 
every statewide election between 1914 and 1934, with the single ex-
ception of 1928. Between them they won the governorship four times 
during this period. 
Ferguson was a forty-three-year-old farmer, lawyer, and small-
town banker from east central Texas when he decided to enter the 
Democratic race for governor in 1914. Calling himself "Farmer Jim," 
Ferguson was presented as a "man who comes from the ranks of the 
people."4 He promised to reform the rental system under which thou-
sands of tenant farmers operated, while adamantly expressing op-
position to any consideration of the controversial liquor question. He 
also poked fun at his Democratic opponent, a respectable prohibition 
leader. Ferguson proved to be a remarkable campaigner, and he won 
a surprisingly large victory in the primary. The new governor per-
suaded the legislature to pass a measure regulating farm rents, but 
the law was never enforced. In 1916 Ferguson was easily reelected. 
Then he blundered by getting into a dispute with the state university, 
an episode that opened the way to his impeachment on charges of 
misapplying state funds and improper interference with the univer-
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sity. When Ferguson was removed from office in 1917, he immediately 
began a campaign for his "vindication." Thousands of tenant farmers, 
small landowners, and day laborers-the ''boys at the forks of the 
creek" -continued to have faith in Farmer Jim, who began to publish 
a paper he called the Ferguson Forum. It became a vital means of 
communicating with his rural flock. "Why, those old fellows out there 
know but two things," one observer remarked in 1918. "The first is 
that Levi Garrett & Sons make the best snuff in the world, and the 
second is that Friday is Forum day, the day the mails bring Ferguson's 
paper."5 
Jim Ferguson's greatest political asset was his oratorical skill. He 
was emotional, reckless, and eloquent in his use of epithets and in-
vective. Reinhard H. Luthin has described him as a campaigner. "Clad 
in a claw-hammer frock coat, he stuck his left thumb in trousers 
pocket, raised his right forefinger in the air, and shouted about his 
opponents' iniquity. Jim could go into a hostile crowd and leave with 
numerous converts."6 A contemporary commented on Ferguson's ef-
fect on his audiences. "He swayed them like the storm sways the 
slender pines, and voted them in droves and platoons."7 Campaign-
ing frequently in the postwar period, Ferguson remained a factor of 
great importance in state politics. "Jim Ferguson," Will Rogers de-
clared, "has 150,000 voters in Texas that would be with him if he blew 
up the Capitol building in Washington. They would say, 'Well, Jim 
was right. The thing ought to have been blowed up years ago.' " 8 
Indeed, Fergusonism was one of the three principal issues in 
Texas politics in the 1920s. The other two were prohibition and the 
Ku Klux Klan, both of which Farmer Jim strongly opposed. He also 
made war on old Wilsonian progressives like Thomas B. Love, who 
continued to wield power in party affairs. Since Ferguson was barred 
from holding state office, he adopted the stratagem of running his 
wife instead. In 1924 this scheme worked, and Miriam Amanda "Ma" 
Ferguson was elected governor. Jim Ferguson campaigned for his 
wife, vigorously attacking the role of the Klan in Texas politics. Once 
in office, Mrs. Ferguson, a quiet, home-loving body, deferred to her 
husband, who actually ran the administration. Controversy soon be-
gan to swirl around the administration, centering on Jim Ferguson's 
mischievous role in the awarding of highway contracts, in the gov-
ernor's liberal issuance of pardons, and in the decisions of the state 
textbook commission. Some of these matters were investigated and 
challenged in the courts by Attorney General Dan Moody, a rising 
young political leader who defeated "Ma" Ferguson in her bid for a 
second term in 1926. Fergusonism, however, was far from dead. Jim 
Ferguson ran his wife again in 1930; she was defeated in her race for 
governor that year but was elected in the primary of 1932. 
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Jim Ferguson's perennial campaigns titillated and entertained the 
white masses of Texas, especially those who lived in rural areas. Po-
litical rallies, "speakings," and personalities remained a source of 
great interest and excitement in the South during the 1920s, despite 
the advent of the automobile, radio, and the motion picture. "Men 
of the people" like Ferguson, Theodore G. Bilbo, and Coleman L. 
Blease were marvelous exhibitionists with a distinctive mode of dress 
and a capacity for pageantry and entertainment. Their vivid person-
alities and brilliant campaign repertoires were often more important 
than their position on the issues in contributing to their political ad-
vancement. Bilbo once remarked that "there is no other entertainment 
for country folks except revivals and politics-and it is up to us poli-
ticians to do our share. " 9 
Spectacular political figures and colorful campaigners were en-
couraged by the individualist and disorganized politics that existed 
in the one-party South. Factional division of the electorate around a 
powerful personality became characteristic of southern politics, some-
times providing an element of stability and structure in an essentially 
amorphous system. On occasion striking leaders of this type advanced 
the cause of reform, but more often they themselves became the cen-
tral political issue. The emphasis on personality in political affairs was 
no doubt related to the longtime dominance of a rural, folk society 
in the region, to the social paternalism carried over from the Old to 
the New South, and to the mythology that enveloped the Lost Cause 
and Reconstruction in the minds of white southerners. Politics in such 
a culture was a prized pastime and a favorite source of entertainment. 
Campaign oratory in early twentieth-century South Carolina, Louis 
B. Wright has recalled, was "pungent and pointed, as candidates 
recommended themselves and damned their opponents. Nobody 
complained of apathy, for audiences turned out en masse to enjoy 
the fun, to cheer their favorites, to heckle the unfortunate, and now 
and then to shoot one another in the exuberance of partisanship."10 
Politics, in short, was a vital part of the regional culture, as familiar 
as evangelical Protestantism or the cultivation and marketing of cot-
ton. As one southerner explained in 1922: "It is a recreation, a part 
of life, a thing in which all are interested, a medium through which 
men express themselves. A political meeting in a 'warm' year is to 
be anticipated as the coming of a circus. Men gather at the county 
seat from villages and farms miles away. The parking spaces are filled 
with buggies, wagons and automobiles. Most of those who come are 
men who work with their hands." 11 
While there were many manifestations of the "man of the people" 
phenomenon in the period between the two world wars, none was 
more dramatic than the case of Louisiana. Although the conservative 
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Democrats who ruled the Pelican State in the late nineteenth century 
were plagued by sharp factional divisions, they carried out the wishes 
of the planters, the commercial and financial interests centered in New 
Orleans, and the railroad and lumber companies. Resentment at this 
state of affairs fanned the fires of agrarian radicalism in the 1890s, but 
this evidence of class conflict was countered by the Bourbon Demo-
crats' resort to an aroused racial animosity, and the insurgence proved 
abortive. Perhaps, as a noted scholar has written in another connec-
tion, "the religious, linguistic, cultural division of the people itself 
made it difficult for a leader to arise who understood both groups 
[the Creole-Catholic south and the Anglo-Protestant north], who con-
stituted a denominator capable of giving full-throated voice to the 
common unhappinesses and aspirations of both peoples in rip-roaring 
political campaigns-after which everyone could go back to work."12 
John M. Parker, a planter and business progressive, won the gov-
ernorship in 1920 by challenging the entrenched political machine and 
its allies in the state's political hierarchy. The Parker administration 
sponsored a moderately successful reform program, but it did little 
to alter the distribution of political power in Louisiana. When Parker 
left office, the state returned to its accustomed conservatism. 
Then, toward the end of the 1920s, a remarkable new leader burst 
upon the political stage of Louisiana. His name was Huey Pierce Long, 
and within a few years, he had established the most complete mastery 
of politics at the state level in American history. Long was· born in 
1893, the seventh child in a family of middle-class hill farmers. He 
came from Winn Parish in the north central part of the state. A poor 
parish, Winn had a heritage of populism, Socialist party support, and 
political dissent. Leaving home at the age of sixteen, Long spent sev-
eral years as a traveling salesman in Louisiana and surrounding states. 
Gregarious and resourceful, he sold household supplies, patent medi-
cines, produce, and a lard substitute called Cottolene. After studying 
law for a year at Tulane University, he was admitted to the bar and 
began to practice in Winnfield. In 1918 he was elected to the state 
railroad commission as a vigorous critic of the Standard Oil Company 
and other corporations. As a member of the commission and even-
tually its chairman, he adopted a tough position in dealing with the 
utilities and was instrumental in securing lower telephone, gas, and 
electric rates, reduced railroad and streetcar fares, and a severance 
tax on oil. The audacious Louisianan already had his eye on the gov-
ernorship, and in 1924, at age thirty, he entered the gubernatorial 
primary. Although Long lost that race, he could not be denied in 
1928. Conducting a colorful, folksy campaign, he denounced the 
planter-business-New Orleans machine alliance and promised to in-
crease state services. In 1928 he expanded his political base in the 
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northern rural parishes into French Louisiana, including working-
class districts in the cities. 
Once in office, Long was able to get his legislative program en-
acted. It included new highway and bridge construction, increased 
appropriations for schools, public health, and welfare facilities, and 
cheap natural gas for New Orleans. Needing additional money for 
the new state services, Long demanded that the legislature levy an 
occupation tax on refined crude oil. This alarmed powerful interests 
in the state, and the governor's efforts to force the lawmakers to 
approve the tax were unsuccessful. Long's enemies then sought to 
remove him from office by charging him with several counts of mis-
conduct. The house of representatives voted to impeach Long, but 
the senate failed to find him guilty of the charges. In fact, the im-
peachment move backfired, and Long steadily extended his control 
over the various agencies of state government. Unlike most southern 
reformers, Long set out not only to bring the political establishment 
in his state to terms; he intended to overwhelm the Louisiana hier-
archy and to replace it with his own authority. He created a powerful 
and ruthless state machine. He also destroyed the old pattern of Loui-
siana politics and brought a new and enduring factionalism into ex-
istence. The struggle between "Longism" and "anti-Longism" would 
dominate the state's politics for a generation or more. 
Huey Long, who moved on to the U.S. Senate in 1932 and was 
assassinated in September 1935, struck many Americans as a clownish 
fellow who liked the nickname "Kingfish," extolled the virtues of 
"potlikker," organized extravagant football trips for students at the 
state university, and sometimes received formal visitors while attired 
in green pajamas. He was full of what Wilbur J. Cash described as 
"the swaggering, hell-for-leather bluster that the South demanded in 
its heroes and champions; and in addition he had a kind of quizzical, 
broad, clowning humor, and a capacity for taking on the common 
touch that had characteristically been the stock-in-trade not only of 
the more successful demagogues but even of many of the best of the 
older leaders."13 Like other southern demagogues, the Kingfish 
"stroked the ego of democracy,"14 but, more than most of them, he 
made the masses feel important. He was, as Cash remarked, "wholly 
Southern in his capacity to represent all his deeds to himself as pro-
ceeding from the most splendid motives."15 In his manners, values, 
and idiom, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has written, "Huey Long re-
mained a backcountry hillbilly. But he was a hillbilly raised to the 
highest level, preternaturally swift and sharp in intelligence, ruthless 
in action, and grandiose in vision."16 
If Long was unmistakably southern, he was southern with a dif-
ference. He himself once dismissed the speculation about his essential 
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character by saying that he was simply sui generis. It was an apt de-
lineation. The Louisiana leader was, for one thing, a realist rather 
than a romantic in politics. He was, in the view of one critical observer, 
"the first Southern politician to stand really apart from his people and 
coolly and accurately to measure the political potentialities afforded 
by the condition of the underdog."17 Then, too, Long was adept in 
the arts of power. He created his own political organization, over-
whelmed an established party hierarchy, and replaced it with a state 
machine based on the poor and disadvantaged and fueled by astute 
use of patronage. Nor was that the end of it: he had a program, and 
he kept his promises. Long was not basically a corruptionist, nor did 
he employ "nigger-baiting" tactics to win elections. He had a populist 
animosity toward concentrated wealth and upper-class privilege, tried 
to promote greater equality, and insisted that government must be 
responsive to social needs. He was, as one historian has suggested, 
"democrat, demagogue, populist, capitalist, political boss" -and all 
of these generic strains were "firmly rooted in the American political 
tradition." 18 "Perhaps the lesson of Long," T. Harry Williams con-
cluded, "is that if in a democracy needed changes are denied too long 
by an interested minority, the changes, when they come, will come 
with a measure of repression and revenge."19 
In general, the years between World War I and the onset of the 
Great Depression represented a period of consolidation in the evolv-
ing pattern of state politics in the South. Changes had occurred in 
the factional politics of the individual states, the role of business and 
industrial interests had grown larger, and the functions of state and 
municipal governments in the region had expanded. But the basic 
features of the one-party system were as solidly established in custom 
and law as ever. It was this pattern of state politics that V.O. Key 
illuminated so brilliantly in 1949 with the publication of Southern Poli-
tics in State and Nation. At the same time, southern politics in the 1930s 
and 1940s was by no means static. Political leaders and issues, in the 
South as in other regions, were strongly influenced by the impact of 
the Great Depression, the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 
comprehensive legislation of the New Deal, the national realignment 
of political parties in the 1930s, and the vast consequences of World 
War II. 
Three of the southern states-Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia-
were distinguished by having fairly well-defined factions in their 
Democratic parties. The median percentage of the total vote polled 
jointly by the two top candidates for governor in the first Democratic 
primary in Virginia during the years 1920-48 was an astonishing 98.3. 
The factionalism among Virginia Democrats was grounded in the 
dominance of a powerful machine. Although an independent Demo-
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crat won the governorship in 1917 and Thomas S. Martin died in 1919, 
the Democratic organization retained control of the state's politics. 
Carter Glass, Virginia's most distinguished citizen and a longtime 
opponent of the Martin machine, made his peace with the organi-
zation in the early 1920s. In the meantime, Harry Flood Byrd, chair-
man of the state Democratic committee, emerged as undisputed leader 
of the organization. Byrd was elected governor in 1925. The organi-
zation suffered a defeat in 1928 when anti-Smith Democrats joined 
with Republicans to carry the state for Hoover. But the organization 
recovered quickly, winning the governorship the following year 
against a coalition of dissident Democrats and Republicans. 
Led by Harry Flood Byrd and strengthened during his governor-
ship in the late 1920s, the "organization" owed its success to effective 
management and a restricted electorate, which enabled its disciplined 
and well-organized campaigns to mobilize the requisite number of 
votes to win statewide primary elections. The machine enjoyed strong 
support from the business community and the well-to-do. Through 
Senator Byrd's leadership (he entered the Senate in 1933), the power 
of the legislature over key local officials, and the cooperation of circuit 
judges and other members of the "courthouse rings," the hierarchy 
could count on a network of outposts across the state. Although the 
Byrd organization was an oligarchy with a cavalier and aristocratic 
outlook, it insisted upon honest and efficient government, and it dem-
onstrated some flexibility within the bounds of fiscal conservatism. 
Guided by Byrd and made more formidable by the support of such 
leaders as the venerable Carter Glass in the Senate and Everett R. 
"Ebbie" Combs, state comptroller and chairman of the state compen-
sation board, the organization was almost always able to elect its 
candidates. The antiorganization faction was a loose alliance of Vir-
ginia Democrats generally identified as liberals. It was strongest in 
the tidewater areas, especially the cities, and in the southwestern 
mountain counties. In the 1930s and 1940s, these dissenters tended 
to support national Democratic leaders and their policies. 
"A cohesive and continuing majority faction," V.O. Key observed 
in his analysis of southern politics, "tends to force most opposition 
elements into at least the semblance of a united minority faction. " 20 
That was the case in Virginia. It was also true of Tennessee, which 
experienced great political turmoil in the 1920s. In the immediate 
postwar years, political groupings took the form of extremely per-
sonalized and amorphous coalitions created by individual candidates. 
The nature of this party factionalism began to change in 1922 with 
the election as governor of Austin Peay, a business progressive whose 
administration reorganized the state government and provided new 
highways, educational facilities, and other needed public services. 
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One consequence of Peay's leadership was a realignment of Tennes-
see politics in which the rural areas, desperately in need of better 
schools and roads, were arrayed against the cities, which supplied 
most of the money to pay for the new services. Governor Peay and 
his allies led the rural faction. In addition, Peay' s administrative in-
novations, designed to make for greater efficiency, concentrated 
power at the state level and in the hands of the governor. After Peay's 
sudden death in 1927, his political heirs, led by Luke Lea, the powerful 
publisher of the Nashville Tennessean, attempted to build a statewide 
machine, using the power in the governor's office and the allocation 
of state contracts and other favors. Meanwhile, an opposition faction, 
encouraged by corruption and scandal in the state administration, 
gained strength. The struggle between the two factions came to a 
climax in 1932 and brought a new political boss to power in the Vol-
unteer State. 
Edward Hull Crump entered politics early in the twentieth cen-
tury as a typical urban reformer. He supported the new commission 
government in Memphis, became mayor of the city in 1910, and 
achieved an impressive record as an efficient administrator and suc-
cessful sponsor of expanded municipal services. But he opposed pn;>-
hibition and was ousted from office in 1916 for failing to enforce the 
state's dry law in Memphis. This setback was only temporary, how-
ever, for Crump proceeded to build a formidable political organiza-
tion. He eventually controlled all of the major city and county offices 
as well as the party machinery in Shelby County. By the late 1920s, 
he had become the single most powerful politician in Tennessee. 
Crump's control of Tennessee's most populous city enabled him, 
when the opportunity came, to use that secure base as a springboard 
to statewide power. The collapse of the banking empire of Rogers 
Caldwell in late 1930 and the subsequent discrediting of Luke Lea for 
having misused state funds in Caldwell's speculative schemes un-
dermined the administration of Gov. Henry Horton and the faction 
once led by Austin Peay. Crump moved quickly at this point to es-
tablish his own dominance over Tennessee politics. He advocated the 
impeachment of Governor Horton, and in 1932 succeeded in electing 
his own gubernatorial candidate, Hill McAlister. For the next sixteen 
years, the Memphis leader was the most influential factor in Ten-
nessee politics. During this period his was frequently the determining 
voice in statewide elections for major office. 
Edward Crump's dominant position was based on his thorough-
going control of political affairs in Memphis and Shelby County and 
on the peculiarities of Tennessee politics. He saw to it that the people 
in Memphis received efficient and honest-but somewhat repres-
sive-government, and his machine made sure that a large number 
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of Memphians registered and voted. In a state with a perennially low 
voter turnout, Crump's dependable 50,000 or more votes in Shelby 
County could easily make the difference in statewide elections. Al-
most one-third of the total Democratic primary vote came from Shelby 
County, which was accustomed to giving Boss Crump's ticket a ma-
jority of about 85 percent. The Memphis leader was strongly sup-
ported by the business community, received the endorsement of 
conservative labor leaders, and controlled a sizable bloc of black vot-
ers. The Crump faction also received support from many Democrats 
in Republican East Tennessee, since they looked to Nashville and 
Washington for patronage. It was widely believed, moreover, that the 
Crump organization received some backing in Democratic primaries 
from East Tennessee Republicans in exchange for certain favors and 
acquiescence in local GOP control. The organization's control of the 
legislative process gave it considerable leverage with politicians in the 
various towns and counties, since in Tennessee local governments 
required a good deal of special legislation from Nashville. There were 
still other sources of strength for Crump and his friends. They con-
trolled Democratic party machinery, could count on a friendly recep-
tion in the governor's office, had great influence in the legislature, 
and were allied with Sen. Kenneth D. McKellar, who was able to 
dispense a large amount of federal patronage to the right people in 
Tennessee. 
Opposition to the Crump forces, though usually manifesting itself 
through shifting alliances rather than a coherent faction, was able to 
turn out a substantial vote. A degree of continuity was evident in the 
antiorganization wing, some of whose elements had been identified 
with the administration of Austin Peay. The anti-Crump faction was 
centered in Middle Tennessee, and its most vigorous newspaper sup-
port came from the Nashville Tennessean, whose publisher, Silliman 
Evans, directed a steady barrage of criticism at Crump and his tactics. 
The most prominent leader of this faction was Gordon Browning, 
who broke with Crump after receiving his support in the gubernatorial 
primary of 1936. As governor, Browning attempted unsuccessfully to 
reduce the power of Memphis, and therefore Crump, in statewide 
elections by introducing a county-unit system that would favor rural 
areas. 
Georgia was another state in which the voters customarily were 
lined up in two Democratic factions. One wing of the party was made 
up of Eugene Talmadge's followers; the other was comprised of his 
opponents. As Key wrote, "The Talmadge personality and the viv-
idness of his race and class appeals divided the Georgia electorate 
into two camps, whose struggles created a strong tendency toward 
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bi-factionalism."21 A political firebrand who called himself a "dirt 
farmer" and encouraged comparison with Tom Watson, Talmadge 
was a dynamic figure in Georgia politics for two decades. He ran in 
every statewide primary except one between 1926 and 1946 and won 
seven victories during that period. As commissioner of agriculture in 
the late 1920s, he fought the fertilizer "trust," misspent public funds 
on the Chicago hog market, and used his weekly agricultural bulletin 
to build a statewide political base. As governor between 1933 and 
1937, he fought with the legislature, employed dictatorial tactics, and 
bitterly attacked the national government's deficit spending and wel-
fare programs. After two unsuccessful campaigns for the U.S. Senate 
in 1936 and 1938, "Our Gene" was again elected governor in 1940. 
Talmadge's growing racism was a factor in his heavy-handed inter-
vention in the affairs of the University of Georgia, a move that cost 
several units in the university system their accreditation and that 
contributed largely to the governor's defeat in his bid for reelection. 
When he died in December 1946, following a successful campaign for 
another term as governor, the leadership of his faction was transferred 
to his son Herman. 
A contemporary account described Talmadge as "a dynamic and 
powerful stump speaker, a rabble-rouser with few equals among the 
piney-woods potentates of Dixie."22 He delighted in a political fracas. 
Slender and wiry, with hom-rimmed glasses and a lock of dark hair 
that fell across his forehead, he would "shuck off" his coat at a rally, 
revealing a pair of red "galluses," roll up his shirt sleeves, and swing 
into a fiery tirade against his opponents-to the great approbation of 
his rural audiences. He pushed the "dirt farmer" theme hard and 
took advantage of the rural-dominated county-unit electoral system. 
"The poor dirt farmer," it was said, "ain't got but three friends on 
this earth: God Almighty, Sears Roebuck, and Gene Talmadge."23 
Although the "Wild Man from Sugar Creek," as he was often called, 
was a dominant leader in Georgia politics for many years, he had 
neither an organization nor a program. His flamboyant campaigns, 
personal magnetism, and race and class appeals brought him a loyal 
following from rural and small-town areas. But he offered no solutions 
to the economic and social problems of his supporters. He had no 
ideological direction beyond state rights, individualism, racial seg-
regation, and an agrarianism that "blended the populism of Tom 
Watson and the parsimony of Jeffersonianism."24 His social conserva-
tism is captured in Numan V. Bartley's comment: "In the theater of 
the absurd that had become Georgia politics, the protection of rural 
and village usages and customs meant striking out at virtually any-
thing that was not inherently native to the Georgia countryside."25 
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Talmadge's laissez-faire principles, fiscal conservatism, and opposi-
tion to organized labor eventually caused business interests to give 
him their quiet backing. 
Eugene Talmadge's most enduring accomplishment was to divide 
the Georgia electorate into two camps that reflected a strong rural-
urban cleavage and helped to create a structure of Democratic bifac-
tionalism in the state. Opposition to Talmadge was stronger in urban 
places than in the countryside, and it was generally more prevalent 
in the northern part of the state than in south Georgia. With Talmadge 
or his personal candidate in a race, the opposition usually managed 
to consolidate against the common enemy. 
North Carolina, like Virginia and Tennessee, had a dominant po-
litical organization and two fairly well-defined Democratic factions. 
The two top vote-getters in the Democratic primaries during this pe-
riod normally received at least three-fourths of the total ballots be-
tween them. Following the defection of Sen. Furnifold M. Simmons 
in the presidential election of 1928 and the collapse of his long-
entrenched organization, a new Democratic hierarchy gradually 
emerged under the leadership of Gov. 0. Max Gardner. It came to 
be known as the Shelby Dynasty, since Gardner and several of the 
new organization's leaders came from the Piedmont town of Shelby. 
The predominant faction was strongest in the Piedmont and western 
section, and it was generally supported by the dynamic industrial and 
financial interests of the state. Unlike the Simmons organization, 
which relied upon a personal network of local politicians spread over 
the state, the Shelby Dynasty depended heavily upon the elective and 
appointive officers of the state administration, especially those head-
ing the highway and revenue departments. Leaders of the controlling 
faction were in tune with North Carolina's moderate progressivism-
with its commitment to industrial development, educational advance-
ment, and harmonious race relations-and they favored the program 
of centralization and efficiency pushed through the legislature by the 
Gardner administration. North Carolina Republicans, concentrated in 
the western counties and normally polling from one-fourth to a third 
of the vote for governor, were strong enough to force a measure of 
coherence and discipline on the Democratic party. The result was an 
effort by the state's Democrats to create a genuine party organization 
with a statewide outlook. 
Governor Gardner selected J. C. Blucher Ehringhaus as his suc-
cessor. Ehringhaus was opposed in the gubernatorial primary of 1932 
by Lt. Gov. Richard T. Fountain, who was viewed by many North 
Carolinians as the "little man's" candidate. Fountain was defeated, 
but the race was close. His electoral strength lay in the eastern tobacco 
belt and the coastal plain, where resistance to the established orga-
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nization was greatest. The insurgent Democrats were weakened in 
1935 when Dennis G. Brummitt, an outstanding opposition leader in 
the legislature, died. Even so, Ralph McDonald, a former professor 
at Salem College, mounted a vigorous campaign in 1936 against Clyde 
R. Hoey, the candidate of the regular Democrats. Given support by 
most opposition leaders, McDonald attacked the Ehringhaus admin-
istration's sales tax, ran on a liberal-labor platform, and promised the 
state a "Little New Deal." But the regulars prevailed, as they contin-
ued to do during the next decade. McDonald challenged the dominant 
faction again in 1944, but he was defeated once more. By the time 
World War II had ended, however, there were signs that the Shelby 
Dynasty was beginning to lose its grip on state politics. 
The factional organization in Alabama's one-party system was 
tenuous and shifting. In the absence of a stable and enduring bifac-
tionalism, political groups were highly personal and amorphous, re-
volving around powerful state leaders. Factions were formed and 
reformed, as voters joined one faction and then another. Yet there 
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was some continuity and rationality in the way Alabama Democrats 
aligned themselves during the 1930s and 1940s. One basis for such 
division was the state's traditional sectionalism, in which the northern 
and southeastern sections of the state were arrayed against the black 
belt-Birmingham "big mules." A pronounced localism found expres-
sion in the support political candidates received from friends and 
neighbors. There was also an ideological factor in the factional conflict 
among Alabamians. The Great Depression and the New Deal sharp-
ened such ideological considerations by forcing new economic and 
political issues into the arena of state politics. Thus, Alexander Heard 
concluded in 1947, after interviewing a large number of Alabama poli-
ticians, that the "only consistent division" on matters of policy among 
the state's Democrats was the split between "liberal" and "conserva-
tive" individuals. 26 
Perhaps the most influential factional leader of this period in Ala-
bama was Bibb Graves. A product of the progressive era in Alabama 
politics and a business progressive as governor in the late 1920s, 
Graves constructed a formidable personal following. Though not him-
self ideologically inclined, he became a strong New Dealer and as 
governor during the years 1935-39 assumed the leadership of the 
liberal Democratic faction in Alabama. Planning to seek another term 
as governor in 1942, he died on the eve of the primary election, leaving 
the liberals without a good candidate. Meanwhile, Frank Dixon, who 
served as governor from 1939 to 1943, represented the conservative 
faction. 
In Louisiana Huey Long strengthened his political machine and 
extended his control over government during the early 1930s. He 
unveiled his "share-our-wealth" program in 1933, became increas-
ingly critical of the Roosevelt administration's policies, and began to 
develop plans for his own presidential candidacy in 1936. His totali-
tarian regime was based both on mass loyalty and on the exercise of 
coercive power. Unlike earlier southern reformers, Long was not ham-
strung by an uncooperative legislature; he elected his own legislature, 
forced it to enact his programs, and saw to it that the corporations 
paid for many of the new public services. Longism brought more 
people to the polls than ever before in Louisiana history. The Kingfish 
employed all of the techniques of the traditional machine, and he 
raised money to operate his organization from such sources as state 
control of petroleum production, gambling concessions, and "de-
ducts" from state employees. Long's tight control was opposed by 
most of Louisiana's large newspapers and usually by the "better ele-
ment," but this opposition was of no avail during Long's lifetime. 
The machine continued in power after Long's death. In 1936 Richard 
W. Leche, the Longite candidate for governor, was elected. Organi-
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zation leaders entered into better relations with the federal govern-
ment, and they seemed to become somewhat more conservative than 
in Huey's heyday. 
The Long machine began to disintegrate in 1939 with a series of 
revelations of political corruption in the Leche administration and of 
extensive bribery, embezzlement, and other types of malfeasance in-
volving Long's heirs. Leche soon resigned and finally went to prison, 
along with several of his cohorts. In the political reaction that followed 
these spectacular developments, a conservative named Sam Houston 
Jones won the governorship in 1940, defeating Earl K. Long, the late 
Kingfish's brother. Running on a clean-up platform but one that also 
promised a liberal program of public services, Jones emphasized such 
themes as good government, honesty, and efficiency in administra-
tion. Jones was succeeded by Jimmie H. Davis, another "reform" 
candidate who defeated the Long faction's candidate in the guber-
natorial primary of 1944. 
One of Huey Long's legacies was a durable bifactionalism in the 
state's one-party system. This dual factionalism exhibited a high de-
gree of coherence and continuity. One evidence of remarkable cleav-
age was the use of "tickets" or "slates" in primary elections, with 
candidates of the two factions running together for state offices, party 
posts, and sometimes even parish positions. The Long tickets were 
normally strongest in northern Louisiana and generally among small 
farmers, workers, and the less affluent. The anti-Long or "good gov-
ernment" faction was usually supported by the business interests and 
the "better element," and its candidates fared best in the cities and 
larger towns and in the planter parishes. The two groups also differed 
in their orientation toward the national Democratic party, especially 
after 1940. The Long faction tended to support the policies of the 
national party, whereas the anti-Long grouping became increasingly 
hostile toward the New Deal, federal initiatives, and the politics of 
the national Democratic party. "Both sides were chastened and mod-
erated by experience," George B. Tindall has written, "but they still 
presented Louisiana voters the dilemma of choice between bucca-
neering 'liberals' and standpat 'reformers.' " 27 
Kentucky also moved toward a more clearly defined state politics 
but in a very different way from Louisiana. During the 1920s Kentucky 
Democrats were divided and disorganized, while the so-called Bi-
Partisan Combine ruled the state to the advantage of powerful race-
track, liquor, and coal concerns. Alben W. Barkley, a reform Democrat, 
challenged these interests in the Democratic gubernatorial primary of 
1923, but he lost to a conservative candidate. Another reform can-
didate was defeated in 1927. These factional struggles, in which moral 
and economic reformers were pitted against conservatives acceptable 
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to the established political and economic interests, enhanced the pros-
pects of the state's Republicans, whose strength was increasing in 
this period. Republicans won the governorship in 1919 and again in 
1927, and they carried the state in the presidential elections of 1924 
and 1928. The Great Depression and the New Deal reversed this Re-
publican trend and promoted a resurgence of Democratic strength, 
particularly among coal miners, farmers, blacks, and urban workers. 
These events also altered the factional lines in the state's Democratic 
party. 
The administration organization, known locally as the Rhea-
Laffoon machine, was defeated in 1935 by Albert B. "Happy" Chand-
ler, whose governorship proved to be popular and successful. Although 
Chandler carried out some modest reforms, including administrative 
reorganization, he was not a New Dealer, and in fact, he failed in his 
attempt in 1938 to unseat Alben Barkley, a strong champion of the 
Roosevelt administration in the Senate. But the governor did succeed 
in building a robust political faction of his own, and it remained an 
important feature of the state's politics for many years. Democratic 
bifactionalism was reinforced by the absence of a run-off primary, a 
situation that encouraged party leaders to line up behind two major 
candidates. Kentucky politics, it was sometimes said, was really rep-
resented by three parties. One was the Republican party. The other 
were Democratic factions, one led by "Happy" Chandler, the other 
by leaders such as Earle C. Clements, who served as governor from 
1947 to 1951. In that respect, at least, the state had developed a some-
what more stable political structure than in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Promising signs of an emerging two-party system in Oklahoma 
were obliterated by the Great Depression and the New Deal. With 
the Republican party reduced to impotence and the fade-out of earlier 
Democratic divisions over the Farmer-Labor Reconstruction League 
and the Ku Klux Klan, Oklahoma voters aligned themselves around 
strong personalities in state politics. Thus, they elected William H. 
"Alfalfa Bill" Murray to the governorship in 1930. Murray, an eccen-
tric, outspoken, and unrepentant old agrarian, had played a leading 
role in framing the Oklahoma constitution and in Oklahoma's gov-
ernment during the early years of statehood. Murray had little success 
with his legislative proposals, opposed New Deal relief programs, 
and left office as a bitter critic of the Roosevelt administration in Wash-
ington. But "Murrayism" remained a divisive issue in the state's poli-
tics. 
Murray's successor was Ernest W. Marland, the head of an oil 
empire that had collapsed in 1930. Marland promised to "bring the 
New Deal to Oklahoma," and as governor he sponsored an impressive 
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program of public works, unemployment benefits, public power proj-
ects, and other state improvements. These proposals encountered 
determined resistance in the legislature, in the metropolitan press, 
and in business circles. Marland's inept leadership contributed to the 
failure of his administration and to the bankruptcy of his legislative 
program. The first of his legislatures was extremely economy-minded, 
while the second appropriated money lavishly for its own pet projects 
and for patronage purposes. Despite the weakness of the Marland 
administration, the New Deal was popular in the Sooner State, and 
in 1936 one of its strong advocates, Joshua B. Lee, was elected to the 
U.S. Senate. But there was also a growing movement against the New 
Deal among Oklahomans, and for a time a vague cleavage developed 
along New Deal and anti-New Deal lines. Leon C. "Red" Phillips, a 
conservative legislator and an opponent of Marland's proposals, won 
the governorship in 1938. By the early 1940s, a strong ideological 
conservatism had become ascendant in the Democratic party of Okla-
homa. This sentiment was one reason for the defeat of Senator Lee 
in 1942 and the election of Ed H. Moore, a reactionary defector from 
Roosevelt's party. 
Personal factions continued to be important in Texas politics dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s. The most notable of these were those iden-
tified with two rural demagogues: James E. Ferguson and W. Lee 
"Pappy" O'Daniel. Disqualified for state office himself, Jim Ferguson 
continued to use his wife as his political proxy. In 1932, in the depths 
of the depression, the Fergusons won again, and "Ma" served another 
term as governor. That was to be the end of the line for the Fergusons, 
although Mrs. Ferguson ran once more in 1940, but without success. 
O'Daniel, a flour salesman with a hillbilly band and a folksy and 
religious radio program, superseded Jim Ferguson as the hero of the 
rural masses. Taking advantage of his large radio following, he sud-
denly decided to run for governor and, to the surprise of most ob-
servers, won the Democratic primary in 1938. His platform included 
the Ten Commandments, abolition of the poll tax, a thirty-dollar-per-
month pension for those over sixty-five, and opposition to a sales tax. 
O'Daniel was reelected in 1940 and won a special election to the U.S. 
Senate in 1941. James V. Allred, who served as governor from 1935 
to 1939, gave Texas its most constructive administration during this 
period. 
While not manifesting itself primarily in gubernatorial politics, an 
intense conflict gradually developed between pro- and anti-New 
Deal Democrats in the Lone Star State. This factionalism reflected 
economic and class differences. "The confluence of the anxieties of 
the newly rich and the repercussions of the New Deal in Texas," V.O. 
Key observed, "pushed politics into a battle of conservatives versus 
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liberals, terms of common usage in political discourse in the state."28 
The scholar called attention to the fluid social structure in Texas: to 
the effects of rapid population growth, migration into and within the 
state, increasing urbanization, and the "wholesale manufacture" of 
new members of the upper economic orders. In such a volatile social 
milieu, one could find the promise of substantial change in the state's 
politics. 
Democratic factionalism in the other southern states was even 
more fluid and unstable. The pattern of intraparty competition in 
these four states was a far cry from the clearly defined bifactionalism 
of Virginia and Georgia Democrats. In Arkansas, following the spec-
tacular Jeff Davis early in the century, a succession of bland and gen-
erally conservative governors had come and gone without effecting 
any lasting change in the configuration of state politics. There was 
no statewide organization with either coherence or continuity. Given 
the small, homogeneous electorate, state politics developed few con-
troversial issues. While the New Deal was an influential force in Ar-
kansas politics, it did not create a durable division over economic 
policy among the voters. The most important political groupings were 
short-lived personal factions brought together by successful governors 
or other statewide candidates. Local leaders and machines played a 
central role in such statewide coalitions, while powerful economic 
interests such as the Arkansas Power and Light Company exerted 
great influence in state government. The most notable personal fac-
tions in the 1930s and 1940s were those led by two governors: Carl 
Bailey (1937-41) and Homer Adkins (1941-45). 
South Carolina politics, like Arkansas's, was characterized by in-
dividualist, free-for-all intraparty fighting. The state's loose multifac-
tional system revolved around the personal followings of strong 
governors. It also reflected a powerful localism and the long-standing 
animosity between the upcountry and the coastal plain (with the city 
of Charleston). The Palmetto State's preoccupation with matters of 
race inhibited the development of a more distinct bifactionalism along 
economic and sectional lines. Although Cole Blease retained his hold 
on his prewar constituency, the old Blease and anti-Blease polarity 
lost strength in the 1920s as the insurgent leader's popularity declined. 
The most noteworthy political factions in South Carolina politics dur-
ing the years of the Great Depression and World War II were those 
of two governors: Olin D. Johnston and Burnet R. Maybank. One 
came from Spartanburg in the upcountry, the other from Charleston 
in the low country. Both men were later elected to the U.S. Senate. 
Johnston, the upcountryman, served as governor during the years 
1935-39. His administration was identified with a number of labor 
and welfare reforms, and he acquired a reputation as a "New Deal" 
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governor. His rise to power was also based on traditional divisions 
and grievances in South Carolina: upcountry opposition to Charleston 
and patrician influence, alleged frauds in Charleston, reaction against 
some of the control exerted by a legislative clique known as the "Barn-
well Ring," and Johnston's appeal to the state's mill workers. After 
losing contests for the Senate in 1938 and 1941, he was elected gov-
ernor for a second term in 1942. Two years later he defeated the 
venerable Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith in a campaign for the Senate. 
By that time Johnston had won the confidence of some conservative 
elements, and he seized on the race issue that arose with the outlaw-
ing of the white primary by the Supreme Court. Maybank, who suc-
ceeded Johnston as governor in 1939, was descended from a famous 
South Carolina family, headed a political machine in Charleston, and 
was himself something of a New Dealer. As governor he provided 
effective support for the Santee-Cooper power project, worked hard 
to obtain federal aid for the state, and placed great emphasis on the 
importance of economic development in the future of South Carolina. 
An amorphous and transient multifactionalism also marked Mis-
sissippi politics in this period. The era of "redneck" control of the 
state government had apparently ended by the mid-1920s. By that 
time both James K. Vardaman and Theodore G. Bilbo had been de-
feated and repudiated. The old division between the delta and the 
hills still manifested itself occasionally in political campaigns and leg-
islative debates, but it had softened and lost much of its intensity. 
The most important groupings were those that developed around the 
state's major political figures; few of these possessed much discipline 
or continuity. Although the New Deal became an issue in state poli-
tics, it did not provide the basis for a new and enduring factionalism 
among Mississippians. The only political faction possessing a sem-
blance of stability and continuity in the 1930s and 1940s was the per-
sonal following of Theodore Bilbo. 
Bilbo's influence in Mississippi politics lasted for almost forty 
years, from his emergence as a leader in the Vardaman faction early 
in the century until his death in 1947. Following his governorship, 
his political fortunes declined. Bilbo lost elections in 1918 and 1923, 
but then he was elected to a second term as governor in 1927. He had 
little success with the legislature, however, and when he left office 
early in 1932 the state was on the verge of bankruptcy. His career 
seemed to be at an end. Yet Bilbo was a resilient politician with a 
faithful following, and in 1934 he won a U.S. Senate seat. He was 
reelected in 1940 and 1946. Somewhat surprisingly, the Mississippi 
senator quickly became a staunch supporter of the Roosevelt admin-
istration's reform program. He was far more enthusiastic about many 
New Deal measures than his senior colleague, Byron Patton "Pat" 
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Harrison, an influential Senate chairman and himself one of the ad-
ministration's congressional leaders. There was no love lost between 
the two senators, and in 1936 Bilbo tried unsuccessfully to defeat 
Harrison by supporting Martin S. Conner against him. This contest 
demonstrated how difficult it was even for Bilbo to transfer his per-
sonal following to the support of another candidate, particularly 
against a man as resourceful and popular as Harrison. "The Man" 
had more success in supporting two winning gubernatorial candi-
dates: Paul B. Johnson in 1939 and Thomas L. Bailey in 1943. In the 
second of these primaries, the contest was infused with state-rights 
rhetoric and criticism of federal bureaucracy, and Bilbo was increas-
ingly stamped as a racist demagogue. With his death, however, Mis-
sissippi no longer had a unifying personality around whom a faction 
could form. 
In Florida the Broward and anti-Broward wings of the Democratic 
party gradually receded, while the personal following of Sidney J. 
Catts, the state's next "man of the people," did not survive his gov-
ernorship as a strong force. Political coalitions, usually constructed 
by successful candidates for statewide office, were remarkably tran-
sitory, and there was a great turnover in the state's major political 
leaders. The gubernatorial primaries normally attracted a large num-
ber of candidates. No basic cleavage arose in the electorate over issues 
or principles, except for an imperfect sectional division between north 
and south and a tendency in some campaigns toward a conservative 
versus liberal dichotomy. In some respects, no doubt, the state's 
shapeless and shifting politics reflected its rapid urbanization, eco-
nomic diversification, population growth, and influx of newcomers. 
As in other southern states, the New Deal influenced the course 
of Florida politics in the 1930s and 1940s. For one thing, it provided 
the state with desperately needed federal assistance. David Sholtz, 
who served as governor during the years 1933-37, showed unusual 
resourcefulness in tapping these sources. Support for and opposition 
to the policies of the Roosevelt administration inevitably flowed into 
electoral politics in Florida. Sen. Claude Pepper, an ardent New 
Dealer, won reelection in 1938 and 1944. Rep. Lex Green became a 
strong supporter of the New Deal. But such a reputation was not 
necessarily an asset in Florida politics. In the gubernatorial primary 
of 1936, for example, Fred Cone defeated Raleigh Petteway, in part 
because the latter was accused of being a "reformer" bent on estab-
lishing a New Deal in the Peninsula State. Millard Caldwell won the 
governorship in 1944, taking advantage of Representative Green's 
reputation as a "liberal." "Floridians," two scholars observe, "have 
shown a persistent dislike of liberal, free-spending candidates at the 
state level. " 29 By the same token, business leaders helped determine 
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the outcome of statewide elections such as the gubernatorial primaries 
of 1940 and 1944. Florida was undergoing enormous change as mid-
century approached, but no basic alteration of the state's politics had 
occurred since the time of Napoleon Bonaparte Broward. 
By the end of World War I, the early twentieth-century patterns 
of Democratic factionalism in the southern states were disappearing. 
From the matrix of the 1920s, new patterns began to evolve that would 
become characteristic of southern politics in the 1930s and 1940s. With 
the coming of the Great Depression, the region's concern with the 
politics of morality associated with prohibition, religious fundamen-
talism, and the Ku Klux Klan receded. The search for industrial de-
velopment and economic growth, on the other hand, continued to 
occupy southern governors and legislators. In Mississippi, for in-
stance, Gov. Hugh L. White secured the adoption in 1936 of his "Bal-
ance Agriculture with Industry" program. One of the most important 
factors in the political affairs of the South after 1933 was the New 
Deal, which became a central issue in state politics and a stimulus to 
liberal ideas and leadership throughout the region. But the New Deal 
also brought a conservative reaction in the southern states, and in 
the 1940s this conservatism gained strength. Conservatives through-
out this period continued to benefit from the overrepresentation of 
rural constituencies, from the restricted electorates in most southern 
states, and from powerful influence exerted by local elites, business 
groups, and other vested interests. 
The state systems that emerged during these years were surpris-
ingly diverse. They ranged across a spectrum from fairly clear-cut and 
stable dual factions in some states to loose and impermanent multi-
factional groupings in others. They included the well-ordered Virginia 
organization, Boss Crump's Tennessee, Gene Talmadge's personal 
faction in Georgia, Huey Long's lasting influence in Louisiana, and 
the free-for-all politics in Florida. Yet all of the thirteen southern states 
were one-party states. The Republican party did have some strength 
in the upper South and in Oklahoma. But the Solid South remained 
intact. Despite growing southern opposition to federal intervention 
and to the national party initiatives, prospects for the disruption of 
the region's Democratic solidarity were not very bright at the end of 
World War II. Significant changes in the pattern of state politics in 
the South seemed equally remote. Nevertheless, the New Deal had 
profoundly affected southern politics and the political role of the 
South in the nation. 
5 The South and the New Deal 
The onset of the Great Depression, the election of Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt in 1932, and the popularity of the New Deal destroyed any 
hope the Republicans may have had of building on the southern 
defection in the presidential election of 1928. Roosevelt's leadership 
tended to broaden and nationalize the outlook of southern congress-
men, in the manner of Woodrow Wilson, and the southerners, a 
goodly number of whom had been in Congress during the Wilson 
years, once again dominated committee chairmanships and parlia-
mentary proceedings. Frank Freidel has summed up the contributions 
of the South and its congressional leaders to the enactment of the 
New Deal and to Roosevelt's foreign policy. "The South figured 
largely and indeed vitally in Roosevelt's political destinies. Most im-
portant of all, had it not been for Southern support, he would never 
have been nominated for President in 1932 and thus would never 
have reached the White House. It was Southern leadership in Con-
gress that enacted the New Deal program and subsequently supplied 
to the President the requisite margin of votes to pass defense measures 
in the late thirties and early forties." 1 
Nevertheless, the South's response to Roosevelt and the New 
Deal was ambivalent. One disquieting development was the recon-
struction of the Democratic party. While the South remained a vital 
part of the Democratic coalition, it was suddenly changed by the 
partisan realignment of the 1930s from a majority faction in a minority 
party to a minority faction in a majority party. The massive Democratic 
gains outside the South, which provided the foundation for the Roo-
sevelt coalition of organized labor, urban ethnic groups, and blacks, 
drastically reduced the dependence of the national party on southern 
voters and threatened the traditional power of southern leaders in 
Washington. One of the South's longtime defenses-the two-thirds 
rule for making presidential nominations in national Democratic con-
ventions-was abolished in 1936. Still, southern congressmen as-
sumed a central role in the legislative history of the 1930s. On the 
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negative side, their powerful positions and skillful use of obstruc-
tionist tactics enabled them to turn back efforts to pass an antilynching 
bill and to outlaw the poll tax as a voting prerequisite. Opposition to 
Roosevelt's reform program gradually increased among southern con-
gressmen, who helped bring the New Deal to a halt in the late 1930s 
and some of whom entered into an informal conservative coalition 
with Republican lawmakers. 
During World War II and the early postwar years, the Solid South 
remained intact. Southerners, in and out of Congress, rallied to the 
support of Franklin Roosevelt's foreign and defense policies, and fol-
lowing the war the South strongly endorsed the nation's new inter-
national leadership. In the presidential election of 1944, southerners 
gave Roosevelt 69 percent of their ballots, as compared to the 52 
percent he received in the Northeast and to his 49 percent in the 
Midwest. In Congress, as one scholar has observed, the devices of 
the concurrent majority "had taken such deep root and were, on the 
whole, protected so skillfully by the champions of the Southern po-
sition that the carefully constructed Southern mechanism did not fall 
apart all at once like the wonderful one-horse shay."2 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became governor of New York in 
1929, was the principal beneficiary of Alfred E. Smith's overwhelming 
defeat in the election of 1928. Most southerners viewed Roosevelt as 
an attractive alternative to Smith, and the region's politicians provided 
strong support for his nomination in 1932. The New Yorker, who 
began to visit Warm Springs, Georgia, in the mid-1920s for the 
strengthening of his withered legs, had established himself as some-
thing of "a Georgia farmer-politician." Having cultivated southern 
political leaders, he impressed many of them in the aftermath of the 
1928 debacle as a man who might bridge the sectional division among 
Democrats and lead them to victory in 1932. As president, Roosevelt 
struck a responsive chord among southerners, who had always 
tended to personalize relationships and to approach politics on a per-
son-to-person basis. He soon captured the minds and hearts of the 
southern people, including a substantial number excluded from any 
part in the political process. During the 1930s his personality and his 
programs were as popular in the southern states as in other parts of 
the country. 
Southerners welcomed the New Deal for several reasons: tradi-
tional attachment to the Democratic party, pride in the party's national 
victories, the influential position of southern congressmen in Wash-
ington, Roosevelt's remarkable popularity, and their desperate need 
of economic relief. The depression and the New Deal also revived the 
voices of dissent and latent radicalism below the Potomac. They 
brought the first modern stirring of the southern "proletariat" -of 
104 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
submerged elements like the sharecropper, the textile worker, and 
the black domestic servant. Whatever their ideological inclinations, 
most southerners were disposed to regard Roosevelt and the New 
Deal as allies in the struggle to curb the economic imperialism of the 
Northeast: to regulate Wall Street, equalize freight rates that discrimi-
nated against the South, liberalize credit, and provide badly needed 
capital for economic development, not to mention saving the region's 
agricultural system and business enterprise. "The New Deal," two 
scholars have recently observed, "meant direct financial aid for many 
whites without a concomitant burden of heavy taxation since most of 
the recipients were too poor to pay much in taxes. By not supporting 
civil rights issues or programs that would provide substantial, obtru-
sive aid to blacks, the Roosevelt administration avoided entangling 
the national government in the one issue that would assuredly have 
infuriated white southerners."3 
The lure of federal assistance was almost irresistible. As a south-
ern political scientist wrote in 1931, "The seeking of Federal aid for 
southern highways, flood control, barge service, or cotton marketing, 
is only one aspect of the southern policy of looking northward for 
public and private funds for economic, scientific, and cultural devel-
opment."4 State rights in the depression seemed less essential than 
national subsidies, and especially so since many of the New Deal 
programs benefited the South more than other regions and since the 
benefits southerners received far surpassed their contributions to fed-
eral revenue collections. Even so, per capita federal expenditures in 
the South during the New Deal were lower than those of any other 
region, in part no doubt because the southern states found it difficult 
to raise matching funds and in part, one suspects, because guardians 
of the low-wage system did not want the money spent in the region. 5 
The new president looked to southern senators and representa-
tives for leadership and cooperation in the enactment of his program. 
The response of these Dixie congressmen in 1933 and 1934 was all 
that Roosevelt could have hoped for. Like their Democratic colleagues 
from other regions, they gave the administration's proposals consis-
tent and often enthusiastic support. They were moved by party loy-
alty, by Roosevelt's skill as a legislative leader, by their desire to 
ensure the success of the first Democratic presidency in twelve years, 
and by the terrible needs of their constituents. They were predisposed 
by experience and tradition to vote for such legislation as agricultural 
benefits and tariff reductions. Most of them liked the president. And 
they liked the power and prestige that came with responsible positions 
in a majority party. 
A southern atmosphere was apparent on Capitol Hill in 1933 and 
the years that followed. Southerners dominated the committee struc-
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hue and the parliamentary proceedings of the two chambers. The 
Texas delegation alone included nine chairmen of permanent com-
mittees. In the Senate the majority leader was Joseph T. Robinson of 
Arkansas, a veteran of twenty years in the upper house and a de-
pendable advocate of administration interests. When Robinson died 
suddenly in the summer of 1937, he was succeeded as majority leader 
by a strong New Dealer, Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky. Two other 
key Senate leaders from the South were Byron Patton "Pat" Harrison 
of Mississippi and James F. Byrnes of South Carolina. In his capacity 
as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harrison steered the 
passage of such important administration measures as the National 
Industrial Recovery Bill and the Social Security Bill. Byrnes, an astute 
and influential senator, was the president's liaison man in the upper 
house. Vice-Pres. John Nance Garner of Texas was also a significant 
figure in the Roosevelt administration's legislative plans, particularly 
during the early years. 
The southern presence was equally forceful in the House of Rep-
resentatives. Three southerners served in succession as majority 
leader and then speaker during the Roosevelt years: Joseph W. Byrns 
of Tennessee, William B. Bankhead of Alabama, and Sam Rayburn 
of Texas. Before becoming majority leader in 1937, Rayburn had been 
chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, a 
position he used effectively to help pass the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, the Rural 
Electrification Act of 1936, and other New Deal legislation. Rayburn, 
George B. Tindall has written, "epitomized certain characteristics 
common among the southern leaders: 'small-townish, agrarian, na-
tionalistic, individualistic, anti-Wall Street,' men of rural background 
and humble origin who had struggled hard for an education, who 
felt an instinctive sympathy for the 'little fellow,' who 'savored the 
honors and prestige associated with Congressional leadership,' and 
who observed party regularity as an article of faith." 6 Another south-
ern House stalwart was Robert Lee "Muley" Dough ton of North Caro-
lina who, as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, steered 
such key measures as the National Industrial Recovery and Social 
Security bills to passage in the lower house. 
Southern congressmen gave the New Deal impressive backing 
during Roosevelt's first term. One scholar has found, after analyzing 
the Arkansas congressional delegation during the years 1933-36, that 
not a single negative vote was cast by the state's senators and rep-
resentatives during that four-year period against measures that were 
central to the developing New Deal program. Like most other mem-
bers of Congress, the Arkansas delegation generally exhibited more 
interest in legislation having a direct effect on their constituents-
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Table 2. Southern Influence in Congress, 1933-1988 
House Senate 
%of %of %of %of 
Committee Majority Committee Majority 
Congress Chairs a Partyb Chairs a Partyb 
73d [1933-34] 71 37 50 43 
77th [1941-42] 47 43 63 40 
82d [1951-52] 58 49 53 53 
87th [1961-62] 60 42 63 37 
92d [1971-72] 43 34 53 33 
97th [1981-82] 38 33 20 21 
100th [1987-88] 27 33 50 33 
souRcEs: Official Congressional Directory, 73d Cong., 1st sess.; 77th 
Cong., 1st sess.; 92d Cong., 1st sess.; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vols. 
7, 17, 37; Congressional Index, 100th Congress. 
aFigures prior to 1951 are based upon major standing committees only; 
figures for 1951 to the present are based upon all standing committees. 
bThe Democrats were the majority party in both House and Senate in 
every Congress covered, with the exception of the 97th, when Republicans 
held a majority in the Senate. 
matters such as agriculture, mortgages, relief, and social security-
than on broad questions of political and economic philosophy? Yet 
their concerted influence was remarkable. In the field of agriculture, 
for example, two historians assert that the southern lawmakers in this 
era shaped the substantive content of farm legislation "to an extent 
far greater than their numbers warranted." The authors attribute this 
to the southerners' "unmatched cohesiveness, continuity, parliamen-
tary skill, and positions of power."8 The journalist Turner Catledge, 
who covered the congressional scene for the New York Times in the 
1930s, thought the southerners were "more closely knit" than legis-
lators from other regions. "They were like a blood brotherhood," he 
later wrote. "They knew they were a minority and could have strength 
only by unity. They differed on details, but on the great issues-race, 
and a generally conservative approach to social and economic issues-
they usually spoke with one voice."9 Southern congressional dele-
gations did gain strength because of their high degree of cohesiveness. 
Some uneasiness was evident among southern congressmen 
about the implications of the New Deal, as well as scattered opposition 
to it, almost from the first. This was especially true of the Senate, 
where Carter Glass and Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia, Josiah W. Bailey 
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of North Carolina, and Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma spoke out 
against several of Roosevelt's legislative programs. Glass was the most 
vehement of these southern critics, for he quickly concluded that the 
New Deal represented a frontal assault on time-honored southern 
traditions such as state rights, individualism, constitutional govern-
ment, and white supremacy. Another southern senator, Huey Long, 
gave the Roosevelt administration even more trouble than the con-
servatives. Until his assassination in 1935, the Louisiana senator con-
demned much of the New Deal as of little benefit to the poor and 
disadvantaged while serving the interests of the established and well-
to-do. Early in 1934 Long began to promote his own Share-Our-Wealth 
program on a national basis. The New Deal provoked bitter contro-
versy in the South, as in other regions. Not since the Populist Revolt 
had ideological divisions been of such central importance in southern 
politics. The labels "liberal" and "conservative" acquired a more sub-
stantive meaning, and the fiscal, regulatory, and welfare functions of 
government generated heated debate among southerners. 
Perhaps the bitterest Democratic enemy of Roosevelt's New Deal 
in the South before 1937 was the conservative governor of Georgia, 
Eugene Talmadge, who by 1935 had set out to obstruct his state's 
participation in the president's new reform programs. "The New 
Deal," Talmadge declared on one occasion, "is a combination of wet-
nursin', frenzied finance, downright communism, and plain damn-
foolishness. " 10 Having presidential ambitions of his own, the Georgia 
governor helped organize an anti-New Deal "Grass Roots Conven-
tion," which was held in Macon, Georgia, in January 1936. "Jeffer-
sonian Democrats" were invited from seventeen southern and border 
states, and the convention was sponsored by the Southern Committee 
to Uphold the Constitution. The affair turned out to be a fiasco. "Our 
Gene" failed to control the Georgia delegation to the Democratic na-
tional convention in 1936, and he was trounced in his campaign for 
the Senate by Richard B. Russell, who defended the New Deal and 
his support of it. 
Several southern governors became known as New Deal liberals. 
James V. Allred, who served as governor of Texas during the years 
1935-39, brought that state into the national social welfare system 
and in other respects cooperated with New Deal programs. Although 
W. Lee O'Daniel, Allred's successor, was no New Dealer, he was an 
advocate of old-age pensions, and there was an aura of reform about 
his governorship. Bibb Graves, a liberal factional leader in Alabama, 
was closely identified with the New Deal during his tenure as gov-
ernor (1935-39). In Georgia, Eurith D. "Ed" Rivers, a former supporter 
of Eugene Talmadge, was elected governor in 1936. He gave Georgia 
a "Little New Deal" and sponsored a series of measures that enabled 
108 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
the state to share in the Roosevelt programs. Rivers encountered reve-
nue shortages, however, and his resort to martial law and liberal use 
of the pardoning power, along with an investigation of wrongdoing 
in the highway department, weakened his administration and caused 
him to leave office under a cloud. Still other politicians at the state 
level acquired reputations as New Dealers, including unsuccessful 
challengers of established Democrats such as Ralph McDonald of 
North Carolina. 
Briefly in the late 1930s, the fortunes of New Deal supporters in 
Virginia assumed a rosy glow. Lt. Gov. James H. Price won the gov-
ernorship in 1937 with the reluctant acquiescence of the Byrd machine. 
Price had been an organization man, but he approved of the New 
Deal, and his campaign was eagerly supported by most antiorgani-
zation leaders. The Price administration accomplished some of its 
objectives, but New Deal Democrats were unable to create a viable 
organization of their own in the Old Dominion, even with a measure 
of support from President Roosevelt. The ranks of the liberal, anti-
organization faction soon dwindled in the face of the regulars' 
strength, their control of patronage, and the growing reaction against 
the New Deal. Roosevelt, increasingly concerned with developments 
abroad, made peace with Virginia conservatives after 1939. 
The president's increasing emphasis on reform in the mid-1930s 
disturbed many southerners. Roosevelt knew that men like Joe Rob-
inson and Pat Harrison were troubled "about the whole New Deal." 
They wondered, the president told Felix Frankfurter in the summer 
of 1935, "where that fellow in the White House is taking the good 
old Democratic party." Roosevelt went on to say, "I will have trouble 
with my own Democratic party from this time on in trying to carry 
out further programs of reform and recovery."11 He had never lost 
sight of the importance of maintaining the support of southern 
congressional leaders. "I did not choose the tools with which I must 
work," Roosevelt explained to Walter White of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People. "Had I been permitted 
to choose them I would have selected quite different ones. But I've 
got to get legislation passed by Congress to save America. The South-
erners by reason of the seniority rule in Congress are chairmen or 
occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and House committees. 
If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill 
I ask Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing. I just can't 
take that risk."12 Still, FOR's patience was not unlimited, and follow-
ing his triumphant reelection in 1936, he was not in a mood to make 
large concessions to southern Democrats. At the same time, he was 
not eager to challenge the dominant power structures in southern 
state politics. 
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The more conservative members of Congress from the South were 
torn between a desire to meet the pressing needs of their constituents 
and their dedication to a balanced budget, strong local government, 
and administrative efficiency. They were not unappreciative of their 
party's extraordinary success and of its leader's great popularity. But 
they were apprehensive and restless. Some of them had a vague fear 
that a liberalized party and a powerful executive would pose a threat 
to white supremacy. The Roosevelt coalition of 1936 frightened many 
southern leaders. As George Wolfskill and John A. Hudson have 
written, the traditional Democratic party "was yielding to one that 
was more northern than southern, more urban than rural; it was a 
new combination of forces which appealed to labor, to traditionally 
Republican Negroes, to the ethnic groups of the New Immigration, 
to women, and to the intellectuals attracted by the imagination and 
pragmatism of the New Deal. It was a new political edifice of which 
the South was the frieze, not the cornerstone."13 
Despite such reservations, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal 
remained immensely popular in the South, and most southern con-
gressmen continued to give the administration loyal support. But that 
began to change in 1937. Roosevelt's audacious plan to "pack" the 
Supreme Court created a great political crisis, gave his critics a weighty 
issue, and brought conservatives from both parties together in op-
position. Although many southern congressmen backed the president 
in the court fight, large numbers of their colleagues from the South 
deserted him for the first time. The struggle demonstrated that Roo-
sevelt was not invulnerable, and his opponents had found an issue 
on which they could openly attack him. By the autumn of 1937, an 
informal coalition of anti-New Deal Democrats and Republicans had 
developed. Southerners took a leading role in the coalescence of these 
congressional conservatives. The concern that united them was their 
opposition to much of the New Deal-to the growth of federal power 
and bureaucracy, to deficit spending, to industrial labor unions, and 
to most welfare programs. In a statement of principles drafted in 
December 1937 by Josiah W. Bailey and other leaders of this con-
servative coalition, the dissidents presented a ten-point list of de-
mands, including a balanced budget, tax reduction in order "to free 
investment funds," a new labor policy, maintenance of state rights 
and local self-government, and reliance upon the "American form of 
government and the American system of free enterprise."14 The coa-
lition was a major factor in the failure of several New Deal measures 
in the late 1930s. During that period nearly half of the southern sena-
tors voted against the administration on key nonagriculhual economic 
issues, while the percentage of southerners voting against such mea-
sures in the House was ordinarily greater than that of other members. 
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Tom Little in the Nashville Tennessean. Courtesy of the Jean and Alexander 
Heard Library, Vanderbilt University 
Other Roosevelt initiatives also provoked resentment and oppo-
sition from southerners in and out of Congress. One of these was 
Roosevelt's behind-the-scenes intervention in the contest to elect a 
Senate majority leader following Joe Robinson's death in the midst 
of the court fight. Alben Barkley, a staunch administration man, de-
feated Pat Harrison, a more conservative and less reliable New Dealer, 
by one vote. The Roosevelt administration was also identified with 
an outbreak of sit-down strikes in 1937 and 1938, and its Wages and 
Hours Bill threatened to wipe out regional wage differentials, against 
the wishes of many southern businessmen and politicians. Roose-
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velt's intervention in several southern primaries in 1938 and his effort 
to "purge" congressional opponents did not go down well with south-
erners. Nor did the president's reference to the South as the "nation's 
no. 1 economic problem," with the implication that the region's plight 
required liberal legislation and the election. of liberal southerners to 
support the New Deal, increase his standing in the South. Furious 
over Roosevelt's court-packing scheme in 1937 and resentful of his 
endeavor to purge his congressional opponents in 1938, Carter Glass 
warned that the South had better "begin thinking whether it will 
continue to cast its 152 electoral votes according to the memories of 
the Reconstruction era of 1865 and thereafter, or will have spirit and 
courage enough to face the new Reconstruction era that northern so-
called Democrats are menacing us with."15 
The political scientist Marian D. Irish once suggested that Franklin 
Roosevelt found both "his staunchest supporters and his strongest 
opponents within the ranks of his own party south of the Mason-
Dixon line."16 This was a perceptive comment. There was mounting 
concern among the "county-seat elites" and other members of the 
governing class over the possible consequences of the national ad-
ministration's welfare and labor programs, over the enlarged role of 
the federal government, and over the president's efforts to reform the 
courts and remove his conservative opponents from office. A recent 
study of North Carolina during this period concludes that the state 
was most influenced by a "conservative, business-oriented ideology 
that survived the changes wrought by the New Deal."17 Congres-
sional leaders like Carter Glass, Pat Harrison, and John Garner, re-
flecting the interests of the propertied establishment of their region, 
were determined "to secure and maintain the existing socioeconomic 
society at home in the South." In the opinion of George E. Mowry, 
they "came near to representing southern conservatism at its most 
informed and articulate best."18 Many Democrats in the South, ac-
cording to Raymond Clapper in 1936, saw the New Dealers as a 
"crowd of interlopers bearing strange and dubious ideas."19 Writing 
in 1935, a South Carolinian informed Sen. James F. Byrnes of his 
dedication to the Democratic party and faith in President Roosevelt. 
"At the same time," he observed, "I have always felt that he was 
surrounded by an aggregation of parlor communists and socialists 
and that too many of this unpractical type was even placed in his 
cabinet. " 20 
Roosevelt's New Deal did not transform southern politics, for 
conservative officeholders, attitudes, and institutions were too firmly 
entrenched at the state and local levels to be dislodged by the presi-
dent's reform programs. The New Deal, being dependent on home-
state authorities for the administration of its programs, did little to 
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interfere with the distribution of political power within the region. 
"In effect," one historian says of the situation in Memphis, "the New 
Deal was filtered through the Crump machine."21 This helps explain 
the Roosevelt administration's willingness to accept racial discrimi-
nation in the operation of its own relief agencies, to acquiesce in racial 
wage differentials, and to shy away from involvement in union-
organizing efforts in the South. Influential southern liberals, more-
over, were small in number and relatively weak, and Alan Brinkley 
has argued that they were further hampered by the fear they shared 
with conservatives of "federal interference in the South's right to 
manage its own affairs and chart its own future."22 Noting the preva-
lence of rebellious forces in southern politics during the 1930s, Brink-
ley suggests that the dominant insurgency in the depression South 
"was not the weak and tentative group of southern liberals who iden-
tified with the New Deal. It was a force that drew from the region's 
own populist traditions, one that could produce both radical andre-
actionary demands, one that could find exroression simultaneously in 
a Huey Long and a Eugene Talmadge." 3 There was also another 
aspect of the matter. While most southerners accepted New Deal 
activism and approved Roosevelt's work for "the common man," they 
were influenced by a deeply conservative culture. "It was obvious 
enough," W.J. Cash wrote in 1941, "that the basic Rooseveltian ideas, 
with their emphasis on the social values as against the individual, 
and on the necessity of revising all values in the light of the conditions 
created by the machine and the disappearance of the frontier, ran 
directly contrary to the basic Southern attitudes."24 
Yet in some respects the Roosevelt presidency had a profound 
and lasting effect on politics and government in the southern states. 
This was most apparent in the altered relationship between the federal 
government and the states and in the composition of the revitalized 
Democratic party in the United States. The New Deal also aroused 
the political consciousness of millions of ordinary southerners-of 
poor farmers, coal miners, schoolteachers, blacks, and working peo-
ple generally. "Negroes shud vote for Mistuh Roosevelt if they kin," 
a black day laborer and Works Projects Administration worker told 
an interviewer in 1940. "I been here twenty years, but since WPA, 
the Negro sho' has started talkin' 'bout politics."25 Roosevelt and the 
New Deal remained popular with many of these southerners. During 
the court fight, a Gallup poll revealed that a majority of the respon-
dents approved FDR' s plan in every southern state except Kentucky 
and Oklahoma, while 53 percent of the national sample opposed it. 
In the election of 1938, to take another example, one study showed 
that in nine southern primaries pro-New Deal candidates had come 
out ahead of anti-New Dealers 53.4 to 46.6 percent. 
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Federal intervention during the 1930s was unprecedented in the 
modern South. Under the pressure from Washington, the southern 
states did a good deal to modernize their governmental structures, 
to extend public services, to develop more adequate social welfare 
systems, and even to improve the position of labor. The New Deal, 
while seldom displacing the dominant political factions, became a 
vibrant issue in the region's state politics. Still more consequential 
were the long-term effects of New Deal programs on the South. For 
the national reforms of the 1930s contributed to a series of deep-seated 
transformations that eventually changed the economic, social, and 
political character of the South and that were accompanied by the 
Second Reconstruction. The New Deal encouraged these develop-
ments through the changes it produced in the South's own social and 
economic institutions and through its impact outside the southern 
region: through its role in the vast migration off the southern land, 
massive out-migration of unskilled labor, the revamping of the ag-
ricultural system, the disruption of the "network of dependency re-
lationships," the increase in the industrial wage level and the 
reduction of the North-South differential, and outside the region the 
creation of a new Democratic coalition that would ultimately demand 
more thoroughgoing federal action in areas such as civil rights. 26 
Franklin Roosevelt's leadership inspired and directed a hardy 
band of southern liberals in Congress-men like Hugo L. Black, Alben 
W. Barkley, Theodore G. Bilbo, Claude Pepper, and Morris Sheppard 
in the Senate and Robert L. Doughton, Maury Maverick, and Lyndon 
B. Johnson in the House of Representatives. There was a more nu-
merous but less well-known aggregation of New Deal liberals in state 
houses and agencies throughout the South. Most of these Democrats 
shared Roosevelt's desire to liberalize the Democratic party in Con-
gress and in their respective states. They tended to accept the reality 
of the colonial South and to believe that a reactionary ruling class at 
home, in combination with powerful outside interests, had hindered 
the economic and political advancement of the region. They sup-
ported efforts to repeal the poll tax, to create liberal coalitions in the 
South, to secure favorable labor legislation, and to equalize intersec-
tional freight rates. There was a populist tinge to their political 
thought, tempered perhaps by their faith in progressivism and eco-
nomic development. In his campaign for the Senate in 1934, Bilbo 
told his Mississippi audiences that many incumbent senators were 
"Tories of the first water," who were "shaking in their boots now. 
They have been forced by the lash of an outraged and indignant 
people to vote against their old masters."27 Roosevelt's New Deal also 
encouraged a sprinkling of liberal and radical activism on the part of 
southerners bent upon investigating and publicizing the reform needs 
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of their region. These included such diverse enterprises as the High-
lander Folk School, the Southern Summer School for Women, the 
Southern Policy Study, the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen, and 
the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. 
Try as conservative politicians might-by joining the New Deal 
for a time, by endeavoring to water down its programs, by resorting 
to subterfuge, disingenuous arguments, and clever appeals to old-
time shibboleths-the threat from Washington remained, and it 
promised to grow larger in the future. Not only did it seem more and 
more unlikely that the South could ever again dominate the Demo-
cratic party, but it was also increasingly apparent that the national 
policies adopted during the 1930s would ultimately strengthen or-
ganized labor, farmers, blacks, and other disadvantaged elements 
sufficiently to force concessions from those who had long had the 
upper hand in the region. This was one measure of the New Deal's 
challenge to southern conservatives. 
But with the faltering of its domestic reform proposals and the 
gathering war clouds in the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration 
moved toward a reconciliation with southern conservatives in Con-
gress. Meanwhile, Republican gains in the midterm elections of 1938 
had strengthened the position of southern congressional leaders. The 
administration's approach to the tense international situation con-
tributed substantially to the restoration of harmony between the presi-
dent and southern conservatives. Although southern congressmen 
had cast their share of votes for the neutrality legislation of the mid-
1930s, they rallied enthusiastically to the support of Roosevelt's for-
eign and defense initiatives after 1938. Party loyalty and economic 
considerations involving foreign trade, as well as such factors as mili-
tary tradition, ethnic composition, and psychological makeup, stimu-
lated southern internationalism. The war boom, moreover, became a 
mighty force in rejuvenating the southern economy and providing it 
with a more substantial foundation than the old reliance upon cotton 
and agriculture. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, southern Democrats 
were more strongly in favor of intervention and internationalism than 
any other regional or party group. Without their almost solid backing, 
the administration would have been defeated on neutrality revision 
in 1939 and 1941, Lend-Lease, extension of the draft, and authori-
zation for seizing foreign ships and arming American merchant ves-
sels. 
President Roosevelt's wartime leadership was strongly supported 
in the South, and southern congressional leaders were generally quite 
satisfied to have "Dr. New Deal" replaced by "Dr. Win the War." 
Southerners were also pleased with the federal expenditure of over 
$10 billion below the Potomac during the war years, in part to com-
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pensate the region for its loss of cotton and tobacco markets abroad. 
Southern influence grew in other ways as well. Large Republican 
gains in the congressional elections of 1942 tightened the grip of the 
southern delegations on the Democratic party in Congress and en-
hanced the role of the conservative coalition. The southerners' po-
litical independence was also heightened by wartime prosperity and 
suspicion of the Roosevelt administration's intentions in dealing with 
race relations. 
The administration could take some satisfaction in the appearance 
of several new Democratic leaders at the state level. Oklahoma and 
Georgia provide examples of this new leadership. RobertS. Kerr, who 
was elected governor of Oklahoma in 1942, did a good deal to unify 
the Democratic party in that state. A popular and successful wartime 
governor, Kerr rallied Oklahomans around such themes as the need 
for economic growth, governmental assistance, and administrative 
efficiency. Though moderate in his liberalism, he was loyal to the 
national Democratic party and became the chief spokesman in 
Oklahoma for Democratic administrations in Washington. In Geor-
gia Ellis G. Arnall, the state's young attorney general, emerged as 
leader of the anti-Talmadge faction. Taking advantage of Governor 
Talmadge's controversial interference in the system of higher edu-
cation, Arnall defeated Talmadge in the gubernatorial primary of 
1942. Arnall proved to be an able governor and a successful re-
former. He restored the independence of the University of Georgia, 
reformed the penal and parole systems, spearheaded the adoption of 
a new state constitution, reduced the voting age to eighteen, took the 
lead in abolishing the poll tax, accepted Negro suffrage following the 
courts' invalidation of the white primary, and was partly responsible 
for the success of the regional movement against discriminatory 
freight rates. 
In Washington, meanwhile, liberals suffered a series of setbacks 
on issues of domestic reform. In the Seventy-eighth Congress (1943-
44), conservative southerners joined with their Republican allies in a 
concerted attack on surviving New Deal agencies. They eviscerated 
the Civilian Conservation Corps, Works Projects Administration, and 
National Youth Administration. They provided strong support for the 
South-Connally Bill, whose enactment in 1943 was designed to curb 
the freedom of labor unions to strike and also to prevent the use of 
union funds for political campaigns. They fiercely resisted an anti-
poll tax bill, which was passed by the House but defeated in the 
Senate, and prevented the approval of a rule that would have liber-
alized the adoption of cloture in the Senate. They denied the admin-
istration's request for a simplified federal soldiers' ballot in the election 
of 1944, approving instead a state rights ballot. Rep. Hatton W. Sum-
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ners of Texas had warned in 1942 that the administration's recom-
mendation would "strengthen the stranglehold of this great Federal 
bureaucracy upon the throats of the States."28 
An early analysis of party loyalty in Congress during this period 
revealed that, whereas southern Democrats were more loyal, on the 
average, than their northern counterparts in the early 1920s and early 
1930s, three-fifths of the northern Democrats were over 90 percent 
loyal to their party in 1944, as compared with less than one-twelfth 
of the southerners. 29 Nevertheless, the influence of the conservative 
coalition should not be exaggerated. V.O. Key's analysis of 598 roll 
call votes in the Senate for the period 1933 to 1945 showed that, while 
southern cohesiveness was slightly higher than that of nonsouthern 
Democrats and Republicans, on more than half of the roll calls in each 
of the seven sessions studied a majority of the southern Democrats 
disagreed with a majority of the Republicans. A majority of the Dixie 
Democrats joined with a majority of the Republican senators against 
a majority of the nonsouthern Democrats on less than 10 percent of 
the roll calls. Key's analysis of 275 roll calls in the House revealed 
similar behavior. He concluded that genuine southern solidarity in 
Congress existed only on the race question. 
If international dangers and wartime mobilization led the Roo-
sevelt administration to abandon its domestic reform agenda, south-
ern conservatives soon learned that federal power and executive 
authority could also be expanded through the creation of new war 
agencies. The Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), for ex-
ample, was, in the opinion of Governor Arnall, an irritant to both 
liberal and conservative southerners, who regarded it as in the tra-
dition of the Lodge Force Bill. 30 Many southern leaders were disturbed 
by the political activities of labor organizations and Negro groups and 
suspicious of their ties with the Democratic party. Feeling resentful 
and neglected, conservative Democrats in the South became increas-
ingly outspoken and belligerent. In late 1942 and early 1943, Gover-
nors Frank M. Dixon of Alabama and Sam Houston Jones of Louisiana 
suggested that southerners might be forced to break the bonds of 
party loyalty. New Deal policies, Jones asserted, "have continued to 
kick an already prostrate South in the face." 31 A few months later, 
Sen. Josiah W. Bailey warned, "We can form a southern Democratic 
party and vote as we please in the electoral college, and we will hold 
the balance of power in this country."32 In August 1943 Leon C. 
Phillips, a former governor of Oklahoma, denounced the New Deal 
for undermining the constitution, for attempting "to destroy in-
dividual initiative ... through regimentation," and for permitting 
"labor racketeers" to become "the bosses of our people."33 Phillips 
announced that he was joining the Republican party. Gessner T. 
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McCorvey, chairman of the Alabama Democratic executive commit-
tee, declared in September 1944, "I believe that the Southern people 
are finally waking up to the fact that by the South presenting a united 
front at our National Conventions we can regain in the councils of 
our Party the prestige which we formerly enjoyed."34 Another Ala-
bamian had written President Roosevelt two years earlier, complain-
ing that "federal agencies have adopted policies to break down and 
destroy the segregation laws of ... the entire South. Unless some-
thing is done by you, we are are going to . . . witness the Annihilation 
of the Democratic Party in this section. " 35 
While these threats reflected a widespread and growing alienation 
among anti-New Deal southerners, they were not typical of there-
gion's rank and file. A Gallup poll taken in the summer of 1943 re-
vealed that 80 percent of the southerners questioned favored FOR's 
renomination for a fourth term. President Roosevelt, the journalist 
John Temple Graves remarked, was "the Democratic party, the rebel 
yell, Woodrow Wilson and Robert E. Lee rolled into one."36 To defy 
him would be equivalent to repudiating the South's political heritage. 
One way to loosen Roosevelt's hold on the white masses of the region 
was to identify him and his administration with threats to white su-
premacy, and southern conservatives made the most of their wartime 
opportunities in this area. They expressed mounting concern over the 
FEPC, the anti-poll tax legislation in Congress, rumors of increasing 
racial violence, and the invalidation of the Democratic white primaries 
in Smith v. Allwright (1944). It is significant that almost all southern 
leaders condemned the FEPC and that even such a staunch New 
Dealer as Sen. Claude Pepper spoke out against the court's white 
primary decision. 
As the presidential election of 1944 approached. sectionalism as-
sumed a more prominent place in Democratic party affairs than at 
any time since 1928. By the summer of 1944, Roosevelt had indicated 
that he intended to revive the New Deal following the war. He had 
also advocated social welfare legislation, a federal ballot for soldiers, 
and noninterference with the rights of organized labor. The presi-
dent's southern critics made much of the changing character of the 
Democratic party-of the part played by labor's Political Action Com-
mittee, urban bosses, and black organizations-and the South's 
diminished role in the party. They linked the administration with 
the challenge to the South's established racial order, with labor 
racketeering, with socialism, and with Communist sympathies. They 
charged Roosevelt with the construction of a gigantic federal bureau-
cracy and with a relentless assault on constitutional government, state 
rights, and local self-government. Meanwhile, conservatives had found 
their own hero in Sen. Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. 
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A Byrd-for-President Committee was established, and conserva-
tive revolts were launched in three southern states. In South Carolina 
the insurgents were turned back by Gov. Olin D. Johnston's faction, 
which controlled the state convention. The Mississippi Democratic 
convention placed a slate of uninstructed electors on the ballot, but 
they were replaced by a loyal slate after the party's national conven-
tion. A bitter struggle between pro- and anti-Roosevelt Democrats 
took place in Texas, which sent two delegations to the national con-
vention. Later, after the pro-Roosevelt faction gained control of the 
state party, a group of conservative rebels known as the Texas Regu-
lars managed to get an independent slate of electors on the ballot. It 
was pledged to vote for any Democrat other than Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt. The Texas Regulars received only 11.7 percent of the vote, 
however, and Roosevelt won easily in the Lone Star State and 
throughout the South. He was too popular and too strong a wartime 
leader to lose in the South in 1944. But the president's critics could 
claim some credit in preventing the renomination of Vice-Pres. Henry 
A. Wallace. And they had pointed the way for future insurgents. 
Roosevelt's reelection in 1944 did little to blunt the edge of the 
conservative coalition in Congress. Early in 1945 the president forced 
Secretary of Commerce Jesse H. Jones to resign and replaced him with 
Henry Wallace. The conservatives, led by Senators Bailey and Walter 
F. George, began an assault on this nomination. Distrusting Wallace, 
they succeeded in stripping the Commerce Department of its lending 
agencies (including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) and then 
almost prevented the Iowan's confirmation. At about the same time, 
Senate conservatives refused to confirm the liberal Alabamian Aubrey 
W. Williams as head of the Rural Electrification Administration. 
With Roosevelt's death in April1945 and the accession of Harry 
S. Truman to the presidency, southern congressional leaders antici-
pated a more harmonious relationship with the White House and a 
revival of their influence in the Democratic party. Many of them 
thought Truman would bring an end to the New Deal. But those who 
savored such prospects were soon disillusioned. The new president 
antagonized the South by joining the advocates of a permanent FEPC, 
and in a special message on September 6, 1945, he called for an ex-
tension of wartime controls and of Roosevelt's domestic reforms. Tru-
man made little headway with this program in the Seventy-ninth 
Congress (1945-46), however, thanks in considerable part to southern 
opposition. Southern Democrats and Republicans emasculated the 
wartime FEPC in 1945, defeated the proposal for a permanent com-
mission by resorting to a long Senate filibuster in 1946, destroyed the 
effectiveness of the Office of Price Administration, drastically weak-
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ened the administration's full-employment legislation, and came close 
to overriding the president's veto of a stringent labor-control bill. In 
1946, 43 of the 102 Democrats from the eleven ex-Confederate states 
in the House of Representatives cast less than 50 percent of their votes 
with a majority of their party members. 
Since President Truman had clearly demonstrated his commit-
ment to the concept of a dynamic chief executive and his desire to 
continue in the tradition of the New Deal, southern congressmen were 
not altogether unhappy with the Republican capture of Congress in 
the midterm elections of 1946. Although the southerners would lose 
their numerous committee chairmanships as well as the speakership 
of the House, they would constitute a majority of the Democratic 
membership in both houses during the next Congress. This would 
enable them to reorganize the party in Congress, dominate the Demo-
cratic caucus, and exercise greater bargaining power. 
In the meantime, a politics of race and reaction had begun to 
manifest itself in the southern states, most noticeably in the deep 
South. Many state and local politicians in the region were upset by 
the Supreme Court's decisions striking at racial discrimination in in-
terstate transportation and in labor unions, and they were appalled 
by the invalidation of the white primary and the prospect of a surge 
of black votes. Several of the southern states grudgingly accepted the 
Smith v. Allwright decision without further opposition, while a number 
of others set about tightening their voting requirements as a means 
of deterrence. The Alabama legislature and electorate approved the 
so-called Boswell registration amendment, whose requirements in-
cluded a literacy test, a "good character" clause, and ability to "un-
derstand the duties and obligations of good citizenship." The white 
primary decision dominated the gubernatorial primary of 1946 in 
Georgia, a contest in which Eugene Talmadge lashed out at Gov. Ellis 
Arnall for not calling the legislature into session to repeal all primary 
laws, as South Carolina had done in 1944. Talmadge promised to 
preserve the white primary, and he was elected, with the help of his 
state's county-unit system and a divided opposition. Theodore G. 
Bilbo adopted Talmadge's tactics in his campaign for reelection in 
Mississippi, and his vituperative assault on black voters was also suc-
cessful. In a number of other states, organized labor and particularly 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations was the focus of conservative 
attacks in 1946. The CIO organizing drive in Dixie and the alleged 
influence of its Political Action Committee alarmed conservative poli-
ticians, who depicted the CIO-PAC as a subversive threat to southern 
institutions. The following year witnessed the enactment of a number 
of right-to-work laws in the southern states. 
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Nevertheless, New Deal liberalism was still a strong force in 
southern politics. That was evident in the Alabama gubernatorial pri-
mary of 1946. With Bibb Graves dead and the liberals divided, Ala-
bama conservatives anticipated success in 1946. But then a new 
political figure suddenly emerged in the person of James E. "Big Jim" 
Folsom, who won the governorship that year, frustrating conservative 
hopes and establishing himself as the state's most powerful politician. 
Folsom's greatest support came from northern Alabama and the 
southeastern Wiregrass section. A man of huge proportions-"the 
Little Man's Big Friend" -he toured the state in 1946 with a hillbilly 
band, "the Strawberry Pickers," and promised to use his "suds 
bucket" to clean out the statehouse. "Big Jim" was genial and kind-
hearted, and he had a taste for strong drink and attractive women. 
He rejected the "courthouse ring" approach. While not cut from the 
same cloth as the old-time southern demagogue, his campaign per-
formance was captivating. "He was every town's overgrown boy," 
one historian writes, "faintly bashful, full of mischief but easy to 
forgive. He exuded a sincerity of purpose and an integrity of intent 
that found ready adherents among those who heard him."37 Folsom 
was basically a neo-Populist who appeared comfortable with the 
legacy of the New Deal and the direction of the national Democratic 
party. Alabama liberals, including Senators Lister Hill and John J. 
Sparkman, hastened to claim him as one of their own. Folsom was only 
partly successful in getting legislative approval of his program, which 
required increased revenues, and his proposals provoked determined 
opposition on the part of the black belt and the big mules. Nor was "Big 
Jim" an effective administrator. By 1948 the luster of his electoral triumph 
had faded, Alabama Democrats were locked in a struggle between state-
rights advocates and those loyal to the national party, and conservative 
strength seemed to be increasing rapidly. 
Back in Washington, civil rights for American blacks had become 
a national issue. An outburst of murders, lynchings, and violence 
directed at southern blacks brought pressure on the White House for 
national action of some kind. In December 1946 Truman established 
the President's Committee on Civil Rights, a panel made up of fifteen 
distinguished leaders. The committee's report, To Secure These Rights, 
was published in October 1947. It was a comprehensive set of 
recommendations for congressional and administrative action to 
overcome racial discrimination in the United States. Though these 
recommendations no doubt went further than Truman had expected, 
he sent a special message to Congress in February 1948 recommending 
passage of a broad civil rights law. He proposed that the Department 
of Justice be strengthened, that the poll tax be abolished, that a per-
The South & the New Deal 121 
manent FEPC be established, that citizens be protected against lynch-
ing, that segregation be outlawed in interstate transportation, and 
several other steps. Truman was the first modern president to rec-
ommend comprehensive civil rights legislation. 
Most southern leaders were sharply critical of the president's civil 
rights proposals. The administration's proposals convinced the re-
gion's conservatives that Truman no longer had any real concern for 
the South and that he had become the spokesman of an urban coalition 
made up of intellectuals, labor unions, ethnic groups, and blacks. The 
national Democratic party could no longer be counted on to represent 
the South. Several southern governors, including Fielding L. Wright 
of Mississippi and J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, sought some 
kind of united action against Truman's civil rights program. They took 
their complaints to the Southern Governors' Conference and then to 
Washington, where they conferred with Sen. J. Howard McGrath, 
chairman of the Democratic national committee. Insurgents like 
Wright and Thurmond eventually decided that nothing was to be 
gained by talking with the Truman administration. Turning to the 
individual southern states, they undertook a movement of indepen-
dence, seeking to persuade the party organizations to oppose Truman 
or any other liberal Democrat at the national convention, and, as a 
second step, the selection of uncommitted electors pledged to vote 
against a presidential nominee who supported the civil rights pro-
gram. In the spring of 1948, the chances of a bolt became more likely 
in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Alabama, while the insurgents 
were optimistic about their prospects in Louisiana, Georgia, and Vir-
ginia. 
Assuming that "the South can be considered safely Democratic," 
President Truman and his advisers had decided to emphasize the 
administration's reform program and to reach out to the party's urban 
constituency, partly as a means of countering the appeal of Henry 
Wallace's Progressive party. 38 At the same time, Truman made some 
effort to allay the discontent within the ranks of southern Democrats. 
Thus, administration forces in the party's national convention, which 
met in Philadelphia in July, pushed for the adoption of a platform 
reiterating the president's Fair Deal program but containing only a 
vague, general commitment to .civil rights. This became the majority 
report of the platform committee, but it was challenged by a group 
of dedicated liberals, including Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, 
and a bitter struggle ensued over the wording of the civil rights section 
of the platform. When the liberals finally won in a close vote, the 
Mississippi delegation and half of the delegates from Alabama walked 
out of the convention. While the other Dixie delegates remained, only 
122 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
a handful of them voted for Truman's nomination. Most of the south-
erners cast their votes for Sen. Richard B. Russell in a symbolic protest 
against Harry Truman and the leadership of the national party. 
Within days a group of the more rebellious southern Democrats 
convened in Birmingham, where they held their own convention. 
Calling themselves States' Rights Democrats, they proceeded to nomi-
nate Governor Thurmond for president and Governor Wright for vice-
president. The insurgents were determined to retain the Democratic 
party label, since it had been an instrument of white unity for gen-
erations and was too much a part of the South's political culture to 
be discarded by southern voters. Taking advantage of their control 
of state Democratic committees and party machinery, the States' 
Righters were able to place their ticket under the Democratic label in 
South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. This tactic 
failed in the other southern states, which were more reluctant to break 
their ties with the national party and the Truman administration. It 
was significant that in the Democratic primaries that year several lib-
eral or reform-oriented candidates were nominated for governor: 
W. Kerr Scott in North Carolina, Gordon Browning in Tennessee, 
Sidney S. McMath in Arkansas, and Earl K. Long in Louisiana. Thur-
mond conducted an energetic campaign throughout the South, hop-
ing to carry most of the region and to hold the balance of power if 
neither Truman nor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican nominee, re-
ceived a majority in the electoral college. But the Dixiecrats polled 
only 1,169,021 popular votes and won only the 39 electoral votes of 
the four states whose Democratic label they had appropriated. In his 
surprising national victory, Truman carried all of the other southern 
states. 
Some southerners supported the States' Rights Democrats be-
cause of their hostility toward New Deal economic policies. But de-
spite its tender regard for business interests and its effort to refurbish 
the arguments for state rights and constitutional government, the 
Dixiecrat movement gathered most of its strength from the racism 
and traditional sectionalism that had always frustrated political rea-
lignment within the region and perpetuated the Solid South. The 
States' Righters enjoyed their greatest success in the black belt areas 
of the deep South. Assuming that Truman would be defeated in 1948, 
they seized upon the election as a favorable time to frighten the party 
leadership into a more cooperative attitude. In the process they doubt-
less hoped to smash their liberal opponents in the South by forcing 
them to endorse the unpopular side of the race issue and align them-
selves with the national party on that question. The outcome sug-
gested that loyalty to the national Democratic party, particularly in 
the peripheral South, was still strong among the region's white in-
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habitants, that civil rights had not yet become an overriding issue in 
much of the South, and that the interests of many southerners were 
too diversified and too dependent on national politics and policies 
for them to join a rebellious sectional assault on Washington and the 
Democratic party. 
Although the Dixiecrat revolt fell far short of its more ambitious 
expectations, it was a significant movement in the history of southern 
politics. For one thing, it led to a real political division in the South. 
The States' Rights party also provided, as Robert A. Garson has sug-
gested, "a coherent and voluble vehicle" for channeling the region's 
growing sense of political isolation. The movement provoked an ex-
traordinary political involvement by southerners, and it disrupted the 
Solid South. "Whatever courses southerners subsequently took," Gar-
son writes, "the Democratic party was never again upheld as the 
embodiment of race, country, God, and southern womanhood."39 By 
the end of the 1940s, another scholar observes, the South was no 
longer a part of the New Deal coalition. The New Deal party-"the 
party of the urban masses, union labor, Negroes, civil rights, and 
social reform" -had become "an affront to the conservative, rural-
minded and rural-dominated, if no longer rural South."40 
When V.O. Key analyzed southern politics in the late 1940s, the 
supporting institutions he identified-disfranchisement, malappor-
tionment, one-partyism, and the elaborate structure and pervasive 
ethos of Jim Crow-were all still in place. Yet there were growing 
doubts about the future course of southern politics. The New Deal 
had sharpened class lines in the region's politics, the traditional sys-
tem of plantation agriculture had been dealt a savage blow by the 
depression, swelling the stream of black migrants flowing out of the 
South, and the war had greatly stimulated and diversified the south-
ern economy. Even more important, in the short run, was the emer-
gence of civil rights as an issue in national politics, the identification 
of the Democratic party with that issue, and the Dixiecrat revolt of 
1948. With the passage of time, it became clear that overwhelming 
southern fidelity to the Democratic party had come to an end in the 
presidential election of 1948. Since 1948, William C. Havard remarked 
in 1980, the South has been "in a more or less active state of rebellion 
against its great symbol of sectional political unity-the Democratic 
party."41 
Developments in the 1930s and 1940s encouraged the eventual 
fragmentation of the Solid South. The changing character of the na-
tional Democratic party and the shrinking importance of the South 
in the party began to eat away at the old assumption that Democratic 
control and defense of the "southern" position were synonymous. 
The growth of centralized government and the creation of a welfare 
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state disturbed conservative southerners, who were inclined to at-
tribute their apprehensions to the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. 
But if they expected Roosevelt's successor to turn aside from the path 
charted by the New Deal, they were soon disillusioned. In fact, the 
reforms Harry Truman sponsored after the war promised not only to 
expand the welfare program of the 1930s but also to enter boldly into 
the field of federal civil rights legislation. The result was the States' 
Rights rebellion of 1948. While racial fears were at the heart of the 
Dixiecrat revolt, the movement was also a manifestation of a broader 
regional conservatism promoted by rapid economic and social change 
as well as tradition. By mid-century the foundation had been laid for 
the "massive resistance" of the 1950s. 
6 The Politics of Massive Resistance 
In the 1950s southern politics entered a period of chronic disorder. 
With racial issues threatening to become all-encompassing, an in-
creasing number of white southerners were alienated from the na-
tional Democratic party, and Republicanism grew more attractive in 
the South. The disruption of the Democratic South in 1948 was re-
peated in the national elections that followed, and presidential Re-
publicanism became an enduring feature of politics below the Potomac 
and the Ohio. New factional patterns began to emerge in the region's 
state politics. In some respects, such as the growth of the Republican 
party, the entry of black voters into Democratic primaries, and the 
rapid pace of economic and social change, particularly in the cities, 
the decade's developments seemed to betoken significant alterations 
in southern politics. Meanwhile, however, the epochal Supreme 
Court decision of 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education provoked a move-
ment of "massive resistance" to public school desegregation. That 
movement dominated southern politics in the late 1950s, fostered an 
intensified politics of race, and debilitated the New Deal-liberal fac-
tions in the Democratic party. 
As for the Dixiecrats, their fortunes declined in the aftermath of 
Harry Truman's startling victory in 1948. While the insurgents created 
a National States' Rights Committee in 1949, the Dixiecrat movement 
as an organized effort soon spent itself. Most Democratic officeholders 
and professional politicians in the South were careful not to break 
their ties with the national party. Democratic officials in Washington 
showed little disposition to punish the southern bolters, although the 
national committee did remove Dixiecrat members from four deep 
South states and the Truman administration denied patronage to Sen. 
James 0. Eastland of Mississippi and other disloyal southern con-
gressmen. Southern Democrats in the tradition of Roosevelt's New 
Deal and Truman's Fair Deal could take heart from several electoral 
successes in 1948, including the victories of W. Kerr Scott in North 
Carolina, John J. Sparkman in Alabama, Estes Kefauver and Gordon 
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Browning in Tennessee, Earl K. Long in Louisiana, Sidney S. McMath 
in Arkansas, and Lyndon B. Johnson in Texas. In 1950 Sen. Olin 
Johnston turned back a campaign challenge by Strom Thurmond, 
while Benjamin T. Laney, chairman of the Dixiecrat national com-
mittee, failed in a bid to regain the governorship of Arkansas. Senators 
Sparkman and Lister Hill led a successful effort in Alabama to regain 
control of the Democratic executive committee from the States' Rights 
Democrats. 
Although state politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s continued 
to reflect the economic and class alignments stimulated by the New 
Deal, the racial apprehensions that gave rise to the Dixiecrat move-
ment did not dissipate. The Truman administration, pressing its Fair 
Deal program in Congress, struggled in 1949 and 1950 to secure pas-
sage of a Fair Employment Practices Commission Bill and other mea-
sures. By that time the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People had begun a direct attack on the separate but equal 
doctrine in the federal courts, and in 1950 the Supreme Court in Sweatt 
v. Painter and other cases ruled against segregated facilities in higher 
education and interstate transportation. These decisions pointed to-
ward the elimination of segregation in southern graduate and profes-
sional schools and seemed to threaten the inviolability of white 
supremacy in the region. Senators Claude Pepper of Florida and Frank 
P. Graham of North Carolina, two of the South's best-known liberals, 
were defeated in hotly contested primary campaigns in 1950. Racist 
charges and innuendos were used with telling effect against both men, 
and Graham probably suffered because the Democratic primary oc-
curred only a short time after the Sweatt decision. 
Racial protest was a factor in the reelection of Gov. Herman Tal-
madge of Georgia and in the gubernatorial victory of James F. Byrnes 
in South Carolina. While refusing to join the Dixiecrats in 1948, Tal-
madge had exploited the race question in his successful campaign 
that year. During his second term, he emerged as the most ardent 
gubernatorial defender of segregation. "As long as I am Governor," 
he declared, "Negroes will not be admitted to white schools."1 In 
1951 the Georgia governor secured the enactment of legislation de-
nying public funds to any state institution that allowed racial deseg-
regation. Byrnes, who had served as secretary of state under President 
Truman, returned to South Carolina in the late 1940s eager to restore 
the rights of the states and the South. After his election in 1950, he 
sought to defend segregation by providing black South Carolinians 
with "substantial equality in school facilities." His administration 
made considerable progress in this endeavor, and it helped secure 
the adoption of a constitutional amendment to permit the conversion 
of public schools into private institutions. Byrnes assured his fellow 
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citizens that South Carolina would not "mix white and colored chil-
dren in our schools."2 
Southern disaffection with the national Democratic party mani-
fested itself in the presidential election of 1952, as it had four years 
before. Democratic leaders, confronted with the candidacy of Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and a revitalized Republican party, adopted 
a conciliatory approach toward the restless southerners. In late July 
at the party's national convention in Chicago, the efforts of liberals 
to impose a "loyalty pledge" on all delegates and to adopt a strongly 
worded civil rights plank were defeated. The party's unifiers pre-
vailed. A resolution was passed that merely pledged the delegates to 
use their influence to see that the national ticket was placed on their 
respective state ballots under the Democratic label. A moderate civil 
rights plank was adopted, and Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois 
and Sen. John J. Sparkman of Alabama were nominated for president 
and vice-president. Most of the southern delegates supported the 
candidacy of Sen. Richard B. Russell, but his bid for the nomination 
failed to gain strength outside the South. Two liberal candidates-
W. Averell Harriman of New York and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee-
were also unable to develop broad support. Yet Kefauver had at-
tracted a national following and had entered the convention as the 
leading candidate in terms of committed delegates. Indeed, he was 
the first southerner since Woodrow Wilson to mount a genuine na-
tional campaign for his party's presidential nomination. 
The Solid South was again disrupted, this time by Republican 
victories in five of the region's states. Building upon the traditional 
Republicanism of the upper South, Eisenhower ran well in the re-
gion's cities and larger towns. His southern victories represented an 
important breakthrough for presidential Republicanism in the South, 
and it gave the minority party a new respectability among southern-
ers, particularly middle-class and affluent urbanites and suburban 
dwellers. While he failed to carry any of the deep South states, Ei-
senhower made an impressive showing in Louisiana and Mississippi, 
and he attracted conspicuous support in the black belts and plantation 
areas, the historic strongholds of the Democratic party. This reversal 
was clearly related to the rising tide of racial protest in the lower 
South. The Republicans owed part of their southern success to the 
collaboration of several Democratic leaders. Governors Robert F. Ken-
non of Louisiana and Allan F. Shivers of Texas were leaders in a 
"Democrats for Eisenhower" movement, while Governor Byrnes of 
South Carolina spearheaded an "Independents for Ike" campaign that 
tried to place its own electors on the ballot. After a lengthy silence, 
Sen. Harry F. Byrd of Virginia announced that he could not support 
the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket, but he did not endorse Eisenhower. 
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While much of this new Republican sentiment was based on mounting 
southern distaste for New Deal-Fair Deal economic and welfare poli-
cies, it also rested in no small part on racial concerns. 
Several factors contributed to a pervasive mood of conservatism 
and foreboding among white southerners in the 1950s. One disturbing 
development was the new leadership and direction of the national 
Democratic party, which for all its conciliatory gestures during presi-
dential years was apparently committed to a policy of civil rights and 
an extension of New Deal reform. White southerners were also con-
cerned over increasing federal intervention: in the invalidation of the 
white primary, desegregation of the armed forces, and the challenge 
to segregated hospitals, graduate and professional schools, and trans-
portation facilities. They were alarmed by the growing assertiveness 
and mounting demands of blacks, both within the South and in Wash-
ington. The Supreme Court's school desegregation decision of 1954 
and the gradual coalescence of civil rights reformers seemed to con-
firm their worst racial forebodings. 
New white sensibilities in the South were in part the product of 
the region's rapid economic and social change during the postwar 
years-of its industrial expansion, quickening urbanization, large-
scale migration, swelling middle class, and declining farm population. 
By the 1950s the South's center of political gravity was shifting from 
rural and small-town voters to residents of urban places. Yet the po-
litical culture remained highly individualist. Widespread economic 
growth and prosperity dampened southern interest in New Deal-
type programs and nurtured the role of "entrepreneurial individu-
alists" dedicated to modernization and economic progress. 3 Though 
eager to obtain federal subsidies, these business promoters strongly 
opposed governmental restraints, welfare programs, and higher 
taxes. 
Southern alienation and defection in the presidential elections of 
1948 and 1952 did not necessarily denote any major change in the 
dominant pattern of southern politics. Indeed, the salient character-
istics of the state patterns portrayed by V.O. Key in 1949 continued 
to be evident for some time. In Virginia the Byrd organization retained 
its control of state politics, despite the opposition of an independent 
faction. But the organization seemed less sure of itself in the early 
1950s than in the past. It was challenged by independents from within 
and Republicans from without. Francis Pickens Miller, an indepen-
dent Democrat, ran a spirited race in the gubernatorial primary of 
1949 against the organization's candidate, JohnS. Battle, who man-
aged to eke out a victory. The state went Republican in the presidential 
election of 1952, and in the next year's general election an attractive 
Republican named Theodore R. "Ted" Dalton waged a surprisingly 
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close race for governor. In the legislative session of 1954, the orga-
nization was forced to compromise when a band of "Young Turks" 
from its own ranks demanded that surplus state funds be spent for 
expanded public services. By the mid-1950s, the Byrd faction was 
showing signs of decline. · 
Tennessee, another state with a durable bifactional structure, ex-
perienced more significant change. The most important new devel-
opments were the weakening influence of Edward H. Crump and the 
rise of new state leaders. Crump, who supported the Dixiecrats in 
1948, was jolted that year when his candidates for the governorship 
and the U.S. Senate were defeated by Gordon Browning and Estes 
Kefauver. Four years later his ally, Sen. Kenneth D. McKellar, was 
denied reelection by Congressman Albert Gore, and the state was 
captured by General Eisenhower. Crump had endorsed Frank G. 
Clement, the successful candidate for governor in 1952. The aging 
boss died in 1954, and his powerful role in state politics came to an 
end. Meanwhile, Kefauver, Clement, and Gore emerged as the most 
prominent politicians in Tennessee; the electorate expanded with the 
invalidation of the poll tax; and organized labor and black voters 
became influential factors in the state's politics. 
Georgia and Louisiana, two other states with strong bifactional 
politics, demonstrated both continuity and change in the 1950s. Fol-
lowing the death of his father, Herman Talmadge soon rose to a 
dominant position in Georgia politics. He won the governorship in a 
special election in 1948 and was elected to a four-year term two years 
later. He prolonged and broadened the Talmadge organization. His 
rural strength lay with the poorer farmers, nurtured on what one 
historian has called a Gene Talmadge "blend of racial demagoguery 
and reaction."4 The younger Talmadge firmly opposed Negro voting, 
resisted the desegregation of the state's universities, and sought to 
preserve the sanctity of the county-unit system. Yet his program in-
cluded a "New South" as well as a neo-Bourbon emphasis, and his 
administration attracted business and urban support with its com-
mitment to the development of education, highways, mental health, 
and economic growth. In many respects Talmadge was a far more 
constructive governor than his father. The anti-Talmadge faction, led 
by former governors Ellis G. Arnall and Melvin E. Thompson, was a 
competitive force in the state's politics until the mid-1950s, when it 
swiftly disintegrated in the face of Talmadge's predominance and the 
mounting racial crisis. 
In Louisiana, meanwhile, Longism continued to provide the basis 
for a bifactional division among the state's Democrats. The anti-Long 
faction, generally characterized by its conservatism, opposed both the 
local radicalism of the Longs and the liberalism of the national Demo-
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cratic party. Both factions enjoyed some success. Earl K. Long was 
elected governor in 1948, the conservative Robert F. Kennon suc-
ceeded him in 1952, and Long was returned to the governorship in 
1956, despite his affronts to respectability and an odor of scandal in 
his previous administration. The state's anti-Washington sentiment 
was reflected in the large vote Dwight Eisenhower received in 1952 
and in his success in carrying Louisiana four years later. By the mid-
1950s, the state-rights issue had shifted heavily to an emphasis on 
race. 
Alabama's Democratic factionalism was less clear-cut and less sta-
ble than that of Louisiana, but "a progressive-conservative cleavage" 
in the state's politics persisted into the 1950s. The personalizing of 
leadership continued to operate in conjunction with class and sec-
tional divisions, as well as growing racial alarm among white Ala-
bamians. As Numan V. Bartley and Hugh Davis Graham have written, 
"The black belt and the suburbs stood broadly for the status quo, or 
perhaps the status quo ante, while the hills and the wire grass and 
the working-class districts in the cities demonstrated a distinct liberal 
bias."5 Momentarily in the early 1950s, the liberals appeared to be 
ascendant. Gordon Persons, a Democratic loyalist, won the gover-
norship in 1950, and earlier that year regulars had taken control of 
the party machinery. James E. Folsom was elected to a second gub-
ernatorial term in 1954, and the state's liberal U.S. senators, Lister 
Hill and John Sparkman, turned back conservative challenges in this 
period. A knowledgeable Alabama journalist, writing on the eve of 
Folsom's second inauguration, commented on his uniqueness "in the 
line of Southern mob spellbinders": his appeal both to "the 'nigger 
hater' element and the Negro himself."6 Nevertheless, Folsom faced 
strong opposition in the legislature, and his reform proposals during 
his second administration were largely unsuccessful. Although Fol-
som, Hill, and Sparkman were all liberals, they campaigned inde-
pendently, and their constituencies, while overlapping, differed in 
some respects. "Big Jim" made an effort to fashion a statewide faction 
in his own image, but he was unable to transfer or perpetuate his 
popularity, which eventually fell victim to the rising tide of racial 
hysteria and his own personal and administrative weaknesses. 
Postwar developments in Texas gave some support to V.O. Key's 
assertion in 1949 that the state's voters were beginning to "divide 
broadly along liberal and conservative lines."7 The 1950s were marked 
by sharp factional struggles in the state's politics, with a fairly distinct 
division along economic lines. Allan Shivers, a forceful conservative, 
succeeded to the governorship in 1949 when Beauford Jester died. 
Shivers, who supported Eisenhower in 1952, was elected three times 
in his own right, serving until early 1957, when Price Daniel, another 
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conservative, assumed office. Lyndon B. Johnson, a moderate liberal 
who had been elected to the U.S. Senate by a handful of votes in 
1948, was reelected in 1954. He then became Democratic majority 
leader. The most pronounced liberal among Democratic leaders in 
the 1950s was Ralph W. Yarborough, a neo-Populist who elicited en-
thusiastic support from "liberal-labor-loyalist" elements in the Texas 
electorate. He also appealed to blacks and generally to lower-status 
whites. Yarborough lost a series of close gubernatorial contests be-
tween 1950 and 1956, before winning a Senate seat in a special election 
in 1957. The year before, in a contest for the chairmanship of the 
Texas delegation to the Democratic national convention, Senator John-
son defeated Governor Shivers. On the whole, however, the con-
servative wing of the party maintained firm control of politics and 
policies in the Lone Star State. 
Factional alignments among North Carolina Democrats at mid-
century were less ideological in origin than those in Texas. But they 
differed from the factional pattern of the prewar period. No leader 
or organization arose to dominate state politics in the manner of the 
Simmons machine or the Shelby Dynasty. W. Kerr Scott, a rural pro-
gressive, served as governor from 1949 to 1953, while Luther H. 
Hodges, a businessman and a political moderate, held that office from 
1954 to 1961. Democratic groupings in North Carolina were shifting 
and indistinct during the postwar era, although the state's Democratic 
politicians in the early 1950s tended to divide into what has been 
described as "the conservative, urban-oriented, establishment wing 
of the Democratic party leadership and the progressive, farm bloc 
followers of Kerr Scott. " 8 
Two aspects of South Carolina politics emphasized by V.O. Key 
continued to characterize political affairs in that state in the 1950s. 
One was the Palmetto State's loose multifactional system; the other 
was the ever-present factor of race in politics. South Carolinians were 
affected by such considerations as the traditional cleavage between 
upcountry and low country, by a broad division along liberal versus 
conservative lines, and by sympathy for the New Deal and national 
Democratic initiatives as opposed to support of the Dixiecrat revolt 
in 1948. The careers of two South Carolina leaders embodied these 
differences. Sen. Olin D. Johnston's political base was the Piedmont 
Plateau, where he attracted strong support from mill workers and 
lower-class whites in the cities. He was identified with the New Deal 
and remained loyal to the national Democratic party. Gov. Strom 
Thurmond, on the other hand, found his greatest strength in the low 
county. He became a symbol of anti-New Deal politics in South Caro-
lina and bolted the national party in 1948. Both Johnston and Thur-
mond were outspoken advocates of white supremacy, and in 1950 
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the senator defeated the governor in the latter's campaign to replace 
him in Washington. Four years later, however, Thurmond won a 
suprising election as a write-in candidate to succeed Sen. Burnet R. 
Maybank, who had died. The politics of race clearly contributed to 
James F. Byrnes's election as governor in 1950 and to the selection of 
George Bell Timmerman to succeed him four years later. 
Mississippi politics in this period was also marked by shifting 
factions in the Democratic party and mounting racial apprehension. 
In the absence of "a unifying personality around whom a faction may 
form, and against whom the anti's can unite," Key had written, "Mis-
sissippi politics tends to disintegrate into a multifactionalism."9 The 
nearest thing to "a unifying personality" in the prewar period had 
been Theodore G. Bilbo, who died in 1947. In the years that followed, 
the state's two U.S. senators, James 0. Eastland and John C. Stennis, 
won reelection with monotonous regularity. But their constituencies 
were highly personal. The governors during the 1950s-Fielding L. 
Wright, Hugh L. White, and James P. Coleman-were unable to ex-
tend the embryonic factions that began to develop during their ad-
ministrations. Coleman, who defeated an ardent segregationist in 
1956, was a moderating force in the state's politics. He resisted ex-
tremist legislation and continued to support the national Democratic 
party. But white militants condemned his moderation and soon 
brought his administration under siege. Meanwhile, a pervasive con-
servatism and heightened fears of racial change steadily debilitated 
the growth of neopopulism and an inchoate liberal versus conserva-
tive division over economic issues. 
Two other southern states, Arkansas and Florida, showed fewer 
signs of political change in the early 1950s. The leader of the reform 
forces in Arkansas, Gov. Sidney S. McMath, was reelected in 1950 
but lost his bid for a third term two years later. In 1954 McMath 
unsuccessfully challenged John J. McClellan for his Senate seat. Party 
factions in Arkansas, as in many other southern states, were personal 
and impermanent, and they seldom assumed the dimensions of a 
statewide organization that lasted beyond a particular election or gub-
ernatorial administration. The same was true of Florida in the years 
after World War II. Despite the enormous economic and social 
changes that were transforming the state, it remained a one-party 
state with a fluid multifactional competition among Democratic poli-
ticians. LeRoy Collins, an attractive newcomer to statewide politics, 
won the governorship in 1954 and served for six years. He sponsored 
a forward-looking program in such areas as educational opportunity 
and economic development and sought to steer a moderate course 
through the troubled waters of racial politics. Collins's efforts to secure 
legislative reapportionment and constitutional revision were blocked 
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by the rurally oriented legislature. By the mid-1950s, the legislature 
had become polarized, with each house being divided between a 
dominant small-county bloc known as the "pork choppers" and a 
minority urban bloc called the "lamb choppers." 
In the peripheral states of Oklahoma and Kentucky, established 
patterns of political behavior continued in the 1950s. The Republican 
party remained weak in Oklahoma, even though the state voted for 
Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. The party's unflinching conservatism, 
dictated by wealthy oil producers, limited its appeal in state and local 
politics. The Republican party in Oklahoma, one historian suggests, 
was "a political Wizard of Oz, all head and no body."10 As for the 
Democratic party, its factions took shape in large part as a result of 
gubernatorial campaigns and administrations. The state's best-known 
and most formidable campaigner was former governor RobertS. Kerr, 
who was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1948. Although Gomer Smith 
and his protege William 0. Coe represented an insurgent strain in 
the state's politics, attacking the "money hogs" and the political es-
tablishment, they were repeatedly defeated by a strong Democratic 
coalition made up of businessmen, rural interests, labor leaders, and 
professional elements. The success of this coalition was finally inter-
rupted in 1958, when a young, urban-oriented candidate named J. 
Howard Edmondson was elected governor on a "reform" platform. 
The political scene in Kentucky was considerably different from 
that in Oklahoma. For one thing, the Republicans in Kentucky posed 
a stronger threat to Democratic control. While the Democrats held the 
governorship throughout the 1950s, the Republicans carried the state 
for Eisenhower in 1956 and won both U.S. Senate seats in the same 
election. The Democratic party's dominant wing-the so-called ad-
ministration faction-was headed by a series of governors: Earle C. 
Clements, Lawrence W. Wetherby, and Bert T. Combs. This faction 
was based on a sturdy organization in western Kentucky, with strong-
holds in the eastern mountains. Albert B. "Happy" Chandler's large 
following comprised the other major party faction. The Chandler fac-
tion was built around the personality of its leader; it was particularly 
strong in central Kentucky but enjoyed the allegiance of able lieuten-
ants in many counties. Chandler, a superlative campaigner and kind 
of Kentucky folk figure, captured the governorship in 1955. As one 
close observer of Kentucky politics has written, "While representing 
the traditionally conservative faction of the party, Chandler cultivated 
a populist image, though his was not a populist record." 11 In general, 
the administration Democrats tended to have a more liberal and na-
tional orientation than the Chandler wing of the party. 
Few events in the postwar period had a greater effect on southern 
politics than the Supreme Court's momentous decision in Oliver Brown 
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et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954), which overturned 
the "separate but equal" doctrine and declared separate educational 
facilities in the public elementary and high schools on the basis of 
race to be "inherently unequal." The Brown decision in May 1954 and 
the court's implementing decree a year later provided a rallying point 
for the forces of reaction in southern politics. It precipitated an out-
burst of political demagoguery, organized resistance, and powerful 
pressure to coerce conformity among white southerners. The result 
was the infusion of politics, especially in the lower South, with racial 
concerns, an obsession that threatened to blot out older factions and 
divisions that had evolved in the various southern states. 
Southern reaction to the Supreme Court's school desegregation 
decision ranged from the moderation and cautious optimism of Gov. 
Thomas B. Stanley of Virginia and Gov. LeRoy Collins of Florida to 
the outspoken defiance expressed by a number of deep South poli-
ticians. Gov. Talmadge of Georgia asserted that the court had reduced 
the constitution to a "mere scrap of paper," while Sen. Richard B. 
Russell condemned the Brown decision as "a flagrant abuse of judicial 
power." Sen. James 0. Eastland of Mississippi predicted that the 
South "will not abide by or obey this legislative decision by a political 
court."12 Writing in the period of massive resistance to school deseg-
regation, one southern historian remarked that "it is safe to attack 
the Supreme Court, the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), 'nigger lovers,' both local and outsiders, 
sociologists, and meddlesome Yankees." 13 
Most of the border state region, including the District of Colum-
bia, Maryland, West Virginia, Missouri, and Kansas, soon began to 
comply with the Brown decision. Although the states to the south 
were not prepared to desegregate their public schools "with all de-
liberate speed," as the Supreme Court decreed in May 1955, they 
were restrained in their reactions for several months. The reason was 
that the desegregation decision had no immediate effect on southern 
schools, which remained segregated. This state of affairs did not last 
long. Local school boards, particularly outside of the deep South, were 
soon being petitioned by black parents to admit their children to pre-
viously all-white schools. The NAACP encouraged these petitions. 
In 1955 and 1956, the federal courts ordered the admission of black 
students to a number of public schools in Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Texas. The courts also issued an injunction to prevent interference 
with the desegregation program worked out by an Arkansas school 
district. 
These court orders resulted in a series of riots and what the New 
York Times described as "actions of violence and the unleashing of 
malevolent moods."14 Angry mobs and ugly scenes surrounded ef-
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forts to desegregate public schools in Clinton, Tennessee, Mansfield, 
Texas, and Sturgis and Clay, Kentucky. In February 1956 a mob of 
students and townspeople forced the expulsion of Autherine Lucy, 
a young black woman who had just been admitted to the University 
of Alabama by court order. In the fall of 1956, Gov. Shivers of Texas 
exercised th~ state's police power to prevent violence and maintain 
order-and to preserve segregation-in two communities under court 
order to desegregate public schools. Mob rule was quickly terminated 
in Kentucky and Tennessee when Governors Albert B. Chandler and 
Frank G. Clement sent in state police and national guardsmen to 
restore order and enable desegregation to continue. Despite Shivers's 
intervention more than a hundred Texas school districts, beginning 
with San Antonio, were desegregated by the end of 1956. Meanwhile, 
a score of judicial decisions had begun to dismantle racial segregation 
in such areas as transportation, housing, and recreational facilities in 
the South. Even so, school desegregation had made little progress in 
the region. By September 1956 only 723 of the South's 10,000 school 
districts had been desegregated, and the eight South Atlantic and 
Gulf Coast states-from Virginia through Louisiana-remained com-
pletely segregated at the primary and secondary school levels. 
By the early part of 1956, an organized resistance movement had 
taken shape in these eight states. "The atmosphere of violence, boy-
cott, reprisal, and caste solidarity," Numan V. Bartley has written, 
"both set the stage for and announced the arrival of the Citizens' 
Council movement." 15 The Citizens' Council soon became the most 
vocal of all pressure groups opposing desegregation. First organized 
in July 1954 in the delta town of Indianola, Mississippi, the Council 
soon spread to surrounding counties and shortly afterward formed a 
state association. The movement quickly dominated political life in 
Mississippi. The Council was also powerful in Alabama, and it became 
an influential movement in Louisiana and South Carolina. Virginia, 
the fifth state with a strong white supremacy organization, was rep-
resented by the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Lib-
erties. A variety of other segregationist organizations, including the 
Patriots of North Carolina, the States' Rights Council of Georgia, and 
the Ku Klux Klan, appeared in other parts of the South. Citizens' 
Councils existed in most southern states, and at the movement's 
height in 1956 the Councils had about 250,000 members. 
Generally, the segregationist groups were strongest in the black 
belts and rural areas, but they also attracted support from working-
class residents of the region's cities. The growth of these groups was 
promoted by racial strife and fears of social change, as well as strident 
appeals to the southern white masses to oppose desegregation. At 
the same time, leaders of the Citizens' Councils renounced violence 
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and pledged themselves to preserve white supremacy through peace-
ful and lawful means, thereby appealing to the "respectable" elements 
of southern society. The Citizens' Councils and allied organizations 
used economic retaliation against desegregationists, worked for the 
passage of legislation to frustrate their opponents, endeavored to "pu-
rify" voting lists and prevent further black registration, and sought 
to rally white southerners to their cause. They contributed to a spread-
ing mood of white defiance in the region. "It was a frightening thing 
to go into a small city," Pat Watters of the Southern Regional Council 
recalled, "and to realize that not merely the semi-literate poor white 
gas station attendant, but also the bankers, the mayor, the editor, 
even some of the preachers, all those who are personages in such a 
place supported it [resistance] fervently." 16 
School desegregation became an absorbing issue in the politics of 
some southern states even before the Supreme Court's implemen-
tation decree in the spring of 1955. The Brown decision was a factor 
in several Democratic primaries in 1954, and it dominated the state 
campaigns in Georgia and South Carolina. Marvin Griffin, a lieutenant 
of Herman Talmadge's and an outspoken critic of the desegregation 
decision, won the governorship in Georgia. George Bell Timmerman, 
Jr., who was identified with the Byrnes-Dixiecrat wing of the party 
in South Carolina, swept to victory in that state's gubernatorial pri-
mary. Later in the year, former governor Thurmond was elected to 
the U.S. Senate. Nevertheless, race was not always a major issue in 
the 1954 elections, and in North Carolina and Tennessee, senatorial 
and gubernatorial candidates were elected over opponents who tried 
to exploit the threat of racial change. 
South Carolina and Georgia foreshadowed the development of 
racially dominated politics in the deep South and several other south-
ern states. Both states were led by determined, resourceful, and in-
fluential politicians: South Carolina by Strom Thurmond and James 
F. Byrnes, Georgia by Herman Talmadge. All three were powerful 
transitional figures in the shift to a politics of massive resistance. 
Thurmond symbolized the Dixiecratic insurgency of 1948, and his 
leadership served to link that movement with the rising opposition 
to the Brown decision. As governor, Byrnes used his considerable 
prestige to resist social change and to promote regional political in-
dependence. In some respects Talmadge was the most significant of 
the three, for he came to dominate his state's politics, virtually de-
stroyed the anti-Talmadge faction, and appealed strongly to the racial 
sensibilities of his constituents. Race was an important issue in the 
younger Talmadge's gubernatorial campaigns of 1948 and 1950, and 
as governor he assumed a fiercely antagonistic position toward any 
change in race relations. The Georgia governor was a harsh critic of 
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the Sweatt decision and other court decrees resulting in the admission 
of black students to southern graduate and professional schools, and 
he was a vociferous opponent of desegregation at the college level. 
Talmadge sought unsuccessfully, in 1950 and 1952, to secure voter 
ratification of a constitutional amendment to formalize the county-
unit system, and his administration succeeded in 1954 in securing 
voter approval of an amendment permitting the substitution of a pri-
vate school system for the public schools. 
Beginning in the lower South, state legislatures soon laid down 
a barrage of defensive enactments. The Louisiana lawmakers, who 
were in session when the Brown decision was handed down in May 
1954, quickly censured the Supreme Court, created a joint legislative 
committee to devise strategy for the maintenance of segregation, 
passed a measure requiring segregation in all primary and secondary 
public schools, and enacted a pupil assignment law, authorizing local 
superintendents to assign individual students to public schools. Simi-
lar bills and constitutional amendments, including measures autho-
rizing the abolition of entire public school systems and a variety of 
other segregationist legislation, were adopted later in the year by 
Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi. Several other southern 
states enacted local pupil assignment laws in 1954 and 1955.17 
In August 1954 Gov. Thomas Stanley of Virginia appointed a 
thirty-two-member Commission on Public Education. Headed by state 
senator Garland Gray, the Commission was created to study how best 
to avoid desegregation of the public schools in the Old Dominion. 
The Gray Commission took more than a year to prepare its report, 
which was presented to the governor in November 1955. The Com-
mission recommended, as part of a comprehensive plan, the adoption 
of a pupil assignment law, modification of the state's compulsory 
attendance requirement, and the payment of tuition grants to any 
student refusing to attend a public school with members of another 
race. Broadly speaking, one historian concludes, the plan "repre-
sented a compromise between the extreme white supremacy senti-
ment of black-belt Virginia and the more moderate attitudes evident 
elsewhere in the state."18 
Although Governor Stanley praised the Commission's work and 
called a special session of the legislature to act on its recommenda-
tions, the Gray Plan encountered strong opposition. The recommen-
dations of the Gray Commission were criticized as being too moderate 
by key figures in the Byrd organization, by the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, by the Richmond News Leader, 
and by white leaders in the black belt. Senator Byrd himself soon 
joined the assault. By the autumn of 1956, a militant segregationist 
program known as "massive resistance" had been adopted, despite 
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the efforts of moderates who argued in favor of the milder Gray Plan. 
In the late summer of 1956, the Virginia general assembly, meeting 
in special session, approved a series of antidesegregation bills, in-
cluding a measure denying state appropriations to any public school 
attended by black and white children. The most important massive 
resistance law was an interpositionist statute declaring that the "Com-
monwealth of Virginia assumes direct responsibility for the control 
of any school, elementary or secondary, ... to which children of both 
races are assigned and enrolled by any court order." Virginia, a part 
of the upper South, had demonstrated the possibilites of massive 
resistance to the Brown decision. The movement soon spread through 
the deep South. As one perceptive scholar has noted, "The southern 
mood made massive resistance possible; Citizens' Councils provided 
the working cadres and crusading fervor; and entrenched southern 
politicians contributed much of the leadership, direction, and 
strength. " 19 
A dramatic indication of the South's mounting political defiance 
came in March 1956, when 101 of the 128 congressmen from the ex-
Confederate states issued a "Southern Manifesto." Originally pro-
posed by Senator Thurmond and quickly endorsed by Senator Byrd, 
the "Declaration of Constitutional Principles," as it was formally 
known, was revised by a committee headed by Sen. Richard Russell. 
Byrd explained that the manifesto was "a part of the plan of massive 
resistance we've been working on and I hope and believe it will be 
an effective action." The document denounced the Brown decision as 
"a clear abuse of judicial power." It commended the motives of those 
states "which have declared the intention to resist forced integration 
by any lawful means."20 The manifesto's signers pledged themselves 
to use all lawful means to reverse the desegregation decision and to 
prevent its enforcement. Only three senators from the states of the 
Confederacy failed to sign the Southern Manifesto: Albert Gore and 
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. Critics 
of the Tennessee senators in their home state tried to make the most 
of their apostasy. As one of Kefauver's constituents wrote him in 1957, 
"You are of the South, yet the 'mouth-men' of your enemies see fit 
to whisper around behind the back of their hands 'He is Pink' 'He is 
a nigger-lover' -'He has nothing in common with the South,' 'He 
leans towards Communism.' " 21 
One of the signatories was Sen. James 0. Eastland of Mississippi, 
who was perhaps the most relentless crusader for massive resistance 
in the 1950s. Dedicated to the principles of racial purity and state 
rights and alarmed by the threat of a Communist conspiracy, which 
he suspected might be at the bottom of the Supreme Court's mis-
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chievous attack on white supremacy, the Mississippi senator soon 
emerged as one of the most resourceful and influential of the new 
Bourbon leaders in the South. "Defeat," he declared in 1954, "means 
death, the death of Southern culture and our aspirations as an Anglo-
Saxon people. With strong leadership and the loyalty and fortitude 
of a great people, we will climb the heights."22 Eastland was one of 
the architects of the Federation of Constitutional Government, estab-
lished in December 1955 as a coordinating agency for the resistance 
movement in the South and as a means of carrying the fight to the 
North. Although the Federation failed to live up to its promoters' 
expectations, it served an important role in helping shape the rising 
tide of southern opposition to desegregation. Eastland and other op-
position leaders soon turned to the Citizens' Council of America, 
which became a center for the formulation of massive resistance strat-
egy. 
The doctrine of "interposition" provided massive resistance with 
a theory and a rallying cry. Reviving constitutional concepts associ-
ated with Thomas Jefferson and John C. Calhoun, advocates of in-
terposition invoked the state-rights tradition, the compact theory of 
the Union, and a strict constructionist view of the Constitution. They 
argued that, by consolidating public school authority in the state gov-
ernment and interposing the "sovereignty" of the state between local 
school officials and federal courts, the Brown decision could be re-
versed. Interposition would be valid, they insisted, until other states 
secured the adoption of a constitutional amendment declaring seg-
regated schools to be illegal. First resurrected by Governor Talmadge 
and endorsed by such votaries as the Richmond News Leader and the 
Citizens' Council, the proposition had become a leading legislative pro-
posal in the southern states by early 1956. It seemed to offer a mar-
velous strategem to turn back federal intervention in the South's 
traditional pattern of race relations and a solution to the region's 
problem resulting from Brown v. Board of Education. 
Early in 1956 Virginia's general assemby adopted a joint resolution 
"interposing the sovereignty" of the state "against encroachment 
upon the reserved powers" of the Old Dominion. The five states of 
the deep South soon followed Virginia's lead, and by mid-1957 eight 
southern commonwealths had approved interposition resolutions. 
Two others had adopted resolutions of protest. Formal adoption of 
interposition provided a pretext for additional resistance legislation. 
Meanwhile, the peripheral South had become the scene of a crucial 
struggle to solidify the region in support of massive resistance. Led 
by moderate, business-oriented chief executives, most of these states 
stopped short of massive resistance tactics, while they strengthened 
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their opposition to complying with desegregation rulings. They en-
acted local option school closing laws, authorized tuition grants to 
students attending private schools, and passed various other segre-
gation measures. Only Kentucky and Oklahoma, and to a lesser extent 
Texas, demonstrated a willingness in the mid-1950s to comply with 
the Brown decision. 
Public opinion polls in late February 1956 suggested the extent of 
sectional polarization over school desegregation in the United States. 
Over 70 percent of northern whites who were interviewed supported 
the Supreme Court's rulings of 1954 and 1955, while 80 percent of 
southern whites were opposed. In national politics, as well, the South 
seemed to be increasingly alienated from the rest of the nation. Ap-
proximately one out of every three recorded votes in Congress during 
the mid-1950s found a majority of the southern Democrats voting 
against the Democratic majority from other regions. The "southern" 
position on many votes was also different from that of congressional 
Republicans, although the two groups tended to agree on issues hav-
ing to do with domestic welfare spending and state rights. Southern 
congressional attitudes toward world affairs were also becoming more 
distinctive. While continuing to champion "cold war" patriotism, a 
growing number of southern senators and representatives had aban-
doned their support of active international involvement, with the ma-
jor exception of military defense and alliances. 
Despite the gathering strength of massive resistance, there was 
no Dixiecrat revival in the presidential election of 1956 nor, for that 
matter, even a southern protest in the manner of Richard Russell's 
candidacy in 1952. Indeed, Russell actively campaigned for the Demo· 
cratic national ticket in 1956. The explanation for this state of affairs 
is apparent. The national Democratic party, including its presidential 
nominee, Adlai Stevenson, was far more conciliatory toward the 
South than it had been in 1948, and the party's national convention 
was unusually harmonious. Southerners had no difficulty in accepting 
the mild loyalty pledge and in agreeing to see that the party's nomi-
nees were placed under the Democratic party label on the ballot. The 
party platform omitted a direct endorsement of the Brown decision 
and specifically rejected the use of force in implementing the deseg-
regation decree. An even more important consideration was the fact 
that the political power structure of the southern states and localities 
had a strong vested interest in Democratic loyalty. That interest in-
cluded not only its domination of local and state politics in the South-
massive resistance won one victory after another in Democratic pri-
maries-but also the enormous influence exerted by southern con-
gressmen in the committee system and the considerable role southern 
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Table 3. The Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1957-1985 
Average 
Coalition Support 
%of %of Scores among 
Year Congress Appearances Victories Southern Democrats 
Senate House 
1957 85th 14 89 NA NA 
1959 86th 17 71 63 82 
1961 87th 28 55 67 61 
1963 88th 17 50 61 58 
1965 89th 24 33 60 61 
1967 90th 20 62 62 65 
1969 91st 27 68 67 68 
1971 92d 30 83 70 63 
1973 93d 23 61 64 63 
1975 94th 28 50 70 63 
1977 95th 26 68 64 63 
1979 96th 20 70 67 64 
1981 97th 21 92 71 70 
1983 98th 15 77 62 65 
1985 99th 14 89 68 64 
souRcE: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vols. 13-41. 
NOTE: Coalition support scores are based upon an analysis of all roll 
call votes on which a majority of Republicans and southern Democrats 
voted in opposition to a majority of nonsouthem Democrats and represent 
the proportion of such voes on which an individual congressman voted in 
agreement with the conservative coalition. 
Democrats played in their party's national campaigns. Southerners, 
moreover, were reluctant to abandon their traditional identification 
with the Democratic party. 
The presidential election year did bring threats of Democratic 
party defection in the South. Two interstate meetings of southern 
Democrats were held in the summer of 1956, presumably as a means 
of safeguarding sectional interests in the forthcoming election, and a 
National States' Rights Conference was convened in Memphis. In-
dependent campaigns were undertaken in several southern states, 
but they fared poorly even in South Carolina and Mississippi, whose 
voters cast 29.4 and 17.3 percent of their ballots, respectively, for Sen. 
Harry Byrd and Rep. John Bell Williams of Mississippi. But the Demo-
crats carried both states, in addition to North Carolina, Georgia, Ala-
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bama, and Arkansas. Nevertheless, the Republicans won Louisiana 
and the other six southern states. They clearly benefited from south-
ern disaffection with the national Democratic party. And President 
Eisenhower was popular in his own right. He ran well in the cities, 
in the upper South hill country, and in such traditional Democratic 
strongholds as East Texas and the hill parishes of Louisiana. The 
Democratic ticket won 50 percent or more of the vote in only five of 
the former Confederate states, receiving only 47.6 percent of the total 
regional vote. 
Federal intervention and the prospect of radical changes in "the 
southern way of life" encouraged "a sense of beleaguered solidarity" 
among white southerners in the 1950s. The advocates of massive re-
sistance were quick to exploit this sensibility. They hoped to unite 
white southerners on the basis of state rights and the maintenance 
of segregation. They also sought to undermine their opponents and 
to discredit the black equal rights movement. Citizens' Councils and 
other resistance groups disseminated a great mass of literature pro-
moting segregation and the "southern" position. These zealous de-
fenders of the traditional South set up speakers' bureaus, sponsored 
radio and television programs, and tried in various other ways to 
create conformity in the outlook of white southerners. The Charleston 
News and Courier, the Jackson (Miss.) Daily News, the Citizens' Council, 
and numerous other newspapers spoke out in support of the segre-
gationist cause. Although some of the region's major newspapers 
opposed the politics of massive resistance, most of the southern press 
reflected the white South's strong opposition to school desegregation. 
The crusade for conformity also resorted to political pressure: through 
lobbying, candidate questionnaires, the purging of "unqualified" 
black voters, and the election of outspoken segregationists. 
State authority was, of course, the ultimate reliance of segrega-
tionist leaders in their quest for conformity. Legislation was one major 
objective. State legislatures in the eleven ex-Confederate states 
passed, by one count, no fewer then 450 prosegregation measures 
during the decade following the Brown decision. Since the burden of 
initiating litigation to force school desegregation fell on the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, segregationists 
singled out that organization and its allies by special legislation and 
legal harassment. "Attacking the NAACP in the South," Professor 
Bartley observes, "was politically analogous to assaulting the Com-
munist Party in the rest of the nation."23 Several states required the 
organization to register and provide membership lists and the names 
of contributors. Other statutes stipulated that no member of the 
NAACP should be employed by a state agency. Criminal sanctions 
were also directed at the association, including efforts in six states to 
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curtail the organization's access to the courts. Southern lawmakers 
did not stop with the NAACP. Several states required their employees 
to take antisubversive oaths and to list all organizations to which they 
belonged. 
Governmental harassment of dissenters and coercion of the uncom-
mitted were most extreme in the investigations and other activi-
ties of state sovereignty commissions and special legislative committees 
created throughout the region. These groups did their best to prevent 
any deviation from orthodox thinking and behavior among southern 
educators, launched harsh probes of black institutions such as South 
Carolina State College in Orangeburg, and severely restricted aca-
demic freedom and civil liberties in many parts of the South. State 
attorneys general like Eugene Cook of Georgia used their positions 
to further the assault on the NAACP and to promote the cause of 
massive resistance. Hearings held by congressional subcommittees 
headed by Senator Eastland and Rep. James C. Davis of Georgia, 
allegedly to investigate the relationship between the black equal rights 
movement and Communist activities in the South, supplemented the 
work of state officials. 
The politics of massive resistance was sustained by a social and 
political philosophy characterized by one scholar as "neobourbon-
ism."24 While emphasizing the centrality of white supremacy and 
state rights, the neo-Bourbons appealed to the values of rural and 
small-town life, to the tradition of southern resistance, and to the 
leadership of the local elites. Since their greatest strength lay in the 
black belts and rural areas, they were determined in their resistance 
to legislative reapportionment. In national politics they condemned 
the intrusion of big government and opposed the welfare state, federal 
aid to education, and protective labor legislation. They tended to be 
nationalists in foreign policy, usually of the "unilateralist" type. The 
most reactionary among them seemed willing to sacrifice the public 
school system in their states if such a step would maintain segrega-
tion. 
Massive resistance reached the limits of its power in 1957-58. In 
the early fall of 1957, the movement was tested in a dramatic con-
frontation that developed over the desegregation of Central High 
School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Arkansas capital city was an 
unlikely scene for such a confrontation, given its lack of political ex-
tremism in race relations and its early formulation of plans to deseg-
regate Central High. But the breakdown of community leadership 
and the pressure exerted by such elements as the Citizens' Council, 
not to mention the surging tide of massive resistance in the South as 
a whole, led Gov. Orval Faubus to intervene with state militiamen in 
order to prevent desegregation. When a federal court enjoined this 
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action and a frenzied mob surrounded the school, President Eisen-
hower sent in federal troops to remove the obstruction. 
News of the Little Rock crisis electrified the South and placed 
Arkansas in the forefront of massive resistance. Orval Faubus was 
suddenly transformed into a heroic southern leader. Some southern-
ers, white as well as black, were no doubt reassured by the president's 
decision to enforce the law. But the immediate effect of Little Rock 
was to embarrass or silence southern moderates and to strengthen 
extremist elements. It also brought the collapse of "Operation Dixie," 
an ambitious plan to rebuild the Republican party in the southern 
states. The crisis stiffened resistance to desegregation in the upper 
South and slowed the trend toward "moderation" in several states 
where school districts were moving cautiously to comply with court 
orders to open white schools to black pupils. State governments 
throughout the region were galvanized into action, reinforcing bar-
riers to desegregation and stepping up their attacks on the NAACP. 
In 1958 Gov. J. Lindsay Almond of Virginia and Governor Faubus 
challenged federal authority in the courts; Almond closed the nine 
schools in his state under federal court order to admit black stu-
dents, while Faubus closed all of the secondary schools in Little 
Rock. Another measure of southern hostility was an intensified 
assault in Congress on the Supreme Court, although this attack was 
also encouraged by conservative opposition outside the South to 
the liberalism of the Warren Court. Five proposals to curb the 
Court's authority passed the House of Representatives in 1958, only 
to die in the Senate. 
"Remember Little Rock!" might be a red flag in the eyes of south-
em recalcitrants, but it was also a warning they could hardly miss. 
Thoughtful segregationists were beginning to understand that the 
power of the national government could now be expected to enforce 
the decrees of the federal courts. After Little Rock it was scarcely 
possible to use violence to nullify decisions of the federal courts. 
Courtroom conflicts over school desegregation during the years 1957-
61 proved to be a significant factor in the undermining of massive 
resistance. The federal courts eventually ruled that a state had no 
right to close some but not all of its public schools; they also refused 
to accept the subterfuge of publicly subsidized private schools. Thus, 
early in 1959 a federal court found that Virginia's action in closing 
nine public schools under orders to desegregate was unconstitutionaL 
In June of the same year, the courts struck down Arkansas's school-
closure laws and ordered the Little Rock school board to proceed with 
its original plan of desegregation. 
Still, the politics of massive resistance had not yet run its course. 
In the election of six southern governors in 1958, the conservative 
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trend in the region's politics was unmistakable, and the position of 
the victorious candidates generally supported the doctrine of massive 
resistance. By the end of 1958, ten southern states had adopted school-
closing laws, and eight states had provisions for substituting private 
schools for desegregated public schools. Nevertheless, the course of 
the upper South remained uncertain, and in the lower South Gov-
ernors James E. Folsom of Alabama and Earl K. Long of Louisiana 
attempted to move politics in their states toward economic issues. 
Both of these rural liberals were finally overwhelmed by the forces of 
massive resistance, Folsom in 1956 and Long in 1958. In Louisiana 
the segregationists, led by state senator William M. "Willie" Rainach, 
made a concerted effort to purge blacks from the voting lists and to 
enact a new registration law that would deny them the ballot in the 
future. In Washington Parish 1,377 of the 1,510 registered blacks were 
removed from the rolls. The controversy over voter registration was 
the first in a series of events that made race a salient issue in the 
gubernatorial election of 1959. 
The first decisive political setback in the massive resistance cam-
paign occurred in Virginia, where a shift away from interposition had 
become apparent by the fall of 1958. Some Virginia leaders had begun 
to weigh the relative importance of traditional white supremacy and 
public education. An open-schools movement was launched, and in-
fluential business interests raised questions about the wisdom of mas-
sive resistance. When the courts overturned the state government's 
school-closure policy in January 1959, Virginia was forced to recon-
sider its position. Governor Almond, a committed advocate of massive 
resistance, gradually moved to a more moderate stance, and under 
his guidance the general assembly finally adopted a series of measures 
compatible with token desegregation. The closed schools were re-
opened, and three cities were soon desegregated. Senator Byrd and 
most of the leaders of his organization strongly opposed these steps. 
But the outcome of the Democratic primary elections in July 1959 
confirmed the demise of massive resistance, although these and later 
elections did not weaken Byrd's personal popularity. 
Massive resistance was also turned back in Arkansas in 1959, 
again with the assistance of an unfavorable court decision. The balance 
of political pressures was narrow, but, as in Virginia, a coalition of 
educators, citizen supporters of the schools, and business elements 
was successful. This success only came, however, after a bitter and 
divisive struggle in Little Rock during the first half of 1959. The public 
high schools of the Arkansas capital were peacefully desegregated in 
August 1959. And the elections of 1960 confirmed the arrival of mod-
eration in Arkansas, even though they resulted in Governor Faubus's 
reelection. 
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"Massive Is in the Cold, Cold Ground" 
Newton Pratt in McClatchy Newspapers. Reprinted by permission. 
Although massive resistance had collapsed in Virginia and Ar-
kansas, the compromises that were effected in those two states sug-
gested the feasibility, from the segregationist point of view, of shifting 
from all-out defiance to a more moderate position and a willingness 
to accept token desegregation. That seemed preferable to most south-
ern leaders when faced with the necessity of choosing between seg-
regation and traditional values, on the one hand, and social stability, 
pecuniary pursuits, and "progress," on the other. Meanwhile, the 
process of school desegregation had slowly continued in the outer 
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South. By the end of the decade, only the five states of the deep South 
remained completely segregated. Yet they, too, succumbed in the 
early 1960s. Georgia and Louisiana acted first, under court orders. 
The University of Georgia opened its doors to black students in 1961, 
and Atlanta, eager to preserve its image as a progessive metropolis 
of the New South, began the desegregation of its public schools in 
the same year. The process was more difficult and painful in Loui-
siana, but New Orleans took the first step in 1960. The other states 
of the deep South followed during the next few years, employing the 
conservative solution of token desegregation. 
School desegregation among white southerners was almost uni-
versally unpopular. As Anthony Lewis wrote in 1964, segregationists 
"have invested their cause with a searing emotional impact. It has 
been made to appeal to the most susceptible tribal impulses: patrio-
tism, racial purity, religious dogma, group solidarity, status and per-
sonal pride."25 One needs to remember, however, that the South was 
not uniformly preoccupied with the politics of massive resistance. The 
peripheral South, save for Virginia and Arkansas, did not yield to a 
racially dominated politics. Nor were most white men and women, 
even in the deep South, consumed with a resolve to support massive 
resistance. Most southerners, white and black, were primarily con-
cerned with the pressures and necessities of their daily lives. For most 
whites racial segregation provided the most feasible means of main-
taining an orderly society in which the two races could coexist in 
relative peace, and their fears, however exaggerated, stemmed not 
only from racial prejudice but also from anticipation of the conse-
quences that would come with the overthrow of long-established 
patterns of racial separation. If life went on more or less as usual 
for most southerners in the 1950s, the same was true in the exercise 
of political power by the organized interest groups and the county-
governing class, though the distribution of that power would soon 
change. 
The collapse of massive resistance did not immediately lead to a 
new politics for the South, even though almost all southern politicians 
by the early 1960s had reconciled themselves to the inevitability of 
token school desegregation. The shift to a policy of moderation in 
dealing with the pressures to desegregate the schools was motivated 
by expediency and conservative purposes. Though the South had 
changed enormously in the 1950s, its racially obsessed politics had 
blurred the lines between legality and illegality, weakened the sources 
of dissent and independence, and sapped the strength of economic 
liberalism in the region. The 1950s had not brought an emerging class 
politics, as V.O. Key had anticipated. Instead, the school desegre-
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gation issue provoked an intense preoccupation with the maintenance 
of white supremacy and a fixation on racial themes in politics, par-
ticularly in the deep South. That does a good deal to explain why the 
structure of political power in the individual southern states had not 
undergone much change during the decade. 
7 The Second Reconstruction 
The failure of massive resistance did not instantly jeopardize the 
South's traditional politics. Political currents in the various southern 
states continued to reflect the influence of well-established interest 
groups and local elites as well as the basic conservatism of most white 
southerners. The region's congressional delegations, overwhelmingly 
Democratic, still constituted a powerful force for the protection of the 
South's special interests in Washington. Although southerners ap-
proached the presidential election of 1960 in a mood of uncertainty, 
many of them hoped that the outcome would enable the South to 
retain a large measure of political autonomy and to ease the threat of 
still further racial change. 
These hopes were soon dashed, not so much by the initiatives of 
John F. Kennedy's administration as by black protest and the civil 
rights movement. Southern white leaders-and the Kennedy admin-
istration-were thus overtaken by events, and the ensuing process 
of interaction between the protest movement and the national gov-
ernment brought the so-called Second Reconstruction into full flower. 
It led to momentous changes in the South, including black enfran-
chisement, but it also produced a strong white reaction in the form 
of Democratic division, Republican gains, and the rise of a new cham-
pion of the white masses. The divergent tendencies of the Second 
Reconstruction came to a climax in the presidential election of 1968, 
by which time the seeds of profound political change had been sown 
in the South. 
Both of the major parties looked to the South in 1960 for vital 
support in a national election that promised to be extremely close. 
While the Republicans were less formidable than in 1952 and 1956, 
with the absence of the popular Dwight Eisenhower from the ticket, 
they undertook a vigorous campaign in the South under the leader-
ship of the party's nominee, Vice-Pres. Richard M. Nixon. In some 
respects southern Republicans were inhibited in exploiting the trou-
bled racial situation in the region, since the Eisenhower administration 
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was identified with the use of federal troops at Little Rock and the 
passage of the civil rights laws of 1957 and 1960. As an Alabama 
newspaper warned, in listing the results of the southern defection to 
Eisenhower in 1952: "What did we gain by ... dereliction? We got 
Earl Warren and the NAACP; we got Little Rock and Federal troops 
on Southern soil again; we got the rights of the individual states here 
in the South ground under foot, and if Slick Dick Nixon has his way, 
we will have carpetbag rule all over again."1 Furthermore, the GOP 
platform in 1960 contained a strong civil rights plank. Although Nixon 
seemed to be a moderate on racial issues, he hoped to attract con-
servative voters on the basis of his party's economic position and state-
rights attitude. In any case, the vice-president made a fervent appeal 
for southern support, campaigning in every southern state. Speaking 
in Atlanta in late August, Nixon was given an enthusiastic reception 
by almost 200,000 people. Ralph McGill, editor of the Constitution, 
wrote that it was "the greatest thing in Atlanta since the premiere of 
Gone With the Wind." Mayor William B. Hartsfield suggested that one 
reason for the spectacular Nixon reception was that "the South has 
been a one-party section for so long it has a sort of feeling of adventure 
like a gal out late at night."2 
Southern interest in the election of 1960 was heightened because 
of the prominent role assumed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. 
Johnson sought his party's presidential nomination on the basis of 
his strong congressional support and his success as Senate majority 
leader. In an effort to transcend his regional base, he stressed his 
western orientation and reached out for delegate support in other 
parts of the country. One reason he helped enact civil rights legislation 
in 1957 and 1960 was his desire to "nationalize" his southern image. 
Some Democrats, particularly liberals from outside the South, were 
suspicious of the Texan's solicitude for the oil and gas industry and 
of his cooperation with the Eisenhower administration. On the other 
hand, Johnson had worked hard as majority leader to keep the race 
question from becoming a disruptive barrier between the two major 
geographical divisions of the Democratic party. Nevertheless, he was 
widely viewed as the southern candidate, receiving backing in the 
national convention from virtually all of the South except Florida. His 
strength in other regions proved to be limited, and he was unable to 
prevent the nomination of Sen. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts 
on the first ballot. Johnson's loss embittered many of his southern 
supporters. One Texas delegate asserted, "They crammed a civil 
rights plank down our throats, a liberal for president, then asked us 
to help sell the deal to the South with Johnson's aid."3 This resentment 
was alleviated when Kennedy persuaded Johnson to join the ticket 
as the party's vice-presidential nominee. During the following cam-
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paign, the Texan devoted much of his time to the South. Touring the 
region by rail on the "LBJ Special," Johnson traveled almost 3,000 
miles, made about sixty speeches at southern stops, and worked with 
his accustomed political flair to secure the cooperation of Democratic 
leaders. Near the end of the campaign, he concentrated a great deal 
of attention on his home state. 
Kennedy himself campaigned in six southern states. Although 
the Democratic platform included a forthright endorsement of civil 
rights, the Massachusetts senator adopted a conciliatory.approach to 
southern whites. He was concerned about the religious as well as the 
racial sensibilities of white southerners, since his Roman Catholicism 
had revived memories of the divisive campaign of 1928. Southern 
Baptists, the largest religious group in the region, were particularly 
aroused over this issue, and some observers predicted that it might 
tip the balance against the Democrats in Tennessee, Kentucky, and 
Oklahoma. Kennedy tried to minimize his potential losses by con-
fronting the question directly. He reassured many southern Protes-
tants when he appeared in September before the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association to assert his belief in the separation of church 
and state. He also seized an opportunity to telephone the wife of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., when the civil rights leader was convicted 
on a technicality and ordered sent to a Georgia penitentiary. This 
dramatic gesture enhanced his appeal to black voters. 
The Democrats carried a majority of the southern states, winning 
50.47 percent of the vote in the former Confederate states, as com-
pared to 47.76 percent in 1956. Yet the election in the South was 
almost as close as in the nation at large. Nixon won most of the rim 
states-Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Florida, and Oklahoma-and 
he came within a few thousand votes of carrying Texas. The Repub-
lican nominee led his Democratic opponent in the metropolitan coun-
ties of the South, and he did better than Eisenhower had done in the 
black belts of six southern states. This impressive Republican showing 
was in part the result of the party's strong campaign throughout the 
region. But it also reflected the accumulating distrust of the national 
Democratic party felt by many white southerners, a distrust that was 
exacerbated by the civil rights movement and by Kennedy's Catholi-
cism. The intense opposition to the Kennedy-Johnson ticket was 
illustrated in Texas, where a Texans-for-Nixon organization was 
sparked by former governor Allan Shivers. 
Still, the Democrats could claim victory in the South. Though their 
winning margin was extremely close in Texas and South Carolina, 
they carried the rest of the South except for Mississippi and part of 
Alabama, where unpledged Democratic electors voted for Sen. Harry 
F. Byrd.4 The religious issue clearly hurt the Democratic ticket in 
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Table 4. Party Identification in the South, 1952-1984 
Party Identification 1952 1960 1968 1976 1984 
All southerners 
Democrats 76 60 58 52 40 
Independents 14 18 31 32 35 
Republicans 10 22 11 16 25 
Whites only 
Democrats 78 61 50 47 33 
Independents 13 18 36 35 38 
Republicans 9 21 14 19 29 
souRcE: Adapted from Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in 
the South (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), p. 237, by permission. 
NOTE: These statistics refer to the eleven ex-Confederate states only. 
several states, and the Survey Research Center at the University of 
Michigan estimated that the defection of Protestant Democrats from 
Kennedy in the southern and border states represented 17.2 percent 
of the two-party vote in those states. Yet Kennedy was popular among 
many southerners; his stand on civil rights appeared moderate, he 
was dynamic and eloquent, and he seemed to have a genuine interest 
in the South. His impressive support from black southerners was an 
important factor in the outcome in several southern states. 
While it is difficult to determine the relative importance of black 
as opposed to white voters in the Democrats' southern success, many 
observers believed, with Sen. John C. Stennis of Mississippi, that 
Lyndon Johnson "made the difference in the 1960 campaign."5 Not 
only did Johnson's moderate record and southern background reas-
sure the region's whites, but his strenuous campaign and strong in-
fluence among southern Democratic leaders made an indispensable 
contribution to his party's victory. One of the notable aspects of the 
Democratic campaign in the South was the supportit received from 
state leaders and party organizations, a situation that had not existed 
since World War II. Among prominent Democrats only Senators Byrd 
and Thurmond, Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia, and Gov. Ross 
R. Barnett of Mississippi failed to endorse the Kennedy-Johnson 
ticket. Soon after the election, Sen. Richard B. Russell of Georgia 
explained his role in the campaign. "I am afraid that I go too much 
on personalities for when my friend Lyndon Johnson called me the 
third time and said that he was really in trouble and I could help, I 
stopped weighing issues and went out."6 At about the same time, 
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Russell wrote a constituent: "I have seen many Senators come and 
go-practically aU of them good men. A very few of them have been 
great men. In my opinion Lyndon Johnson is the ablest legislator who 
has served in the Congress in the past half century. " 7 
The prospect of federal appropriations and patronage from a new 
Democratic administration was undoubtedly an important considera-
tion in the minds of southern politicians. Democratic success in state 
and congressional contests was as great as ever. But the Republicans 
did make one breakthrough. In a special election held in May 1961 
to fill Lyndon Johnson's Senate seat, a young Republican named John 
G. Tower won a close race against William A. Blakley, an extreme 
conservative, with the help of liberal Democrats. 
John F. Kennedy's election raised the hopes and expectations of 
Americans who wanted significant advances in the movement for civil 
rights. During the campaign of 1960, Kennedy had expressed sym-
pathy for the equal rights cause and had promised an "innovative 
and vigorous" administration in this area. But the new president soon 
disappointed those who expected him to pursue a bold and vigorous 
civil rights program. The reasons for his cautious approach soon be-
came obvious. Realizing how narrow his margin of victory was in 
1960 and that Richard Nixon had attracted more votes from southern 
whites than he had, Kennedy was unusually solicitous of those south-
erners, whose support he coveted in Congress and in the election of 
1964. Of more immediate import was the powerful presence of south-
ern congressmen in the committee structure and leadership of the 
Senate and House of Representatives. Kennedy needed the coopera-
tion of these southerners in order to get his legislative program en-
acted. As the young president said to an aide, "If we drive [John] 
Sparkman, [Lister] Hill and other moderate Southerners to the wall 
with a lot of civil rights demands that can't pass anyway, then what 
happens to the Negro on minimum wages, housing and the rest?"8 
Finally, while the president agreed with the general objectives of the 
civil rights movement, he was not yet convinced of the need for or 
the desirability of comprehensive federal involvement in the struggle. 
Rather than sponsoring a broad civil rights program in Congress, 
the Kennedy administration emphasized executive action in such 
areas as voting rights, employment, transportation, and education. 
The administration helped secure a two-year extension of the Civil 
Rights Commission in 1961, established the President's Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity, under the chairmanship of Vice-
President Johnson, and endorsed two voting rights proposals in 1962. 
Kennedy's use of executive power was also evident in his appoint-
ment of a considerable number of blacks to high-level positions and 
in other employment gains in the federal government. The president 
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lent his support to the civil rights division in the Department of Jus-
tice, which was headed by his brother, Robert F. Kennedy. During 
the Kennedy years, the number of voting rights suits initiated by the 
Justice Department was greatly increased. On the other hand, the 
chief executive refused to act on a recommendation that nondis-
crimination be made a condition of federally aided programs in the 
states. Pressured by southern senators, he appointed several staunch 
segregationists to federal judgeships in the South. And despite his 
campaign promise to ban discrimination in federally subsidized hous-
ing, he delayed such action for almost two years, and even then his 
executive order was cast in a narrow and ineffective form. The ad-
ministration sought to encourage the voluntary acceptance of the civil 
rights of black people in the South, but it studiously avoided even 
the appearance of federal coercion. 
By the time of Kennedy's election, the civil rights movement had 
entered a new phase, a phase manifested in sit-ins by college students 
and other kinds of direct protest that spread rapidly over the South 
in 1960. Although these direct-action campaigns employed the non-
violent tactics advocated by Martin Luther King, Jr., they led to height-
ened tension and bitter confrontation in many southern cities. The 
writer John Egerton later described the almost apocalyptic nature of 
these events in the region below the Potomac and the Ohio. "The 
civil-rights movement was a traveling road show that held center stage 
before massed crowds of the hopeful and the hostile during a twelve-
year run in the South. For sheer drama, it was unsurpassed; the 
emotional fervor whipped up by fire-eyed evangelists on the Sawdust 
Trail in an earlier day seems by comparison as quiet and placid as a 
Sunday night vespers. The Movement had all the elements of a great 
folk epic-heroes and villains, triumphs and tragedies, martyrs and 
prophets, a supreme cause (integration), and a cast of thousands."9 
The wave of antidiscrimination demonstrations soon confronted 
the Kennedy administration with troublesome problems. One of the 
first incidents was that of the so-called Freedom Riders, an interracial 
group sponsored by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) as a 
means of implementing the Supreme Court's decision declaring seg-
regated restaurants and other public facilities in bus terminals to be 
unconstitutional. Setting out from Washington, D.C., the Freedom 
Riders got as far as Anniston, Alabama, before a mob attacked their 
bus, burned it, and beat the demonstrators. Later on the same day, 
the riders were beaten by a group of Ku Klux Klansmen in Birming-
ham, at which point the venture was abandoned. The Kennedy ad-
ministration was reluctant to get involved, in spite of the failure of 
local authorities to protect the demonstrators, since Gov. John Pat-
terson, a dedicated segregationist, had been the first southern political 
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leader to endorse John F. Kennedy for president. But when a new 
group recruited by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) resumed the ride to Montgomery, Attorney General Kennedy 
managed to persuade Governor Patterson to guarantee the safety of 
the bus as far as the Montgomery city limits. At the downtown ter-
minal, however, an angry mob of whites viciously attacked the riders. 
When a second riot developed during the evening of the next day 
outside a black church where Martin Luther King was leading a rally 
in support of the Freedom Riders, the president sent 400 federal mar-
shals to Montgomery; Governor Patterson finally acted as well, de-
claring martial law in the city and mobilizing the National Guard. As 
the Freedom Riders traveled on to Jackson, Mississippi, the Justice 
Department was able to secure their safety by agreeing not to interfere 
in the arrest of the riders, who were found guilty, fined, and given 
two-month suspended sentences. The demonstrators all went to jail 
rather than pay their fines. 
One result of the Freedom Rides was the Kennedy administra-
tion's decision to file a petition with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to compel the desegregation of all bus and railroad terminals 
in the United States. The ICC approved that petition in September, 
to become effective on November 1. This administrative action rep-
resented a major defeat for southern segregationists because, for the 
first time, desegregation was decreed for an entire class of institutions 
in the region. In the meantime, the administration attempted to per-
suade black leaders to shift their emphasis from demonstrations to 
voter registration drives, and SNCC and several other organizations 
did devote much of their time to that task, especially in the deep 
South. Mass protests and civil disobedience continued, however, as 
in Albany, Georgia, where, beginning in November 1961 and lasting 
more than a year, thousands of blacks led by King endeavored to win 
the franchise and to secure the complete desegregation of public fa-
cilities. Many of the demonstrators were arrested, but city authorities 
were careful to maintain order. In the end, the Albany campaign 
collapsed. Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration refused to become 
involved, in part because it wanted to enhance the chances of Carl 
Sanders, a moderate candidate in the Democratic gubernatorial pri-
mary of 1962. 
As the pressure for change in racial practices mounted, the White 
House was eventually drawn into a dramatic confrontation with in-
transigent white supremacists in Mississippi. The federal courts had 
ordered the admission to the state university of a black Mississippian 
named James H. Meredith in the fall of 1962. Gov. Ross Barnett, who 
had been elected with strong Citizens' Council support, aroused the 
public with demagogic rhetoric and talk of nullification. He defied the 
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court orders and denied Meredith's enrollment in the University of 
Mississippi. The Kennedy administration tried persuasion with Bar-
nett, and the president addressed the nation over television, urging 
the students and people of Mississippi to comply with the court rul-
ing. Such pleas were unavailing. Meredith's appearance on campus 
was greeted by an outbreak of violence, and only after a night of 
terror and a pitched battle involving thousands of students and seg-
regationist sympathizers, on the one hand, and 400 federal marshals 
and a small contingent of army troops, on the other, was the lone 
black man enrolled. Kennedy moved to quell the riot by sending in 
regular troops and federalizing the state's National Guard. Much of 
the nation applauded the president's actions. 
While the crisis over Meredith's admission to Ole Miss forced the 
Kennedy administration to intervene and brought a triumph of great 
symbolic importance to the equal rights struggle, it did not dethrone 
Jim Crow in the deep South. The token desegregation of schools and 
universities had been accepted by even the most recalcitrant of the 
region's states, but segregation and other forms of racial discrimi-
nation were still solidly entrenched in most of the lower South. The 
failure of the Albany demonstrations made unmistakably clear how 
much remained to be done in the civil rights struggle. What was 
desperately needed, Martin Luther King and other black leaders de-
cided, was a dramatic new confrontation that would capture the at-
tention and the sympathy of the American public and bring civil rights 
gains, including federal action. 
Massive demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, led by King 
in the spring of 1963, provided the needed confrontation. When the 
black leader and his associates defied an injunction barring racial dem-
onstrations, they were subjected to police brutality and mass arrests. 
But the demonstrators, including black children, persisted for almost 
a month. When the Birmingham police, under the leadership of the 
notorious segregationist T. Eugene "Bull" Connor, met the peaceful 
demonstrators with clubs, fire hoses, guns, and police dogs, vivid 
pictures of the brutal repression were seen on television screens 
throughout the country. The president finally sent federal troops to 
restore order in the city. By early May Birmingham business leaders 
had become more determined in urging negotiations with King and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and, after a 
series of discussions, an agreement was reached. The protesters won 
their demands for the desegregation of lunch counters, rest rooms, 
and certain other facilities, as well as the hiring and promotion of 
blacks "on a nondiscriminatory basis throughout the industrial com-
munity of Birmingham." Even so, the end of the Birmingham protests 
was marked by two bombings and a Ku Klux Klan rally. 
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By the time the Birmingham demonstrations finally ended, the 
Kennedy administration was moving rapidly toward a new position 
in its response to the gathering momentum of the equal rights move-
ment. When Gov. George Corley Wallace threatened to defy a court 
order admitting two black students to the University of Alabama, 
Kennedy acted quickly, federalizing the state's National Guard and 
forcing the governor to stand aside when he personally sought to 
prevent their registration. In an eloquent television address soon after 
this episode, on June 11, the president declared that America was 
confronted "primarily with a moral issue." The nation would not be 
fully free, he warned, "until all its citizens are free." A week later, 
Kennedy sent Congress a comprehensive civil rights bill. The move-
ment for black equality now seemed to be moving inexorably toward 
the enactment of a broad civil rights law. The Birmingham demon-
strations in the spring had sparked one black protest after another, 
and by the summer almost 800 demonstrations, involving growing 
numbers of whites, had taken place in some 200 southern cities and 
towns. The culmination came when more than 200,000 blacks and 
whites staged a great March on Washington on August 28, which the 
president praised for its "deep fervor and quiet dignity." 
Prospects for early passage of the administration's civil rights bill 
were uncertain, but Kennedy's assassination in November altered the 
situation and identified the equal rights movement with the tragic 
death of the young president. The new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
made a point of stressing his commitment to the realization of Ken-
nedy's New Frontier. Johnson seemed determined to push ahead with 
civil rights legislation, almost as if that alone would demonstrate his 
loyalty to his predecessor and certify his own liberalism. When the 
second session of the Eighty-eighth Congress convened in January 
1964, the Johnson administration mobilized all of its powers behind 
the effort to enact an omnibus civil rights law. The threat of a discharge 
petition persuaded the House Rules Committee to clear the measure 
for floor action by late January, and the bill was passed with strong 
bipartisan support on February 10. Ninety-two southern Democrats 
voted against the bill, while only eleven of the region's Democratic 
representatives supported it. Meanwhile, thousands of people poured 
into Washington to press for congressional approval, and scores of 
national organizations participated in the movement through the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. 
In the Senate the outlook was much less encouraging, given the 
strategic positions of southern leaders in that body and the difficulty 
of overcoming filibusters. Southern senators hoped to bury the 
House-approved bill in James 0. Eastland's Judiciary Committee, but 
administration leaders skillfully avoided that trap and on February 26 
158 The Life & Death of the Solid South 
managed to have the measure placed directly on the Senate's calendar. 
Senate leaders of both parties and administration spokesmen carried 
on intensive negotiations in an effort to work out an agreement that 
would make it possible to halt debate and pass the bill. President 
Johnson was a pivotal figure in these negotiations. Finally, on June 
10, the Senate adopted a cloture resolution, and for the first time in 
its history the upper house had voted to close debate on a civil rights 
bill. Twenty-one southern senators voted against cloture; five senators 
from the peripheral South supported it. Senator Russell, who spear-
headed the opposition, and his southern colleagues had made a stra-
tegic error in demanding unconditional surrender. Had they sought 
an agreement with Republican moderates earlier in the debate, they 
might have obtained significant concessions and seriously weakened 
the final enactment. Yet by late spring the mood of the country clearly 
favored passage of the administration's proposal. After adopting clo-
ture the Senate approved a few minor amendments, voted down a 
large number designed to weaken the measure, and passed the bill 
on June 19 by a roll call vote of 73 to 27. Twenty-one southern senators 
voted no. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the most sweeping affirmation 
of equal rights and the most comprehensive commitment to their 
implementation ever made by a U.S. Congress. The law contained 
new provisions to help guarantee black voting rights; assured access 
to public accommodations such as motels, restaurants, and places of 
amusement; empowered the federal government to bring suit to de-
segregate public facilities and schools; extended the life of the Civil 
Rights Commission for four years and gave it new powers; provided 
that federal funds could be cut off when programs were administered 
discriminatorily; required most business firms and labor unions to 
follow equal opportunity procedures in employment; and authorized 
the Justice Department to enter into pending civil rights cases. Com-
pliance was not universal, but the act was generally obeyed through-
out the South, in part because of careful preparations by federal and 
local officials. A startling change in the daily behavior, if not the 
thinking, of millions of southerners took place almost overnight. 
Taking advantage of a more sober and supportive mood in Con-
gress and the public, Lyndon Johnson adroitly maneuvered to break 
the long congressional deadlock that had held up reform legislation 
year after year. The results were impressive, not only in the passage 
of civil rights legislation, but also in the approval of several other 
major proposals urged by the Kennedy administration. Advocates of 
equal rights for American blacks applauded the Johnson administra-
tion's role in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which seemed 
to demonstrate the depth of the president's commitment to liberal 
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reform. Hoping to attract broad support for his comprehensive pro-
gram of domestic reform and to win an overwhelming triumph in the 
election of 1964, Johnson pursued the politics of consensus with great 
energy and skill. In approaching the campaign of 1964, Johnson 
stressed his role as the national leader of all the people. But he faced 
a serious problem in his own region, where many white southerners 
reacted strongly against the new civil rights legislation and were dis-
turbed by Johnson's liberal policies. The party images of southerners 
changed sharply between early 1961 and late 1964. One analysis of 
interviews conducted in 1964 by the Survey Research Center at the 
University of Michigan revealed that the proportion of southern blacks 
with strongly pro-Democratic party images had more than doubled 
during this period, from 24 to 52 percent, while the proportion of 
southern whites with strongly pro-Republican party images had dou-
bled, from 9 to 18 percent. 10 During the campaign the president ap-
pealed for unity and party loyalty on the part of southern Democrats, 
and on one occasion, in New Orleans, he sought to call forth the 
South's "finest instincts" in defending his administration's support 
of civil rights. "Race should not be the issue," he declared, "only 
'equal opportunity for all, special privileges for none.' " 11 
While Johnson was consolidating his national leadership, the two 
political parties were making preparations for the presidential election 
of 1964. The Republicans, racked by internal conflict and frustrated 
by the resurgence of Democratic strength in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, turned abruptly from the moderate course followed by their 
presidential nominees since 1940 and launched a militantly conserva-
tive campaign for control of Washington. Over the years a variety of 
right-wing organizations had sprung up, among them the John Birch 
Society, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the Citizens' Coun-
cil, and the Minutemen. In general, these groups emphasized eco-
nomic freedom; "strict" construction of the Constitution; opposition 
to governmental intervention, welfare programs, and heavier taxes; 
and unrelenting hostility toward international communism, which 
they interpreted as a pervasive and subversive threat within the 
United States. The radical right found a political figure to rally around 
in Sen. Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona. 
The South and the "heartland" of the Midwest were vitally im-
portant in the movement for Goldwater's nomination. Conservative 
sentiment in the South, frustrated by the civil rights demonstrations 
and increasingly opposed to the liberal Democratic administrations 
in Washington, was strongly attracted to Goldwater. An early indi-
cation of this conservative disaffection came in the midterm elections 
of 1962, when Sen. Lister Hill of Alabama was almost defeated by 
James D. Martin, a staunch Republican conservative, and Sen. Olin 
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D. Johnston of South Carolina was given a serious challenge by an-
other Republican conservative, William D. Workman, Jr. Significantly, 
much of Martin's support came from the traditionally Democratic 
black belt. 12 Southern Republicans such as John Grenier of Alabama 
and Peter O'Donnell of Texas were leaders in the task of capturing 
the party machinery for the senator from Arizona. The outspoken 
Goldwater, an advocate of state rights and an opponent of federal 
civil rights legislation, elicited enthusiastic support from white south-
erners, particularly in the deep South. When the GOP national con-
vention met, Goldwater received the vote of virtually every southern 
delegate and was nominated on the first ballot. He ran on a platform 
that was decidedly more conservative than that of the Democrats. 
In some respects President Johnson was successful in holding the 
Democratic party together in the South. When the regular Mississippi 
delegation to the national convention was challenged by the insur-
gent, largely black Mississippi Freedom Democratic party, Johnson's 
lieutenants worked out a compromise permitting the regular delegates 
to take their seats if they would sign a party loyalty pledge and give 
two convention seats to the challenging group. 13 Most of the party 
leaders in the South endorsed the national ticket. Among these sup-
porting leaders were Senator Russell of Georgia and Governor Faubus 
of Arkansas. But there were exceptions. Sen. Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina left the Democrats and joined the "Goldwater Re-
publicans party." No major Democratic politician in Mississippi spoke 
out in favor of Johnson's election. Governor Wallace of Alabama was 
so disillusioned with the Johnson administration that he challenged 
the president's nomination in several northern primaries. He even-
tually gave up this fruitless venture, apparently in order to allow 
southern conservatives to rally behind Senator Goldwater in the No-
vember election. 
Johnson won the election by a landslide, carrying forty-four states 
and 61 percent of the popular vote. He captured eight southern states. 
The president was aided by the endorsement he received from the 
party organization in several southern states, and he was given over-
whelming support by the region's black voters. Many southerners, 
black and white, were impressed by Johnson's record of accomplish-
ment and were put off by Goldwater's impulsive pronouncements 
about the desirability of selling the Tennessee Valley Authority, aban-
doning farm subsidy and social security programs, and undertaking 
a more vigorous war in Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, Goldwater made his best showing in the South. He 
received 87 percent of the votes in Mississippi and also carried Ala-
bama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Goldwater's popu-
larity in the deep South swept seven new Republican congressmen 
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into office, five in Alabama and one each in Georgia and Mississippi. 
Race was an ever-present concern in the lower South. As one historian 
has written of Louisiana, the state "seemed engulfed by a wave of 
pro-segregation and anti-Johnson feelings that fall." 14 The perception 
of Goldwater as the segregationist candidate clearly influenced many 
white voters in the deep South, although the continuing rebellion 
against the national Democratic party was a significant consideration. 
Unlike the Republican pattern in the three previous elections, Gold-
water's greatest southern strength was in the old Dixiecrat belt and 
in the rural areas. He was weaker in the urban counties, in the tra-
ditionally Republican areas, and in the upper South. Eisenhower and 
Nixon had made their best showing in the peripheral South, whereas 
Goldwater carried none of the states in that subregion. On the other 
hand, the Arizona senator won 61.8 percent of the deep South's popu-
lar vote to Nixon's 35.9 percent in 1960. Goldwater won a majority 
of the white votes in all of the ex-Confederate states except Texas. In 
1964 a great many southerners supported the Republican party for 
the first time in their lives. As a perceptive student of the Goldwater 
campaign points out, "The Republican presidential party, for the first 
time in history, played the role of the 'traditional' party of the 
South."15 
Encouraged by his electoral triumph in 1964, President Johnson 
soon decided to seek additional legislation in the field of voting rights. 
Ancient obstructions such as literacy tests, discriminatory treatment 
by local officials, economic pressure, and intimidation were still preva-
lent in much of the South, particularly in the lower part of the region. 
Perhaps a million black southerners had registered to vote by 1952, 
but in the face of stiffening white resistance fewer than half a million 
new Negro registrants were added to the voting lists during the next 
ten years. In 1962 less than 30 percent of the South's black adults 
were registered. In moving to sponsor a federal voting rights statute, 
the administration was influenced not only by the slow progress of 
registration campaigns in the deep South during recent years but also 
by the strong support of the black community and by the leaders and 
tactics of the evolving civil rights movement. 
By the time of the March on Washington in the late summer of 
1963, many equal rights leaders had come to believe that enfranchise-
ment was probably of more immediate importance to southern blacks 
than desegregation. The vote, they assumed, would gradually im-
prove the condition of the black masses and provide a political means 
of attacking both racism and poverty. Southern blacks themselves 
showed a growing interest in the ballot. Shortly before the November 
election of 1963 in Mississippi, SNCC leaders devised a Freedom Elec-
tion to prove that Afro-Americans wanted to vote. On the same day 
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that white Mississippians voted, nearly 80,000 disenfranchised blacks 
cast "freedom ballots." Registration drives were supported by na-
tional foundations and by such organizations as the Southern Re-
gional Council's Voter Education Project (VEP). CORE concentrated 
its registration efforts on Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, 
while SNCC turned its attention to Alabama and Mississippi. 
The success of these registration campaigns was limited. Setbacks 
in Mississippi during the early 1960s persuaded voter registration 
leaders to concentrate on exposing the hazards of trying to register 
blacks in the Magnolia State. "The whole of Mississippi became the 
stage," Neil R. McMillen has written, "its public officials and law-
enforcement personnel unwitting, but perfectly cast, villains, its 
400,000 disfranchised adult Negroes the principal players, and the 
nation at large the audience to which 'live' television presentations 
were offered each evening with the news."16 In 1964 the Council of 
Federated Organizations (COFO), a coalition of equal rights groups, 
conducted what was called the Mississippi Summer Project, a voter 
registration campaign that enlisted over 700 student volunteers and 
resulted in fierce opposition by local whites and the death of 3 vol-
unteers. Gains were few. While COFO staff members and volunters, 
working in 25 communities, brought perhaps as many as 17,000 black 
applicants to courthouses across the state, only some 1,600 were able 
to register, and most of them in Panola County under a federal court 
order. 17 Soon afterward the Voter Education Project reported that 
688,800 blacks had qualified to vote for the first time in the eleven 
states of the old Confederacy between April1, 1962, and November 
1, 1964, but most of that impressive increase came in urban areas and 
in the upper South. While 38 percent of the adult black population 
in the region was registered by 1964, the percentage ranged from less 
than 7 in Mississippi to almost 70 in Tennessee. Less than half of the 
potential black electorate was registered in eight of the southern 
states. The white registration in the ex-Confederate states was 73.4 
percent. 
In late 1964 Martin Luther King, Jr., and other members of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference developed plans to arouse 
the nation to the need for a national voting rights law. The SCLC 
leaders planned a series of demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, in the 
heart of the black belt. Speaking in Selma early in January 1965, King 
announced, "We will dramatize the situation to arouse the federal 
government by marching by the thousands to the places of registra-
tion."18 Dallas County, in which Selma is located, had a black ma-
jority, but only 325 Negroes were registered to vote as compared with 
9,800 whites. In some other black belt counties, not a single black 
man or woman was enfranchised. King and his associates spent sev-
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eral weeks leading black people to the courthouse to register and 
staging demonstrations. Few blacks were able to register, and 
hundreds were arrested. Frustrated by these developments, King 
called for "a march on the ballot boxes throughout Alabama," moving 
from Selma to Montgomery, the state capital, fifty-four miles away. 
Governor Wallace refused to permit such a march, and when the 
demonstrators tried to proceed without his approval, they were met 
with dubs and tear gas. The president finally stepped in, federalizing 
the Alabama National Guard, and the march, involving a large num-
ber of black and white participants, was completed between March 
21 and 25. The violent dashes that took place in the Selma area pro-
voked national outrage and set the stage for congressional action on 
voting rights legislation. 
Lyndon Johnson addressed a nationally televised joint session of 
Congress on March 15, 1965, to urge the prompt passage of a strong 
voting rights act. Having committed itself to this legislation, the John-
son administration submitted a carefully developed proposal on 
March 17. From March until August, the voting rights coalition never 
lost its momentum. It was a bipartisan effort, with stalwart admin-
istration support and important assistance from the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights and other groups. After a compromise 
anti-poll tax provision was approved, the Senate adopted a cloture 
motion on May 25-the second one in two years. The major oppo-
sition came from southern senators. The bill was passed on the fol-
lowing day. The House passed a similar measure on July 9, and after 
a conference committee worked out an agreement reconciling the dif-
ferences between the two houses, the revised measure was signed 
by the president in early August. While most of the negative votes 
on final passage were cast by southerners, thirty-six representatives 
and a few senators from the South voted for the bill. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 authorized direct federal action to 
enable blacks to register and vote. It empowered the attorney general 
to appoint federal examiners to supervise voter registration in states 
or voting districts where a literacy test or similar qualifying devices 
existed and where fewer than 50 percent of the voting-age residents 
had voted or were registered to vote in the presidential election of 
1964. This brought the federal registration machinery to bear on seven 
southern states-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and twenty-six counties in North Carolina. To reg-
ister under the new law, an applicant merely had to fill out a simple 
form (with assistance from a registrar if necessary), giving name, age, 
length of residence, and whether he or she had ever been convicted 
of a felony. Stiff penalties were provided for interference with voter 
rights. 
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Justice Department officials moved rather circumspectly to im-
plement the new statute, hampered in the beginning by subterfuge 
and lack of cooperation on the part of many local officials in the deep 
South. In Mississippi, the state with the most disfranchised blacks, 
U.S. examiners were sent to twenty-four "noncompliance" counties; 
they accounted for over 70,000 of the aproximately 140,000 Negroes 
registered in that state by September 1966.19 Federal intervention was 
never very extensive. Between 1965 and 1980, federal registrars en-
tered no more than 60 of the 533 southern counties covered by the 
Voting Rights Act. Most of those counties were in Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and Louisiana. Still, this statute has been aptly characterized 
as "the grand turning point in modern times for the reentry of blacks 
into southern politics."20 
Meanwhile, the ratification in 1964 of the Twenty-fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which invalidated the poll tax as a prerequi-
site for voting in federal elections, and a Supreme Court decision in 
1966 outlawing the poll tax as a requirement for voting in other elec-
tions also gave impetus to the enfranchisement of blacks and whites 
in the South. The number of black voters in the southern states steadi-
ly increased during the next few years. More than 400,000 blacks were 
registered in the ex-Confederate states during the first year following 
passage of the Voting Rights Act. In Mississippi the percentage of 
registered blacks rose from 7 to 59 between 1964 and 1968, and in 
Alabama from 24 to 57. During that period the number of southern 
black voters increased from fewer than 2 million to 3.1 million, 62 
percent of the black voting-age population. Thus, the federal statute 
of 1965 seemed to be rapidly changing the face of southern politics. 
Writing about this phenomenon in 1966, the political scientists Donald 
R. Matthews and James W. Prothro spoke of "a revolution in pro-
cess-the growing participation of southern Negroes in the politics 
of the 1960's."21 But if a sharp increase in black voter registration 
resulted from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that de-
velopment was in turn a major reason for an even larger increase in 
white registration. About six million names were added to the voting 
rolls of the ex-Confederate states during the 1960s, of which 70 percent 
were white. Many of these white registrants became supporters of 
George Wallace and other insurgent leaders. 
The dramatic increase in the voter registration of southern blacks 
after 1965 was only one result of federal intervention in the 1960s. 
That intervention included, in addition to the civil rights laws of 1964 
and 1965, the invalidation of the poll tax and the widespread reap-
portionment of legislative and congressional seats in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" principle in Baker v. Carr (1962). 
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These external forces were destined to have an enduring influence 
on southern politics. Meanwhile, more subtle developments such as 
the region's growing economic diversification, urbanization, and 
changing migration patterns were also contributing to the reconstruc-
tion of southern politics. The evolving shape of southern politics was 
significantly affected by still another factor: the nature of the political 
and civic response within the South to these pressures. That response 
varied from one state to another and thus helped shape the political 
behavior of region and subregion. One notable reaction to the chal-
lenge of the civil rights movement was that of the business community 
in most southern cities. Even in the 1950s urban leaders like Mayor 
Hartsfield of Atlanta were concerned about a closed public school 
system and its effect upon the image of their individual cities. Massive 
resistance and the equal rights demonstrations were a sobering ex-
perience for these leaders. As two scholars have written, "When busi-
nessmen became convinced that sustained racial upheaval would 
imperil economic development, they provided a climate for change 
in southern customs by taking a stand on upholding 'law and or-
der.' " 22 
Perhaps the most spectacular political changes precipitated by the 
new dynamics of the 1960s took place in Virginia. Although the Byrd 
organization survived the failure of massive resistance and entered 
the 1960s in control of the state's politics, it proved to be too inflexible 
to accommodate itself to the Great Society of Lyndon Johnson, who 
carried Virginia in 1964, to mounting opposition within the Demo-
cratic party at home, and to a stronger Republican challenge in the 
Old Dominion. Legislative reapportionment in 1964 shifted a number 
of seats in both houses of the general assembly and clearly showed 
that future redistricting would increasingly reflect the state's impres-
sive urban growth. The rising tide of black voters, who tended to vote 
as a bloc, made their support frequently decisive, both in Democratic 
primaries and in general elections. The changing political environ-
ment began to have its effect as early as 1965, when state senator 
Mills E. Godwin, Jr., an organization man who had supported massive 
resistance, won the governorship with strong backing from black vot-
ers. Responding in a positive way to the new political and economic 
currents, Godwin set the state on a new course by sponsoring a pro-
gressive program and effecting a shift from traditional state policies. 
Senator Byrd's failing health led him to resign in late 1965, and the 
next year brought the defeat of two machine stalwarts, Sen. A. Willis 
Robertson and Rep. Howard W. Smith. Unfortunately for the new 
Democratic leadership, the party was soon divided into conservative, 
moderate, and liberal factions, which contributed to the election of 
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A. Linwood Holton, a moderate Republican, as governor in 1969. The 
long period of stability provided by the Byrd organization had given 
way to political upheaval, conflict, and uncertainty. 
Economic and social change, intense factionalism in the Demo-
cratic party, and voter susceptibility to the race issue quickened the 
pace of change in Florida politics during the 1960s. The remarkable 
growth of urban centers in central and south Florida, the sharp in-
crease in voter registration and turnout, and the reapportionment of 
the legislature in 1969 all brought added pressure on the traditional 
political system. Politics became more competitive. Although Presi-
dent Johnson carried the state in 1964, the Democrats soon fell to 
fighting among themselves. In 1966 Mayor Robert King High of 
Miami, who had defeated Gov. Haydon Burns in the Democratic gu-
bernatorial primary, was himself overcome by Republican Claude R. 
Kirk, Jr., who campaigned as a conservative and pictured his oppo-
nent as a Great Society liberal. Two years later Florida Republicans 
won another victory when Edward J. Gurney defeated former gov-
ernor LeRoy Collins for a Senate seat. Once again the GOP nominee 
sought to appeal to the conservative and racist sensibilities of the 
voters by portraying Collins as an extreme liberal and a champion of 
equal rights for blacks. The Republican beachhead, in a state experi-
encing rapid economic growth and demographic volatility, promised 
still greater political change in the future, regardless of the party in 
control. 
Change was less striking in Tennessee than in Florida, but even 
so the politics of the Volunteer State shifted noticeably during the 
1960s. A revived Republican party, continuing urban growth, and an 
increasingly significant black vote all had their effect. The relative 
position of the two parties began to shift. The death of Sen. Estes 
Kefauver in 1963 seemed to mark the beginning of the Democratic 
party's disintegration in the state, although Frank G. Clement and 
Buford Ellington alternated as governor throughout the decade. 
Intense Democratic factionalism, an enlarged electorate, and an 
expanding middle class worked to the advantage of the state's Re-
publicans. After Baker v. Carr, the legislative dominance of rural and 
small-town elements was broken, and the cities began to wield greater 
influence in political affairs. This transfer of power enhanced the po-
litical importance of the growing suburbs and in some respects deep-
ened the conservatism of Tennessee and the South. In 1966 Howard 
H. Baker, Jr., was elected to the Senate, and in 1970 the Republicans 
won the other U.S. Senate seat and the governorship. Tennessee 
seemed to be on the threshold of two-party politics. 
The political scene in Texas was characterized by strong continuity 
and limited but prophetic change. As might have been expected, 
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Texas politics in the 1960s reflected the state's extraordinary economic 
expansion, the ideological orientation of its voters, and the fact that 
racial questions were normally not a salient political concern. The 
state's Republicans made an important breakthrough early in the de-
cade with the election of John G. Tower as Lyndon Johnson's suc-
cessor in the Senate. Tower received the help of a substantial number 
of Democratic voters who preferred a conservative Republican to a 
reactionary Democrat. Thus, as in many other southern states, Demo-
cratic factionalism opened the door to the Republican party in state-
wide elections. Although Texas politics in the 1960s was dominated 
by conservatives such as three-term governor John B. Connally, a 
liberal movement gained strength by recruiting blacks, Mexican-
Americans, and blue-collar workers. Johnson's Great Society also gave 
a boost to the state's liberals. The liberals' leading spokesman was 
Ralph Yarborough, who was elected to the Senate in 1957 after losing 
several earlier statewide races. Johnson succeeded in holding the 
feuding Democrats together for a time, but in the long run, the pre-
vailing conservatism among white Texans and the strong reaction 
against the liberalism of the national party could be expected to 
strengthen the Republicans. 
Meanwhile, the Republican party was becoming more competitive 
in two other states of the peripheral South-Kentucky and Oklahoma. 
In the postwar period, Kentuckians elected a succession of strong 
Democratic governors: Earle C. Clements, Lawrence W. Wetherby, 
Bert T. Combs, and Edward T. Breathitt, Jr. Breathitt, who assumed 
office in 1963, was, in the words of one historian, "identified with a 
new breed of Southern Democrats, men who accepted the broad di-
rections of the New Deal and Fair Deal, who viewed state government 
as a proper tool with which to address social, economic, political, and 
human problems, and who rejected the traditional demagoguery of 
race and states' rights."23 The factionalism that revolved around Earle 
C. Clements and Bert Combs, on the one hand, and "Happy" Chand-
ler, on the other, became somewhat less acrimonious in the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, it persisted, sometimes weakening the Democrats and 
strengthening the Republicans, who held both Senate seats during 
the 1960s and gained the governorship with the election of Louie B. 
Nunn in 1967. In Oklahoma the decade began auspiciously for the 
Democrats with the election of a young, urban-oriented governor 
named J. Howard Edmondson. But he suffered a series of setbacks, 
and in 1962 Henry Bellmon became the first Republican governor in 
the state's history. The minority party was broadening its appeal. 
Bellmon was succeeded four years later by another Republican, 
Dewey Bartlett, and in 1968 Bellmon was elected to the U.S. Senate. 
The state also voted for the GOP ticket in presidential elections, except 
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for 1964. The Democrats, while less faction-ridden than in earlier 
years, found it difficult to work together effectively. They did send a 
strong congressional delegation to Washington, led by RobertS. Kerr 
(until his death early in 1963), A.S. Mike Monroney, and Carl Albert. 
Yet Oklahoma, like Kentucky, was becoming a two-party state. 
During the decade between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, 
North Carolina politics and government seemed to reflect the pro-
gressive image for which it was famous. Governors Luther H. Hodges 
and Terry Sanford adopted a cautious and moderate approach to de-
segregation and civil rights, and their administrations were largely 
concerned with economic development and, especially in Sanford's 
case, educational reform. Nevertheless, the debate over racial ques-
tions led to violence in the early 1960s, and many white North Caro-
linians were attracted to the segregationist pronouncements of Dr. I. 
Beverly Lake, who sought the Democratic nomination for governor 
in 1964. Although Lake was defeated, the progressive faction's can-
didate was turned back by the conservative Dan K. Moore. North 
Carolina Republicans also went fishing in these troubled waters. 
James C. Gardner, the GOP gubernatorial nominee in 1968, stressed 
the race issue and appealed to the supporters of Beverly Lake. But 
Gardner was defeated by a Democratic moderate, Robert W. Scott. 
North Carolina Republicans had reason to be optimistic, however. 
They expected to gain new strength from the rapidly growing urban 
corridor that stretched from Raleigh to Charlotte. In 1968 they elected 
more legislators than at any time since the days of Herbert Hoover-
29 of 120 in the house and 12 of 50 in the senate. 
State politics in Arkansas during the 1960s assumed a different 
pattern. The racial reaction identified with Gov. Orval Faubus's lead-
ership during the Little Rock school crisis, while somewhat muted in 
the mid-1960s, persisted until1966, when Faubus decided not to run 
for a seventh term. Faubus, a skillful administrative and political 
manager, got along well with special interest groups. His successor 
as the Democratic gubernatorial nominee was James D. Johnson, an 
outspoken segregationist. Johnson's nomination drove many liberal 
Democrats to vote for the Republican candidate, Winthrop Rockefel-
ler, who had run against Governor Faubus two years before. Rocke-
feller, a refreshing change in Arkansas politics, was a moderate on 
the race question and a strong advocate of the state's economic de-
velopment. He played a key role in changing the state's economic 
and political direction. In 1966 his well-organized and well-financed 
campaign was successful. He received strong support from black vot-
ers, an important new factor in Arkansas politics, and from disaffected 
liberal Democrats. But this Republican breakthrough was hardly the 
wave of the future. Two years later Arkansas voters reelected Rocke-
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feller, returned J. William Fulbright to the Senate, and gave the state's 
presidential electoral votes to George C. Wallace. 
The situation was somewhat different in the deep South. In South 
Carolina Senator Thurmond's shift to the Republicans gave the mi-
nority party an established figure around whom to rally. As could 
have been predicted, South Carolina Republicans appealed to voter 
disaffection with civil rights legislation and the liberal policies of 
Democratic administrations in Washington. Democratic leaders, 
somewhat surprisingly, made the decision to open their party to 
blacks and to sponsor more liberal social programs. As upper-income 
elements and an increasing number of blue-collar whites began to 
vote Republican, the Democrats worked harder to attract black voters, 
who made up about 20 percent of the heavy turnout in the election 
of 1966. By the fall of 1968, over 200,000 blacks had registered, almost 
a quarter of the state's voters. The Democratic strategy of seeking to 
build a black and white coalition seemed to work in gubernatorial 
elections. Beginning with Ernest F. Hollings in 1959, one moderately 
liberal Democrat after another served as governor for the next sixteen 
years. 
Politics in the other states of the deep South showed how the 
social upheavals of the decade were encouraging "the darker strains 
in southern politics."24 Developments in Louisiana illustrate the 
trend. By 1960, when Earl Long died, the Long era seemed to be 
ending. Race had become the major political issue, and the electorate 
was divided less by economic questions than by racial concerns, north 
versus south, and Protestant against Catholic. Mayor deLesseps S. 
Morrison of New Orleans, a moderate on the race question, was twice 
defeated for governor by segregationist opponents, first by Jimmie 
H. Davis in 1959 and then by John J. McKeithen in 1963. McKeithen 
and several other Louisiana politicians, one scholar writes, "had been 
running hard against the 'feds' in general and the Kennedys in par-
ticular."25 McKeithen, who was reelected in 1967, was able to project 
three contradictory images-those of reformer, progressive Longite, 
and segregationist. Yet as racial tensions mounted and as conflict 
within the Democratic party increased, McKeithen's legislative pro-
gram foundered, his popularity declined, and he announced that he 
would not campaign for his party's presidential nominee in 1968. The 
results of that election seemed to indicate Louisiana's continued swing 
toward conservatism. 
Georgia began the decade on a more promising note, only to 
succumb to racist fears. The official acceptance of token desegregation, 
the ending of the county-unit system, and the election of Carl Sanders, 
a racial moderate and a spokesman for urban Georgia, as governor 
in 1962 pointed toward a reorientation of Georgia politics. "The urban 
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victory over rural areas in the school desegregation controversy," 
Numan V. Bartley writes, "symbolized the transfer of the focus of 
power in Georgia from plantation elites to uptown metropolitan 
elites."26 The altered political situation brought former governor Ellis 
G. Arnall out of political retirement in 1966. But the progressive Arnall 
was defeated in a run-off primary by Lester G. Maddox, a fanatical 
opponent of civil rights who ardently defended free enterprise and 
Protestant fundamentalism. In the meantime, Republicans launched 
their first real campaign to win the Georgia governorship. Their can-
didate, Howard H. "Bo" Callaway, came within a few thousand votes 
of defeating Maddox. Since neither man received a popular majority, 
the election was thrown into the legislature, which voted along party 
lines in favor of Maddox. A colorful and flamboyant advocate of rural 
and small-town values, Maddox was, in one writer's words, "the 
symbol of poor white protest in the tradition of Tom Watson and the 
Talmadges."27 His election reflected the same basic concerns that led 
Georgians to give the state's electoral votes to Barry Goldwater in 1964 
and George Wallace in 1968. 
Ross Barnett, Paul B. Johnson, Jr., and John Bell Williams-all 
ardent segregationists-served as governors of Mississippi in the 
1960s. In 1963 former governor James P. Coleman was tellingly por-
trayed by Paul Johnson as a moderate, a racial liberal, and a pro-
Kennedy candidate. In 1967 another moderate, state treasurer William 
Winter, found his chances similarly destroyed. In that contest even 
Ross Barnett, trying to make a comeback, was apparently perceived 
as insufficiently firm on the race issue, since he finished far back 
among the contestants. By the late 1960s, there was some evidence 
of a fear among the state's more sensitive citizens that racial violence 
and political demagoguery would hinder badly needed industrial and 
economic development. The national Democratic party had become 
an anathema to a large number of whites in the Magnolia State. A 
statewide survey of white Mississippians in 1967 revealed that the 
image of the Republican party was more favorable than that of the 
Democratic party. 
In neighboring Alabama the politics of race was equally predomi-
nant. The most powerful factor in the state's politics was the lead-
ership of George C. Wallace, who won the governorship as a 
champion of white supremacy in 1962. Wallace quickly emerged as 
the most influential and unrelenting opponent of the civil rights move-
ment in the South-as the defender of the faith against the protest 
demonstrations led by Martin Luther King, Jr., and the equal rights 
policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Since Wallace 
was constitutionally ineligible to succeed himself, he arranged for his 
wife, Lurleen, to run instead in 1966. She won a decisive victory. 
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When she died of cancer in 1968, Lt. Gov. Albert P. Brewer assumed 
the governorship. He tried to pursue a moderate approach to racial 
questions and to concentrate on economic development. But in 1970 
Wallace narrowly defeated Brewer in the Democratic primary by re-
sorting to a demagogic campaign based on racial accusations and 
fears. Meanwhile, James B. Allen, a conservative critic of the national 
Democratic party, was elected in 1968 to succeed Sen. Lister Hill. The 
Republican party had made some headway in the state. Goldwater 
won 69.5 percent of the popular vote in 1964 and was instrumental 
in the election of five Republican congressmen in Alabama, three of 
whom retained their seats in the midterm elections of 1966. 
Governor Wallace proved to be the most compelling politician in 
the South during the 1960s, and he was possibly the most influential 
popular leader to appear in the region since Huey Long. Marshall 
Frady, one of his biographers, refers to the Alabamian as "the palpa-
ble, breathing articulation into flesh of Willie Stark in Robert Penn 
Warren's All the King's Men." 28 Politics was his life. A fellow politician 
once described him as a man "who has no other desires, no hobbies. 
Doesn't waste any of his time drinking. Doesn't waste any of his time 
doing anything, except talking politics every waking hour."29 Wallace 
began his career as a supporter of "Big Jim" Folsom, in the state 
legislature and in the Folsom campaigns. But the young politician 
voted for the Dixiecrat ticket in 1948 and eventually broke with Folsom 
over patronage and the segregation issue. As a state circuit judge, 
Wallace gained a certain notoriety for his truculent behavior in dealing 
with the federal courts in civil rights matters. After running unsuc-
cessfully for governor in 1958, he was elected to that office four years 
later. His inaugural address was a fiery "Segregation Now! Segre-
gation tomorrow! Segregation forever!" The fire-eating governor pro-
ceeded to involve himself in several dramatic confrontations with the 
federal government, including his "stand in the schoolhouse door" 
at the University of Alabama in an effort to prevent the admission of 
black students. He quickly became the dominant figure in politics and 
a symbol of white-supremacy defiance throughout the South. 
The Alabama governor was described as "a stumpy little man 
with heavy black eyebrows and bright black darting eyes and a puglike 
bulb of a nose who looked as if he might have stepped out of an 
eighteenth-century London street scene by Hogarth."30 He existed, 
one of his biographers wrote, "as the very incarnation of the 'folks,' 
the embodiment of the will and sensibilities and discontents of the 
people in the roadside diners and all-night chili cafes, the cabdrivers 
and waitresses and plant workers, as well as a certain harried Prufrock 
population of dingy-collared department-store clerks and insurance 
salesmen and neighborhood grocers."31 His appeal was especially 
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powerful among white southerners deeply committed to rural and 
traditional values in the midst of an industrializing and urbanizing 
region. Wallace himself explained his appeal as resulting in part from 
his role in restoring confidence and pride to southerners, who had 
long resented the criticisms, sneers, and patronizing attitude of out-
siders. Southerners, he remarked, "were talked about. You know, 
rednecks, hill billies, backward, ignorant, illiterate, racist. And the 
people developed a complex. They knew it wasn't true, but they 
had a hard time proving it. ... And when I became the governor of 
the state of Alabama we still had that viewpoint about our re-
gion .... And I think they feel that my position as governor was 
used to help restore ... [a sense of pride]."32 In some respects a 
latter-day Populist, Wallace's politics struck a responsive chord by 
appealing to morality, apprehensions over rapid social change, and 
antiestablishment feelings. The governor's exploitation of racial fears 
was the means that made it possible for much of his constituency to 
override their traditional identification with the Democratic party and 
the ideological orientation of lower-class status. 
In 1964 Wallace challenged Lyndon Johnson's consensus politics 
by entering three presidential primaries in the Midwest and East-
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland. "Here was a boy from the Deep 
South," the political scientist Donald S. Strong remarks, "who was 
going up to play ball in the major leagues." Strong suggests that this 
gesture probably "brought emotional gratification to large numbers 
of Alabamians."33 It appeared that Wallace might resort to the Dixie-
crat strategy of running as a third-party candidate. He did surprisingly 
well in his presidential primary ventures outside the South, receiving 
43 percent of the vote in Maryland and about a third of the ballots in 
Indiana and Wisconsin. But the Alabama governor retired from the 
presidential scene when Senator Goldwater won the Republican 
nomination. Nevertheless, Wallace had demonstrated his vote-getting 
potential, and during the next few years he became the ultimate 
expression of the appeal to racism in southern politics. Despite his 
racial demagoguery, the Alabamian believed in using the powers of 
government to assist lower-income people, and as governor he spon-
sored a series of costly programs in vocational education and other 
fields. 
For a time it seemed that Lyndon Johnson's Great Society would 
not only strengthen the Democratic party throughout the country but 
also rehabilitate it in the South. In 1965 the Great Society swept aside 
all restraints, as the Johnson administration scored one legislative 
triumph after another in civil rights, medical insurance, federal aid 
to education, urban renewal, and so on. But Johnson's reformism 
provoked opposition and disaffection among many white southern-
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ers. While there was strong southern support for the administration's 
course in Vietnam, in the nation as a whole Johnson's escalation of 
the war following the election of 1964 made his presidency increas-
ingly vulnerable. As U.S. involvement deepened and as more and 
more Americans perceived a credibility gap between what Johnson 
said and what was actually happening, the president lost popularity 
steadily. Plagued by ghetto riots, campus unrest, rising inflation, and 
bitter divisions over Vietnam, the administration was eventually 
threatened with paralysis. Early in 1968 it was dealt a series of heavy 
blows, including the Tet offensive by the enemy in Vietnam. Then, 
on March 31, came Johnson's shocking announcement that he would 
not seek reelection in 1968. 
As the election of 1968 approached, Democratic prospects in the 
South were dimmed by a number of unfavorable developments. In 
the deep South, the war against the national party was being carried 
on by Governors Wallace, Maddox, and Williams. In Congress south-
ern Democratic dissidence manifested itself in hostility to urban social 
and welfare programs, opposition to increased federal spending and 
growth of federal services, and concern for state control of various 
programs. This southern defiance of national Democratic policies also 
found expression in the growing strength of the conservative coalition 
in the late 1960s. As Democratic party unity declined in Congress, 
the percentage of coalition victories over the administration increased. 
Controversies over the recognition and seating of Alabama, Georgia, 
and Mississippi delegations to the national Democratic convention, 
leading to the unseating of some regular delegates, as well as the 
nomination of Vice-Pres. Hubert H. Humphrey and Sen. Edmund S. 
Muskie as the party's standard-bearers, alienated many southern 
Democrats, as did the platform's strong endorsement of civil rights. 
Even more portentous was the decision by George Wallace to bolt the 
Democratic party and run for president at the head of the American 
Independent party. Southerners who continued to think of them-
selves as Democrats were dispirited. "I have about given up hopes 
of really reforming the Democratic Party," Richard B. Russell in-
formed a constituent late in the campaign. "We have to live with 
it as it is. It has been an oil and water mixture and, if Humphrey 
wins ... I am afraid that you will not see a housecleaning job but 
only the spreading on of several new layers."34 
Wallace's new third party also alarmed GOP leaders in the South, 
where the minority party had high hopes for electoral success in 1968. 
Many southern Republicans were attracted to Gov. Ronald Reagan 
of California, an outspoken conservative, and that fact made former 
vice-president Richard M. Nixon, who became the party's presidential 
nominee, unusually solicitous of the South. Nixon dealt with the chal-
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lenge from Reagan by holding private talks with a number of impor-
tant southern Republicans in Atlanta on May 31 and June 1. He 
assured Senator Thurmond and other Republican leaders of his sym-
pathy for their position on questions like the use of busing as a means 
of achieving school desegregation and a get-tough policy against crime 
and disorder. Southern influence was clearly an important factor in 
Nixon's nomination and also in the choice of Gov. Spiro T. Agnew 
of Maryland for vice-president. The Republican platform emphasized 
an "all-out" campaign against crime, reform of the welfare laws, an 
end to inflation, and a stronger national defense. 
In contrast to the Republicans, who enjoyed a substantial lead in 
the public opinion polls, the Democratic party seemed to have dis-
integrated, torn apart by controversy over Vietnam and a divisive 
preconvention campaign. The assassination of Sen. Robert F. Ken-
nedy and the Democrats' strife-torn convention in Chicago cast a pall 
over the party. Wallace's third-party candidacy also contributed to 
the Democrats' gloomy outlook. Well financed by wealthy conserva-
tives and many grass-roots donations, the new party was able to get 
itself listed on the ballots of all fifty states. Wallace developed sur-
prising strength, not only among white southerners, but also among 
blue-collar groups and the lower-middle class in other regions, where 
there was often rising tension between white and black America. 
Displaying a quick wit and a folksy speaking style, the Alabamian 
campaigned throughout the country. He had become a national fig-
ure. He liked to assert that there was not "a dime's worth of differ-
ence" between the two major parties. His jibes at the "pointy-headed 
bureaucrats" and the "intellectuals who look down their noses at you" 
were calculated to appeal not only to the "white backlash" but also 
to the growing sense of alienation, resentment against war demon-
strators, and frustrations of powerlessness felt by blue-collar workers, 
rural dwellers, and hard-pressed members of the lower-middle class. 
He hoped to prevent either Humphrey or Nixon from getting a ma-
jority of the electoral votes and thus to throw the election into the 
House of Representatives, where the South might hold the balance 
of power. Early in the fall this appeared to be a possibility, since 
Wallace was receiving more than 20 percent of the preference votes 
in the public opinion polls. 
After their slow start, Humphrey and Muskie began to gather 
strength, having managed to bring a measure of unity to the party 
and to mount an effective appeal to labor unions and working-class 
people, often at the expense of George Wallace. By early November 
the Humphrey surge had brought the Democrats almost abreast of 
the Republicans in the polls. But Nixon won a narrow victory, re-
ceiving 31.7million votes to 31.2 million for Humphrey and 9.9 million 
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for Wallace. The South played a major role in Nixon's election. He 
carried six states in the peripheral South, plus South Carolina, while 
Wallace won Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkan-
sas. Humphrey captured only one southern state-Texas, where 
President Johnson's vigorous support no doubt made the difference. 
Nixon, with 34.7 percent of the popular vote in the ex-Confederate 
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states, did best in the upper South and appealed to higher-income 
and middle-class voters on the basis of economic conservatism and 
law-and-order rhetoric. Wallace, with 34.3 percent of the southern 
vote, showed his greatest strength in the deep South and attracted 
impressive support from rural and blue-collar voters. Humphrey, 
with 31 percent of the vote, was strongly supported by southern 
blacks and did well in Jewish and Chicano precincts. Wallace's south-
ern vote in 1968 correlated positively with that of Goldwater in 1964, 
although there were significant differences in their constituencies. 
Economic and class distinctions were much less marked in 1968 than 
in earlier elections. Wallace's effect on the outcome in the South was 
even greater than was evident in the five states he carried: his cam-
paign influenced Republican leaders throughout the South to move 
closer to the positions assumed by the third-party candidate. Finally, 
the election of 1968 represented a momentous departure in southern 
politics, since it produced an almost solid non-Democratic South. A 
completely solid non-Democratic South would come in 1972. 
The Second Reconstruction, like the First Reconstruction, had a 
profound effect upon the thinking and behavior of southerners. Once 
again, federal intervention on behalf of black southerners brought 
bitter protest and opposition from much of the region's white popu-
lation. But in some respects the reforms of the Second Reconstruction 
promised to be far more lasting than those of the First. This was 
particularly true of the institutional changes made in the 1960s: the 
overturning of Jim Crow, disfranchisement, malapportionment, and 
the one-party system. The traditional pattern of southern politics sim-
ply disintegrated. The Second Reconstruction led to the enfranchise-
ment of millions of southern blacks-and whites-to more democratic 
political machinery and to a more open and competitive politics. "By 
settling the principle of racial segregation," two scholars have recently 
observed, "federal intervention indirectly encouraged the region's 
politicians to concentrate more single-mindedly on stimulating eco-
nomic development. " 35 Whether it would also lead to a genuine two-
party system remained unclear as the 1960s ended and the 1970s 
began. Only time would tell how the most striking political divisions 
of 1968-white Republicans, black Democrats, and third-party reb-
els-would sort themselves out. 
Toward a 
Two-Party South 
In the aftermath of the presidential election of 1968, it was hard to 
tell what direction party politics in the South would take. The three-
way cleavage in 1968 seemed to reflect a politics that was more volatile 
and unpredictable than ever. While Republicanism had apparently 
taken a giant step forward, the future course of the five million south-
erners who voted for George Wallace remained imponderable. One 
thing was certain: the Democratic party was in a shambles, having 
been reduced to an impotence it had not experienced since Radical 
Reconstruction. 
Although Democratic loyalties persisted, many southerners were 
distancing themselves from the party of their fathers and grandfa-
thers. In a survey of Mississippi whites conducted in the summer of 
1967, for example, 46 percent of those questioned identified them-
selves as Democrats, 6 percent as Republicans, but no less than 39 
percent as independents. A survey of the Oklahoma electorate by a 
team of political scientists in 1972 revealed that only 20 percent of the 
voters identified themselves as "strong Democrats," while 9 percent 
characterized themselves as "strong Republicans" and 26 percent as 
independents. 1 Still, a good deal of truth was contained in the ob-
servation of a South Carolinian on the Republican vote during the 
1960s. "There ain't that many Republicans in South Carolina, just a 
lot of mad Democrats."2 Democratic leaders in the South could take 
some comfort in the rapid enfranchisement of southern blacks after 
1965. By 1970 the number of blacks registered in the eleven states of 
the Old South had reached 3.3 million. But this development was 
accompanied by a dramatic increase in white registration, part of 
which involved blue-collar and low-income southerners who com-
prised a significant part of Wallace's constituency. 
Richard Nixon lost no time in appealing to the Wallace supporters 
and to other white southerners. Calculating the best means of assuring 
his own reelection, Nixon pursued a "southern strategy" from the 
time he entered the White House in January 1969. His immediate 
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purpose was to counter the Wallace movement, to attract as much 
southern support as possible in and out of Congress, and thus to 
enhance his chances of carrying the South against the Democratic 
nominee in 1972. Conceding the loss of black votes and those of white 
liberals, Nixon made a determined bid for the support of white south-
erners, suburbanites, and ethnic workers troubled by the threat of 
racial equality and social disorder. His strategy was designed to attract 
southerners by combining law-and-order appeals with economic con-
servatism. The latter was an important factor in attracting middle-
class white southerners to the Republican philosophy in national 
politics. Despite the lip service he paid to racial justice, the Republican 
president launched a wide-ranging campaign to exploit the racial fears 
and prejudices of white Americans, particularly in the South. He at-
tempted to slow the pace of school desegregation, weakened civil 
rights offices in the Justice Department and in the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, tried to undermine the fair-housing 
enforcement program, opposed the extension of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, and urged Congress to impose a moratorium on court-
ordered busing. In other respects, Nixon followed a policy of willful 
neglect in dealing with civil rights questions. Meanwhile, he nomi-
nated three conservative "strict constructionist" southerners to the 
Supreme Court.3 And he made extensive use of Vice-Pres. Spiro Ag-
new's slashing rhetoric in presenting his case to the South. 
Although Nixon's "southern strategy" heightened the sectional 
sensibilities of many white southerners and elicited their strong ap-
proval, it did not result in substantial Republican gains in the South 
in the elections of 1970. Administration leaders conducted a vigorous 
campaign that year, giving particular attention to congressional con-
tests. A central theme in the president's appeal was that southerners 
should elect Republicans to Congress so that they could support his 
firm stand against busing to achieve racial balance in the schools. 
According to two southern newspaper editors, "It was a cynical stra-
tegy, this catering in subtle ways to the segregationist leanings of 
Southern voters-yet pretending with high rhetoric that the real aim 
was simply to treat the South fairly, to let it become part of the nation 
again."4 The results were disappointing-in the South and elsewhere. 
Except in Tennessee, where Winfield Dunn was elected governor and 
Rep. William E. Brock defeated the liberal senator Albert Gore, the 
Republicans made few gains in the South. They lost the governorship 
in Arkansas and Florida and were unable to win any other statewide 
offices in the region. Most Democratic candidates opposed busing 
and identified themselves with the social conservatism of their white 
constituents. Nixon was somewhat ambivalent in campaigning 
against southern Democrats, since he coveted their votes in his bid 
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for reelection and their support in Congress, where southern Demo-
cratic dissidence was as conspicuous as ever and where southerners 
still dominated the committee structure. 
Even though the Nixon administration adopted an outspoken an-
tibusing position in 1971 and 1972, it was unable to undermine George 
Wallace's political strength in the South. Many Wallace supporters 
had returned to the Democratic ranks in 1970. Following his narrow 
victory in the Alabama gubernatorial election of 1970, Wallace con-
solidated his political base in his home state and became a candidate 
for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972. He called himself 
a national candidate, made plans to enter presidential primaries in 
and out of the South, and criticized both President Nixon and Demo-
cratic aspirants like Edmund S. Muskie, Hubert H. Humphrey, and 
GeorgeS. McGovern. In March 1972 Governor Wallace won a sur-
prising victory in the Florida primary, an achievement that concerned 
Republican leaders and led them to intensify their own efforts in the 
southern states. Wallace moved on to win Democratic primaries in 
Tennessee, North Carolina, Michigan, and Maryland, while dem-
onstrating impressive strength in the Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and 
Indiana primaries. At that point fate intervened: the Alabama gov-
ernor was shot by a would-be assassin on May 15 while campaigning 
in Maryland. Left paralyzed from the waist down, Wallace was forced 
to abandon his presidential campaign in 1972. 
The Democratic party's reform of its delegate-selection process, 
which favored minority and liberal elements, helped Sen. George 
McGovern win the party's presidential nomination in 1972. The new 
selection procedures, as well as McGovern's liberalism, endorsement 
of civil rights and school busing, and forthright opposition to the war 
in Vietnam, alienated many conservative Democrats, particularly in 
the South. Few Democratic leaders in the region campaigned for the 
South Dakota senator, and a number of southern.Democrats, includ-
ing former governors John Connally of Texas and Mills Godwin of 
Virginia, worked actively for Nixon's election. Sam Nunn, the Demo-
cratic nominee for a vacant Senate seat in Georgia, openly declared 
his intention of voting for President Nixon. The latter, meanwhile, 
tried hard to appeal to white segregationist sentiment in the southern 
states. He made effective use of the highly emotional issue of busing. 
The controversy over "forced busing" offered Republicans a means 
of exploiting regional divisions within the Democratic party while 
drawing a distinction between busing and legal segregation. Nixon 
was careful not to antagonize powerful Democrats in the South and 
made clear his support of Senator Eastland's reelection in Mississippi. 
Republican hopes were overwhelmingly realized in the South-
and throughout the nation. Nixon and Agnew carried every southern 
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state, winning more than 70 percent (as compared to 61 percent in 
the United States as a whole) of the popular vote in the ex-Confederate 
states. McGovern received only 28.9 percent of the region's popular 
votes. Seldom had the color line been more visible in southern politics. 
A great majority of the South's white voters supported Nixon, while 
most of its black electorate voted for McGovern. The major difference 
between the elections of 1968 and 1972 in the South was the absence 
of the Wallace alternative in the latter contest. Had Wallace continued 
as a candidate, he would probably have carried most of the southern 
states. As it was, a great majority of those southerners who voted for 
Wallace in 1968 cast their ballots for Nixon four years later. Survey 
data suggests that three out of four such voters followed that course. 
Nixon had apparently created a southern coalition based on white 
disgruntlement over civil rights and a preference for state rights and 
fiscal conservatism. 
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While the GOP sweep of the South did not extend below the 
presidential _level in 1972, the party did make modest gains in other 
races. Republicans won six of twelve Senate elections in the southern 
states and increased their number of seats in the House of Represen-
tatives by seven, giving them about a third of the region's membership 
in the two houses of Congress. They were less successful in guber-
natorial elections and despite some gains held only about 16 percent 
of the legislative seats in the eleven Old South states following the 
election. The Republican party was most successful in Virginia and 
North Carolina. In the Old Dominion, William L. Scott, a conserva-
tive, defeated the Democratic incumbent, the moderate William B. 
Spong, for a U.S. Senate seat. A year later Mills Godwin, a former 
Democratic governor, won the governorship as a Republican, with 
the help of a great many conservative Democrats. In 1972 North Caro-
lina Republicans captured the governorship, a U.S. Senate seat, and 
four of the eleven seats in the House of Representatives. The new 
Republican governor was a moderate named James E. Holshouser. 
The newly elected Republican senator was Jesse A. Helms, an extreme 
conservative who defeated the liberal Democrat Nick Galifianakis. 
Despite the disastrous setback in the presidential election of 1972, 
Democratic prospects in the South began to brighten in 1970. From 
the wreckage of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Democratic leaders 
moved to contain the protest politics of George Wallace and to meet 
the challenge of Republican growth. The consensus on racial segre-
gation among southern politicians had begun to fall apart in the 1960s, 
and by the early years of that decade most office seekers in the pe-
ripheral South "no longer conformed to the traditional model of the 
segregationist white candidate."5 By the early 1970s, segregationist 
campaign rhetoric had declined sharply even in the deep South. Alex-
ander P. Lamis has described the political scene. "The racial tension 
that had alienated traditionally Democratic white voters lessened, and 
at the same time large numbers of blacks carrying strong Democratic 
party leanings entered the electorate. The potential flowing from this 
new situation was not lost on a host of Democratic office seekers, 
who put together potent black-white coalitions in the early 1970s."6 
As racial tensions declined in the 1970s and as the political partici-
pation of blacks-and whites-increased in the wake of suffrage re-
form and reapportionment, moderate Democrats began to attract 
many Wallace supporters. Wallace himself, who was reelected to a 
third term as governor in 1974, moved toward the center of the po-
litical spectrum. The nature of the Democratic party was clearly chang-
ing in the southern states, stimulated by the weakening vitality of the 
Dixiecrat mentality among Democrats, by Republican successes, and 
by the emergence of new Democratic leaders. This new Democratic 
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leadership tried to avoid the label "liberal," did not ordinarily endorse 
"integrationist" policies, and made use of subtly differentiated ap-
peals to Jiverse elements in the electorate. 
In the short run, moreover, the frustration and collapse of the 
second Nixon administration worked to the advantage of Democrats 
in the South. Although white southerners tended to support Nixon's 
policies in continuing the war in Vietnam and were slow to condemn 
his behavior in the Watergate scandal, many of them were disillu-
sioned and discouraged by the president's downfall. The leading roles 
assumed by Democrat Sam J. Ervin and Republican Howard H. Baker 
in the Senate investigation of Watergate also encouraged southern 
disaffection with Nixonian Republicanism. More generally, the 1970s 
witnessed what one journalist described, with some exaggeration, as 
a "new breed" of southern congressmen-"more independent and tol-
erant and more national in their outlook than their counterparts of 
previous decades."7 
One manifestation of Democratic resurgence in the South was the 
election of a group of moderate governors during the 1970s. These 
governors sought to construct majority coalitions that included work-
ing-class whites and blacks as well as middle-class and professional 
people. Having been largely emancipated from the burden of the racial 
issue, they emphasized economic development and opportunity. Pro-
grammatic and goal-oriented, they tried to modernize their state gov-
ernments and to extend public services. They represented a larger 
group of new activists who hoped to rehabilitate the Democratic party 
in the South and to strengthen its popular support. In their ranks 
were the likes of Reubin 0. Askew of Florida, Dale Bumpers of 
Arkansas, James Earl "Jimmy" Carter, Jr., of Georgia, Edwin W. 
Edwards of Louisiana, James B. Hunt, Jr., of North Carolina, and 
John C. West of South Carolina. 
The Democratic party's renewed vitality in the South was espe-
cially evident in four of the gubernatorial campaigns of 1970. One of 
those campaigns took place in Florida, where Reubin Askew defeated 
the Republican incumbent, Claude R. Kirk, Jr., on the basis of a broad 
reform coalition. Lawton Chiles, a young Democrat in the same mold, 
won a Senate seat that year. As governor, Askew boldly took the lead 
in the enactment of a tax on corporation profits and in securing other 
important reforms. He was reelected in 1974 and was succeeded four 
years later by Robert Graham, another representative of the new breed 
of southern governors. In Arkansas the party of Orval Faubus and 
James D. Johnson was pointed in a new direction by Dale Bumpers, 
a well-spoken moderate who defeated Faubus in the Democratic gu-
bernatorial primary of 1970 and then won the general election against 
Gov. Winthrop Rockefeller. Bumpers was reelected in 1972 and was 
Toward a Two-Party South 183 
succeeded two years later by another moderate reformer, former U.S. 
representative David Pryor, who had narrowly lost a race against Sen. 
John L. McClellan in 1972. After Pryor was reelected in 1976, William 
"Bill" Clinton, a third Democratic moderate, won the governorship 
in 1978. Starting with Rockefeller's defeat in 1970, one political sci-
entist observes, "attractive, skillful moderate Democratic leaders capi-
talized on strong white-voter allegiance to the Democratic party 
coupled with black support, which became solidly Democratic in the 
post-Rockefeller era, to reduce statewide Republican challenges from 
1972 through 1978 to no more than nominal contests."8 
Democratic moderation and broad-based campaign coalitions in 
South Carolina were continued with the election of Lt. Gov. John C. 
West as governor in 1970. West attracted most of the black votes and 
defeated Albert W. Watson, a former Democratic congressman, who 
waged a racist campaign that came close to succeeding. Racial issues 
began to lose strength after 1970, however, and even Sen. Strom 
Thurmond began to appeal for black support. South Carolina Demo-
crats suffered a setback in 1974, when their nominee for governor, a 
liberal named Charles D. "Pug" Ravenel, was declared ineligible be-
cause he failed to meet the five-year residency requirement. James B. 
Edwards, the Republican nominee, was elected. But the Democrats 
carried the state for Jimmy Carter in 1976, and two years later their 
gubernatorial nominee, Richard W. Riley, was elected. 
The reorientation of Democratic leadership in Georgia was more 
complicated and took longer. In the late 1960s, the Democratic party 
seemed to be disintegrating in the Empire State of the South. Lester 
Maddox had won the governorship in 1966 with a racist and reac-
tionary campaign, and in 1968 the Democratic presidential ticket had 
come in third behind George Wallace and Richard Nixon. A new state 
leader emerged in 1970, however, when Jimmy Carter defeated former 
governor Carl Sanders for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination 
and then won the general election. Carter, who opposed busing and 
appealed to the social conservatism of rural and small-town Geor-
gians, attracted much of the Talmadge-Maddox-Wallace following in 
his campaign against the racially moderate and urban-oriented Sand-
ers. Yet, as governor, Carter expressed liberal racial views, set about 
reorganizing the state government, and began to fashion a coalition 
that included blacks and rural and small-town workers. His tenure 
as governor, Numan V. Bartley suggests, seemed to confirm "the tri-
umph of a metropolitan ideology that stressed economic expansion, 
businesslike administration, and free market individualism."9 The 
same kind of coalition helped elect George Busbee, another Demo-
cratic moderate, in 1974. Busbee was reelected in 1978. 
Louisiana and Mississippi also showed signs in the early 1970s of 
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moving away from an obsession with racial issues in state politics. 
Candidates in those states, as in other parts of the deep South, began 
to frame issues in terms of economic and class rather than social 
appeals. In 1971-72 Edwin W. Edwards, a congressman of Cajun 
background, won the governorship of Louisiana. As Edwards recalled 
in 1973, "I was elected by a coalition of blacks, farmers, [and] people 
from South Louisiana of French Cajun descent."10 Edwards was re-
elected in 1976, and Louisiana Democrats were able to carry the state 
for Carter in a close election that year. William Winter, who won the 
Mississippi governorship in 1971, began to bring blacks into the state's 
politics and government, and Charles "Cliff" Finch, who was elected 
as his successor in 1975, went further in creating a black-white Demo-
cratic coalition. Having acquired greater unity than they had pos-
sessed in a generation, Mississippi Democrats managed to deliver the 
state to Jimmy Carter in 1976. It was the first time Mississippi had 
voted Democratic in a presidential election since 1956. 
The new-style Democrats were not immediately successful in the 
other southern states. In Tennessee Rep. Ray Blanton reclaimed the 
governorship for the Democrats in 1974, aided by Watergate and his 
success in attracting Wallace supporters back to the party. But Lamar 
Alexander, the Republican nominee, won the office in 1978 when the 
Democrats nominated a rich banker and controversy surrounded the 
Blanton administration. Tennessee Democrats could take some sat-
isfaction in the election of James R. Sasser, a middle-of-the-road lib-
eral, to the Senate in 1976 and in the fact that Jimmy Carter carried 
the state that year. Despite the North Carolina Republicans' success 
in 1972, Democratic moderates were able to control most of the state 
offices during the 1970s. Attorney General Robert B. Morgan was 
elected to the Senate in 1974, Lt. Gov. James B. Hunt, Jr., won the 
governorship in 1976, and Jimmy Carter carried the Tarheel State in 
the same year. Bitter factionalism among Virginia Democrats follow-
ing the demise of the Byrd organization left the party there polarized 
and enervated, with a weak and diffused center, throughout the 
1970s. Republicans controlled the governorship for twelve straight 
years after 1969, and after 1982 they held both U.S. Senate seats. 
Democrats presided over the state government of Texas until 1978, 
when Republican William P. Clements, Jr., was elected governor. The 
conservative faction of the Democratic party had long held the upper 
hand in Texas politics. Sen. Ralph Yarborough, the leading Demo-
cratic liberal in the state, was defeated by a conservative Democrat in 
1970. 
A stronger Democratic party in the South in the 1970s, along with 
the debilitating effects of Watergate on the Republican party, set the 
stage for the extraordinary rise of Jimmy Carter and his accession to 
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the presidency. In 1972, while in the middle of his term as governor, 
Carter decided to run for president. The governor and his advisers 
decided to employ the strategy they had won with in Georgia-build-
ing on Carter's political base in the southwestern part of the state and 
putting together a broad coalition through a diversified platform and 
intensive campaigning-in the national arena. Beginning with Geor-
gia, they set out to commit the rest of the South to Carter's candidacy, 
while entering a large number of presidential primaries both in and 
out of the southern region. Meanwhile, the Georgian traveled exten-
sively throughout the United States in preparation for the precon-
vention campaign of 1976. He emphasized the innovative character 
of his governorship and his commitment to a new approach in race 
relations. In his inaugural address, he had declared that "the time for 
racial discrimination is over. Our people have already made this major 
and difficult decision. No poor, rural, weak, or black person should 
ever have to bear the additional burden of being deprived of the 
opportunity for an education, a job, or simple justice."11 
Carter faced a major obstacle in the person of George Wallace, 
who was once again prepared to seek the Democratic presidential 
nomination by conducting a grass-roots campaign. Opinion polls in 
the spring of 1975 showed the Alabama governor to be the leading 
candidate among the Democratic leaders who were actively working 
for the nomination. But the political situation had changed since 1972, 
and in Carter, Wallace was confronted with a formidable opponent. 
Carter presented himself as a moderate, New South alternative to 
Wallace. To the surprise of many observers, the Gecrgian won a de-
cisive victory over Wallace in the Florida preferential primary on 
March 9, and he went on to defeat the Alabamian in North Carolina, 
Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Carter's national strat-
egy was also working. He won the New Hampshire primary in late 
February and proceeded to capture the delegates of ten other non-
southern states in presidential primaries. When the Democratic na-
tional convention convened, the one-term governor from Georgia was 
nominated on the first ballot. Carter obviously benefited from the 
aftereffects of the Watergate scandal, and he was widely perceived 
as an antiestablishment candidate running against the "mess in Wash-
ington." He thus appealed both to the reaction against Richard Nixon 
and to the alienation and distrust felt by many of Wallace's supporters. 
The Democratic presidential nominee had a broader appeal, how-
ever. He attracted widespread support in other regions as well as the 
South, and at the outset of the fall campaign he and his running mate, 
Sen. Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, enjoyed a substantial lead in 
the polls over Pres. Gerald R. Ford and Sen. Robert Dole. Even so, 
the election was close, and the Democrats won with a bare majority 
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of the popular vote and a majority of only 297 to 241 electoral votes. 
Carter and Mondale made their best showing in the South, winning 
eleven of the thirteen southern states and receiving 54 percent of the 
popular votes cast in the region. The Democrats lost Virginia and 
Oklahoma by extremely narrow margins. While the Democratic ticket, 
with strong support from Congressman Andrew Young and other 
Afro-American leaders, captured over 90 percent of the southern black 
votes, the Republicans had a lead of 53 to 46 percent among the 
South's white voters. Carter's strength in the South, his success in 
appealing to anti-Washington sentiment, and the image of honesty, 
sincerity, and trust that he projected were not alone responsible for 
his election. He was also able to mobilize a considerable part of the 
traditional New Deal coalition-religious and ethnic groups, racial 
minorities, and organized labor. "Fundamentally," one scholar con-
cludes, "Carter won because he was a Democrat in a nation where 
Democrats outnumbered Republicans by approximately a two-to-one 
margin, and Republican Gerald R. Ford ran a close race because he 
was the incumbent."12 
Millions of southerners felt a sense of pride and triumph in the 
election of a president from the heart of their region. Humbled, iso-
lated, and bereft of a positive role in national affairs for generations, 
they savored a moment of vindication. "Whatever else he may do," 
the liberal journalist Tom Wicker wrote, "Jimmy Carter has removed 
the last great cause for Southern isolation; and even in the remote 
little farm towns that dot the Southern countryside, it is already pos-
sible to sense that Southerners are coming to believe that they finally 
belong to something larger than the South."13 Still, the presidency of 
Jimmy Carter did little to clarify the ambiguity that had come to char-
acterize southern politics. One reason may have been that Carter came 
to the presidency after waging a highly personalized campaign, which 
left him without a clear policy mandate and without the loyalty of 
established Democratic leaders. Entering the White House as an out-
sider, the Georgian had trouble with Congress, including the mem-
bers of his own party. Had his administration been more successful, 
the president from Georgia might have had a more enduring influence 
on southern politics. But that is problematic. As it was, the Carter 
administration became increasingly vulnerable to Republican attacks. 
Despite the president's good intentions and some notable accomplish-
ments, particularly in foreign affairs, he was eventually frustrated by 
intractable problems, a resurgent Congress, and a divided Democratic 
party. Ironically, the leadership of this southern president opened the 
door wider to Republican advances in the South. 
Carter's renomination in 1980 was contested by Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, who portrayed Carter as a weak and in-
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effectual leader who had abandoned the Democratic party's tradition 
of domestic reformism and was unable to forge a successful foreign 
policy. In the end, Carter won a series of preferential primaries and 
turned back the Kennedy challenge. The Democratic national con-
vention then renominated Carter and Mondale. The Republicans, sen-
sing victory, turned to Ronald Reagan, an ex-governor of California 
who had come close to winning the GOP nomination in 1976. The 
conservative Reagan provided a sharp contrast to Carter. He urged 
a reduction of federal spending and promised to "take government 
off the backs of the people." He blamed the Carter administration for 
the nation's economic doldrums and accused it of weakening the 
national defense and allowing the Soviet Union to achieve an advan-
tage in strategic striking power. Carter fought back, but he remained 
on the defensive throughout the campaign, buffeted by a faltering 
economy, deteriorating relations with the Russians, and a humiliating 
crisis precipitated by the holding of American diplomats as hostages 
in Iran, which seemed to symbolize the bankruptcy of the president's 
leadership. Economic setbacks, including a sluggish growth rate, 
mounting deficits, and galloping inflation, undermined public con-
fidence in the Carter administration. The Republicans, moreover, con-
ducted a unified and well-organized campaign, in contrast to the 
Democrats' loosely organized and poorly integrated efforts. 
In an election that brought the lowest U.S. turnout in the twen-
tieth century, Reagan received 43.9 million popular votes (51 percent) 
to 35.5 million (41 percent) for Carter. Rep. John B. Anderson, an 
independent candidate, obtained 5.7 million votes. The Republicans 
had an overwhelming electoral margin of 489 to 49. Carter and Man-
dale carried only six states, including Carter's home state of Georgia. 
The Republican ticket won the other twelve southern states, but the 
outcome was very close in six of those commonwealths. The GOP 
majorities in Virginia, Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma were much 
larger. Whereas Carter captured 93 percent of the black ballots in the 
eleven ex-Confederate states, he received only 35 percent of the re-
gion's white votes. Among southern whites, he did best with older, 
low-income, and less well-educated voters. The Republicans also 
made gains below the presidential level in the South. They won new 
Senate seats in North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. They 
gained nine seats in the House of Representatives and also won the 
governorship of Arkansas. 
By the 1980s the South's once-powerful Democratic delegations 
were becoming less formidable. For one thing, the number of Re-
publican members of Congress from the South had steadily risen. 
Unlike the situation a few years earlier when the Democratic ascen-
dancy was so overwhelming that the Republicans left many congres-
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sional seats uncontested, the minority party had begun to field 
candidates for most House and Senate seats. The 1970s brought "a 
core nf right-wing Republican strength [from the South] in Con-
gress."14 After the 1980 elections, Republicans held eleven of there-
gion's twenty-six Senate seats15 and one-third of the House seats. 
Republican congressional strength was most impressive in Virginia, 
where the party held nine of the state's ten House seats following 
the elections of 1980 and both Senate seats after 1982. When the Re-
publicans won control of the Senate in 1980, southern senators as-
sumed an influential role. Howard Baker became the new majority 
leader, while Strom Thurmond, John G. Tower, and Jesse Helms took 
over the chairmanships of important Senate committees. Although 
the Democrats retained control of the House of Representatives, 
southerners no longer dominated the committee structure and lead-
ership positions of the lower house as they once had. Only a decade 
before, southerners had headed almost half of the standing commit-
tees in the two houses. But deaths, resignations, and increasing com-
petition had diluted the dominance formerly exercised by southern 
Democrats in both houses of Congress. The powerful figures of an 
earlier day-Richard B. Russell, Harry Flood Byrd, John L. McClellan, 
James 0. Eastland, Howard W. Smith, and Wilbur Mills-had dis-
appeared from the scene. New rules in the House of Representatives 
had diminished southern power, and in the mid-1970s a revolt of 
young liberals in that body was instrumental in the removal of two 
southern Democrats from important chairmanships. With the decline 
of civil rights as a major issue, southern Democratic unity in Congress 
fell somewhat. Significantly, a majority of the Democratic members 
from the South voted for an extension of the Voting Rights Act in 
1975 and 1982. 
Meanwhile, the Republican presence in the South was enhanced 
because the party's southern leaders included persons of influence 
and power. Senator Baker, for example, became a serious candidate 
for the presidency in the 1980s. Southern Republicanism was also 
encouraged by the Reagan administration, which showed its solici-
tude for the South in ways that were both tangible and symbolic. 
"Reagan's popularity," the columnist David Broder observes, "has 
created a real opportunity for political realignment of the region, down 
to the courthouse level."16 One reason President Reagan and other 
GOP leaders looked to the South was the region's conservative tra-
dition, and the reservoir of conservatism below the Potomac was re-
currently replenished by white southerners' deep-seated views on 
economic and moral issues. Reagan's policies at home and abroad 
were popular among these southerners and received considerable 
support from the region's Democrats in Congress. This regional re-
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Table 5. Percentage of Republican Victories for Selected Federal 
Offices, 1965-1985 
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State 
President Senator Governor Legislator 
South 69 33 24 14 
Deep South 60 22 8 8 
Peripheral South 77 43 34 21 
souRcE: Adapted from Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in 
the South (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), p. 311, by permission. 
NOTE: These statistics refer to the eleven ex-Confederate states only. 
The "deep South" states include South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana. The "peripheral South" states include Florida, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, and Texas. 
sponse involved more than racial considerations. White southerners 
generally liked the fortieth president's emphasis on lower taxes, eco-
nomic growth, reduction of federal regulatory activities, resistance to 
redistributive welfare programs, strong opposition to a "predatory" 
Soviet Union, and the need to restore patriotism and renew traditional 
values and institutions. Republican growth in the South, especially 
in national and statewide election campaigns, was stimulated as well 
by the disarray in the Democratic party and the lack of purposeful 
and compelling leadership at the national level. 
On the surface, at least, the presidential election of 1984 gave 
Republicans in the South, as in other parts of the country, further 
cause to be optimistic about their party's continued growth. The times 
were propitious for the Grand Old Party. Economic recovery was in 
full swing following the recession of 1981-82, foreign affairs had as-
sumed a less hazardous outlook, and the president's popularity re-
mained gratifyingly high. Reagan dominated the Republican party, 
which was strongly united in support of his reelection. Democratic 
prospects, on the other hand, were never very bright. The party went 
through a long and bruising preconvention struggle before nominat-
ing former vice-president Walter Mondale and Rep. Geraldine A. Fer-
raro. The Democrats waged a forceful and energetic campaign, but 
they were no match for the confident and united Republicans. Reagan 
and his running mate, George Bush of Texas, won by a landslide, 
receiving 54.5 million votes (59 percent) to 37.6 (41 percent) for the 
Democratic ticket. The electoral vote was an overwhelming 525 to 13, 
with the Republicans carrying every state except Mondale' s Minne-
sota and the District of Columbia. 
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While Ronald Reagan demonstrated his own extraordinary po-
litical appeal in the election of 1984, the results of that contest were 
less certain in other respects. It was not clear whether Reagan's vic-
tories in 1980 and 1984 were part of a realignment of the political 
parties-a fundamental shift in voter affiliation that would last 
through several elections. Although the Republicans had captured 
the Senate as well as the White House, the Democrats remained in 
control of the House of Representatives and continued to dominate 
the governorships and state legislatures. Despite the decline in party 
identification and the growth of independentism, the Democrats were 
still ahead in terms of party preference and registration. Much would 
depend on whether Reagan succeeded in rebuilding the national gov-
ernment along conservative lines. The venerable Roosevelt coalition 
seemed to be disintegrating, and the Republicans were enjoying great 
success in presidential elections, having won six of the nine contests 
since 1952 and four out of the last five. Perhaps, as some scholars 
suggested, there were two separate constituencies in contemporary 
American politics-one for the presidency and one for Congress and 
state and local offices. 
What these national trends meant for the South was uncertain, 
although it was increasingly apparent that the region's political future 
would be closely involved in whatever configuration the nation's poli-
tics might assume and that it would likely help establish that pattern. 
Unlike 1980, Reagan and Bush carried every southern state by a sub-
stantial majority in 1984. In other races, however, GOP gains in the 
southern states were limited. Notwithstanding the party's heavy ma-
jority at the presidential level, it barely held its own in congressional 
races, winning one additional House seat but losing a Senate seat in 
Tennessee. Following the 1984 elections, the southern Democrats had 
a majority of 15 to 11 Senate seats and 90 to 39 House seats. The 
Republicans did gain a governorship in North Carolina, but that left 
them with only two such positions in the thirteen southern states. In 
the elections of 1986, they lost five Senate and three House seats in 
the South, while winning four additional governorships. 
For all their internal conflict and tumultuous experience in the 
recent past, Democrats in the South remained the dominant party in 
state and local politics. When South Carolinians voted Republican in 
presidential elections, Senator Thurmond once remarked, "They feel 
that's way out yonder and if they vote Republican there won't be any 
stigma. But in state elections, especially among the less enlightened 
people, there's still that stigma against Republicans that goes back to 
the military rule of 1866 to 1876."17 Many southerners still felt a lin-
gering attachment to the party of Bryan, Wilson, and Roosevelt. 
Southern Republicans were not unfamiliar with the stubborn reality 
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of Democratic dominance at the local level. In their study of recent 
southern politics, Jack Bass and Walter DeVries speak of "the con-
servative Dixie Democrat who gets black votes by being a Democrat 
and white votes by voting conservative."18 Robert Shaw, chairman 
of the Republican state committee in Georgia, explained the problem 
his party faced. "So what catches us is that you find the conserva-
tive rural vote going in voting the straight party ticket, and by the 
same token you find the urban blacks voting the straight party 
ticket .... they're voting hand in hand, and when they do, they're 
squeezing the lives out of us."19 The Democrats had still another 
advantage. They were able in most southern states to "protect" the 
governorships from the direct impact of presidential campaigns by 
shifting gubernatorial elections to off-presidential years. Since the 
Democrats usually controlled the machinery of government at the 
local and state levels, aspiring politicians saw their best chance to be 
elected as Democrats, not as Republicans. This was graphically illus-
trated in the party's preponderance of legislative seats in the South: 
in 1984 the Democratic margin in senate seats was 441 to 99 and in 
house seats 1,162 to 355. The best Republican showing was in Ten-
nessee with about 36 percent of the combined legislative seats. 
Nevertheless, no aspect of the transformation of southern politics 
since World War II is more remarkable than the development of in-
terparty competition. By the 1980s the Republican party had appar-
ently become the majority party in presidential elections, and it was 
no longer a rarity to find Republican officeholders in congressional 
and statewide positions. The party was organized in every southern 
state, and it had begun to contest all statewide and congressional 
offices and an increasing number of local elections. As the Republican 
party grew stronger and became more competitive, it attracted a 
steady stream of conservative Democrats. Many of these Democratic 
defectors began to think of themselves as Republicans or indepen-
dents. Republican growth in the South was related to the changing 
nature of the Democratic party: to the liberalization of the national 
party during the New Deal and after and to the recomposition of the 
party in the southern states. 
A dramatic change in the party loyalties of white southerners had 
occurred, at least in national politics. A process of "dealignment" 
seemed to be dissolving the once-powerful Democratic coalition in 
the South without a new coalition being formed to replace it. The 
party system had splintered into minorities of Democrats, Republi-
cans, and independents. Whereas Democrats in the South had out-
numbered Republicans almost eight to one in the early 1950s, their 
advantage in party identification in presidential elections had dis-
appeared by the 1980s. Polling data indicated that the percentage of 
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southern whites favorably disposed toward the Republican party 
nearly doubled between 1976 and 1984. Political scientists estimate 
that the Democrats suffered a net loss of 25 percent between the 1950s 
and the 1980s, while the Republicans enjoyed a net gain of 20 percent 
during that period. Meanwhile, a sharp drop occurred in the per-
centage of white southerners who considered themselves strong 
Democrats. The GOP attraction was especially notable among con-
servatives, the college-educated, and the younger generation. A sub-
stantial majority of the South's white residents identified themselves 
as conservatives, and in many respects the political outlook of the 
white working class was quite similar to that of the white middle 
class. Organized labor's lack of influence enhanced the political 
strength of conservatives. The failure of southern liberalism, Earl 
Black and Merle Black suggest, resulted from the fact that "too many 
white voters welcome conservative positions and candidates andre-
ject the symbols, policies, and beneficiaries of contemporary liberal-
ism."20 
The most striking feature of the new Democratic party in the South 
was the support it received from black politicians and black voters, 
who registered in large numbers in the years after 1965 and entered 
the Democratic party almost en masse. Blacks became the strongest 
liberal element in the southern Democracy. While this phenomenon 
encouraged many Democratic candidates to broaden their appeal to 
include blacks, it also led thousands of white Democrats to leave their 
traditional party. The number of blacks registered in the eleven states 
of the Old South increased from 1.5 million in 1960 to 5.6 million (as 
compared with 28 million whites) in 1984. By the latter year, the 
registered percentage of the black voting-age population had almost 
reached that of the white-66.2 to 75.3. In the meantime, the number 
of black elected officials in the region rose rapidly, increasing from 
fewer than a hundred in 1965 to about 3,500 in 1984. Most of these 
officials were members of city councils, county commissions, school 
boards, and law enforcement agencies. In Mississippi the number rose 
from zero in 1965 to 521 in 1986, making that state the leader in black 
elected officeholders. By 1980 there were 106 black mayors in the 
region, mostly in small towns but including Richmond, Raleigh, At-
lanta, Birmingham, and New Orleans. The number of blacks in south-
ern legislatures also increased, reaching a total of 178 in both houses 
by 1985. Virginia elected L. Douglas Wilder as lieutenant governor in 
1985, making him the first black to hold a statewide office in the Old 
Dominion, and Mississippi elected its first black Democratic member 
of Congress in 1986. 
It did not take long for the expanding black electorate to have an 
effect on southern politics, particularly on Democratic leaders. Evi-
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dence of changing attitudes and practices could be found throughout 
the South. In George Wallace's Alabama, for instance, the state Demo-
cratic party in 1966 removed the party emblem-"White Supremacy-
For the Right" -from the ballot. Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, 
the first U.S. senator from the South to be elected after passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, illustrates the transitional response of 
many politicians to the new political environment. In 1969 Hollings, 
who had earlier defended the traditional racial order in his state, led 
a successful Senate battle to expand federal food stamps and other 
programs to combat hunger and malnutrition, an effort that would 
be especially helpful to blacks. A broader and more significant change 
occurred in the character of the southern black belts, which historically 
had been the bulwark of regional conservatism and solidarity. As 
Afro-American men and women began to register and vote in large 
numbers, the black belts began to shed their traditional conservatism 
and to express a more moderate and even liberal position on political 
issues. In South Carolina Hubert H. Humphrey won thirteen of the 
fifteen counties with black majorities in 1968. Only one of those coun-
ties had voted Democratic in 1964. In 1976 twelve of the state's black 
belt counties cast 64.9 percent of their ballots for Jimmy Carter-
almost 10 percent higher than the other counties. "In general," one 
authority observes with respect to senatorial and gubernatorial elec-
tions, " ... Republicans must draw in the area of 65 percent of the 
non-black vote to win in any of the heavily black Southern states."21 
Southern efforts to dilute the black vote continued even after the 
Voting Rights Act went into effect. Particularly in the deep South, 
blacks were often subjected to voter reidentification, harassment at 
the polls, and economic threats. Black officeholding was minimized 
through the use of at-large elections for municipal and county offices, 
multimember districts, racial gerrymandering, and other forms of 
electoral discrimination. Southern whites did not often vote for black 
candidates in large numbers. When the Mississippi courts finally or-
dered a shift to single-member legislative seats in 1979, black leaders 
had high expectations in thirty districts with large Negro populations. 
But black candidates were successful in only fifteen house and two 
senate races. In 1982 state representative Robert Clark became the 
first black candidate in Mississippi to win Democratic nomination for 
Congress-with 57 percent of the primary vote. Yet he lost in the 
general election when many whites defected and voted for his Re-
publican opponent. In 1986 another black candidate, Mike Espy, won 
the Democratic nomination for the same seat. He won a narrow vic-
tory. Richard Arrington, Jr., a black professor and member of the 
Birmingham city council, was elected mayor of that city in 1979; he 
won by carrying 98 percent of the black votes and only 12 percent of 
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the white ballots. He was reelected in 1983. In 1980 blacks held only 
4 percent of the elective county offices and 3 percent of the elective 
municipal offices in the South. 
Southern blacks were still less active politically than were whites. 
Even after registering, their voting percentages tended to be poor. 
Black leaders in office, being human, found it difficult to live up to 
the expectations of their constituents. Writing in the mid-1960s, Don-
ald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro suggested that "the concrete, 
measurable payoffs from Negro voting in the South will not be revo-
lutionary."22 They were right. The Democratic governors of the 1970s 
were unable or unwilling to undertake substantial programs for the 
benefit of blacks. "None of the new leaders," wrote Roy Reed, the 
New York Times southern correspondent, "has made real headway in 
providing industrial jobs for the multitudes of poor people who still 
live in the black belts. None has found the answers to newer problems 
such as urban blight and the growing concentration of economic 
power in fewer hands."23 Despite their new role in politics, the po-
litical influence of southern blacks was limited. For one thing, they 
were a minority in most parts of the region. In 1920 blacks made 
up 32 percent of the population in the ex-Confederate states; by 1980 
that proportion had declined to 20 percent (29 percent in the deep 
South and 15 percent in the peripheral South). In the 1980s black 
majorities existed in only eighty-six rural counties. While the black 
voter registration rate had risen almost to the level of whites in the 
South, Afro-Americans constituted less than one-fifth of the southern 
electorate. Furthermore, blacks were poorer, less well educated, and 
subjected to far worse living conditions than were whites. These 
disparities contributed to marked differences on such political issues 
as the government's responsibility for jobs, expenditures for welfare 
programs, and the relative importance of dealing with unemployment 
and inflation. 
If southern politics had become more competitive, it had also 
become more democratic. This resulted in part from court decisions 
that forced the redistricting of congressional and legislative seats, from 
the invalidation of the poll tax and disfranchising devices, and from 
the effects of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and hundreds of regis-
tration drives. It also stemmed from increasing registration of south-
ern whites, often in response to the enfranchisement of blacks. In 
1948 the political scientist Herman Clarence Nixon described the typi-
cal southern legislature as "chiefly a body of Democratic, small-town 
or rural, white men, a majority of whom represent a minority of the 
population of the state, not to mention the restricted suffrage by which 
the members were chosen in a party primary."24 Thirty years later 
the composition of the region's legislatures had undergone a decided 
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change. By the 1970s they were much more urban-oriented, and their 
members included increasing numbers of blacks, women, and Re-
publicans. Competition for legislative seats had become keener. In 
some respects, politics had become more accessible and more mean-
ingful to southerners than at any time since the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Many of the disparities that differentiated political affairs in the 
South from other parts of the country had disappeared. The turnout 
of southern voters, particularly in presidential and statewide elec-
tions, increased dramatically after 1960. By 1980 the percentage of the 
voting-age population in the South casting ballots in the presidential 
election had risen to 47.4; the national percentage was 52.6. Mean-
while, more southern voters were attracted to general elections than 
to Democratic primaries, telling evidence of the arrival of two-party 
competition below the Potomac. 
The new southern electorate was clearly influenced by the mas-
sive restructuring of the South's economy and society: the dynamic 
growth of industry, business, and finance; rapid urbanization and the 
prevalence of suburban affluence; the swelling middle class and the 
in-migration of corporate executives and business managers. These 
developments affected the entire region, but in states such as Texas, 
Florida, and Virginia, the results were spectacular. The Sunbelt men-
tality blossomed. The growth of urbanization approached national 
rates, led by Florida with 84 percent and Texas with 80 percent in 
1980. Southern cities spawned their own ghettos, the farm population 
was greatly diminished, and the mass of industrial workers and white-
collar employees showed little interest in organized labor. By 1980 
migrants from other parts of the country accounted for 20 percent of 
the South's white inhabitants. In many respects, the region seemed 
to be experiencing the fruition of the New South dream. This New 
South looked more promising to Republicans than to Democrats. The 
more affluent elements and the growing middle class were disposed 
to acquiesce in a measure of social change, including racial readjust-
ment, but they had strong conservative predilections on economic 
questions and cultural issues. 
Political change was in considerable part a consequence of the 
region's profound economic and social transformation. Thus, the 
South's dynamic involvement in the emergence of a national, inte-
grated economy was a significant factor in the acceptance of black 
enfranchisement and a new political system. "In every southern 
state," a recent study notes, "industrialization has multiplied and 
diversified the number of institutions-banks, insurance companies, 
utilities, construction firms, real estate interests, transportation com-
panies, communications businesses, leading law firms-that make 
up state power structures, while simultaneously augmenting the col-
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lective resources at the disposal of state 'establishments.' " 25 The po-
litical effects of urbanization were also striking; they included the 
decline of the rural South as a source of political leadership and power 
and the rise of influential urban leaders and interests. The large met-
ropolitan and medium-urban sector provided 70 percent of the south-
ern vote in the presidential election of 1980. The new middle class, 
in which white women constituted a notable part, was at the very 
heart of political change in the South. As two analysts write, "Middle-
class southerners occupy most of the region's political offices, domi-
nate its key decisionmaking institutions in the private sector, and 
control most of its communications and mass media."26 
While the individual states responded in uniquely different ways 
in adapting their politics to the pressures of change, they were gen-
erally affected by the region's economic and social transformation: the 
decline of agriculture, increasing economic diversification, urbaniza-
tion and suburbanization, and extensive migration within and be-
tween states. Reapportionment affected the entire region, hastening 
the decline of rural influence and the transfer of political power to 
metropolitan and urban areas. All thirteen states were involved in the 
disruption of the Solid South: in the revolt against the region's historic 
bulwark-the Democratic party-and in the growth of Republican-
ism. In every state politics became more competitive, and the emer-
gence of an effective Republican opposition, along with the challenge 
of George Wallace and other insurgents, stimulated renewed Demo-
cratic efforts in state and local contests. These developments were 
related to the expansion of the southern electorate-to the enfran-
chisement of the black masses, to the dramatic increase in the reg-
istration of whites, and to the marked rise in voter turnout. Women 
became an important part of the new electorate, and their turnout in 
the presidential election of 1980 was higher than that of southern men. 
Although southern women took the lead in organizing a regional 
suffrage movement early in the century, played a vital role in many 
reform campaigns, and gradually found new opportunities for public 
service, they were not prominently involved in electoral politics, seeing 
that as a male sphere. But that has changed, and they have become 
more active, not only as voters, but also as party workers, candidates, 
and officeholders, particularly in local and municipal politics. 
In the South, as elsewhere, old-style personal politics and other 
traditional forms of campaigning gave way to expensive and high-
powered media appeals to the mass of voters and to a diminished 
role for the political party. The changing technology of mass com-
munications hastened the adoption of new techniques of campaigning 
based on telephone polling and television advertising. Meanwhile, 
the South was undergoing what two political scientists describe as "a 
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grand secular transition from a politics of faction to a politics of faction 
and party."27 Durable factions in the region's one-party politics largely 
disappeared, replaced by transient factions in multifactional primar-
ies. Gubernatorial tenure grew longer in most states, and governors 
became more important as party leaders. While few of these governors 
were neo-Populists, most of them were willing to spend money for 
public services, especially education. Segregationist-type leaders vir-
tually passed from the political scene. Every southern state could boast 
an increasingly competitive two-party politics. Another common 
theme was the concentration of political power in the hands of pow-
erful elites. If southern politics had became more open, more demo-
cratic, and more competitive in certain respects, it was nonetheless 
true that disproportionate power was exercised by large, well-orga-
nized, and well-financed interest groups along the entire range of the 
political process. Special interests were also effective in shaping public 
policy. During the 1984 session of the general assembly in Virginia, 
for example, no fewer than 401 groups employed lobbyists who were 
officially registered, representing business, occupations and profes-
sions, agriculture, labor, education, and so on. The business com-
munity, one scholar writes, "remains the dominant set of interests 
represented at the Capitol and in particular, such long established 
business interests as the railroads, banks, truckers, manufacturers, 
retailers, utilities and homebuilders retain a strong presence, adapting 
to the changing landscape."28 
Early in the twentieth century, and even as late as the 1930s, it 
made sense to divide the South into three political subregions: the 
states of the upper South, the lower South, and the trans-Mississippi 
Southwest. Over the years since World War II, these classifications 
have become progressively less distinctive. Insofar as a meaningful 
typology for contemporary southern politics is concerned, the best 
approach may be simply to divide the political South into two cate-
gories of states: those states that comprise the peripheral or outer 
South and those that make up the inner or deep South. Although 
these divisions are somewhat arbitrary, they reflect genuine differ-
ences in condition and behavior, and they may offer a useful frame-
work in which to consider the distinguishing features of the state 
political systems. 
In general, the states of the peripheral South were historically 
more diversified economically, had closer ties with the North, were 
more divided over secession, had fewer blacks, and were less ob-
sessed with the politics of race than was the deep South. Several of 
these states retained a hardy but minority brand of mountain Re-
publicanism, and since World War II they have made the greatest 
progress toward two-party politics. Some of them have undergone 
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such dramatic change that they no longer appear to be peculiarly 
"southern." The inner South, on the other hand, which was more 
closely identified with the plantation system and was more united in 
its support of secession and the Democratic party, retains much of 
its traditional culture. Having the largest percentage of blacks, the 
states of the deep South were more preoccupied with the "race ques-
tion" than was the upper South. This preoccupation continued in the 
post-World War II period, and it was a major consideration in the 
rebellion against the national Democratic party and in the political 
extremism manifested in the overwhelming support of Goldwater and 
Wallace. While Republicans have gained strength and respectability 
and while Democrats have broadened their appeal to include black 
voters, the politics of these states is still in flux, characterized by 
instability and unpredictability. 
Perhaps none of the southern states has experienced greater po-
litical change since mid-century nor witnessed a more spectacular 
Republican breakthrough than Virginia. The most important aspect 
of politics in the Old Dominion was the Byrd machine's long domi-
nation, which was perpetuated through low voter participation and 
tight control over the counties. But with the demise of the machine 
in the mid-1960s and the splintering of the Democratic party, the 
Republicans won the governorship and a U.S. Senate seat. They domi-
nated statewide and congressional elections in the 1970s, until a mod-
erate and reorganized Democratic party regained the governorship 
under the leadership of Charles S. Robbin 1981. Robb was followed 
by another centrist Democrat. Interparty competition had unmistak-
ably come to Virginia. Meanwhile, urban growth and economic de-
velopment had changed the political setting, the electorate had greatly 
increased in size, and the weight of the urban voters had altered the 
nature of statewide elections and the process of political decision mak-
ing. With the decline of the political oligarchy, the old values of a 
restricted electorate, rule by the "better sort," and limited social ser-
vices were largely repudiated. 
In two other upper South states-Tennessee and North Caro-
lina-the Democrats lost their monopoly of statewide offices, and 
competition between the parties became more intense. The Demo-
cratic structure that resulted from the powerful role of Edward H. 
Crump's Memphis organization came to an end in the early 1950s, 
and for about a decade thereafter a vague dual factionalism revolving 
around Senators Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore, on the one hand, 
and Governors Frank G. Clement and Buford Ellington, on the other, 
characterized the Democratic party. As these leaders passed from the 
scene in the 1960s, the party fell into disarray, setting the stage for 
Republican victories in 1966 and 1970. The Republicans benefited from 
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strong leadership, notably that of Senator Baker in national politics 
and Lamar Alexander, who served as governor from 1979 to 1987. 
The Democrats remained strong, however, and following the elec-
tions of 1986, they controlled the governorship, both U.S. Senate 
seats, and six of the state's nine congressional seats. Still, the Re-
publican party was a genuine competitive force. Building on its tra-
ditional strength in East Tennessee, Republican influence grew in the 
cities and in West Tennessee, a conservative area once dominated by 
the Democrats. 
In similar fashion, North Carolina Republicanism spread eastward 
from its historic base in the mountains, picking up adherents in the 
dynamic Piedmont crescent and eventually attracting conservative 
white support in the traditionally Democratic farm country of the east. 
There were competing factions in both parties, but by the late 1970s 
the most powerful Republican voice was that of the ultraconservative 
Sen. Jesse Helms, while the spokesman for Democrats was a moderate 
and successful coalition builder, Gov. James B. Hunt, Jr. 29 During the 
first half of the 1980s, the Republicans controlled both U.S. Senate 
seats, and in 1984 they won the governorship again. In 1986 the Demo-
crats regained one of the Senate places and won two additional 
congressional seats. North Carolina, like Tennessee and Virginia, had 
become an intensely contested battleground between Republicans and 
Democrats in presidential, congressional, and statewide elections. 
Political change in Florida and Texas, while quite remarkable, 
lagged behind the extraordinary economic and social transformation 
of those states in the postwar period. Florida's rate of population 
growth, magnitude of urbanization, and increase in per capita income 
led the South. Its population more than tripled between 1940 and 
1980, and an influx of outsiders, many of whom were northerners, 
poured into the state. These conditions provided fertile ground for 
Republicanism. Beginning in 1952, Florida Republicans won seven of 
the next nine presidential elections, and in 1966 they captured the 
governorship and a Senate seat. New leaders such as Reubin Askew 
and Lawton Chiles soon rejuvenated the Democratic party on the basis 
of an expanded constituency and a progressive agenda. Reappor-
tionment, the approval of a new constitution in 1968, and a sharp 
increase in voter registration and turnout strengthened the political 
role of the cities and enhanced the influence of Republicans, blacks, 
and other minorities. Although the state's politics was affected by the 
geographic cleavage between the conservative, Old South region to 
the north and the booming, urban-centered areas of central and south 
Florida, the atomized one-party system described by V.O. Key in 1949 
was replaced by a competitive and increasingly stable biparty system 
throughout the state. 
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The advance toward two-partyism in Texas was slower and more 
inchoate. The state's dynamic economy and new wealth created by 
industrial and commercial expansion generated powerful conser-
vative forces in politics. Republicans profited from these forces, but 
so did the Democrats. The latter were also strengthened by the potent 
leadership of Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn in national poli-
tics and by effective state leaders such as Price Daniel and John B. 
Connally. While the liberal-conservative factionalism that charac-
terized the Democratic party in the 1930s and 1940s continued after 
mid-century, conservatives won most of the statewide contests. 
Nevertheless, the Republicans made gains, and the liberal policies 
promulgated by the national Democratic party caused many conserva-
tive Democrats to identify with the minority party, including former 
governor Connally in 1973. Republican growth might be accelerated 
if Texas liberals were ever able to bring together Mexican-Americans 
(21 percent of the population in 1980), blacks, organized labor, and 
other dissatisfied elements. Meantime, Texas gave the appearance of 
being a three- rather than a two-party state, with conservative and 
liberal Democrats and Republicans. 
Kentucky and Oklahoma, two other states of the peripheral 
South, were also traditionally Democratic. The Republicans made sig-
nificant gains in Kentucky in the 1940s and 1950s, but their major 
advances in Oklahoma did not come until the 1960s and 1970s. As 
was true throughout the South, politics in both states retained a strong 
Democratic flavor below the state level. Kentucky Democrats tended 
to be moderate and to be more in line with the policies of the national 
party than Democrats in many other southern states. Despite the 
Republican challenge, the Democrats controlled the governorship for 
forty years after 1946, except for the four-year term of Louie B. Nunn. 
Kentucky Republicans were more competitive in Congress, holding 
three of the state's seven seats in the House during the 1980s and 
capturing one of the Senate seats in 1984. In Oklahoma a bipartisan, 
conservative consensus reflected the widespread conviction in the 
state that minimal taxes were essential to economic growth. Though 
less fragmented than in prewar years, the Democratic party remained 
amorphous, and personal rivalries flourished. The rural exodus from 
the counties south of the Canadian River hurt the Democrats, while 
migration from the North and the state's increasing urbanization aided 
the Republicans. Despite the growing two-party competition, observers 
noted an increasing public mood of independence, if not indifference, 
toward both parties. As two historians remark: ''The old armies of 'yel-
low-dog' Democrats and 'rock-ribbed' Republicans have passed. In their 
places are a decisive bloc of voters unattached to either party."30 
Geographically, Arkansas belongs to the peripheral South, but in 
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some respects its politics is more like that of the inner than the outer 
South. The state held on to the poll tax until the very end, and it 
waited until the 1960s to adopt a genuine registration system. Tra-
ditional Democratic loyalties remained strong among whites. Arkan-
sas was also the scene of an obsessive racism orchestrated by Orval 
Faubus that overcame the amorphousness of the Democratic party. 
This was followed by the success of Winthrop Rockefeller's moderate 
Republicanism, which in turn was superseded by the governorship 
of Dale Bumpers and other new-style Democrats. The success of both 
Rockefeller and Bumpers reflected the growing importance of black 
voters in Arkansas politics. Republicans won the governorship again 
in 1980, and the party controlled two of the state's four House seats 
in the early 1980s. The state's old-time sectionalism had become less 
important, party organization on a statewide basis was being at-
tempted, and a two-party politics appeared to be emerging. 
South Carolina seemed to be following a similar path. The state's 
basic conservatism was at least partly offset by the enfranchisement 
of its large black population. The Republicans, given a momentous 
boost by the party switch of Senator Thurmond and the white back-
lash in the 1960s, grew steadily stronger. They made notable gains 
in the urban sector of the upcountry Piedmont. They elected a gov-
ernor in 1974 and again in 1986, and in the early 1980s, the minority 
party controlled half the state's seats in the House of Representatives. 
Meanwhile, however, the Democrats successfully pursued a politics 
of moderation and the cultivation of black-white coalitions. 
Two other deep South states-Georgia and Louisiana-experi-
enced great political turmoil and change but made only limited prog-
ress toward two-party politics. The bifactionalism that characterized 
the dominant Democratic party in both states disappeared after mid-
century, wiped out by the rise of Herman Talmadge in Georgia and 
by the pressure of massive resistance in Louisiana. The politics of race 
preoccupied both states in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Disarray 
among the Democrats, heightened by the civil rights movement and 
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, promoted Republican growth in the 
two states. Both Georgia and Louisiana voted for Goldwater in 1964 
and Wallace in 1968. Nevertheless, following the civil rights era, a 
more moderate Democratic leadership asserted itself in the two com-
monwealths. In Georgia, two scholars have written, the new Demo-
cratic coalition "consists of blacks, courthouse Democrats who have 
learned the benefits of black allegiance to the Democratic party, a 
developing role for organized labor, rural whites with a Democratic 
heritage who remain suspicious of urban Republicans and their coun-
try club image, a few white urban liberals, and the top echelon of the 
business and financial community, who tend to view Georgia Re-
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publicans as somewhat unstable political amateurs."31 Although the 
"ticketing system," in which one faction's candidates for various of-
fices ran on the same ticket, is no longer used in Louisiana, the class 
basis of Longism has not entirely disappeared. The continuation of 
geographical, ethnic, and religious conflicts has no doubt slowed the 
development of a more rational and stable party system in that state. 
In Georgia, on the other hand, the abolition of the county-unit system 
and the effects of legislative reapportionment have led to a new em-
phasis on the popular vote in statewide campaigns and also to domi-
nance of the urban over the rural and small-town areas. 
Mississippi and Alabama, the other states of the deep South, con-
tinued to be the most "southern" commonwealths in the region. In 
the post-World War II period, Mississippi retained its distinction as 
the poorest and most rural state in the Union. It also had the highest 
percentage of blacks. The economic and ideological differences re-
flected in the historic conflict between the hills and the delta became 
less salient after the war, surrendering to the racist politics of Bilbo, 
Eastland, and Barnett. As one analysis suggested in 1972, the nature 
of the division in Mississippi politics changed after 1948. "Basically, 
the new cleavage results from a new direction of the political issues 
of the state. In general, the conservative forces have won the upper 
hand over the neopopulist elements, as a result of the developing 
industrialization and urbanization and the emergence of race as the 
most dominant issue in Mississippi elections."32 The race issue could, 
in fact, explain the most significant developments in the state's tor-
tured political course since World War II: the revolt against the na-
tional Democratic party, the growth of Republicanism, and the effort 
of moderate Democratic leaders to assimilate black voters and poli-
ticians into winning coalitions. While this was happening, Republican 
prospects improved, with presidential victories in 1980 and 1984, the 
capture of a Senate seat in 1978, and control of two of the state's five 
House seats in the 1980s. 
In Alabama the longtime political division between the black belt 
planters and business "big mules," on the one hand, and the northern 
hill country and southeastern Wiregrass, on the other, did not im-
mediately disappear following the war. Liberals such as Senators Hill 
and Sparkman and Governor Folsom headed a New Deal, loyalist 
faction against the conservative States' Righters. But the rise of 
massive resistance eroded these divisions and paved the way for 
the remarkable career of George Wallace, who dominated Alabama 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Wallace's hegemony delayed the de-
velopment of the Republican party in the state as well as the reor-
ganization of the Democratic party along more moderate and 
pluralistic lines. Yet notable changes came even in Alabama. Legis-
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lative reapportionment broke the hold of white conservatives on the 
black belt. The rising tide of black voters began to influence statewide 
campaigns and to elect Negroes to local offices. In the post-civil rights 
era, Wallace himself moderated his racial position and sought the 
support of black Alabamians. And the Republican party gained 
strength, first by winning presidential elections and then by gaining 
a Senate seat and three of the state's seven House seats in 1980. Taking 
advantage of a fierce factional struggle in the Democratic party, the 
Republicans captured the governorship in 1986. 
Although southern politics retained a strong conservative flavor, 
the political scene in the 1980s was almost unbelievably different from 
that of the 1930s. The Solid South had been shattered. Disfranchise-
ment, malapportionment, and the one-party system had largely dis-
appeared. Rural domination of state government had ended, and the 
political leverage of the old county-seat governing class had declined 
drastically. Urban voters, now making up a majority of the electorate, 
had begun to carry much greater weight in election campaigns and 
in policy outcomes. Blacks had become a significant factor in the re-
gion's politics. The Republican party had become respectable and 
competitive. The southern electorate had expanded dramatically, and 
the turnout for elections had risen proportionately. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, state governments throughout the South were modernized 
in an effort to make them more effective in carrying out their enlarged 
governing mission. The situation had also changed in Washington. 
Southern congressional delegations now included a substantial num-
ber of Republicans, and by the mid-1970s southern Democrats had 
yielded their domination of the congressional committee system. 
There appeared to be greater agreement and less friction, in and out 
of Congress, between the southern and nonsouthern wings of the 
Democratic party. But if the old order was passing away, it was not 
clear how fundamental the changes were that ushered in the new 
order. The rules of the political game had changed, the number of 
players had increased and become more diversified, the expectations 
of constituents had risen, and politics seemed to have become more 
responsive to public pressure and public needs. Yet the acquisition 
of power within the political system was limited, a distinct racial 
cleavage characterized electoral politics, particularly in presidential 
contests, and the white middle class was the major beneficiary of the 
new southern politics.33 
Epilogue 
Politics in the South, as in other parts of the United States, reflected 
and helped rationalize economic and social changes in the society. 
For a long time after the Civil War, the southern economy was de-
pressed, underdeveloped, and concentrated along agricultural and 
extractive lines. It was a colonial economy. Political power in such a 
milieu gravitated into the hands of planters and businessmen. New 
credit and land tenure arrangements, as well as the increasingly capi-
talist nature of the agricultural economy, weakened the economic and 
political independence of yeomen and tenant farmers. The southern 
masses suffered from endemic poverty and growing dependency. 
Meanwhile, the controlling voices in rural areas and small commu-
nities throughout the region were those of the county-seat elites. 
These developments contributed to the agrarian uprising of the late 
1880s and the Populist insurgency of the early 1890s, a political up-
heaval that coincided with and was partly responsible for a major 
realignment in the American party system. Whatever their propor-
tional influence, planters, commercial groups, and industrialists as-
sumed a dominant role in Democratic politics and state government 
in the South. By the turn of the century, most black men and perhaps 
a third of the white men had been removed from any part in the 
political process. 
The one-party system was consolidated early in the twentieth 
century. Far-reaching structural changes were put into place: stringent 
voter qualifications to reduce and alter the composition of the elec-
torate, malapportioned legislatures that overrepresented the black 
belts, constitutional limitations on the imposition of taxes, and pro-
visions designed to restrict formal decision making in politics to rou-
tine matters. The result was a politics dominated to a great extent by 
black belt planters, commercial and industrial interests, and the local 
governing class. Even so, the system was flexible enough to allow for 
some redistribution of political power and an expansion of govern-
mental functions. While disfranchisement and the new ballot laws 
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contributed to the widespread deprivation and apathy in southern 
politics, the introduction of primary elections, the growth and diver-
sity of new interest groups, and the reform campaigns of southern 
progressives opened up the political system of the individual states 
and made politicians responsive to a wider array of constituents and 
organizations. The major beneficiaries of this shift were the emerging 
middle-class and professional people in the growing cities and towns. 
These groups were instrumental in the reform movements to make 
state and municipal governments honest, efficient, and capable of 
providing public services. They filled the ranks of numerous civic, 
commercial, and professional organizations. By the 1920s they were 
coming into their own. 
Having become institutionalized in the early 1900s, the one-party 
system dominated the region's political life, gave southern Democrats 
an influential voice in the national councils of their party and in Wash-
ington, and enabled white southerners to safeguard their most prized 
interests, including racial segregation and a large measure of au-
tonomy in the conduct of state and local politics. The administrations 
of two Democratic presidents and the exigencies of two world wars 
brought new challenges and opportunities to southern political lead-
ers, but those developments failed to introduce significant changes 
in the formal structure of southern politics or to alter the one-party 
system appreciably. Nevertheless, the party realignment of the 1930s, 
the enormous popularity of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the creation 
of the New Deal coalition transformed the position of the South in 
the Democratic party and began in various ways to undermine the 
region's traditional politics. However undemocratic and conservative 
their politics may have been, the southern states made some progress 
in their efforts to cope with the realities of modern industrial life. 
The Great Depression and the New Deal marked a decisive turn-
ing point in the economic and political history of the South. The long-
term effects of these events were not always evident at the time. Thus, 
a recent study of North Carolina and the New Deal found that "con-
servative individualism" persisted in that state, along with what 
George B. Tindall has called "the vision of an organic traditional com-
munity with its personal relationships, its class distinctions, its habits 
of deference to the squirearchy."1 But the depression and the New 
Deal brought about massive changes in southern life, including the 
breakdown and transformation of plantation agriculture, the vast mi-
gration off the land, and the disruption of such elements of the social 
order as the "network of dependency relationships" so basic to the 
region's labor system.2 The developments of the 1930s slowly began 
to reorganize the workplace of the industrial South. By the latter part 
of the decade, the New Deal, having helped make the South a national 
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problem, was moving to nationalize it. The war encouraged the in-
tegration of the South into the national economy, bringing the region 
an outpouring of federal expenditures and an infusion of new in-
dustry. Yet those years also confronted southerners with the reality 
of growing federal intrusion and the specter of outside interference 
in their long-established pattern of race relations. Meanwhile, begin-
ning with the New Deal, the South demonstrated a growing fiscal 
dependency on federal disbursements. 3 
In 1948 the pressure of these events and the political sensibility 
of a new national administration precipitated a dramatic break in the 
South's longtime party loyalty. That break marked the beginning of 
a process that disrupted the Solid South, first in presidential elections 
and then more slowly in the electoral politics at lower levels. The 
South's open rebellion against the national Democratic party in 1948, 
its resort to massive resistance in an effort to preserve white unity in 
the face of federally mandated desegregation of the public schools, 
and the guerrilla warfare many southern Democrats waged against 
the liberal leaders and policies of their national party produced a 
period of great turbulence and uncertainty in the region's politics 
during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the deep South. And the 
collapse of massive resistance was followed by a time of painful ac-
commodation for many white southerners and increasing evidence 
of Republican strength in Dixie. A significant feature of this troubled 
landscape was the appearance of a group of new "Whigs," who have 
been described as "southern politicians who numbered economic de-
velopment as their first priority and who looked to the federal gov-
ernment to underwrite the effort."4 These politicians were sensitive 
barometers of the vast economic and social changes that were trans-
forming their region after World War II. 
The metamorphosis of the South in the postwar period-the 
growth of advanced industrial production and modern marketing net-
works, the formation of new capital from internal and external 
sources, the continued out-migration of blacks, the in-migration of 
industrial entrepreneurs, businessmen, and professional people, the 
rapid rise of urban and suburban life, and the heightened attractive-
ness of the southern region in terms of economic opportunity, tour-
ism, and permanent residency-has begun to have important 
consequences for southern politics. This regional transformation is 
related to a larger nationalizing process that is evident in such trends 
as the growing homogeneity of working conditions and consumer 
goods across the country, the development of national "labor mar-
kets" for many skilled trades and professions, and the increasing 
number of state and local government programs that receive funds 
and performance standards from federal agencies. These tendencies 
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have helped make the political system in the various southern states 
more open and accessible, more pluralistic, and more urban centered. 
At the same time, the expansion of the electorate, the increase in voter 
turnout, and the unaccustomed competition between political parties 
have given the politics of the southern states the kind of broad base 
it has not had since the late nineteenth century. In short, the South 
has experienced a political revolution during the last four decades. It 
is not yet clear what structure the South's politics will assume in the 
years ahead. The historian can only surmise that the southern states 
are still in a period of political transition and that a more stable pattern 
of politics will eventually assert itself. 
For all its eccentricities, southern politics has been a national as 
well as a sectional institution. It has been part of a national system, 
and it has served national purposes. At one level the South functioned 
as an economic, ethnocultural, and political antipode for the North. 
The two regions, C. Vann Woodward writes, historically served each 
other as inexhaustible scapegoats in "the old game of regional polem-
ics." "Back and forth the dialogue has gone, sometimes at shrill pitch 
and sometimes in low key, depending on the temper of the times and 
the moods and needs of the participants."5 The South has also played 
an essential part in the American party system and in the realignment 
of parties within the system. Southern Democrats and northern Re-
publicans maintained a sort of symbiotic relationship during the first 
part of the twentieth century; they had reached a modus vivendi on 
the treatment of blacks, and each party was dominant in its own 
sphere. With the coming of the New Deal and the political transfor-
mation of the 1930s, a more active collaboration developed between 
the two regional groups, first in the form of the conservative coalition 
and later in the growth of Republicanism in the South, usually with 
the help of southern Democrats. In a sense, the emergence of a strong 
Republican party in the southern states represents another albeit de-
layed stage in the partisan realignment that began in the 1930s. 
There is a reverse side to the South's experience in national poli-
tics. That is the way in which the pressure of national politics and 
policies has shaped southern politics. One need only cite the far-
reaching decisions of the federal courts since 1944 or the momentous 
effects of the civil rights laws of the 1960s to be convinced of this 
point. Southern politics has also responded to the constraints of the 
national party system. Although the South was able for decades to 
benefit from its majority position in the Democratic party, it was 
forced to make concessions to other regions, as in the 1920s, and 
following the realignment of the 1930s, its role in the party was less-
ened. Ultimately, the Democratic party was no longer widely per-
ceived by white southerners as a dependable bulwark against 
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unwanted intrusion from the outside. By that time, southerners could 
no longer agree upon the South's most vital political interests. The 
disruption of the Solid South began a process of nationalizing voting 
alignments in the region. One scholar has even asserted that George 
Wallace's third-party movement "corresponds not only to a nation-
alizing of southern politics, but a southemizing of national politics."6 
Meanwhile, the gradual development of two-party competition seems 
to have strengthened the discipline of national parties in the South 
and to have enhanced the region's role in national politics. 
After a long life, the Solid South is dead! Born in the divisive and 
unsettled years of the late nineteenth century, it entered upon an 
extended period of political dominance, stability, and vitality. Then, 
as it grew older, the one-party system began to show signs of weak-
ness; it became increasingly anachronistic, crotchety, and vulnerable 
to internal changes and outside pressures. Its final years were crisis-
ridden and unhappy, marked by struggle to the very end. 
Throughout its life, the Solid South was sustained by the region's 
distinctive political culture. The political culture says something about 
the character of political leadership in the South, the stress on per-
sonality in politics, and the role of the demagogue in southern affairs. 
Like so many other ideas and institutions associated with the origins 
of the New South, the culture of southern politics owed a great deal 
to the leadership of the Redeemers, whose rhetoric emphasized such 
values as white superiority and fraternity and community integrity. 
The ideal of the organic community was an important source of the 
conservatism in southern politics-of the southerner's defensiveness, 
suspicion of change, and adherence to traditional values. Other ele-
ments in this complex of political traditions included the heritage of 
social paternalism from the Old South, the personalism that suffused 
the folk culture, the emphasis of southern Protestantism on localism 
and the standards of personal morality, and the mythology of the 
Lost Cause and Reconstruction. These cultural distinctions have not 
entirely disappeared. While the Solid South has passed from the 
scene, many of its essential elements and much of the political culture 
in which it once flourished are still significant determinants of south-
em politics. Ironically, these very elements and this very culture 
played an important role in the death as well as the life of the Solid 
South. 
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Essay 
In considering the sources for a historical study of southern politics in the 
twentieth century, one quickly discovers two things of great importance. The 
first is the abundance and scope of such sources, ranging from a variety of 
primary materials to all manner of scholarly monographs and other secondary 
works. The second compelling aspect of the question is the dynamic character 
of the scholarship, especially during the last quarter-century. Those working 
in this field have asked new questions and emphasized new themes. Their 
contributions reflect more adequate research and stronger analysis than was 
true of earlier scholars. This literature is so extensive, particularly in the form 
of journal articles, that it is almost impossible to read it all. Contributors 
include not only historians but political scientists, sociologists, political jour-
nalists, and other writers. This book leans heavily on the work of these writers. 
Without their contributions this study could not have been written. 
The commentary that follows is not a comprehensive evaluation of 
sources used in the writing of this book. It is intended, instead, to identify 
the major sources on which I have relied, to suggest the nature of the extensive 
monographic literature that bears on modern southern politics, and to com-
ment on the most significant interpretations advanced by scholars and other 
interpreters. No attempt is made to evaluate the vast literature in scholarly 
journals. I hope the essay will introduce readers to the large and impressive 
body of books and monographs devoted to the southern political experience 
during the last hundred years. 
Contemporary Sources 
Although it was impossible for me to undertake a systematic examination 
of manuscript collections for this project, I have used a fairly representative 
group of personal and public papers. Earlier research led me to make a search 
in the various state archives for the letterbooks and official papers of southern 
governors during the progressive era. Among other manuscript collections 
consulted for this work were those of the following individuals: 
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Three extensive interviewing projects have contributed to my under-
standing of recent southern politics. The first of these are the transcripts of 
over 500 interviews conducted in 1947 and 1948 by Alexander Heard and 
Donald S. Strong for V.O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949). 
These transcripts are located in the Vanderbilt University Library. Another 
set of interviews was carried out during the years 1973-75 by Jack Bass and 
Walter DeVries for their book, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social 
Change and Political Consequence since 1945 (1976). The transcripts of these in-
terviews, numbering more than 300, are in the Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina. The third group is made up of interviews and 
observations made in the late 1950s and early 1960s by the journalist Benjamin 
Muse, who traveled through the South for the Southern Regional Council's 
Southern Leadership Project. This collection is housed in the Robert W. Wood-
ruff Library of the Atlanta University Center. A valuable published collection 
of interviews can be found in Ralph J. Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro 
in the Age of FDR, ed. Dewey W. Grantham (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1973). In preparing this working paper for Gunnar Myrdal's An American 
Dilemma, Bunche drew upon more than 500 interviews conducted by his 
assistants with black and white southerners in 1939 and 1940. 
A number of southern states, including Kentucky and North Carolina, 
attempt to publish the public addresses and papers of their governors as soon 
as possible after they leave office. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961-), begin-
ning with the administration of Herbert Hoover but excluding that of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, provide a source of considerable importance for the South in 
national politics. For other examples of useful published documents, see El-
ting E. Morison et al., eds., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1951-54); Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of 
Colonel House, 4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926-28); Arthur S. Link 
and associates, eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vols. 1-58 (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1966-88); Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York: Random House, 
1938-50); Aubrey Lee Brooks and Hugh Talmage Lefler, eds., The Papers of 
Walter Clark, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1948-50); 
and Robert C. Cotner, ed., Addresses and State Papers of James Stephen Hogg 
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1951). 
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Several regional and national newspapers were consulted for this study, 
but no effort was made to read the voluminous files of these journals in a 
systematic fashion. The author has relied more heavily on a number of spe-
cialized journals and news magazines, including the Southern School News, 
published by the Southern Education Reporting Service; South Today and 
Southern Changes, published by the Southern Regional Council; and Southern 
Exposure, published by the Institute for Southern Studies. 
Presidential election returns can be found in W. Dean Burnham, ed., 
Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1955); 
Edgar E. Robinson, ed., The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932 (Stanford: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1934); and Richard M. Scammon, comp., America at the Polls: A 
Handbook of American Presidential Statistics, 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1965). See also Richard M. Scammon, comp., America at the 
Polls: A Handbook of Contemporary American Statistics, 17 vols. (Washington, 
D.C.: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1956-87), which extends through the 
elections of 1986. Paul T. David, Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 
(Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1972), is a useful statistical study of 
the relative strength of the political parties in terms of presidential, congres-
sional, and gubernatorial returns. Primary election returns are provided by 
Alexander Heard and DonaldS. Strong, eds., Southern Primaries and Elections, 
1920-1949 (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1950); Richard M. Scam-
mon, comp., Southern Primaries '58 (Washington, D.C.: Governmental Affairs 
Institute, 1959); and Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, eds., Southern 
Elections: County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
Univ. Press, 1978). Election statistics for the individual states are available in 
their manuals and registers and in a variety of special publications, among 
which are Annie M. Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, comps., Florida Votes, 
1920-1962 (Tallahassee: Institute of Governmental Research, Florida State 
Univ., 1963); F. Glenn Abney, ed., Mississippi Election Statistics, 1900-1967 
(University, Miss.: Bureau of Governmental Research, Univ. of Mississippi, 
1968); Donald R. Matthews et al., comps., North Carolina Votes: General Election 
Returns by County . .. 1868-1960 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 
1962); Joe C. Carr and Shirley Hassler, eds., Fifty Years of Tennessee Elections, 
1916-1966 (Nashville: State Government, n.d.); and Ralph Eisenberg, ed., 
Virginia Votes, 1924-1968 (Charlottesville: Governmental and Administrative 
Research Division, Univ. of Virginia, 1971). 
General Studies 
Students of southern politics since the end of Reconstruction can tum to 
three preeminent general works as a point of departure: C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
1951); George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1967); and V.O. Key, Jr., with the assis-
tance of Alexander Heard, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: 
Knopf, 1949). The first two volumes chart the course of southern politics 
within the broad frame of the region's social and cultural development. The 
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third volume provides an illuminating analysis of contemporary southern 
politics against the backdrop of its historical experience. An ambitious new 
study by Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), throws light on the South's changing electorate 
and contrasts the era of classic one-party politics (1920-49) with the emergence 
of the new southern politics (1950-85). Three stimulating volumes that deal 
more broadly with the southern experience are W.J. Cash, The Mind of the 
South (New York: Knopf, 1941); Frank E. Vandiver, ed., The Idea of the South: 
Pursuit of a Central Theme (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964); and C. Vann 
Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, rev. ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State Univ. Press, 1968). John B. Boles and Evelyn Thomas Nolen, eds., In-
terpreting Southern History: Historiographical Essays in Honor of Sanford W. Hig-
ginbotham (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1987), is a valuable 
source for all serious students of southern history. 
Coverage of the period since Key wrote in 1949 is provided by William 
C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
Univ. Press, 1972); Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics 
and the Second Reconstruction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975); 
Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social 
Change and Political Consequence since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and 
Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1984). Monroe Billington's brief survey, Southern Politics since the Civil War 
(Malabar, Fla.: R.E. Krieger, 1984), is helpful in understanding the broad 
sweep of the region's political affairs in the late nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries. 
Several short interpretive works deal broadly with southern politics since 
the late nineteenth century. These include Jasper Berry Shannon, Toward a 
New Politics in the South (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1949); T. Harry 
Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Athens: University of Geor-
gia Press, 1961); Dewey W. Grantham, The Democratic South (Athens: Univ. 
of Georgia Press, 1963); and George Brown Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid 
South (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1972). Numan V. Bartley's essay, "The 
South and Sectionalism in American Politics," Journal of Politics 38 (Aug. 1976): 
239-57, offers a valuable overview. An important and often neglected aspect 
of regional politics is examined in Tod A. Baker, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence 
W. Moreland, eds., Religion and Politics in the South: Mass and Elite Perspectives 
(New York: Praeger, 1983). In this connection see also Samuel S. Hill, Jr., 
ed., Religion and the Solid South (Nashville: Abington, 1972). 
For the South's involvement in the evolution of national party systems, 
consult William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., The Ameri-
can Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1967); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of 
American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., with 
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of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
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Only a few southern states are the subjects of comprehensive political 
histories during the period covered by this book. Among the best of these 
are Allen W. Moger, Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925 (Charlottesville: 
Univ. Press of Virginia, 1968); Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Loui-
siana, rev. ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1971); James R. 
Scales and Danney Goble, Oklahoma Politics: A History (Norman: Univ. of 
Oklahoma Press, 1982); Numan V. Bartley, The Creation of Modern Georgia 
(Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1983); and Bennett H. Wall, ed., Louisiana: 
A History (Arlington Heights, lll.: Forum Press, 1984). Less satisfactory but 
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and Boyce A Drummond, Jr., "Arkansas Politics: A Study of a One-Party 
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and Richard K. Scher, Florida's Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century 
(Tallahassee: Univ. Presses of Florida, 1980); Timothy P. Donovan and Willard 
B. Gatewood, Jr., eds., The Governors of Arkansas: Essays in Political Biography 
(Fayetteville: Univ. of Arkansas Press, 1981); Edward Younger and James Tice 
Moore, eds., The Governors of Virginia, 1860-1978 (Charlottesville: Univ. Press 
of Virginia, 1982); and Lowell H. Harrison, ed., Kentucky's Governors, 1792-
1985 (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1985). Coleman E. Ransone, Jr., 
The Office of Governor in the South (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 
1951), and Fred Gantt, Jr., The Chief Executive in Texas: A Study in Gubernatorial 
Leadership (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1964), are also helpful. 
More restricted studies that throw light on state politics or that deal with 
significant features of southern politics include Paul Casdorph, A History of 
the Republican Party in Texas, 1865-1965 (Austin: Pemberton Press, 1965); Peter 
D. Klingman, Neither Dies Nor Surrenders: A History of the Republican Party in 
Florida, 1867-1970 (Gainesville: Univ. Presses of Florida, 1984); Andrew Buni, 
The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965 (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Vir-
ginia, 1967); Idus A Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South 
Carolina from 1895 to 1968 (Columbia: Univ of South Carolina Press, 1973); 
James R. Soukup, Clifton McCleskey, and Harry Holloway, Party and Factional 
Division in Texas (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1964); Jack D. Fleer, North 
Carolina Politics: An Introduction (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 
1968); Samuel A Kirkpatrick, David R. Morgan, and Thomas G. Kielhorn, 
The Oklahoma Voter: Politics, Elections and Parties in the Sooner State (Norman: 
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1977); and James Bolner, ed., Louisiana Politics: 
Festival in a Labyrinth (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1982). 
Finally, one additional source of central importance should be mentioned: 
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the large periodical literature dealing with southern politics in the twentieth 
century. Scholarly articles and essays on southern political topics have mush-
roomed during the last quarter-century, appearing in a variety of historical 
journals, political science quarterlies, and other social science publications. 
One has only to examine the Journal of Southern History's annual bibliography 
of periodical articles to discover how extensive this scholarship is. Although 
essays and articles are cited in this book only to provide the source of direct 
quotations, the author is deeply indebted to the hundreds of contributors 
responsible for this impressive body of scholarly writings. 
Forging the Solid South 
Woodward's Origins of the New South, previously cited, is indispensable 
for an understanding of the post-Reconstruction decades in which the Solid 
South gradually took shape. Richard· H. Abbott, The Republican Party and the 
South, 1855-1877: The First Southern Strategy (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Caro-
lina Press, 1986), and Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 
1869-1879 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1984), provide useful 
background on the political situation in the South following Reconstruction. 
Several state studies are valuable sources for southern politics in the late 
nineteenth century. The best of these studies are William J. Cooper, The 
Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 1968); William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana 
Politics, 1877-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1969); Jack P. 
Maddex, Jr., The Virginia Conservatives, 1867-1879: A Study in Reconstruction 
Politics (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1970); Alwyn Barr, Re-
construction to Reform: Texas Politics, 1876-1906 (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 
1971); Roger L. Hart, Redeemers, Bourbons, & Populists, 1870-1896 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1975); and Edward C. Williamson, Florida 
Politics in the Gilded Age, 1877-1893 (Gainesville: Univ. Presses of Florida, 
1976). Moger's Virginia, Bartley's The Creation of Modern Georgia, and Wall's 
Louisiana, all mentioned above, are also important in this connection. Political 
affairs in a major southern city are discussed by Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans 
in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 1880-1896 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State Univ. Press, 1969). 
For good illustrations of Bourbon Democracy, see Allen Johnston Going, 
Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874-1890 (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama 
Press, 1951), and Judson Clements Ward, Jr., "Georgia under the Bourbon 
Democracy, 1872-1890" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of North Carolina, 1947). Joseph 
H. Parks, Joseph E. Brown of Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
1977), is an informative biography of an important Bourbon leader. George 
Brown Tindall, The Persistent Tradition in New South Politics (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1975), includes a thoughtful characterization of 
the Redeemers. Paul M. Gaston's The New South Creed: A Study in Mythmaking 
(New York: Knopf, 1970) illuminates the social thought of the region's domi-
nant leaders in the 1880s and 1890s. The theme of intersectional reconciliation 
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is sympathetically explored by Paul H. Buck in The Road to Reunion, 1865-
1900 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), while the South's fear of "northernization" 
is considered by Richard N. Current in Northernizing the South (Athens: Univ. 
of Georgia Press, 1983). The mythology of the Lost Cause is treated in Charles 
Reagan Wilson's fine book, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 
1865-1920 (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1980). The influence of southern 
oratory in this period is suggested in WaldoW. Braden, ed., Oratory in the 
New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1979). Carl V. Harris, 
"Right Fork or Left Fork? The Section-Party Alignments of Southern Demo-
crats in Congress, 1873-1897," Journal of Southern History 42 (Nov. 1976): 471-
506, and Harold D. Woodman, "Sequel to Slavery: The New History Views 
the Postbellum South," ibid. 43 (Nov. 1977): 523-54, are challenging and 
important essays. 
The shifting Republican approach to the "southern question" following 
Reconstruction is described by Vincent P. DeSantis, Republicans Face the South-
ern Question-The New Departure Years, 1877-1897 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 1959), and Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: North-
ern Republicans & the Southern Negro, 1877-1893 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. 
Press, 1962). The nature of the Republican party within the South is shown 
in Olive Hall Shadgett, The Republican Party in Georgia: From Reconstruction 
through 1900 (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1964); Gordon B. McKinney, 
Southern Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: Politics and the Appalachian Com-
munity (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1978); and the previously 
cited studies of Republicanism in Texas by Casdorph and in Florida by Kling-
man. Lawrence Grossman, The Democratic Party and the Negro: Northern and 
National Politics, 1868-92 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1976), is a notable 
study of the role of the Democratic party in the North in dealing with the 
race question. 
Opposition to the Bourbon Democrats in Virginia is explored by two older 
studies: Charles Chilton Pearson, The Readjuster Movement in Virginia (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1917), and Nelson Morehouse Blake, William Mahone 
of Virginia: Soldier and Political Insurgent (Richmond: Garret and Massie, 1935). 
The sources of internal dissension-and of the agrarian revolt-in other states 
are studied by Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks: Mississippi Politics, 
1876-1925 (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1951); Steven Hahn, The Roots 
of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Up-
country, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983); Charles L. Flynn, 
Jr., White Land, Black Labor: Caste and Class in Late Nineteenth-Century Georgia 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1983); and Paul D. Escott, Many 
Excellent People: Power and Privilege in North Carolina, 1850-1900 (Chapel Hill: 
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1985). Another side of the postwar agricultural 
economy is described in Jay R. Mandie, The Roots of Black Poverty: The Southern 
Plantation Economy after the Civil War (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1978). Jona-
than M. Wiener, in Social Origins of the New South: Alabama, 1860-1885 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1978), and Dwight B. Billings, Jr., in 
Planters and the Making of a "New South": Class, Politics, and Development in 
North Carolina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1979), 
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seek to explain the process of modernization and argue that the upper classes 
headed by the old landed elite imposed an industrial society on Alabama and 
North Carolina. For a broader perspective, see Gavin Wright, Old South, New 
South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War (New York: Basic 
Books, 1986). 
Populism, a topic discussed by Woodward and several other authors 
mentioned above, has been investigated with renewed energy in recent years. 
This scholarly inquiry has produced two significant general studies: Robert 
C. McMath, Jr., Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers' Alliance 
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1975), and Lawrence Goodwyn, 
Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1976). The ideas of southern Populists are revealingly analyzed in Bruce 
Palmer, "Man Over Money": The Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism 
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980). Michael Schwartz, Radical 
Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 
1880-1890 (New York: Academic Press, 1976), is more controversial but is 
useful in pointing out the class struggle within the Farmers' Alliance. Other 
studies of farm politics and populism include Sheldon Hackney, Populism 
to Progressivism in Alabama (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969); William 
Warren Rogers, The One-Callused Rebellion: Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970); Barton C. Shaw, The Wool-
Hat Boys: Georgia's Populist Party (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
1984); Donna A. Barnes, Farmers in Rebellion: The Rise and Fall of the Southern 
Farmers Alliance and People's Party in Texas (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1984); 
Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 (Berkeley: Univ. 
of California Press, 1960); Robert F. Durden, The Climax of Populism: The Election 
of 1896 (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1965); and Gerald H. Gaither, 
Blacks and the Populist Revolt: Ballots and Bigotry in the "New South" (University, 
Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1977). Carl N. Degler's The Other South: Southern 
Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pro-
vides a useful context for the evaluation of southern political dissent. 
Helpful biographical studies include C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: 
Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan, 1938); Stuart Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette 
Polk: Agrarian Crusader (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949); 
Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian (Baton Rouge: Loui-
siana State Univ. Press, 1944); Robert C. Cotner, James Stephen Hogg: A Bi-
ography (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1959); Daniel Merritt Robison, Bob Taylor 
and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennessee (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 
1935); and Sam Hanna Acheson, Joe Bailey: The Last Democrat (New York: 
Macmillan, 1932). 
One aspect of the political upheaval of the 1890s was the fusion of Popu-
lists and Republicans in North Carolina. The trials and tribulations of that 
turbulent movement are described in Helen G. Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion 
Politics in North Carolina, 1894-1901 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1951); Jeffrey J. Crow and Robert F. Durden, Maverick Republican in the 
Old North State: A Political Biography of DanielL. Russell (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State Univ. Press, 1977); Frederick A. Bode, Protestantism and the New South: 
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North Carolina Baptists and Methodists in Political Crisis, 1894-1903 (Charlottes-
ville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1975); and H. Leon Prather, Sr., We Have Taken 
a City: Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898 (Rutherford, N.J.: Farleigh 
Dickinson Univ. Press, 1984). Broader aspects of race and politics are consid-
ered in Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill: 
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947); George B. Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 
1877-1900 (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1952); Charles E. Wynes, 
Race Relations in Virginia, 1870-1902 (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 
1961); Lawrence D. Rice, The Negro in Texas, 1874-1900 (Baton Rouge: Loui-
siana State Univ. Press, 1971); and Joseph H. Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim 
Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880's (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 
1976). Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-1901: The Black 
Second (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1981), focuses on a center 
of black political strength in the post-Reconstruction period. 
Negro disfranchisement is analyzed by J. Morgan Kousser in The Shaping 
of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party 
South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974), a comprehensive and 
critical reevaluation of antisuffrage campaigns and legislation. Several older 
works remain useful: Ralph Clipman McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1901-1902 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928); Paul Lewinson, 
Race, Class, & Party: A History of Negro Suffrage and White Politics in the South 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1932); William Alexander Mabry, Studies in 
the Disfranchisement of the Negro in the South (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1938); 
and Malcolm Cook McMillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-
1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro, and Sectionalism (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 1955). For a "reform" movement that often restricted the 
suffrage, in the South and in other regions, see L.E. Fredman, The Australian 
Ballot: The Story of an American Reform (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. 
Press, 1968), which contains a detailed treatment of Louisiana. 
The political and social milieu in which disfranchisement and racial pro-
scription were carried out is recreated in several illuminating volumes: Ray-
ford W. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877-1901 
(New York: Dial Press, 1954); August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-
1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor: Univ. of 
Michigan Press, 1963); Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black-White Re-
lations in the American South since Emancipation (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1984); George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate 
on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971); John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of 
Segregation in South Africa and the American South (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1982); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3d rev. ed. 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974); Howard W. Rabinowitz, Race Relations 
in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); Idus A. 
Newby, Jim Craw's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought in America, 1900-1930 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1965); and James M. McPherson, The 
Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the NAACP (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1975). 
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The One-Party System 
The best general accounts of southern politics in the early years of the 
twentieth century, when the one-party system became firmly established, are 
Woodward's Origins of the New South and Tindall's The Emergence of the New 
South. Jack Temple Kirby's lively volume, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and 
Reform in the Progressive South (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), concentrates 
on the interaction of the race issue with reform in the region. For two other 
general studies, see Hugh C. Bailey, Liberalism in the New South: Southern Social 
Reformers and the Progressive Movement (Coral Gables, Fla.: Univ. of Miami 
Press, 1969), and Dewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconcilia-
tion of Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1983). James 
R. Green, Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest, 1895-1943 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1978), offers a revealing perspec-
tive for an examination of progressivism in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas. For a penetrating treatment of social reform ideas in the South at 
the tum of the century, see Bruce Clayton, The Savage Ideal: Intolerance and 
Intellectual Leadership in the South, 1890-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1972). One of the region's social critics and reformers is treated in a model 
biography by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Walter Hines Page: The Southerner as 
American, 1855-1918 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1977). 
Among the most impressive state studies of reform politics in the early 
twentieth-century South are Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks, and Hackney, 
Populism to Progressivism in Alabama, both cited earlier; Raymond H. Pulley, 
Old Virginia Restored: An Interpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1870-1930 
(Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1968); and Danney Goble, Progressive 
Oklahoma: The Making of a New Kind of State (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma 
Press, 1980). Seth Shepard McKay, Texas Politics, 1906-1944, With Special Ref-
erence to the German Counties (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1952), is also useful. 
Lewis L. Gould's Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson 
Era (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1973) provides a comprehensive treatment 
of reform politics in that state during the latter part of the progressive era. 
An informative unpublished study of another state is Joseph Flake Steelman's 
"The Progressive Era in North Carolina, 1884-1917" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of 
North Carolina, 1955). The conditions and activities of blacks in an era of 
racial segregation and political demagoguery are examined in John Dittmer, 
Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 
1977); Lester C. Lamon, Black Tennesseans, 1900-1930 (Knoxville: Univ. of 
Tennessee Press, 1977); and the previously cited books by Buni and Newby. 
The best introduction to the party mechanisms and procedures that be-
came characteristic of the Solid South are Key's Southern Politics in State and 
Nation and Kousser's The Shaping of Southern Politics, both referred to above. 
More specialized studies include Cortez A.M. Ewing, Primary Elections in the 
South: A Study in Uniparty Politics (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1953); 
Frederic D. Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama 
Press, 1958); L.M. Holland, The Direct Primary in Georgia (Urbana: Univ. of 
lllinois Press, 1949); Darlene Clark Hine, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the 
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White Primary in Texas (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1979); Larry Sabato, The 
Democratic Party Primary in Virginia: Tantamount to Election No Longer (Char-
lottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1977); and Allen W. Jones, "A History of 
the Direct Primary in Alabama, 1840-1903" (Ph.D. diss., University of Ala-
bama, 1964). 
Important political issues in the early twentieth-century South are ana-
lyzed in James F. Doster, Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1875-1914 (University, 
Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1957); Paul E. Isaac, Prohibition and Politics: 
Turbulent Decades in Tennessee, 1885-1920 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 
1965); C. C. Pearson and J. Edwin Hendricks, Liquor and Anti-Liquor in Virginia, 
1619-1919 (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1967); Jimmie Lewis Franklin, Born 
Sober: Prohibition in Oklahoma, 1907-1959 (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 
1971); James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-
1920 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963); Mark T. Carleton, Politics and 
Punishment: A History of the Louisiana State Penal System (Baton Rouge: Loui-
siana State Univ. Press, 1971); Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in 
the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1972); Elizabeth H. Da-
vidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States (Chapel Hill: Univ. 
of North Carolina Press, 1939); Louis R. Harlan, Separate and Unequal: Public 
School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915 (Chapel 
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1958); and Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo 
Frank Case (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1968). Woman suffrage cam-
paigns in the South have been studied intensively by A. Elizabeth Taylor. 
She is the author of The Woman Suffrage Movement in Tennessee (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1957), and a series of valuable articles on other southern 
states. In this connection, see also Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1965), and 
Paul E. Fuller, Laura Clay and the Woman's Rights Movement (Lexington: Univ. 
Press of Kentucky, 1975). 
A good brief survey of the urban political scene in the early twentieth-
century South is contained in Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, 
eds., The City in Southern History: The Growth of Urban Civilization in the South 
(Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977). Bradley Robert Rice, Progres-
sive Cities: The Commission Government Movement in America, 1901-1920 (Austin: 
Univ. of Texas Press, 1977), is a key study of structural reform in municipal 
government in the South and other parts of the country. Carl V. Harris's 
Political Power in Birmingham, 1871-1921 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 
1977) is a pioneering analysis of the influence wielded by economic and social 
interest groups. Urban politics and reform are considered in George M. Reyn-
olds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926 (London: P.S. King and Son, 
1936); William D. Miller, Memphis during the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (Mem-
phis: Memphis State Univ. Press, 1957), and idem, Mr. Crump of Memphis 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1964); James R. McGovern, The 
Emergence of a City in the Modern South: Pensacola, 1900-1945 (Pensacola: n.p., 
1976); Evan Anders, Boss Rule in South Texas: The Progressive Era (Austin: Univ. 
of Texas Press, 1982); Don H. Doyle, Nashville in the New South, 1880-1930 
(Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1985), and idem, Nashville since the 1920s 
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(Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1985); and Christopher Silver, Twentieth-
Century Richmond: Planning, Politics, and Race (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee 
Press, 1984). 
Scholarly studies of political leadership in the southern states during this 
period constitute an indispensable source for the historian of the region's 
politics. See, for example, William E. Larsen, Montague of Virginia: The Making 
of a Southern Progressive (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1965); Jack 
Temple Kirby, Westmoreland Davis: Virginia Planter-Politician, 1859-1942 (Char-
lottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1968); Henry C. Ferrell, Jr., Claude A. Swan-
son of Virginia: A Political Biography (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1985); 
Oliver H. Orr, Jr., Charles Brantley Aycock (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1961); Joseph L. Morrison, Josephus Daniels Says ... :An Editor's Political 
Odyssey from Byran to Wilson and F.D.R., 1894-1913 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of 
North Carolina Press, 1962); Robert Milton Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and 
the Progressive Movement in South Carolina (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina 
Press, 1974); Lewis Pinckney Jones, Stormy Petrel: N.G. Gonzales and His State 
(Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1973); Dewey W. Grantham, Hoke 
Smith and the Politics of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. 
Press, 1958); Samuel Proctor, Napoleon Bonaparte Broward: Florida's Fighting 
Democrat (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1950); Wayne Flynt, Duncan 
Upshaw Fletcher: Dixie's Reluctant Progressive (Tallahassee: Florida State Univ. 
Press, 1971), and idem, Cracker Messiah: Governor Sidney J. Catts of Florida (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1977); William F. Holmes, The White Chief: 
James Kimble Vardaman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970); Ray-
mond Arsenault, The Wild Ass of the Ozarks: Jeff Davis and the Social Bases of 
Southern Politics (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1984); Rupert N. Rich-
ardson, Colonel Edward M. House: The Texas Years, 1858-1912 (Abilene, Tex.: 
Hardin-Simmons Univ. Press, 1964); Edward Everett Dale and James D. Mor-
rison, Pioneer Judge: The Life of Robert Lee Williams (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch 
Press, 1958); and Keith L. Bryant, Jr., Alfalfa Bill Murray (Norman: Univ. of 
Oklahoma Press, 1968). 
In the National Arena 
Although there is as yet no good book on the South's participation and 
influence in early twentieth-century national politics, some light is thrown 
on the subject by Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of 
Controversy: Episodes of the White House Years (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
Univ. Press, 1970); John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow 
Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983); and 
Anne Firor Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," Journal 
of Southern History 29 (Feb. 1963): 53-70. C. Vann Woodward, American Coun-
terpoint: Slavery and Race in the North-South Dialogue (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1971), provides some essential background. The movement in the South to 
nominate and elect Woodrow Wilson as president has been described in im-
pressive detail by ArthurS. Link in Wilson: The Road to the White House (Prince-
ton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1947), and idem, The Higher Realism of Woodrow 
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Wilson and Other Essays (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1971). Also see 
Paul D. Casdorph, Republicans, Negroes, and Progressives in the South, 1912-
1916 (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1981). Tindall's The Emergence 
of the New South contains an authoritative treatment of the interrelationship 
between the South and the Wilson administration. That relationship is also 
clarified in Link's multivolume biography of Wilson, which carries the story 
to American entrance into the war in 1917. Aspects of the South's role in 
Wilson's New Freedom are described in John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the 
Wilson Era (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), and John J. Broesamle, William 
Gibbs McAdoo: A Passion for Change, 1863-1917 (Port Washington, N.Y.: Ken-
nikat Press, 1973). Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, cited earlier, in-
cludes two valuable chapters on the New Freedom and southern agriculture. 
The role of the southern congressional delegations during the Wilson 
years is given some attention in the works by Link and Tindall. A number 
of biographies explore this topic in greater detail, including George Coleman 
Osborn, John Sharp Williams: Planter-Statesman of the Deep South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1943); Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman: 
South Carolinian (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1944); Monroe 
Billington, Thomas P. Gore: The Blind Senator from Oklahoma (Lawrence: Univ. 
of Kansas Press, 1967); Evans C. Johnson, Oscar W. Underwood: A Political 
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980); and the studies 
of Duncan U. Fletcher, Hoke Smith, Claude A. Swanson, and James K. Varda-
man mentioned above. The contributions of southern congressmen to the 
demands of the war are analyzed in two impressive articles by Richard L. 
Watson, Jr.: "A Testing Time for Southern Congressional Leadership: The 
War Crisis of 1917-1918," Journal of Southern History 44 (Feb. 1978): 3-40, and 
"Principle, Party, and Constituency: The North Carolina Congressional Dele-
gation, 1917-1919," North Carolina Historical Review 56 (July 1979): 298-323. 
The broader congressional context is provided by Seward W. Livermore, Poli-
tics Is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916-1918 (Middletown: 
Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1966). Southern involvement in the struggle over one 
important national issue is revealed in David Morgan, Suffragists and Demo-
crats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America (East Lansing: Michigan State 
Univ. Press, 1972). The reaction of a North Carolina congressional leader to 
the difficult problems of American neutrality is examined in Alex Mathews 
Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937). 
The nature of the South's powerful influence in Congress in this period and 
afterward is made clear by David M. Potter in The South and the Concurrent 
Majority (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1972). See also Cortez 
A.M. Ewing, Congressional Elections, 1896-1944: The Sectional Basis of Political 
Democracy in the House of Representatives (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 
1947). 
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